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“ECONOMIC” MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES: EMERGENCIES 
(REAL AND ALLEGED) AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 
Giuseppe Cataldi* 
 
1. Because of the economic crisis and widespread political instability 
that exists throughout the African continent and that became more acute 
because of the ‘Arab Springs’, the departure of migrants seeking a better 
life in Europe has become a constant over the past few years. However, 
as we are well aware, the right of each human being to migrate is not 
matched by an equal duty on the part of the country of destination to 
welcome such migrants.1 
Thus the massive phenomenon of unauthorized migrations, in respect 
of which we can make a general distinction between forced migration, 
determined by the need to escape political persecutions or contingent 
events (war, revolutions, environmental disasters) and migrations for 
economic reasons, the result of widespread and endemic poverty.2 
The transit of these migrants through the Mediterranean is dramatic, 
for although migration by sea is a minority percentage of the whole it 
involves serious risks to human life because of the means of 
transportation used. It is by now a known fact that transnational criminal 
organizations control and profit from the entire chain of migratory 
movements, from initial departures, often from sub-Saharan countries, 
to transit across the desert, to detention in ‘clearing houses’ along the 
Southern shores of the Mediterranean, to embarkation on board rafts or, 
in some cases, ‘mother-ships’ from which migrants are then transferred 
to small dilapidated boats directed toward European coasts, up to the 
moment of the ‘assistance’ provided when, once they have reached land, 
they need to reach their chosen destination. The ‘corridors’ most 
commonly travelled by these ships are: the Channel of Sicily, the Ionian 
Sea, the Straits of Gibraltar. The Mediterranean is therefore the 
principal natural ‘wall’ obstructing migration. To this we must add the 
walls that the governments of several European nations have recently 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* Chair of Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence on Migrants’ Rights in the 
Mediterranean, University of Naples “L’Orientale”.	  
1 On the ‘Asymmetrical Right to Emigrate’ see T. Scovazzi, “Human Rights and 
Immigration at Sea”, in R. Rubio-Marin (ed.), Human Rights and Immigration, Oxford, 
2014, p. 212 ff. 
2 On the different meanings of ‘irregular migrant’ see S. Trevisanut, Immigrazione 
irregolare via mare. Diritto internazionale e diritto dell’Unione europea, Naples, 2012, 
p. 1 ff.  
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constructed, following the ‘collapse’ of Syria, to block the use of a ‘land 
route’ through Turkey, Greece, Macedonia, Serbia, Hungary, Croatia. 
How do we handle this phenomenon? The national and supranational 
legal tools currently available are inadequate and often obsolete. We 
know, for example, that responding to ‘emergency’ situations (real or 
alleged) is the guiding principle of the Italian policy on immigration. 
This is the policy implemented since 1989, when the s.c. Martelli law 
was approved, up to the present, to deal with the ‘North Africa 
emergency’, subsequent to the ‘Balkan emergency’, the ‘terrorism 
emergency’ and the ‘nomad emergency’. The intervention of the 
European Union has also been invoked in responding to these 
emergencies, but because of the contrast that exists among its member 
States it continues to provide evidence of its immobility when faced 
with the growing number of migratory flows through the Mediterranean 
and the increasing number of tragedies at sea. The challenge, for nations 
of the Northern shore and especially for the European Union now that it has 
decided to implement a common immigration policy, should be that of not 
denying its founding principles, and implementing the dictates of the Treaty 
of Lisbon and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. It follows that 
instead of building ‘walls’ (material and otherwise), we should be 
reconciling the humanitarian aspects, always a priority, with the need to 
control borders and the prevention and repression of crime, moving away 
from the logic of emergency. This because the true emergency is the 
‘South-South’ emergency, with, for example, almost four million Syrian 
refugees in Lebanon and Jordan, a territory significantly smaller than that of 
the 28 EU Member States. It is essential that we first act on the causes that 
are forcing migrants to leave. Secondly, any decision regarding the 
management of migratory flows cannot deny the imperatives of ‘solidarity’ 
and respect of human rights. Finally, cooperation among States is 
indispensable if we are to prevent and suppress crimes connected to the 
traffic of migrants, managed by transnational criminal organizations.  
On a strictly humanitarian level, the most significant example of 
intervention is operation Mare Nostrum, inaugurated by Italy following 
the tragedy that took place off the coast of Lampedusa on October 3, 
2013, an incident that caused over 350 deaths. This was a strictly 
national operation that lasted until the end of 2014 and was wholly 
compliant with the principles of the European Union. Equipment and 
men from various administrations, spread throughout a vast area of the 
Mediterranean (up to the Libyan coast) were employed, executing a 
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truly enormous number of operations and saving a great number of 
lives. Unfortunately, the high cost of this operation, and the criticism 
from numerous partners of the Union led to its conclusion. The principal 
criticism from domestic political oppositions and European 
governments (especially Spain and Greece) consisted in an alleged 
incentive to departures, known as a ‘calling effect’, given the likely 
possibility of being intercepted in a very vast area, ‘saved’ by Italian 
coast guard cutters and accompanied to ports of the peninsula. The 
validity of these claims was soon proven wrong in light of the tragic 
events during the months following the end of operation Mare 
Nostrum.3 The incentive to departure by sea, and this is proven by the 
numbers and tragedies of the early months of 2015, is determined solely 
by the socio-political conditions of the countries of origin and transit, in 
addition to such contingent initiatives as the construction of ‘walls’ of 
containment along the frontiers of Bulgaria and Hungary, rejection by 
rather ‘energetic’ means by Greece and Spain (as pointed out by several 
humanitarian organizations) and the restrictive policies in granting visas 
recently adopted by many countries of Northern Europe. 
Operation Mare Nostrum was replaced by operation Triton, which 
has very different characteristics. It is first of all an operation that, 
though taking place in maritime spaces close to Italian coasts (within a 
30 mile limit), is managed and financed by the European Union, in 
particular with the involvement of the Frontex Agency.4 Secondly, the 
primary purpose of this operation is surveillance of the frontiers, bearing 
in mind, as stated by its Executive Director, the need to safeguard 
human life at sea.5 It follows that, presumably (and as partly already 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Departures continue without interruption, as do the tragedies at sea such as the 
disaster of 8 February 2015 when 29 persons died of hypothermia in spite of rescue 
efforts (see La Repubblica, 10 February 2015, interview with the Mayor of Lampedusa 
titled: “Tragic proof of the ineffectiveness of Triton, under Mare Nostrum they arrived 
alive”), up to the carnage of 18 April when the number of dead were estimated to be 
between 700 and 900.  
4 Frontex (complete name: “European Agency to Coordinate Cooperation along the 
External Borders of Member States of the European Union.”), is an agency of the 
European Union, headquartered in Warsaw.  It is tasked with coordinating border patrols 
along air, maritime and land borders of all member states of the Union and 
implementing agreements with nations bordering member states of the EU for 
readmission of migrants from non-EU countries who were denied entry along the 
borders.  
5 As stated when Operation Triton was first launched (see Frontex web site): 
“According to the mandate of Frontex, the primary focus of Operation Triton will be 
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demonstrated by the events of 2015) rescuing migrants at sea will still 
be entrusted primarily to the authorities of the coastal States, in primis 
Italy. We believe that this consideration remains valid even after the 
meeting of the extraordinary European Council of 23 April 2015, 
convened after the tragedy at sea of April 18. The final documents in 
fact basically indicate that the economic commitment of the Union will 
be tripled and that members of the Council reached an agreement to 
intensify the struggle against migrant traffic. On the other hand, no 
consideration is being given to establishing, finally, an extraordinary 
humanitarian operation in the Mediterranean and in the countries of 
origin and of transit. The rescue and assistance operations thus remain 
functional to the prevention and repression of irregular, or illegal, 
migration, in accordance with the original mandate of operation Triton.6 
2. The question of refugees merits a separate discussion. On June 26, 
2013, the European Union adopted what is known as the ‘Asylum 
Package’, consisting of two directives and two regulations to which we 
must add the recasting of the ‘qualifications’ directive adopted in 2011.7 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
border control, however I must stress that, as in all our maritime operations, we consider 
saving lives an absolute priority for our agency”. 
6 Concerning these latest development, and to see relevant documents, refer to a C. 
Favilli, “Le responsabilità dei Governi degli Stati membri nella difficile costruzione di 
un’autentica politica dell’Unione europea di immigrazione e di asilo”, in SIDIBlog (blog 
of the Italian Society of International Law); ivi, F. De Vittor, “I risultati del Consiglio 
europeo straordinario sull’emergenza umanitaria nel Mediterraneo: repressione del 
traffico di migranti o contrasto all’immigrazione irregolare?”. 
7 Directive 2013/32/UE, establishing a common procedure for granting and 
withdrawing international protection, and 2013/33/UE, laying down standards for the 
reception of applicants for international protection; regulations 604/2013, establishing 
the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for 
examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member 
States by a third-country national or a stateless person, and. 603/2013, on Eurodac 
(system for the comparison of digital fingerprints of asylum applicants and some 
categories of illegal immigrants). These acts were adopted in accordance with the 
ordinary legislative procedure (art. 294 TFUE – ex art. 251 TCE) that, together with the 
Treaty of Lisbon, has become the primary legislative procedure of the EU decision-
making process. On December 13, 2011 directive 2011/95/UE was adopted, establishing 
the standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as 
beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons 
eligible for subsidiary protection and for the content of the protection granted, replacing 
directive 2004/83/CE. For doctrine see G. Cataldi, A. Del Guercio, A. Liguori (a cura 
di), Il Diritto di asilo in Europa, Napoli, 2014; G. Morgese, “La riforma del sistema 
europeo comune di asilo e i suoi principali riflessi nell'ordinamento italiano”, in Diritto 
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This reform, though introducing novelties and improvements compared 
to the past, is still not sufficient to reach the final objective, and that is 
“regardless of the Member State in which the asylum application is 
lodged… ensure that similar cases are treated alike and result in the 
same outcome”,8 due to the vast discretionary power granted to Member 
States. 
Subsequent to the entry and identification of the asylum seeker, 
assessment of the request for international protection is the competence 
of one Member State, usually the migrant’s State of initial entry, regular 
or irregular (with exceptions regarding minors and the possibility of 
family reunification). The goal is to prevent the asylum seeker from 
submitting applications to multiple Member States (known as Asylum 
Shopping) and reducing the number of asylum seekers ‘in orbit’, that is 
transferred from Member State to Member State. According to the 
Dublin Regulation, if a person who has submitted an application for 
asylum in one nation of the Union, or was identified upon entering said 
nation, enters another Member State, he is to be sent back to the former 
State.  This mechanism is based therefore on trust among the Member 
States that consider themselves mutually ‘safe’ for purposes of 
application of the principles and rules of the Union on asylum, 
principles based on the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of 
Refugees and thus, primarily, on the principle of non refoulement.  
Application of the criterion of ‘initial entry’ has nevertheless 
produced a disproportionate pressure on frontier States, which have 
furthermore demonstrated that they are not always capable of 
responding adequately to needs of reception and examination of asylum 
applications. 9  This criterion also increases responsibility for the 
increased number of victims at sea as migrant traffickers organize 
longer and more dangerous voyages to Italy instead, for example, of 
taking them to Malta and Cyprus, because of the greater possibility of 
acceptance of an application for international protection. Finally, the 
presumption that member States must always be considered mutually 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
immigrazione e cittadinanza, n. 4/2013, p. 15 ff.; A. Del Guercio, “La seconda fase di 
realizzazione del sistema europeo comune d’asilo”, 2015, www.osservatorioaic.it/la-
seconda-fase-di-realizzazione-del-sistema-europeo-comune-d-asilo.html. 
8 Cfr. Stockholm Program – An open and secure Europe saving and protecting 
citizens, Official Journal of the European Union, C 115 dated 4.5.2010. 
9 On this topic see the European Agenda on Immigration, 13.5.05. In 2014 five 
Member States (including Italy) handled 72% of all asylum applications. 
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secure for purposes of reception has been refuted by European courts. 
Regarding the European Court of Human Rights, we note the case of 
M.S.S. vs. Belgium and Greece (21.1.11, Grand Chamber) in which 
Belgium was sentenced, among other things, for having sent an asylum 
applicant back to Greece, the country of initial entry, pursuant to the 
Dublin Regulation.10 The Strasburg judges stated that complying with 
the law of the European Union does not exempt from responsibility for 
violation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), 
confirmed in this particular case (Art. 3, prohibiting “inhuman and 
degrading treatment”) by the conditions of asylum seekers in Greece. 
The more so considering that the Dublin Regulation contemplates what 
is known as a “sovereignty” clause that allows a member State to accept 
an application for protection even though it is not its responsibility. 
Even more interesting and recent is another ruling of the Grand 
Chamber handed down on 4.11.14 in the case of Tarakhel v. 
Switzerland. Faced with Switzerland’s refusal to grant asylum to an 
Afghan family of refugees because the family had to be returned to 
Italy, the country of first entry, the refugees appealed to the Court of 
Strasburg, in accordance with Art. 3 of the ECHR. The Court sentenced 
the country convened because, in light of the data provided by the 
Italian Interior Ministry, there was an obvious discrepancy between the 
number of asylum requests and the places available in the SPRAR 
facilities (System of Protection for Asylum Seekers and Refugees). 
Switzerland therefore should not have mechanically applied the Dublin 
system, as the absence of ‘systemic deficiencies’ in Italy (deficiencies 
noted by the Court in respect of Greece in the previously cited case) 
cannot exempt the State from ascertaining whether there is a real risk of 
inhuman and degrading treatment in the country of destination, 
especially when minors are involved as in this particular case. 
Similar principles were also affirmed by the European Union Court 
of Justice, specifically the preliminary ruling handed down on 21.12.12 
(N.S. case) upon referral by a court of the United Kingdom. The Court 
confirms the presumption of safe country status to be attributed 
mutually among the member States, a presumption that, however, is not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 On case law relating to the Dublin Regulation, see A. Liguori, “Clausola di 
sovranità e regolamento “Dublino III””, in G. Cataldi, A. Del Guercio, A. Liguori, op. 
cit., p. 43 ff. and Conference Reports on “Il sistema di Dublino versus la libertà di 
movimento dei rifugiati in Europa”, held in Rome, in the Chamber of Deputies on 24 
February 2014, published in Diritti dell’uomo. Cronache e battaglie, n. 1/2014, p. 96 ff. 
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absolute but a relative one; it thus establishes the obligation to suspend 
transfer in cases in which the authorities of the sending State  “cannot 
ignore the fact that systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and 
conditions for welcoming asylum applicants in the Member State are 
serious and proven grounds for believing that the applicant may risk 
being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment” as such forbidden 
by Art. 4 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
Other issues concerning the common European asylum regime were 
raised regarding persons belonging to ‘vulnerable categories’, 
specifically minors, who can be subjected to administrative detention, in 
addition to accelerated procedures in examining the application for 
international protection, and may thus not be sufficiently protected. 
Even the correct and uniform assessment of the concept of  ‘safe third 
country’ in which to send the foreigner is far from being defined.  Is the 
safety requirement the only valid one? And how can one substantiate it? 
As frequently pointed out in the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights, 11 it is not sufficient for third States to simply meet the 
requirements of ratification of treaties on human rights or to provide 
government assurances. 
Indeed, it is not surprising, especially in light of the events of the 
summer of 2015, that there has been a general rethinking of the Dublin 
system, the subject of abundant criticism by the European Commission, 
as well as by the doctrine and associations active in the safeguard of 
human rights.  At the time of this writing the situation is still fluid, even 
though there appear to be significant changes on the horizon, on a 
European but also on a national level. The 2015 European immigration 
crisis led to an even sharper division among the Member States 
regarding the overall approach and the measures to be adopted. Starting 
June 23, 2015, Hungary began to push back migrants along the frontier 
with Serbia. 
On August 24, 2015, on the other hand, Germany decided to suspend 
the Dublin Regulation with reference to Syrian refugees and to process 
their applications for asylum directly, announcing they would welcome 
all refugees from that country who so requested. This latter position, 
though commendable from a humanitarian aspect, poses the problem of 
‘selective acceptance’. There is no doubt that there are serious situations 
that require an immediate response, but it is difficult to diversify 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 See European Court of Human Rights, Hirsi e altri c. Italia, appeal n. 27765/09, 
ruling of 23 February 2012 (discussed further in following paragraph). 
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persons who have the same rights on the basis of nationality. This is 
also in conflict with the 1951 Geneva Convention on recognition of 
refugee status, which prohibits any discrimination in benefiting from 
guaranteed rights.12 
Finally, there is a growing conviction in Europe of the need to 
elaborate a mechanism for resettlement in other countries, principally 
Germany, France and Spain, of part of the asylum seekers currently in 
Italy, Greece and Hungary. According to the proposals submitted by the 
Commission on September 9, 2015, a system of automatic permanent 
resettlement that would go into effect whenever there any sudden and 
conspicuous increases in the number of arrivals could be introduced.13  
The quota assigned to any one country would depend on its GNP, level 
of unemployment, number of inhabitants and the number of asylum 
applications already processed. Nations that refuse to receive migrants 
would be subject to economic sanctions. The quota system has the 
drawback of not considering the aspirations of the asylum seekers, who 
may have acquaintances, ties and desires that do not necessarily 
coincide with the destinations to which they are assigned. We also need 
to avoid hazardous voyages by sea, without however preventing those 
who are escaping from reaching a safe place. 
 One final observation concerns Italy. A country that, at Art. 10, par. 
3, of the Constitution has a provision on the right to asylum that is one 
of the most advanced in Europe, a provision that allows for welcoming 
those who do not enjoy fundamental rights, not just those who are being 
pursued, as indicated in the 1951 Geneva Convention. It is also a fact 
that to date there still does not exist any organic law that implements the 
constitutional principle, and only the ‘substitutive responsibility’ of the 
judge has at times obviated this lack (see the decision by the Corte di 
Cassazione, Joint Civil Sections, 26 May 1997, No. 4674).  On May 26, 
2015, a draft law was presented before Chambers (No. 3146), on the 
“organic discipline of the right to asylum and other forms of 
international protection”. However this is not the appropriate forum to 
discuss this particular section, which consists of 45 articles. However, it 
should be pointed out that for the first time, Art. 25 puts forward the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 The Geneva Convention was ratified by Italy by means of law 722, on 24 July 
1954. The amendments made to the Convention by the New York Protocol were 
transposed into our own legal system by Law 95 on 14 February 1970. 
13  See: Refugee Crisis: European Commission takes decisive action: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5596_en.htm?locale=en. 
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interesting possibility, one that could be the harbinger of positive 
developments (although it does not lack counter-indications), in which 
“application for international protection can also be lodged in the 
applicant’s country of origin, following an interview with ACNUR or 
other national and international bodies and NGOs present in the country. 
Following the positive outcome of the interview said bodies will 
forward the application electronically to the Italian embassy or 
consulate competent for the territory”. By examining the application in 
the country of origin the creation of legal channels of entry could 
certainly prevent those ‘journeys of hope’ that, especially at sea, have 
turned out to be so dangerous to human life. 
3. After the humanitarian needs, always to be considered as the 
priority, and the issue of border controls, the third significant aspect in 
managing migration by sea concerns the prevention and repression of 
crime either from the perspective of exercising force against ships and 
the people on board and from the perspective of the right to exercise 
jurisdiction, obviously following different rules and methods according 
to the maritime spaces in question.14 
On this particular topic we point to the recent case law of the Italian 
Corte di Cassazione, whose common denominator consists of illegal 
conduct, directly attributable to a unitary criminal plan that takes place 
partly in areas under Italian jurisdiction and partly on the high seas.15 
Criminal organizations involved in human trafficking have for some 
time come up with a new system, as effective as it is cynical, to 
facilitate the transit by sea of unauthorized migrants, minimizing the 
risk of interception by the police forces of the country of arrival. A 
‘mother ship’ takes off from North African coasts and, once on the high 
seas, transfers the migrants to inflatable rafts or small boats offering 
little or no safety, usually assigning one of the migrants, usually with no 
knowledge of the matter, to drive the boat, directed toward the northern 
Mediterranean. At this point the ‘mother ship’ returns to the port from 
which it had left, issuing an SOS in order to involve, and thus 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Regarding this issue in general, and with numerous references to relevant Italian 
case law, see U. Leanza, F. Graziani, “Poteri di enforcement e di jurisdiction in materia 
di traffico di migranti via mare: aspetti operativi nell’attività di contrasto”, in La 
Comunità internazionale, 2014, p. 163 ff. 
15 Of the many cases, some examples are the trial held by the Corte di Cassazione  
Criminal Section (Section I), on 23 January 20125, No. 33455; Corte di Cassazione  
Criminal Section (Section I), 27 May 2014, n. 14510; Corte di Cassazione  Criminal 
Section (Section I), 23 May 2014, n. 36052.  
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instrumentalise, police units of the country of arrival (usually Italy). The 
police of course cannot avoid intervening for humanitarian reasons, 
carrying out what is technically known as a ‘SAR intervention’ (Search 
and Rescue), pursuant to the 1979 International Convention on search 
and rescue at sea. It should be pointed out that this obligation was 
confirmed, specifically in respect of Italy, by the ruling of the European 
Court of Human Rights (GC) in the case of Hirsi Jamaa and others, 
handed down on February 22, 2012, which also clarified the context of 
validity of the obligation of non-refoulement in marine spaces, and that 
is that the high seas is equivalent to a national frontier, requiring 
application of the same principles in the case of “occupation” by the 
military ships of a State (in this case Italy) involved in the rescue and 
ascertainment of refugee status of the persons on board. Consequently 
Italy was sentenced for having forcibly accompanied the persons 
rescued to Libya (in application of the bilateral treaty Italy-Libya).16 
Very effectively Italian case law highlighted that, in the cases under 
judgment, the action of the rescuers is, from the aspect of criminal law 
(art. 54.3 of the Italian Criminal Code) quantifiable as an “action of the 
indirect offender”. Consequently, the rescue appears “not as an 
unforeseeable event but as one that was foreseeable, sought and 
provoked” and that since the state of need is attributable to and 
provoked by traffickers, the activities of the latter are “sanctionable in 
our State” even though they took place in an extra territorial sphere. 
The Corte di Cassazione is responsible both for the exercise of 
jurisdiction and the exercise of concrete and immediate powers of 
coercion. For purposes of applying Italian jurisdiction it is sufficient for 
a ‘fragment’ of the criminal activity to be connected with Italian 
territory. Proof of the existence of a direct link of communication via 
radio, telephone or even by electronic means between the coast and the 
naval units involved is sufficient, it is a question of each time qualifying 
the fact as committed in Italy (art. 6, Criminal Code) or abroad (art. 7, 
Criminal Code). 
What we find truly interesting however are the developments, in line 
with the evolution of the conventional international framework, 
regarding forced intervention on ships involved in migrant trafficking. 
Using the precedent of Pamuk and others, a ruling handed down by the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 For commentary see A. Liguori, “La Corte europea dei diritti dell'uomo condanna 
l'Italia per i respingimenti verso la Libia del 2009: il caso Hirsi”, in Rivista di Diritto 
internazionale, 2012, p. 415 ff. 
	   19 
Court of Crotone on 27 September 2007, 17 the Corte di Cassazione is 
demonstrating that it is in favor of increasing the possibility of 
intervention by the coastal State and is consequently in favor of a 
significant, additional redimensioning of the principle of freedom on the 
high seas in the name of defending the common interests of the 
international community as a whole.   
Can the coastal state, in this case Italy, exercise coercive powers in 
marine spaces that are not subject to its sovereignty or jurisdiction? The 
problem of course does not exist in respect of ships flying the national 
flag. In the case of ships with no flag or of foreign nationality on the 
other hand, one must first refer to article 110 of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), governing the right to 
board on the high seas. This provision does not contemplate, among the 
exceptions to exclusive power of control by the coastal State, the 
possibility of migrant traffic and only a very broad and debatable 
interpretation of the definition of “slave trade” (possibility contemplated 
at art. 110) has at times been referred to in order to allow the use of 
coercive power in cases similar to those under review. 
The Palermo Convention against transnational organized crime is 
much more specific and detailed, especially Protocol 4, against migrant 
trafficking on land, sea and air, with art. 8 containing measures against 
migrant trafficking by sea.18 According to this provision, the boarding 
and inspection of a ship, and the adoption of appropriate coercive 
measures are always allowed, with reference to actions intended to 
combat migrant trafficking, if there is a suspicion that the ship has no 
nationality, while if a a ship on the high seas is flying the flag of a State 
other than the State that intervenes, the measures in question must be 
authorized. Applying this principle (in our opinion valid even from the 
aspect of customary law), by confirming the mentioned decision of the 
Corte di Cassazione the ruling at comment provides operational 
indications that may be summarised as follows: 
If there are justified grounds to connect the ‘mother ship’ (or even 
‘daughter boat’) to accomplices operating on Italian territory (local 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 The ruling is published in Rivista di Diritto internazionale, 2001, p. 1155 ff. and 
summarised in Italian Yearbook of International Law, 2001, p. 273 ff. with commentary 
by G. Andreone. 
18 United Nations Convention and Protocols against transnational organized crime, 
adopted by the General Assembly on December 15, 2000 and 31 May 2001, ratified by 
Law 146 on 16 March 2006. 
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organizers), Italian jurisdiction and the exercise of coercive powers on 
the high seas may be considered legitimate. If however there is no 
connection with Italy, one must wait for the daughter boat to enter the 
contiguous zone. When this happens, and because of the link that exists 
between the two ships, coercive powers may be exercised in respect of 
the smaller boat and the mother ship, even if the latter is in navigation or 
has stopped on the high seas, obviously with the consent of the flag 
State unless the ship is not flying any flag. In this case the principles of 
hot pursuit and constructive presence (art. 111 UNCLOS) apply. 
This last conclusion presupposes a permanent solution to the 
question of Italy’s adoption of the contiguous zone, at least for purposes 
of prevention and repression of national laws on immigration. It is 
known that there has never been a formal proclamation, as envisaged by 
international law; it is also known, however, that art. 11, letter d, law 
189 of 30 July 2002 specifically envisages that: 
 An Italian police boat meeting a ship in respect of which there are 
justified grounds for believing it may be involved in illegally 
transporting immigrants in the territorial sea or contiguous zone may 
stop and inspect such ship and if they find elements confirming the 
ship’s involvement in migrant trafficking, may confiscate it and lead it 
to the port of the State.  
We can thus deduce that, for the sole purpose of immigration (thus 
excluding any other possibilities provided for in case of establishment 
of a contiguous zone), the contiguous zone exists, and its existence is 
enforceable against all States as it is an institute contemplated by 
customary law. We emphasize this fact in order to once again reiterate 
the erroneousness of the conclusions reached on this issue by the Corte 
di Cassazione in its ruling of 8 September 2010.19 This decision, in fact, 
affirms the illegitimacy of the claim confirming the existence of the 
contiguous zone in respect of Turkey, as this State did not ratify the 
UNCLOS. Unfortunately this decision continues to condition and limit 
the actions of the police in the contiguous zone. 
In accordance also with the tendencies that appear to prevail within 
European institutions, as already mentioned, we believe that there 
should be an even broader interpretation of the rules governing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Kircaoglu Mehemet e Sanaga Mehemet, cfr. Italian Yearbook of International 
Law, 2010, p. 419 ff., with comment by G. Andreone; ID., “Immigrazione clandestina, 
zona contigua e Cassazione italiana: il mistero si infittisce”, in Diritti umani e diritto 
internazionale, 2011, p. 183 ff. 
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connection with the coast, in the interest of repressing the crime of 
migrant trafficking and saving human lives at sea. It should also be 
pointed out that the techniques used to intercept communications, and 
the cooperation that exists among States, now allows us to anticipate, 
with respect even to the recent past, verification of this connection.  
Important in this regard is the EUROSUR system, created by the 
European Union by regulation 1052 on 22.10.2013, “which establishes a 
European system of surveillance of the frontiers”. 20 Secondly, in order 
to permanently discourage the practices of migrant traffickers, we 
believe it necessary to allow the use of coercive actions, even when 
there is no proof of contact with the coast, but both the transfer on the 
high seas from the mother ship to the daughter ship, or the route taken 
by the latter, prove the existence of a criminal plan and the goal of 
reaching the Italian coast.  The more so (but we do not consider it an 
essential requirement) if the larger ship has issued an SOS activating 
search and rescue procedures in an instrumental manner. A good 
example of this possibility is the ruling handed down by the Tribunale 
di Reggio Calabria whereby, in the wake of investigations carried out 
since the beginning, including with the help of Frontex, intervention on 
the ships and persons involved was considered legitimate even though 
everything took place on the high seas. 21 It is our hope that the Corte di 
Cassazione may in the future confirm this position.  
In conclusion, we believe the time has come for the European Union 
and the individual States to take a step back and abandon the concept of 
emergency in order to finally achieve an effective and lasting policy to 
manage migrations, one that is first of all shared and that implements the 
dictates of the Treaty of Lisbon and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the Union. The priority is to act on the causes that are inducing migrants to 
leave. Secondly, any decision concerning management of migratory flows 
cannot deny the fundamental principles of European Union law and thus 
the imperatives of ‘solidarity’ and respect of human rights. Finally, 
cooperation among nations is indispensable in order to prevent and repress 
crimes connected to migrant traffic managed by transnational criminal 
organizations.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 See S. Carrera, V. Den Hertog, “Whose Mare? Rule of Law Challenges in the 
field of European Border Surveillance in the Mediterranean”, in CEPS Paper in Liberty 
and Security in Europe, n. 79, January 2015, p. 17 ff. 
21 Tribunale di Reggio Calabria (Sez. Gip – Gup) - 28 July 2014, n. 223 - Hazer 
Elsahat Mohamed Elmokader e altri. 
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History teaches us that civilizations that have raised walls to prevent the 
arrival of migrant populations were soon overpowered, while the 
acceptance of a ‘melting pot’ has encouraged the social, economic and civil 
development of nations. 
These principles were reiterated and led to several operational 
proposals on the concluding day of the works presented in this volume, 
the day of the Stakeholders’ Workshop with representatives of maritime 
professionals, migrations and human rights activists, military and police 
forces, representatives of State and International Institutions, and that 
led to the drafting of the “Naples Charter”, titled “From Mare Nostrum 
to Triton and the Way Forward to Deal with Migration in the 
Mediterranean Sea”, provided at the appendix. 
 
I PART 
 
Migrants’ Rights in the Mediterranean: a Juridical Overview 
	   
  
REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS AT SEA: DUTIES OF CARE 
AND PROTECTION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN  
AND THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL ACTION 
Guy S. Goodwin-Gill∗ 
 
I am particularly pleased to be here today at the ‘initiation’ of 
the Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence on Migrants’ Rights in the 
Mediterranean, and I would like to express my thanks to Professor 
Giuseppe Cataldi and to Dr Anna Liguori for the invitation and for 
what is a most timely initiative in a most appropriate location. 
Above all, however, I would like to express my thanks to Italy, to 
the people of Italy, for all that they have done over the past eighteen 
months and more to bring safety and protection to those putting their 
lives, their future, at risk on the sea. It is a noble record. Italy has 
acted as the conscience of Europe, putting into daily practice the 
values which so many of us, speaking as a European, count dear. 
But it has done so without the degree of support – material, moral 
and practical – which it is entitled to expect from its partners 
in the community. 
Europe, or at least, the European Union, claims the right to 
manage the movement of people across the Mediterranean, but it is 
too ready to decline the responsibilities and to dispute the obligations 
that go with that claim. Many of us hope that this will change, and 
this afternoon, I want to follow up my thanks with what I hope will be 
some insights into the nature of those duties, and some suggestions 
about what needs to be done next. 
Let me begin, however, with some views from outside, from 
across the Atlantic. Writing in The New Yorker on 4 May, Philip 
Gourevitch put it clearly and succinctly: 
 
“... every year, people drown in the waters between Africa and 
Europe. And this year almost two thousand have died, including, 
last week, nearly eight hundred on one ship, which capsized and 
sank en route to Italy. Before that horrifying incident, this year’s 
death rate for Mediterranean boat people was ten times higher than 
it was for the same period a year ago. Now it’s thirty times higher, 
and that increase is attributable to Europe’s dereliction of duty...” 
                                                
∗ Emeritus Fellow, All Souls College, Oxford. Emeritus Professor of International 
Refugee Law, University of Oxford. 
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After reviewing aspects of that continuing failure and the 
predilection for tightening border controls and acting militarily 
against traffickers, he went on to note that Europe’s leaders seem, 
 
“... to be avoiding the fact that, as long as people are prepared to 
risk everything for a better life, there will be boat people, and that 
when dealing with them the law of the sea is the place to start: 
rescue first, then sort out the rest on land. When it comes to the 
drowned and the saved, we know dereliction of duty when we 
see it”. 
 
Turning closer to home, as one Syrian refugee said to the 
Guardian (4 May 2015), he had been, 
 
“... determined to go, whether or not there is a rescue operation. 
I’m risking my life for something bigger, for ambitions bigger than 
this... If I fail, I fail alone. But by risking this, I might create life 
for my three children”. 
 
1. Europe’s role and Europe’s responsibilities 
In a paper which I presented in Athens in March,1 I considered 
what the European Union might do, indeed, ought to do, with 
regard to so-called irregular migration, and I looked in particular at 
the ‘inwards-looking’ dimensions of the EU’s common policy on 
refugees and asylum. 
The strategy of implementing a common policy through 
twenty-eight national systems, I suggested, was always bound to 
fail, no matter how comprehensive the top-down, legislative 
agreement on qualification, standards and criteria. The Dublin 
scheme, too, for all that it guarantees a decision for the asylum 
seeker somewhere, contributes nothing to what is and always was 
clearly needed in Europe, namely, effective, equitable sharing of 
protection responsibilities among a community committed to 
common, fundamental principles. 
The situation for refugees and asylum seekers is now further 
compounded by the fact that the EU remains uncertain how to 
                                                
1  Regulating ‘Irregular’ Migration: International Obligations and International 
Responsibilities, Keynote Address to the International Workshop, National and 
Kapodistrian University of Athens Faculty of Law, Friday, 20 March 2015. 
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respond to the essentially demographic and economic drivers of 
movement between States, (a substantial working age population with 
no work to turn to), which accompany flight from conflict and 
persecution, and which could already be anticipated two or three 
decades ago. 
I suggested that, given the nature of the Union, its basis in 
common values and shared international obligations, what was 
needed was a truly European response, in which ‘Europe’s refugees’ 
would enjoy European asylum, European protection and the rights 
and benefits accorded by European law. This would require, in 
turn, an EU institution, a European Migration and Protection 
Agency competent to fulfill collectively and to implement the 
individual obligations of Member States and the policy and 
protection goals of the EU. Moreover, it is essential to add 
‘migration’, along with refugees and asylum seekers, precisely 
because the arrival of those in an irregular situation, whether 
directly or following interception or rescue at sea, presents Member 
States with legal and practical challenges that demand a community-
based response. 
But the ‘internal’ dimension can only ever be but one aspect of 
a coherent response. Europe must also look outwards and engage 
beyond the region, beyond the Mediterranean, for the movement of 
people today affects the interests of multiple States and 
stakeholders. 
There is no European Migration and Protection Agency just yet, 
and while existing institutions, such as the European Asylum 
Support Office and the Fundamental Rights Agency, can play a 
role in monitoring for effective protection the sorts of ‘solutions’ to 
which I will now turn, a much more international approach is still 
needed. 
 
2. Duties of care and protection 
When thinking about the movements of people and about 
international legal obligations – ‘Whose obligations?’ is a 
question to which I will return – it helps to recall certain basic 
principles. 
States party to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees accept that those leaving their country for fear of 
persecution, are entitled to special protection, on account of their 
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position. The European Court of Human Rights has spoken to like 
effect, noting that asylum seekers are a “particularly 
underprivileged and vulnerable population group in need of 
special protection...” 
The ‘vulnerability’ of the migrant, not in the sense of 
weakness, so much as in exposure to smuggling and trafficking 
and the absence of any effective protecting authority, was 
recognized by the Commission on Human Rights back in 1997, and 
their need for protection has been underlined since in the work of 
successive Special Rapporteurs on the Human Rights of Migrants and 
in a series of UN General Assembly resolutions. 
Children seeking refuge are also entitled to “receive appropriate 
protection and humanitarian assistance”, whether accompanied or 
not; and in 2014, of the roughly 170,000 who arrived one way or 
another in Italy, more than 13,000 were children travelling alone; 
this year already, the number is approaching 2,000. 
This same emphasis on ‘protection’ appears expressly in the 
Palermo Protocol on Trafficking – to protect and assist the victims – 
and again in the Palermo Protocol on Smuggling. In each case, the 
Protocol includes specific ‘savings clauses’ preserving the “rights, 
obligations and responsibilities of States and individuals...”, under 
the refugee treaties and the principle of non-refoulement. 
How, if at all, are these principles to be made meaningful in 
the Mediterranean today, and how should they govern Europe’s 
operations? 
In my view, that comes about through a combination of context, 
circumstance, knowledge and, in particular, engagement. Europe 
already asserts the right to manage the movement of people across 
those waters, and with that comes obligations. 
Some might argue that protection is compromised by 
fragmentation, by the apparently contradictory pull of obligations 
relating to interception and rescue at sea or combating smugglers 
and traffickers, on the one hand, and of human rights, on the 
other. States’ responsibilities are certainly not part of a seamless web 
of rights and obligations when it comes to seaborne migration, but 
some things are clear. A State minded to take action, as it should, 
against smuggling and trafficking, ‘already’ has duties towards the 
victims. A State which elects to intercept boats believed to be 
carrying irregular migrants likewise has protection obligations 
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to those over whom it exercises authority and control, irrespective of 
the legality of any particular interception. 
The State which commendably engages in a dedicated search 
and rescue operation situates itself straightaway within the legal 
framework set by the UN Law of the Sea Convention, the Safety of 
Life at Sea Convention, the Search and Rescue Convention, the 
standards set by the International Maritime Organization, and the 
basic principle of disembarkation in a place of safety. 
All of this is known to the EU and to its Member States. After 
all, the 2014 EU Regulation governing Frontex search, rescue and 
interception operations at sea could not be clearer on the basics, 
underscoring the obligation of Member States to render assistance to 
any vessel or person in distress at sea, and prohibiting the 
disembarkation of intercepted or rescued persons in a country where 
they would risk serious harm. 
It is common knowledge, of course, that notwithstanding the 
primary role of the State responsible for a Search and Rescue 
Region to ensure cooperation and coordination, an obligation 
deficit remains with regard to disembarkation – in large measure, I 
suspect, because no State can come close to anticipating with 
confidence the potential scope of its responsibilities; and none, it 
seems, can yet rely on the support of others. There’s a contingency 
issue here which calls for closer examination, and it is precisely the 
reason why we need to step beyond the field of individual State 
responsibilities to consider the regional dimension and the distinct 
opportunities for co-operation and mutual support presented by this 
unique environment. 
 
3. Due diligence 
The Mediterranean is an interesting place to start. It covers some 
2.5 million square kilometers. Some twenty-three States have littoral 
responsibilities, and for twelve or thirteen of them, that involves 
responsibility for Search and Rescue Regions. 
The Mediterranean has also become something of a proving 
area, where a few States have sought to question the applicability 
of certain protective principles in the context of extra-territorial 
operations, but where the European Court of Human Rights, 
among others, has confirmed what students of the law of State 
responsibility already knew, that liability can follow the flag. 
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The Mediterranean is special, and being a shared and much 
exploited space, it raises questions about collective responsibility, 
and the ways in which that might be translated into practical results. 
Certainly, the EU has a collective role and a collective 
responsibility. Through the operations of individual Member States, 
but particularly through Frontex, it has staked a claim to control or 
manage large areas of the Mediterranean with a view to curbing 
irregular migration, and regular calls on search and rescue 
responsibilities have helped to underline the EU’s practical 
engagement in the area. 
What, then, are its duties? ‘Responsibility’ in international law 
has a number of facets, and we need always to look at the nature of 
the primary obligations involved. 
Fault, in the sense of willful or negligent conduct may be 
relevant in some instances; or responsibility may be consequential 
on the breach of due diligence obligations, understood as an 
objective, international standard; and actual liability itself may be 
contingent on circumstances, such as the parties involved, 
knowledge, capacity, the requisite goals, and so forth. 
For a number of reasons, the Mediterranean provides the basis 
for a special regime which engages, in general, the responsibility of 
littoral States and those which stand behind them or otherwise 
involve themselves in relevant conduct; the result, I suggest, is a 
special regime, linking Sates which act both in the fulfillment of 
their individual obligations and in the interests of the community, 
to those which are part also of that community and share those 
interests. 
 
4. Bases of obligation: Search, rescue, interception, protection 
and solutions 
The reasoning of the International Court of Justice in the 
Hostages case suggests a useful approach for identifying the key 
elements of legal responsibility in comparable situations, 
including:  
- where States are fully aware of urgent ongoing situations of 
risk, endangering life at sea, in part as a result of smuggling and 
trafficking; 
- where States are fully aware of their obligations (a) to 
establish search and rescue regions in the area; (b) to provide 
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and/or to co-ordinate search and rescue services; (c) to combat 
smuggling and trafficking, including by taking preventive measures 
against non-State actors whose conduct violates human rights; (d) 
to protect human rights; and 
- where States and their institutions have the capacity and the 
means at their disposal to respond through surveillance and rescue, 
both individually and collectively. 
Unlike the Hostages case, where two parties only were 
involved, the situation in the Mediterranean engages many potential 
actors, few of which will necessarily have a direct juridical 
relationship with the individuals at risk. Nevertheless, the 
circumstances and the known facts clearly put in issue the 
individual and collective responsibility of identifiable States to 
save lives at risk and to ensure, respect and protect human rights. 
The Mediterranean is a large, but enclosed maritime area, subject 
to regular, close surveillance and to a certain level of effective 
control. The failure by those States (and their institutions) to 
respond comprehensively and in such a way as to maximise 
protection and solutions engages their responsibility, whether 
individually or inter se, irrespective of the availability of a remedy 
in the individual case. 
This is not a counsel of perfection, or a statement of obligation to 
achieve the required result in all circumstances, but rather, “... an 
obligation to deploy adequate means, to exercise best possible 
efforts, to do the utmost, to obtain this result”, as the Seabed 
Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the 
Sea described it in 2011. 
What we see is nonetheless a positive protection obligation, not 
immediately absolute in the sense of the prohibition of torture, but a 
positive due diligence obligation to save lives; and thereafter to 
treat those rescued or otherwise brought within the jurisdiction in 
accordance with settled law. 
Moreover, given the nature of the humanitarian crisis, this 
regime of responsibility does not stop at the shore line. The 
phenomenon of contemporary migration has much deeper roots and 
so long as the drivers of desperation continue, so too will the search 
for refuge. The legal interests of States of origin, transit and intended 
or accidental destination are all engaged, and only a rights- and 
protection-based strategy can have any impact. This is a bigger 
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question, requiring more time and more thought, and this paper 
can do little more than signal the urgent necessity to respond both 
to symptoms and to causes. 
 
5. Rescue at sea 
On one issue in particular, there is a pressing need to act, and to 
reduce and ideally eliminate the disjuncture between rescue and 
safety of life at sea, on the one hand, and solutions, on the other; 
disembarkation in a place of safety is essential, but it cannot be the 
end of the story. 
In principle, a starting point for disembarkation could be 
flag-State responsibility in the case of rescue or interception by 
public ships (that is, a State’s naval or equivalent vessels). But 
although a beginning, that must not be allowed to result in 
ultimate gross disparities between States, lest they be disinclined 
to commit resources to the safety of life at sea. States committed 
to search and rescue in the Mediterranean fulfill a community 
responsibility, and a formula for equitable sharing is called for 
which, while securing prompt disembarkation, then leads on to 
land-based assistance, processing, and solutions. 
Nor can flag-State responsibility be applied to merchant 
vessels. What is needed here, as experience with the Indo-China 
refugee crisis demonstrated, is an internationally agreed and 
administered scheme or pool of disembarkation guarantees, 
together with provision for compensating ships’ owners for at least 
some of the costs incurred when ships’ masters fulfill their 
international legal duties. 
In thinking medium- and long-term, attention must also focus on 
assistance to States of transit, many of which are facing new 
challenges in the management of migration, but without the 
infrastructural capacity to accommodate, assist, protect and 
process non-nationals on the move. The EU has taken initiatives 
with third States in the region, but too often they are oriented to 
control alone (in the EU’s interest), with no regard to the wider, 
international dimensions. 
If those intercepted or rescued at sea are not disembarked in 
European space, then effective, open and internationally supervised 
agreements will be essential to ensure their landing and 
accommodation in a place of safety, their treatment and 
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protection in accordance with applicable international and 
European standards, and a solution appropriate to individual 
circumstances, such as asylum, resettlement, facilitated third country 
migration, or return in safety and dignity to countries of origin. 
Indefinite detention of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants in sub-
optimal conditions ought never to be on Europe’s agenda, and 
given the extraterritorial reach of Europe’s obligations (both EU 
and ECHR), may well engage its liability. 
This means bridging, in law and practice, the migration/refugee 
protection gap, which is what Mediterranean transit is effectively 
achieving in fact. And it means a readiness on the part of the EU 
and its Member States to integrate their own human rights and 
fundamental values into truly cooperative relations with transit and 
other affected States. 
 
6. Next steps 
What we are witnessing in the Mediterranean today is not just a 
European phenomenon. It is international, engaging States on all 
sides of the sea, and many also beyond the littoral. 
Certainly, it has resonance in the European Union, because 
we have mutually agreed principles of cooperation – solidarity 
and fair sharing of responsibility; because we are committed to 
certain values – democracy, the rule of law; because we are obliged 
to protect those fundamental rights now set forth in the Charter; and 
because we have elected to engage pro-actively in this maritime 
space. 
But the ‘international’ dimension, the impact of EU policies and 
practices on third States is also evident, whether in the EU’s 
negotiation of readmission agreements; its endorsement of individual 
Member States’ use of so-called safe third country removals 
outside the Dublin scheme; in the management of internationally 
agreed search and rescue areas (for better or worse); and 
necessarily also in the interests of a variety of non-State 
stakeholders, whether international organizations or representative 
organizations such as the International Chamber of Shipping. 
Given the manifest need for a concerted, internationally agreed 
and implemented response, why does the EU continue to dither? 
Why do the practical proposals of key organizations, such as 
UNHCR, seem to fall on deaf ears? The EU’s response to date is 
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woefully inadequate, in principle, in practical proposals, in 
comprehending the situation and the power and magnitude of the 
drivers at work, in looking beyond narrow self-interest, and in 
characterizing the challenges almost exclusively in terms of control 
and security. 
This lack of direction and sense of purpose seems due in part to 
the nature of the entity, and to the fact that, for all its formal espousal 
of ‘community’ goals and ‘community’ values, the Union remains a 
congeries of dislocated, dysfunctional sovereign States, unable to 
contemplate working together on what is perceived perhaps as a 
‘difficult’ issue touching sovereignty, security, and, of course, ‘the 
other’. 
As the European Council on Refugees and Exiles noted last 
month, commenting on the then latest response to the crisis, current 
proposals merely seek to prevent migrants and refugees reaching 
Europe, essentially by moving border control farther and farther 
outwards, ‘fighting’ the traffickers, destroying the boats, building 
fences, and, we suppose, ‘preventing’ illegal migration. 
But one look at ‘who’ is moving and ‘why’ shows how the 
focus on smuggling and trafficking misses the big picture. What is 
needed, clearly, are ‘opportunities’ – substantial safe, legal access to 
Europe, through resettlement, family reunion, humanitarian 
visas, and temporary protection, coupled with greater protection 
capacity along the way and real solidarity between north and south. 
But we have been here before, and we know that with the right 
political will, workable and working solutions can be found; that 
mechanisms can be put in place which will ensure disembarkation 
against appropriate guarantees (such as assistance in identification 
and determination of status, or with care and accommodation, or 
with appropriate solutions in asylum, migration or return); that transit 
States (which also have problems of accommodation, processing, 
solutions) ‘can’ be brought on board as partners in a protection 
oriented response with international and regional oversight; that 
countries yet more distant can be brought into what will have to be 
longer-term planning for development. 
The Mediterranean, though, has an ‘ international’ and not 
purely regional dimension. It is a microcosm of indecision and 
inaction, but it also brings forth issues and challenges common to 
many other parts of the world – the Caribbean and the Pacific, to 
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name just two. What could be achieved in the Mediterranean, 
properly founded on principles of protection and accountability 
intrinsic to a democratic community oriented to the rule of law, 
could serve as a model for elsewhere (unlike the unilateralist 
Australian approach, which is premised on arbitrariness and 
clouded in secrecy). 
In the 1970s, too, there were difficulties galvanizing political 
will and political action around the no less desperate situation 
of Indo-Chinese refugees, and it took an international 
conference to kick-start serious progress. Ironically, given the 
nonsense spouted by British ministers apparently content until 
recently to witness continuing loss of life at sea, it was the 
United Kingdom which, in May 1979, proposed to the United 
Nations Secretary-General that he convene an international 
conference to deal with the problem. The Secretary-General, 
together with the High Commissioner for Refugees, conducted 
intensive preliminary consultations, following which he called a 
meeting in Geneva in July that year, with representation at the 
ministerial level. 
Sixty-five governments participated in the conference, chaired 
by the Secretary-General, together with observers, international 
organizations and NGOs. Building on the preceding informal 
consultations, it led to substantial increases in the funding of relief and 
the provision of resettlement places; in the offer of sites for 
processing centres; in opening discussions with the principal source 
country, Viet Nam, on family reunion, orderly departures, and 
return; and, as already mentioned, in practical proposals regarding 
rescue at sea. 
Looking at the results of that conference and at the concrete 
initiatives which followed, it is surprising how similar are the issues 
we are facing today, notwithstanding the very different political 
situation. Then, as now, it was essential to maintain the primacy 
of protection principles; to engage with governments across the 
broadest spectrum; to secure commitments both from within and 
outside the region; to ensure the involvement of competent 
international organisations and NGOs; to promote practical and 
humanitarian relations with source countries; and to bring in the 
shipping community and build on its commitment to rescue at sea 
by devising practical disembarkation schemes. 
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That was just the beginning. Ten years later, the Secretary-
General was back in the picture, working again with UNHCR and 
convening a second international conference on Indo-Chinese 
refugees, this time to adopt a Comprehensive Plan of Action which 
would eventually bring to an end a humanitarian crisis which had 
nevertheless changed dramatically over the years. 
A new international consensus was needed, and the Secretary-
General urged States to refrain from acting unilaterally. The outcome of 
this international approach, to what by then comprised both refugee and 
migration dimensions, was ultimately effective in restraining 
‘clandestine’ departures, enhancing regular family reunion programmes, 
confirming the principle and practice of temporary refuge, determining 
entitlement to protection against international standards, making 
continuing provision for third country resettlement, developing 
internationally administered return and repatriation operations, and 
reviewing progress over time. 
 
7. Conclusions for now 
Today we need a similar initiative, for what we are facing in 
the Mediterranean is not an isolated issue, not a purely European 
problem. On the contrary, it is truly international. The movement of 
people leaves few States untouched, and much of that movement is 
driven by desperation – unremitting conflict and persecution, failed 
and exhausted economies. Only a long-term approach, combining 
protection, humanitarian assistance and opportunity with political 
and financial investment in mitigating and removing causes can 
have any impact. 
The Secretary-General is already involved in a number of 
migration and development projects. It is time now to think and act 
wider and deeper, to turn to and address constructively the 
humanitarian dimensions. It is time to learn from Indo-China and 
other experience that international cooperation can work. 
It is time to convene an international conference, perhaps on a 
rolling basis, for this is not a one-off situation. It is time to draw on 
the knowledge and experience of the United Nations; on the UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees; the UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights; the Emergency Relief Coordinator and the 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs; the 
Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants; the UN 
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Development Programme; the UN Children’s Fund; the World 
Health Organisation; the International Maritime Organisation. 
It is time to bring in regional organizations – Europe, of course, 
in its different cooperative forms; the African Union; ASEAN; the 
Organization of American States. 
It is time to bring in other international and non-government 
organisations, including the International Chamber of Shipping, the 
Inter-Parliamentary Union, the International Organisation for 
Migration, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the grass 
roots capacities of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies. 
Only by engaging across the broadest spectrum of interest can 
we make a start to what will and must be a generations-long 
project of protection and opportunity, in strengthening asylum, 
but also in realising human potential both at home and abroad, in 
bringing working and workable alternatives to those whom 
desperation drives to risk all. 
 
 
Selected sources  
 
Treaties 
1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (Final Act, 
Recommendation D): 189 UNTS 150 
1979 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR): 
http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfCo 
nventions/Pages/International-Convention-on-Maritime-Search-a nd-Rescue-
%28SAR%29.aspx (05/15) 
1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS): 
http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConven 
tions/Pages/International-Convention-for-the-Safety-of-Life-at-Sea-
%28SOLAS%29,-1974.aspx (05/15) 
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Article 98): 
1833 UNTS 3  
1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (Article 22): 1577 UNTS 3 
2000 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
Especially Women And Children, supplementing the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Articles 2(b), 6, 7, 
14(1)): 2237 UNTS 319; UN doc. A/55/383, 2 
  
38 
November 2000 
2000 Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, 
supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime (Articles 16, 18(7), (8), 19(1)): 2241 UNTS 507; UN doc. 
A/55/383, 2 November 2000 
 
Judgments 
International Court of Justice, United States Diplomatic and 
Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. Iran), Judgment, 
24 May 1980, ICJ Reports, 1980, p. 3, 32-3, §68 
International Court of Justice, Case concerning Pulp Mills on the 
River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), ICJ Reports, 2010, pp. 1, 58, §197 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Seabed Disputes 
Chamber, Responsibilities and obligations of States with respect to 
activities in the Area, Advisory Opinion, 1 February 2011, ITLOS 
Reports 2011, p. 10, §110 
European Court of Human Rights, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, 
Application No. 30696/09, 21 January 2011, §§216, 251 
 
United Nations 
United Nations General Assembly resolution 34/62, ‘Report of the 
Secretary-General on the Meeting on Refugees and Displaced Persons in 
South-East Asia’, 29 November 1979 
United Nations General Assembly resolution 43/119, ‘International 
Conference on Indo- Chinese Refugees’, 8 December 1988 
United Nations General Assembly resolution 44/ 138, ‘International 
Conference on Indo- Chinese Refugees’, 15 December 1989 
United Nations General Assembly resolution 69/167, ‘Protection of 
Migrants’, 18 December 2014 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Meeting 
on Refugees and Displaced Persons in South-East Asia, convened by the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations at Geneva, on 20 and 21 July 
1979, and subsequent developments. Report of the Secretary-General: UN 
doc. A/34/627 & Corr. 1, 7 November 1979 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: 
International Conference on Indo-Chinese Refugees. Report of the 
Secretary-General: UN doc. A/44/523, 22 September 1989 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, Ms. 
Gabriela Rodríguez Pizarro: UN doc. E/CN.4/2000/82, 6 January 2000 
  
39 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, François 
Crépeau: UN doc. A/68/283, 7 August 2013 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘UNHCR proposals to 
address current and future arrivals of asylum-seekers, refugees and migrants by 
sea to Europe’, 12 March 2015: http://www.refworld.org/docid/55016ba14.html 
(05/15) 
 
Europe 
Regulation (EU) No 656/2014 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 15 May 2014 establishing rules for the surveillance of the 
external sea borders in the context of operational cooperation coordinated 
by the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation 
at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union, Title V: Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice (Article 80) 
2000 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, The human tragedy 
in the Mediterranean: immediate action needed, Resolution 2050 (2015), 
23 April 2015; Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons, 
Report: Doc. 13764, 21 April 2015: 
http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref -XML2HTML-en.asp?f ileid= 
21743&lang=EN (05/15) 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Committee on 
Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons, Rapporteur: Mr Thierry 
Mariani, Report: Doc. 13764, 21 April 2015: 
http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2H TML-
en.asp?fileid=21690&lang=en (05/15) 
European Parliament, ‘Migration: Parliament calls for urgent measures 
to save lives’, Press release, 29 April 2015: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/ 
20150424IPR45723/html/Migration-Parliament-calls-for-ur gent-measur 
es-to-save-lives (05/15) 
 
Literature 
R. P. Barnidge Jr., “The Due Diligence Principle under International 
Law”, in International Community Law Review, 2006, p. 81 
D. French, T. Stephens, International Law Association Study Group on 
Due Diligence in International Law, First Report, 7 March 2014: 
http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/stud y_groups. cfm/cid/ 1045 (05/15) 
  
40 
N. Klein, “A Case for Harmonizing Laws on Maritime Interceptions of 
Irregular Migrants”, i n  International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, 2014, p. 787 
K. Newland, “Rethinking Global Protection: New Channels, New 
Tools”, in Transatlantic Council on Migration, Migration Policy Institute, 
April 2015: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/rethinking-global-protect 
ion-new-channels-new-tools (05/15) 
 
Media and comment 
“Shipowners, Unions Urge EU Address Migrant Crisis”, i n  The 
Maritime Executive, 8 April 2015: http://www.maritime-
executive.com/article/shipowners-unions-urge-eu-address-migrant-crisis 
(05/15) 
European Community Shipping Association, ‘European Shipping 
Industry Repeats Call for Urgent and Immediate Collective Action by EU 
Member States’, 20 April 2015: http://www.ecsa.eu/news-and-media/latest-
news/9-latest-news/197-merchant-shipping-industry-repeats-call-for-urgent-
and-immedi ate-collective-action-by-eu-member-states (05/15) 
A. Faiola, “A global surge in refugees leaves Europe struggling to 
cope”, in Washington Post, 22 April 2015:  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/new-migration-crisis-
overwhelms-european-refugee-system/2015/04/21/3ab83470-e 45c-11e4-ae0f-
f8c46aa8c3a4_story.html (05/15) 
European Council on Refugees and Exiles, EU’s response to situation 
in Mediterranean fails refugees and migrants, say NGOs, 24 April 2015: 
http://ecre.org/component/content/articl e/70-weekly-bulletin-articles/1040-eus-
response-to-situation-in-mediterranean-fails-refugees-and-migrants-say-
ngos.html (05/15) 
European Parliament, Migration: Parliament calls for urgent measures 
to save lives, Press release, 29 April 2015: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/20150 
424IPR45723/html/Migration-Parliament-calls-for-urgent-measures-to-save-
lives (05/15) 
P. Gourevitch, “Search and Rescue”, in The New Yorker, 4 May 2015: 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/05/04/sea rch-and-rescue (05/15) 
P. Kingsley, R. Mason, “Royal Navy flagship to join migrant rescue 
mission after diplomatic wrangle”, in The Guardian, 4 May 2015: 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/may/04/royal-navy-migrant-
mission-delayed (05/15) 
  
41 
P. Legrain, “Open Up, Europe! Let Migrants In”, in The New York 
Times, 6 May 2015: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/06/opinion/open-up-
europe-let-migrants-in.html (05/15) 
  
 
	  	  
THE HUMAN TRAGEDY OF ILLEGAL MIGRANTS 
Tullio Scovazzi* 
 
In the last years too many people have put at risk their lives in 
attempts to cross a border. They are driven by the desire to enter into a 
country where they will be safe from persecution, poverty, conflicts, 
natural disasters or other calamities and where they will have the chance 
to spend a decent life. They are ready to face social discrimination and 
vulnerability, after arriving somewhere and living there irregularly. The 
hope to migrate is the reason why the waters of some seas, such as the 
Mediterranean, have become the graveyard of thousands of human 
beings, including children, who are moving from a number of African or 
Asian countries to reach the European Union. This is a great human 
tragedy that unfortunately is not yet completely understood by the States 
of destination, including the European Union where an adequate 
immigration and asylum policy is lacking. 
The human right to mobility is not fully protected by international 
law. Art. 13, para. 2, of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights provides that every individual has the right to leave any country, 
including his own. The same right is protected by Art. 12, para. 2, of the 
1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. However, it 
remains an asymmetrical right, as it is not complemented by a 
corresponding right to immigrate. Under customary international law 
and unless different provisions are applicable because of treaties in 
force, any State has the sovereign right to allow or not to allow migrant 
aliens to enter its territory and can adopt legislation limiting 
immigration flows. Such legislation is in force today in many States for 
a number of reasons. 
In the present situation of so-called globalization, goods and capitals 
move freely or almost freely, but not human beings. If they want to 
escape from persecution, poverty or conflict, human beings are often 
forced to cross borders clandestinely at the cost of great risk and 
suffering. Looking at the question from the point of view of the migrant, 
one may ask what is the meaning of a right to emigrate without a 
corresponding right to immigrate. Where are migrants entitled to settle 
if they are rejected by the States of destination? On the high seas? In the 
unclaimed sector of Antarctica? On the Moon or in outer space? 
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If illegal migrants are in distress at sea, the duty to render assistance 
to persons in danger is an expression of the principle of protection of 
human life which has a longstanding tradition in maritime custom and is 
reflected in Art. 98 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea. Several treaties adopted within the framework of the 
International Maritime Organization aim at ensuring safety of life at sea, 
in particular the 1979 International Convention on Maritime Search and 
Rescue. It provides that any person in distress at sea has the right to be 
rescued and brought to a place of safety. Unfortunately, the thorny 
question left open by the Search and Rescue Convention is how to 
determine where the place of safety is located and consequently where 
the rescued persons are to be delivered. This does not help to ensure 
adequate assistance to rescued people, especially if they consist of large 
groups of migrants.  
According to the 2000 Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants 
by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime, illegal migrants have the right 
to be treated humanely and not as criminals. Also illegal migrants enjoy 
the human rights granted to any individual and arising from customary 
international law and treaties in force. In particular, they have the right 
not to be returned to a State where they could be tortured, as provided 
for, inter alia, in the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 
Some illegal migrants qualify to be considered as refugees under the 
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Unfortunately, the 
international definition of refugee does not include people who are 
trying to flee conflicts, either international or internal, poverty or natural 
disasters (so-called war, economic or environmental refugees). Most of 
present illegal migrants belong to this kind of people. 
If illegal migrants qualify as refugees, they have the right not to be 
returned to a place where their life or freedom would be threatened on 
account of their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion. While the right to receive asylum 
might be granted under the national legislation of States parties, the 
Refugees Convention does not provide the refugee with such a right. 
Here is another instance of asymmetrical rights in international law. A 
refugee, who has a right not to be returned to a country where he is 
threatened, has no right of entry into a given State. He could be rejected 
to a State where he is not threatened. But the latter in its turn has no 
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obligation to allow the refugee to enter its territory. If States, one after 
the other, reject the refugee, where should he be entitled to settle? On 
the high seas? In the unclaimed sector of the Antarctic continent? On the 
Moon or in outer space? 
Although the Refugees Convention is not clear enough on such a 
crucial question, it seems implied in the object and purpose of this treaty 
that a refugee who is outside his country and presents himself to an 
official of a State party has a right to submit an application for asylum 
and to have it processed and screened in a fair and efficient way. States 
cannot play with ‘asymmetrical rights’ beyond a certain extent and 
reach the point where the true objective of a treaty of humanitarian 
nature is denied. If the refugee cannot decide whether, where and when 
he will be admitted, he must at least be granted a right to present himself 
to submit an application. 
At sea, the identification of asylum-seekers and the processing of 
their applications are activities that normally cannot be carried out on 
ships. Consequently, the rescuing or intercepting State is under an 
obligation to disembark the potential refugees in a place where they can 
exercise their right to fair and efficient asylum procedures. Regrettably, 
some States have taken the position that human rights treaties, including 
the Refugees Convention, do not apply outside the national territory and 
have engaged in policies of ‘pushing-back’ potential refugees at sea. 
This was in the past also the policy of Italy which in 2012 was held by 
the European Court of Human Rights responsible for violations of the 
European Convention of Human Rights in a case relating to the 
pushing-back to Libya of illegal migrants.† In fact, the theory that 
human rights treaties apply only within the territory of States parties is 
not only wrong, but is also a mockery of the rule of law. Respect for 
human rights is due to any individual who is under the power or 
effective control of any agent of a State party, wherever he or she 
happens to act, including the high seas. 
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Today Italy has radically changed its previous attitude. In October 
2013, after 366 migrants drowned in the vicinity of the island of 
Lampedusa, it started a policy of engaging units of the navy and police 
bodies (Coast Guard, Finance Guard) to face the humanitarian 
emergency occurring in the waters of the South-Central Mediterranean 
Sea. Illegal migrants and asylum seekers found in unseaworthy boats, 
where they are often abandoned by smugglers, are rescued and 
transported to the Italian territory where applications for asylum are 
processed. A new and more balanced regime of asylum is expected at 
the European Union level to better share the burdens met by 
Mediterranean member States. 
The situation has not changed after the adoption by the United 
Nations Security Council of Resolution 2240 (2015) of 9 October 2015,‡ 
which temporarily authorizes for the purpose of saving human life 
interventions on the high seas off the coast of Libya: 
The Security Council,  
… 
7. Decides, with a view to saving the threatened lives of migrants or of 
victims of human trafficking on board such vessels as mentioned above, 
to authorise, in these exceptional and specific circumstances, for a 
period of one year from the date of the adoption of this resolution, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
‡ The resolution has been adopted with fourteen votes in favour and one against 
(Venezuela).This State disagrees on the use of Chapter VII of the United Nations 
Charter (Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches and acts of aggression) to 
meet illegal migration from Libya: “… we believe that the current humanitarian crisis of 
refugees, who are desperately trying to cross the Mediterranean cannot be tackled with a 
military approach with the pretext of combating international organized crime. This 
serious problem cannot be solved by building walls or by taking military action. … 
Venezuela therefore rejects the notion of making migrants, refugees and asylum seekers 
into a security issue, as has been done on this occasion. The complexity and 
multidimensional nature of this problem requires a comprehensive approach that goes 
beyond the purely military and security approach that some States Members of this body 
seek to promote. … We believe it is not through the use of force or criminalizing the 
phenomenon that this human tragedy will be resolved. It seems that, beyond the 
argument in favour of fighting criminal gangs, the purpose of the resolution is simply to 
prevent these human beings from reaching a safer destination; in other words, to set up a 
policy of raising barriers, where, in the end, we will have a world where the rich 
countries are surrounded by walls that prevent them from seeing and feeling the terrible 
reality of poor people battered by wars, most of which have been supported and 
promoted by the power centres in these rich countries” (intervention by Ramirez 
Carreño at the meeting of 3 October 2015, in U.N. doc. S/PV/.7351, p. 4).  
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Member States, acting nationally or through regional organisations that 
are engaged in the fight against migrant smuggling and human 
trafficking, to inspect on the high seas off the coast of Libya vessels that 
they have reasonable grounds to suspect are being used for migrant 
smuggling or human trafficking from Libya, provided that such Member 
States and regional organisations make good faith efforts to obtain the 
consent of the vessel’s flag State prior to using the authority outlined in 
this paragraph;  
8. Decides to authorise for a period of one year from the date of the 
adoption of this resolution, Member States acting nationally or through 
regional organisations to seize vessels inspected under the authority of 
paragraph 7 that are confirmed as being used for migrant smuggling or 
human trafficking from Libya, and underscores that further action with 
regard to such vessels inspected under the authority of paragraph 7, 
including disposal, will be taken in accordance with applicable 
international law with due consideration of the interests of any third 
parties who have acted in good faith;  
… 
The resolution clearly points out that the rights belonging to 
immigrants and asylum seekers must be fully respected: 
 
The Security Council,  
… 
12. Underscores that this resolution is intended to disrupt the organised 
criminal enterprises engaged in migrant smuggling and human 
trafficking and prevent loss of life and is not intended to undermine the 
human rights of individuals or prevent them from seeking protection 
under international human rights law and international refugee law;  
13. Emphasises that all migrants, including asylum-seekers, should be 
treated with humanity and dignity and that their rights should be fully 
respected, and urges all States in this regard to comply with their 
obligations under international law, including international human rights 
law and international refugee law, as applicable;  
… 
 
In conclusion, many of the relevant facts show that illegal migrants 
are too often the victims not only of smugglers, but also of a number of 
States which try to evade their legal and moral duties by resorting to 
shows of strength against the weakest human beings or to hardly 
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credible legal technicalities. The treaties so far concluded are not 
sufficiently clear to deal with all the problems posed by this great 
human tragedy. The very invention of asymmetrical rights undermines 
the merits of international law in addressing the basic human needs of 
illegal migrants and asylum seekers among them. This is the reason 
why, where different views are admissible, a clear position should be 
taken in favour of the weaker subject, that is the illegal migrant, and 
against the stronger subject, that is the State. If it appears that the 
international rules in force do not offer sufficient protection for the 
weaker party, the only conclusion to be drawn is that the present regime 
should be changed and improved as soon as possible. 
	  	  
CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS OF A COMMON EUROPEAN 
ASYLUM SYSTEM 
Roberto Zaccaria* 
 
1. Introduction. A brief overview of legislation on asylum 
The term ‘asylum’ appears in the first legislative texts of the modern 
era. Article 120 of the 1793 French Constitution specifically states that 
the French people are to “give asylum to foreigners who have been 
banished from their homeland in the name of liberty and refuse it to 
tyrants”. In contemporary times almost all Constitutions contemplate 
asylum. 
I will of course focus on the Italian Constitution. We must remember 
that on the international level asylum is also covered by the United 
Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Geneva 
Convention. On a European level asylum is included in the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights and in the European Union Treaty. 
But not all contemporary constitutional texts are equally convincing. 
For example consider the case of France, closer to the approach taken 
by the Geneva Convention, which focuses on the refugee status. The 
French Constitutional law of 1993 includes a provision that integrates 
the constitutional text of 1958. This norm, considered as unclear by part 
of French doctrine, establishes at Art. 53-1, that: “(…) the authorities of 
the Republic always have the right to grant asylum to any foreigner who 
is persecuted because of activities in favor of liberty or who requests the 
protection of France for other reasons”. 
We will not linger further on this aspect but we will highlight the 
different approaches that can exist among the different States on this 
subject. 
Some preliminary considerations are necessary also on the numerical 
level. Immigration from Africa and the Middle East continues to be 
extremely intense. During the first five months of this year 41,703 
immigrants landed on our shores, compared to 39,900 during the same 
period of last year. The numbers are even greater if we consider Europe 
as a whole and the new routes toward Greece.  
Speaking before the Constitutional Affairs Commission of the 
Senate, Chief of Police Alessandro Pansa stated that during the same 
period of 2015, “there were 24,678 asylum seekers, but this does not 	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mean that they were all entitled to asylum”. Pansa went on to say that: 
“in 2014, 15,726 were actually repatriated, that’s 52% of the expelled, 
while this year only 5,823 out of 12,154 of the expelled were 
repatriated”. 
 
2. The Framework of Constitutional Principles and EU principles  
In Italy the obligation to accept asylum seekers issues from its 
Constitution (Art. 10, par. 3) and from the 1951 Geneva Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees. 
Art. 10, par. 3 states that “the foreigner who is denied in his own 
country the real exercise of democratic liberties guaranteed by the 
Constitution has the right of asylum in the territory of the Republic in 
accordance with the conditions established by law”. The right of the 
individual is directly recognized by the Constitution. The law can only 
regulate the conditions of its exercise.  
According to Art. 1 of the Convention a refugee is an individual who 
flees from his homeland because of the fear of being subjected to 
persecution for one of the reasons listed. Over the years this notion has 
been broadly interpreted (religious or sexual orientation: for example in 
order to protect women who are pursued because of their sex or persons 
who risk criminal prosecution because of their sexual orientation). 
The Convention establishes a more limited notion compared to the 
Constitution, but it has become the cornerstone of the right of asylum on 
a global level. 
Recently the European Union adopted its own system of asylum, 
completed in June 2013 and based on the concept of international 
protection, articulated in the three forms of refugee status, subsidiary 
protection and temporary protection, intended to allow anyone to be 
recognized the status appropriate to his situation. 
A vast discipline is contained in the qualifications, reception and 
procedures directives, of which there is an initial version and one that is 
more recent. The European delegation law of 2013 (Law No. 96/2013) 
contains a delegating act for the transposition of the new ‘qualification”’ 
directive of 2011 (Dir.2011/95/EU adopted to replace Dir. 2004/83/EC). 
The delegation was exercised with the adoption of Legislative Decree 
18, dated 21 February 2014. 
The asylum package is completed by various other measures, 
including the new ‘reception’ directive and the new ‘procedures’ 
directive that, together with the already cited ‘qualification’ directive, 
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form the regulatory basis for this subject matter. The transposition of 
these two acts is contemplated by the 2013 European Delegation Law - 
second semester (Law No. 154/2014) and will go into effect in the next 
few months. 
 
3. Implementation in Italy: delegation for a Unified Act on Asylum 
Procedures 
The European Delegation Law for the second semester of 2013 (at 
Art. 7, Law No. 154/2014) gives the Government mandate to adopt a 
unified act implementing EU directives on the right of asylum, 
subsidiary protection and temporary protection (par. 1).  
The deadline for exercising the delegation is 12 months, starting on 
the entry into force of the legislative decrees for implementation of the 
last two community directives mentioned (reception and procedures).  
 Furthermore, an additional delegation is granted to the Government 
to issue any corrective and supplementary provisions to the unified act, 
to be exercised within 24 months from the entry into force of the unified 
act (par. 2).  
Finally, a financial neutrality clause is also contemplated, according 
to which adoption of the Unified Act may not lead to any new or greater 
burdens to public finance, as the administrations involved will be 
responsible for any tasks associated with implementation of the 
delegation using the resources available according to current legislation 
(par. 3). 
 
4. Italian Case Law: the Court of Cassation and the Constitutional 
Court 
In our country the right of asylum, not lacking in interpretative 
disagreements, has been consolidated by case law. We will refer first to 
ordinary case law and specifically to the Court of Cassation, 
distinguishing three separate phases. 
a) Phase One. A 1997 decision of the Court conferred upon the 
ordinary judge jurisdiction over constitutional asylum, affirming several 
important principles. In primis, the Supreme Court maintains that the 
foreigner who is prevented from the effective exercise of the democratic 
liberties guaranteed by the Italian Constitution in his homeland enjoys, 
pursuant to Art. 10, par. 3 of the Constitution, a “subjective right of 
asylum”. 
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From the constitutional provision, in fact, it is possible to derive a 
norm that is directly effective since “although (it) partly requires 
implementing legal measures, it sets out with sufficient clarity and 
precision the case that grants the right of asylum to the foreigner”. 
The Court maintains that justification for the right of asylum is to be 
found in the “obstacle to the exercise of democratic liberties”, 
specifically highlighting the ‘effective’ nature of such illiberality. 
Nevertheless the Supreme Court is concise regarding one focal point, 
that is on the actual scope of the rights of asylum seekers in the absence 
of any law enforcing Art. 10, par. 3. Here the Court limits itself to 
stating that “nothing else is guaranteed except entry into the State”. 
b) A second phase began around 2006. In the brief period of little 
more than five years the Court of Cassation takes another route and 
inaugurates a new direction, relegating constitutional asylum to a 
limited and marginal role through an argumentative iter that is not 
always linear. 
A more restrictive idea takes shape, maintaining that the content of 
the right of asylum pursuant to Art. 10, par. 3 of the Constitution, in the 
absence of an ordinary implementation law, “must be viewed as the 
right to enter the territory of the State in order to carry out the procedure 
to obtain refugee status”. 
 Starting from these premises, Cassation reaches the point of 
claiming that, in view of the legislative gap, “the right of asylum, which 
may be exercised under the conditions established by law, in reality 
does not exist.” And continues, “the existence of an autonomous right of 
asylum” is considered, apertis verbis, to be “inconsistent”.  
Given the inertia of the legislator, the new legal course of the court 
reduces the right to constitutional asylum to a very slight one. There is a 
return to the ancient, unhealthy controversy of the first half of the 50s 
on the limits and scope of constitutional provisions and on the 
preceptive nature of fundamental rights even in the absence of an 
intervention by the ordinary legislator. The right of asylum, albeit 
proclaimed in a solemn and emphatic manner in the fundamental 
principles of the Charter of the Republic, loses consistency, limited to 
the refugee status in spite of the fact that such status is based on other 
legally appreciable motivations. 
c) The third phase is decidedly a more comforting one. Following 
two fundamental actions by the legislator regarding international 
protection, implementing two European directives, the Court of 
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Cassation abandons its restrictive case law and arrives at an 
interpretation of constitutional asylum that is vaguely ‘internationalist’. 
 In brief, the Supreme Court explicitly transcends previous case law 
according to which the right outlined in Art. 10, par. 3 of the 
Constitution is relegated to a mere procedural or instrumental position, 
but continues to maintain that there is no margin for direct application 
of constitutional asylum. In other words, given the framework of 
protections provided within this international system, it would no longer 
be necessary to have a specific implementation law for constitutional 
asylum. The Court of Cassation has added various other aspects to this 
reasoning in subsequent and even recent decisions, maintaining, with 
greater clarity, that the system of international protection (specifically 
subsidiary protection), as well as internal residual protection 
(humanitarian protection), fulfills the need to  
 
“include in the system […] cases of risk of serious harm to 
personal safety or other relevant violations of human rights, not 
attributable to the persecutory model of refuge, because generated 
by endemic situations of conflict and domestic violence, by 
inertia or by the collusion of state powers or subjective conditions 
of vulnerability that cannot be corrected in the country or origin”.  
 
This led the judge to state, perhaps with too much emphasis, that the 
two types of international protection (refuge and subsidiary protection) 
and the internal humanitarian measure, residual and atypical, “have 
finally led to implementation of the constitutional right of asylum”. 
The Constitutional Court did not specifically intervene on the subject 
of asylum but did take the opportunity to affirm important principles in 
its case law concerning the legal condition of the foreigner.  
We point out in particular decision 148/2008 regarding residence’s 
permit. Through various interventions (see decisions 203/1997, 
252/2001, 432/2005 and 324/2006) the Court was able first of all to 
recognize that the foreigner is entitled to all the fundamental rights to 
which individuals are entitled by the Constitution. 
 Secondly, the Court pointed out the need for the legislator to respect 
the canon of reasonableness, the expression of the principle of equality, 
that, in general terms, affects the enjoyment of all subjective positions. 
Finally, the Court emphasized that regulating the entry and residence 
of foreigners into the national territory is connected to the consideration 
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of diverse public interests, such as, for example, public safety and 
health, public order, international obligations and the national policy on 
immigration and that this consideration is the responsibility primarily of 
the ordinary legislator, who has broad discretionary powers on the 
matter, limited, from the perspective of compliance with the 
Constitution, only by the obligation that his choices not be manifestly 
unreasonable (as per decision No. 206/2006 and decree No. 361/2007).  
 
5. The Dublin Regulation and the Common System of Asylum. 
Humanitarian Operations: Mare Nostrum, Frontex and Triton 
It is within this constitutional and legal context that we must place 
the supranational law that concerns the European framework within 
which our country operates. Since the end of the 90s the European 
Union has been involved in the creation of a common European system 
of asylum (CEAS) intended to guarantee a common approach by 
member States on the subject of asylum in order to provide high 
standards of protection for refugees. In this initiative an essential role is 
played by the Dublin System. The first edition of this system is 
contained in the Dublin Convention of 1990. 
This system was updated with the Dublin Regulation II (Reg. (EU) 
343/2003, thus called as adopted to replace the Dublin Convention 
concerning determination of the State competent to examine an 
application for asylum. 
After completion of the first phase there began a reflection on further 
development of the common system. The 2007 Green Book was the 
basis for a public consultation that led to the development by the 
Commission of a Plan of Action on Asylum, presented in June 2008, 
and the updating of the norm in order to identify more flexible, fair and 
effective laws and to produce a true common policy on asylum. As 
noted by a study of the European Council on Refugees and Exiles 
(ECRE) in September 2013, there are still significant differences in 
regulations and practices among the member States. 
The second phase concluded in 2013 with the final approval of new 
provisions to replace previous ones. The legal apparatus is very complex 
and regrettably also very recent. Let’s take a look at why all that has 
happened and that is still happening unfortunately risks making this 
complex normative system that we must nevertheless remember, 
anachronistic. 
	  	  
55 
The new provisions intended to reform the entire discipline were the 
following: Dublin Regulation III (EU) n. 604/2013 dated 26 June 2013 
replacing Dublin Regulation II (implemented as of 1 January 2014); the 
new EURODAC regulation for comparison of fingerprints for purposes 
of application of the Dublin Regulation Reg. (EU) No.603/2013 dated 
26 June 2013, replacing Reg. (EU) No. 2725/2000; the EASO regulation 
that establishes the European office for asylum support: Reg (EU) No. 
439/2010 dated 19 May 2010.  
But what are the facts, in many respects dramatic, that have so 
profoundly changed the status of things? In October 2013, after an 
extremely serious tragedy near Lampedusa (with over 350 victims) Italy 
launched operation Mare Nostrum. Heroic and extraordinary rescue 
operations were performed by our armed forces, employed in a peace 
operation of gigantic proportions. A year later, in an attempt to involve 
Europe, Mare Nostrum ceased and was replaced by Frontex and Triton, 
with however more limited goals. 
A new tragedy took place the beginning of 2015 in which more than 
nine hundred persons lost their lives in the collision between a boat 
overloaded with immigrants and a rescue merchant ship which deeply 
disturbed all Europe. 
Numerous extraordinary conferences and meetings of community 
bodies, the European Commission, Parliament and Council are being 
held these weeks.  
 
6. The new ‘positions’ of Europe 
An increasingly clear and plural dimension of Europe begins to 
emerge. The various bodies do not always speak in the same tone. The 
President of the European Commission, even though representative of a 
conservative party, is the spearhead of a new and more open policy. 
Little of new and a tendency to hold back rather than provide new 
impulses is issuing from the various European councils. We must 
remember that a new document outlining 10 points has come out in the 
past few weeks, one with many lights but also with many shadows. And 
we must also take note of the much more significant positions taken by 
the European Parliament. 
 The Commission has finally presented a European Agenda with 
some significant novelties. 
One interesting premise contained in the Agenda is the frank 
admission by the EU Commission that “our common European policy 
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on immigration was not adequate”. For this reason, the European 
Agenda on immigration lays the groundwork for a new policy. The road 
indicated by Brussels, in effect, contemplates four significant moves, 
designated as ‘pillars’. First: decrease incentives to illegal immigration, 
specifically by assigning liaison officers and European delegations to 
the principal third countries. Second: manage frontiers, saving lives and 
reinforcing external boundaries. This will be possible by increasing the 
role and the capabilities of Frontex and by helping third countries to 
reinforce their frontier management capabilities. Third: a strong 
common policy on political asylum. In this case, priority must be to give 
full implementation of the common European system of reception, 
specifically by promoting the identification of migrants, setting up a 
systematic file of digital fingerprints, strengthening directives on asylum 
in countries of origin and reviewing the Dublin Regulation (the rule that 
obliges migrants to remain in the country of initial entry) in 2016. 
Finally, the fourth pillar calls for adoption of a new policy on legal 
immigration: through the modernization and review of the system of 
Blue Cards (the residence’s permit for workers from non-EU countries), 
giving new priorities to our policies on integration and maximizing the 
benefits of the immigration policy for privates and for countries of 
origin, also by facilitating safer remittances. 
The first and instinctive consideration that should be accomplished 
concerns a sort of ‘non-vision’ of Europe. One of the problems that has 
always existed in the EU is that it has always considered the economic 
aspect as the sole horizon, almost never considering the political aspect. 
The greatest sin of the EU is the fact that it continues to observe every 
event that affects our interests from a strictly economic-financial 
perspective, thus the blind allocation of public money as the sole 
practicable solution.  
Allow me however to assess these European decisions in a more 
insightful manner, in the words of the Italian Refugee Council of which 
I have been President for little over a year. Were I to express a brief 
assessment I would speak only of a ‘moderate’ satisfaction. 
First of all, the extension of the territorial mandate and financial 
capability of the Triton and Poseidon missions accomplished by Frontex 
is highly significant.  
 
“One of the most pressing demands during these months has been 
the resumption of the Mare Nostrum mission in a European 
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perspective. With the expansion of the Frontex mission as currently 
defined, covering the same geographic area as Mare Nostrum and 
envisaging a slightly greater financial endowment, and with clear 
specification of the function of search and rescue as one of the priority 
tasks of the European mission we must say that we have reached an 
important goal in attempting to reduce the risks of victims at sea”. 
 
Regarding on the other hand the subject of mandatory ‘quotas’ on the 
basis of which asylum seekers in clear need of international protection 
arriving in Greece and Italy are to be redistributed, there are various 
ways of viewing this system: the European one, the Italian one and 
perspective of the asylum seeker. 
From the European perspective, this introduction seems to be the 
first true derogation of the Dublin System and from this aspect it is of 
fundamental importance. For Italy, the possibility of transferring 24,000 
asylum seekers in 2 years can help decongest a system that is 
deteriorating with reference to both reception and analysis of asylum 
applications.  
But from the perspective of asylum seekers we fear this system is not 
useful at all. 
If in determining the countries to which they are to be transferred we 
do not take into serious consideration family and cultural ties and their 
potential for integration, we believe these transfers will be a failure. 
After a short while the refugees will begin to move toward other 
countries of the Union, thus increasing their secondary movements even 
further. 
We believe that the 6 thousand euro that the European Union is 
contemplating for States who take in asylum seekers, should be used to 
structure more credible programs of integration. We are also perplexed 
by the fact that the asylum seekers to be transferred are selected 
according to their nationality – only Syrians and Eritreans – when the 
international framework of protection always starts from the individual 
situation rather than national groups. 
Finally, another positive aspect: the program of resettlement for 20 
thousand refugees.  
 
“We are however perplexed both concerning the number that 
seems frankly too small and the membership of member States on 
a voluntary basis. This is a first step, albeit a small one, in the 
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right direction. We now ask that the European institutions take a 
more courageous road to open legal channels of entry in order to 
provide an effective response to the growing need for protection: 
the resettlement programs should be greatly strengthened, 
programs of humanitarian admission and sponsorship activated 
and the presuppositions to ask for asylum from countries of origin 
and transit created”. 
 
7. Conclusions 
We must realize that these great migrations, either for economic or 
humanitarian reasons, are not an isolated factor: the economic 
conditions of the planet and the current state of wars form a dramatic 
chessboard. 
Those who are under the mistaken impression that they can be 
stopped with walls, naval blockades or weapons are profoundly 
mistaken. Of course there are xenophobic movements in all of Europe, 
but they will not change the course of history. A great cultural 
movement is needed. We require national and European policies 
appropriate to the times in which we live. 
In Italy fundamental laws are needed, laws that we have been 
waiting for far too long: a law on citizenship, a law on immigration, a 
law on religious freedom. It is indispensable for there to be a greater 
opening and greater solidarity within Europe. These matters must pass 
to European competence. 
The system of asylum must be managed in a European manner. 
Centers of initial reception must be European and not national. The 
large centers must be abandoned and replaced with a capillary system in 
the various countries.  
We must put in place new policies, rapidly abandon the logic of 
emergency, prepare adequate investments, demonstrate that our nations 
and Europe as a whole will be able to offer models of reception, in a 
word we must build bridges, open doors and demolish all barriers with 
determination.  
	  	  
THE EUROPEAN AGENDA ON ASYLUM AND IMMIGRATION.  
FROM THE STRUGGLE TO STOP ‘ILLEGAL’ IMMIGRATION  
TO THE WAR AGAINST REFUGEES 
Fulvio Vassallo Paleologo* 
 
1. Crocodile tears and measures of dissuasion. Europe denies its 
own fundamental principles 
The great tragedies of immigration, from the disappearance at sea of 
thousands of persons south of Lampedusa to the continuing massive 
influxes along the Balkan route, provide the opportunity for yet another 
reinforcement of policies to combat what is defined as ‘illegal’ 
immigration. With our own eyes we are witnessing the construction of 
new walls and concentration camps. There is a proliferation of summary 
practices of collective expulsions, without the long awaited decisions to 
enact more effective rescue operations at sea and no prospects of legal 
and safe channels of entry. In the more exposed European countries, 
such as Italy and Greece, there are no proper and dignified systems of 
reception that respect the choices of refugees. Hundreds of thousands of 
people are being forced to move through Europe in an irregular status 
and thus exposed not only to blackmail by traffickers on land and sea 
but also to the hostile actions of European police forces. 
The proposals submitted by the European Commission to open legal 
entry channels (limited for the time being only to highly skilled 
workers), for the easing of the Dublin III Regulation through the 
introduction of a system of shared responsibility for those seeking 
asylum, and for their relocation from countries of initial entry and their 
transfer from third countries in which they have found refuge, seem 
destined to be abandoned. This is happening primarily because of the 
opposition of Eastern European countries of recent entry into the Union, 
especially Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, following the 
clear opposition to any large-scale reception schemes already expressed 
by Denmark, Great Britain and France. The entire issue seems to be 
shifting toward repressive measures to combat ‘illegal’ immigration and 
agreements to be concluded with third countries for their involvement in 
the repatriation of irregular ‘economic’ migrants. 
It really is not sufficient to point out that the situation in the 
Mediterranean is a ‘tragedy’, as acknowledged in the final declaration 
issued by the Extraordinary European Summit of 23rd April, convened 
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at the request of Italy. And it is hypocritical to claim that that best way 
to reduce the number of victims at sea is to seek cooperation agreements 
with the countries of origin and of transit. The times required to 
conclude such negotiations are medium to long term at best and in the 
meantime people could continue to die. In addition to the fact that the 
majority of migrants is escaping from dictatorships and wars that are 
being fuelled by those very countries with which the European Union 
would like to negotiate. To say that these talks aimed at entering into 
new bilateral agreements are an ‘immediate priority’ means recognising 
that the cooperation of countries like Sudan, Eritrea, Niger, Chad, 
Gambia and Mali is required in order to stop and detain migrants before 
they reach Europe. Such is the political scheme, linked to a re-launching 
of commercial exchanges, as per the Khartoum Process, submitted by 
Italy to the Presidency of the European Union during the second 
semester of last year, and re-launched by the Extraordinary Council of 
Brussels. A plan that could be achieved completely with the support of 
the European Council, as evidenced by the proposals already defined as 
disseminated by Statewatch. In this area in fact the European Council 
has deprived the European Parliament of competences assigned to it by 
European Treaties on immigration and asylum. 
In order to restore a deterrent effect to repatriation policies it appears 
that the principal goal now consists in a clearer separation between 
economic migrants and asylum seekers. The European agenda on 
immigration presented by the Commission this past 13 May placed great 
emphasis on the distinction between economic migrants, to be arrested 
and denied entry, and asylum seekers, in light of the stricter norms (now 
obsolete, given the current characteristics of internal conflicts) of the 
1951 Geneva Convention. Any summary practice of refoulement and 
administrative detention seems justified, even to the detriment of human 
life, as absolute priority is still given to fighting human trafficking, in 
the wake of the Protocols to the U.N. Convention on transnational crime 
adopted in Palermo in the year 2000. Documents that in 2008 led to 
agreements for re-admission and refoulement even with such countries 
as Libya, a country that had not even adhered to the 1951 Geneva 
Convention on refugees. Not even the negative ruling of the European 
Court of Human Rights on the Hirsi case regarding the illegal push-
backs to Libya carried out by Italy was sufficient. An issue that today no 
longer seems to matter. Yet, on September 1, 2015, the European Court 
of Human Rights handed down another ruling against Italy’s collective 
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refoulement toward Tunisia in 2011. If countries are no longer allowed 
to enact collective refusals they attempt to block escapees before they 
depart, transferring to the governments of countries of transit resources 
and means to stop those migrants that Europe also considers as ‘illegal’, 
just as Gadhafi defined potential asylum seekers from Somalia and 
Eritrea.  
Regarding the conclusions adopted by Brussels on 25 June 2015 
“Return policy: Mobilise all tools to promote readmission of 
unauthorised economic migrants to countries of origin and transit …” a 
distinction is introduced between economic migrants and asylum 
seekers or refugees that in no way considers the current composition of 
migration nor the very diversified application, in the various EU 
countries, of Directives on repatriation and international protection, 
especially concerning qualifications and methods of appeal against 
rejection and/or expulsion rulings. 
 
2. Prospects of military intervention in Libya  
Brussels states that “instability in Libya is creating an ideal 
environment for the criminal activities of traffickers” and that all efforts 
by the United Nations will be sustained for the re-establishment of 
government authority in that country. Furthermore, efforts to “address 
the conflicts and instability as key push factors of migration, to include 
Syria”, must be intensified, and they are already considering a series of 
‘targeted’ military interventions, not only in Libya but also in the 
countries along its southern border. Operations that the European Union 
by itself obviously cannot sustain, and that are being asked to be 
activated within the context of a United Nations mandate and forces. 
Regarding this issue European Commissioner Mogherini received a 
mandate from the European Council on April 23, 2014, to request a 
decision by the Security Council. However, we do not see on what legal 
and de facto basis one can invoke a United Nations Charter that 
envisages, in chapt. VII, the Security Council having determined the 
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of 
aggression (art. 39), in addition to enacting sanctions against a State (but 
not implying the use of force) such as the partial or total interruption of 
communications and economic relations by other States (art. 41), actual 
armed actions (Art. 42). The proposal submitted by the Italian 
government to Brussels, to “establish safety zones along areas of the 
Libyan coast” is a violation of sovereign rights, attributable to the two 
	  	  
62 
Libyan governments currently involved in a difficult process of 
reconciliation under the sponsorship of the UN, and appears to be 
completely impracticable on the basis of an international mandate that 
should be conferred upon the European Union by the United Nations 
Security Council. A proposal that after being denied by the government 
of Tripoli met with the complete opposition of the UN Secretary 
General following the clear stance taken by the Rapporteur for the High 
Commissioner of the United Nations on Human Rights, Francois 
Crepeau. 
The negative judgment on targeted military interventions over 
Libyan territory “against criminal organizations involved in trafficking”, 
a clear ruling reiterated by Ban Ki-Moon on various occasions, certifies 
the failure of this attempt from the very start, one that was 
recommended on a European level by Italy and that is a true folly from a 
political and military perspective. “There is no military solution to the 
human tragedy that is taking place in the Mediterranean”, stated the 
Secretary General of the UN, in an interview published in the Stampa 
and in the Secolo XIX following his latest meeting with Renzi. For Ban 
Ki-Moon what is required is a “collective response that addresses the 
root causes, the security and the human rights of migrants and refugees, 
such as safe and legal channels of migration”. 
What is needed is a comprehensive approach to the entire regional 
context of migrations in the Mediterranean, with no simplistic solutions 
based on military operations and blockades, in respect of the primary 
values of human life, peace and the rights of refugees. From this 
perspective it is essential that in addition to pacification in Libya, we 
reach a political solution to the crisis in Syria that has produced a 
number of refugees without precedent in neighbouring countries, while 
only a minimum number of the refugees forced to flee have been able to 
reach Europe. Syrian refugees must be provided with guaranteed secure 
channels of evacuation, especially from Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey, 
and humanitarian corridors for resettlement, not only toward the 
European Union, by the immediate suspension of the Dublin III 
Regulation, implementation of the measures envisaged by Directive 
2001/55/CE on the mass influx of displaced persons, and mutual 
recognition (among the different countries of the EU) of the procedures 
for international protection, until the cessation of hostilities that have 
destroyed the majority of the cities and caused hundreds of thousands of 
victims. 
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Similar possibilities of rescue and protection of human life must be 
guaranteed to all potential asylum seekers, of different nationalities, 
trapped in Libya, the Sudan and Niger, who are increasingly subject to 
kidnappings and torture for purposes of extortion. For the Eritreans also, 
who are arriving in great numbers these months with marks of violence 
and abuse, we must open legal channels of evacuation from Libya and 
protected entry into Europe, by granting entry visas  for reasons of 
temporary protection, activating the measures envisaged by Directive 
2001/55/CE for cases of mass influx of refugees. 
 
3. Modify or suspend the Dublin III Regulation. Mutual 
acknowledgment of decisions recognising the right to international 
protection 
The points of the decision adopted by the European Council calling 
for a “rapid and full transposition and effective implementation of the 
Common European Asylum System by all participating Member States” 
and to “increase humanitarian aid to frontline member States and take 
into consideration the options to organize emergency transfer among all 
member states on a voluntary basis” do not modify the Dublin III 
Regulation currently in force, as the concept of first country of entry, the 
lynchpin of the readmission system, remains unchanged, nor do they 
appear to guarantee their full implementation from the perspective of 
possible family reunification. The recent mass movements of refugees 
through the Balkan Route profoundly impacted the concrete value of the 
Dublin III Regulation, before it was modified as had been demanded for 
years. A growing number of nations have reintroduced border controls 
and it does not appear that this situation will change in the short term. In 
addition to the Dublin III Regulation, suspended or not implemented 
along European frontiers that are becoming increasingly militarized, the 
principle of free movement affirmed in the Treaty and in the Schengen 
Regulation is also at risk.  
The proposal, expressed in the decisions of the European Council in 
June 2015, to “distribute teams of EASO in member States in order to 
jointly process applications for asylum, including identification and 
fingerprinting” appears to be an innovative aspect with unforeseeable 
consequences regarding the secondary mobility of refugees in the 
various European countries. If the European Union should actually 
succeed in sending these teams to the ports of entry there could be an 
explosion of reception centres in the event of a mass influx of refugees. 
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The photosignalling and recourse to measures of administrative 
detainment, which would be mandatory at that point, could cause a 
grave humanitarian crisis overburdening the few centres of detention 
that have remained in operation, exactly as occurred in Italy prior to the 
implementation of the European Union Directives on reception and on 
procedures for recognition of international protection. 
Mutual recognition of the decisions that establish the right to 
international protection is needed, eliminating the requirement for 
procedures for recognition of international protection in the country of 
first entry. 
The refugees’ right to free movement in Europe must be ensured by 
accelerating and simplifying procedures. In the immediate future all 
those who are re-admitted into Italy by other European countries must 
be supported through special measures of an assistance, legal and 
psychological nature, by implementing the Regulation. This will ensure 
subsequent possibilities of mobility, the right to appeal and the right to 
family reunification. 
 
4. From the European Commission a proposal on forced repatriation 
beyond the rule of law and the principle of non-refoulement. 
Concerning the reinforcement of policies on forced repatriation, 
furthermore, the creation of ‘hotspots’ in the areas closest to the sites of 
arrival in Europe, at least two in Sicily, should allow, in addition to 
greater cooperation between Frontex, Eurojust and Europol in the search 
for alleged smugglers, and with the assistance of EASO (European 
agency of ‘support’ for nations in difficulty with requests for asylum), 
for rapid selection regarding those who are admitted to procedures for 
recognition of international protection and irregular migrants. This 
should lead to more rigorous identification procedures. In this manner, 
through an improved functionality of the SIS (Schengen Information 
System), we could stimulate repatriation from a country other than the 
country that adopted the provision for forced removal, always remaining 
within the context and with the guarantees of the Directive on return 
2008/115/CE. According to the documents proposed by the European 
Commission, these forced repatriations should be entrusted to Frontex 
(the agency for external border control), which should be further 
strengthened and refinanced. 
In conclusion we risk witnessing the total distortion of the founding 
Regulation of the Frontex Agency 2007/2004/CE and non-compliance 
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with the procedures that European Union law establishes for 
modification of the Regulations. This risk is also noted in Brussels, such 
that the more recent documents issued by the Commission highlight the 
need for substantial changes to the founding Regulation of Frontex No. 
2007/2004/CE.  
 
5. New cases of administrative detention of denied asylum applicants 
and forced fingerprinting 
The increased possibilities of administrative detainment and forced 
repatriation, following an accelerated examination of asylum requests, 
with a binding extension of the “list of safe third countries”, the 
objective toward which the new European policy on asylum is directed, 
could violate both the minimum guarantees granted in terms of the right 
to defence as outlined in Directive 2008/115/CE and the procedures 
envisaged by the recently issued Directive Procedures 2013/32/CE. A 
risk already present in Italy in light of the scheme of the Legislative 
decree of transposal approved by the Council of Ministers on May 18, 
and that will go into force on September 30, envisaging the 
administrative detention in the CIE of asylum applicants at “risk of 
flight” or who are rejected. But there could be new cases of 
administrative detainment for those migrants who refuse to provide 
fingerprints. Following Italy’s conviction by the European Court of 
Human Rights, there are other possibilities of appeal, both before the 
European Court of Human Rights for violation of norms that prohibit 
torture and inhuman or degrading treatment (art. 3) and that recognise 
the right to effective remedy (art. 6) ECHR, and before the Court of 
Justice of Luxembourg for non-implementation of Union Directives or 
Regulations or for the discord that exists among the more recent 
operational instructions issued by the Frontex Agency and the limits of 
its mandate. 
The purpose of the European Plan against human trafficking (2015-
2020) approved by the Commission aims to overcome those regulations 
of the rule of law, beginning with habeas corpus and jurisdictional 
competence, that are experienced along European frontiers, especially 
by the police forces, as a brake to repressive activities. Activities 
considered essential to discourage what for many remains simply 
‘illegal immigration’. Even in the instructions issued by the Brussels 
authorities, it is clear that the attention of the public is shifting from the 
tragedies of the migrants who continue to die at sea, and the many walls 
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that block the movement of persons in Europe, toward the “war against 
human trafficking”, perhaps with military intervention in the countries 
of transit, such as Libya. It is thus important to inform of the real 
content of the decisions adopted by the various bodies of the European 
Union before the effects are felt in the practices applied by police 
authorities, as usual, against migrants and those who provide them with 
assistance. Immigration and the right to asylum are becoming an 
increasingly democratic concern. It is not the European identity that is at 
risk, but the rule of law. 
	  
  
L’EXPULSION DES ETRANGERS POUR DES RAISONS DE 
SECURITE NATIONALE A LA LUMIERE DE LA CONVENTION 
EUROPEENNE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME 
Anna Liguori* 
 
1. Introduction  
L’exigence de la lutte contre le terrorisme – qui s’est accentuée après 
le 11 septembre 2001 et à nouveau après les attaques de 2015 à Paris – 
peut comporter de sérieux problèmes d’incompatibilité avec les droits 
de l’homme. Parmi les catégories de sujets les plus directement 
concernées, il y a celle des étrangers: non seulement ils peuvent être 
victimes de violations de droits humains de même que les citoyens1, 
mais les règles en matière d’entrée et d’expulsion2, en particulier à 
travers l’augmentation des pouvoirs discrétionnaires de l’exécutif et la 
réduction des garanties procédurales3, ont été modifiées dans le sens 
d’une restriction. Comme le souligne E. Guild, “The 11 September 
                                                
* University of Naples “L’Orientale”. 
1 Dans un rapport de la FIDH (Fédération internationale des droits de l’Homme), 
rendu public au mois d’octobre 2005, rapport qui «s’attache à démontrer que lutte anti-
terroriste et respect des droits de l’homme sont non seulement compatibles, mais que le 
second est une condition de l’acceptabilité et de l’efficacité de la première» (voir H. 
Mock, “‘Guerres’ contre le terrorisme et droits de l’homme”, in Revue Trimestrielle des 
Droits de l’Homme, 2006, p. 23 et ss.), sont dégagées six catégories de droits 
fondamentaux les plus menacées par les mesures anti-terroristes. Les cinq premières 
catégories concernent tous, citoyens et non, et sont les garanties relatives à: 1) arrêt et 
détention; 2) procès; 3) vie privée; 4) libertés d’expression et d’information; 5) propriété 
privée; la sixième par contre concerne spécifiquement les garanties reconnues aux 
immigrés, réfugiés et demandeurs d’asile. 
2 Voir E. Guild “Aliens and Counter-terrorism”, Routledge Handbook of Law and 
Terrorism (G. Lennon, C. Walker dir.); London, 2015; Terrorism and the Foreigner- A 
decade of tension around the rule of law in Europe (A. Baldaccini, E. Guild dir.), 
Leiden, 2006; Lutte contre le terrorisme et droits fondamentaux (E. Bribosia, A. 
Weyembergh dir.), Bruxelles, 2002; P. De Sena, “Esigenze di sicurezza nazionale e 
tutela dei diritti dell’uomo nella recente prassi europea”, in Ordine internazionale e 
valori etici, Atti VIII Convegno SIDI (N. Boschiero dir.), Naples, 2004, p. 195 sqq. Pour 
un examen des modifications intervenues au niveau de l’Union européenne voir The 
Impact, Legitimacy and Effectiveness of EU Counter-Terrorism (F. de Londras, J. 
Doody dir.), London, 2015; A. Adinolfi, “Politica dell’immigrazione dell’Unione 
europea e lotta al terrorismo”, in Diritti umani e diritto internazionale,  2008, p. 483 ss. 
3 A. Baldaccini remarque dans son Introduction: “Asylum and immigration law is 
more vulnerable to exceptional measures than other areas of law” (Terrorism and the 
Foreigner…, cit., p. xiv). 
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attacks transformed the face of the foreigner into a prima facie face of 
terrorism”4. Toutefois, s’il est vrai que les exigences relatives à la sûreté 
nationale peuvent être invoquées dans certains cas pour apposer des 
limites et des dérogations5 au respect des droits humains, de même qu’il 
est vrai que les États jouissent d’une marge d’appréciation à cet effet, il 
convient de noter, néanmoins, qu’un tel pouvoir n’est pas sans bornes.  
Notre travail s’inscrit dans cette perspective et entend examiner 
quelles sont les limites que la Convention européenne des droits de 
l’homme pose au pouvoir d’expulsion pour des raisons de sécurité des 
États.  
 
2. Cadre Légal 
La Cour européenne des droits de l’homme a toujours fait appel à un 
principe de droit international général selon lequel les États ont le droit, 
sans préjudice pour les engagements dérivant des traités, de contrôler 
l’entrée, le séjour et l’éloignement des non nationaux6. Toutefois les 
organes de Strasbourg (la Commission et la Cour jusqu’à l’entrée en 
vigueur du Protocole n. 11, la nouvelle Cour à partir du 1er novembre 
1998) garantissent, à des conditions particulières, une protection «par 
ricochet» aux immigrés visés par une mesure d’expulsion ou un refus du 
permis de séjour, au cas où cette mesure comporterait un préjudice dans 
la jouissance des droits garantis par la Convention – en particulier en ce 
qui concerne le droit à ne pas être soumis à la torture ou à des 
traitements inhumains ou dégradants (article 3 CEDH) – et le droit au 
respect de la vie privée et familiale (article 8 CEDH). 
La Cour a affirmé la possibilité de violation «par ricochet» 
également en ce qui concerne les articles 5 et 6 CEDH, qui protègent 
respectivement le droit à la liberté et à un procès équitable, mais 
uniquement dans les cas où le requérant serait exposé dans le pays de 
                                                
4 Cf. E. Guild, “International terrorism and EU Immigration, Asylum and Borders 
Policy: The Unexpected Victims of 11th September”, in European Foreign Affairs 
Review, 2003, p. 336. 
5 Voir, parmi les nombreuses contributions, G. Cataldi, “Art. 15”, Commentario 
breve alla Convenzione europea (S. Bartole, P. De Sena, V. Zagrebelky dir.), Padova, 
2012; T. Christakis, “Etat avant le droit? : l’exception de ‘sécurité nationale’ en droit 
International”, in Revue Générale de droit international public, 2008, p. 5 sqq.; P. 
Tavernier, “Art. 15”, in La Convention européenne des droits de l’homme: commentaire 
article par article (L.-E. Pettiti, E. Decaux, P.-H. Imbert dir.), 1999, Paris. 
6 Par contre, les expulsions des nationaux et les expulsions collectives d’étrangers 
sont explicitement interdites (articles 3 et 4 du Protocole n. 4). 
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destination à un risque de «violation flagrante» de ces dispositions. 
Dans l’affaire Othman c. Royaume Uni, du 17 janvier 2012, la Cour a 
reconnu pour la première fois la violation «par ricochet» de l’art. 6 dans 
la mesure où, pour le cas du requérant expulsé vers la Jordanie, il 
existait un risque réel que des preuves obtenues par la torture soient 
admises lors du procès dans le pays de destination7. Par la suite, la Cour, 
dans l’arrêt El Masri c. l’ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine8, du 
13 Décembre 2012, a condamné l’Etat défendeur  pour violation «par 
ricochet» de l’article 5 pour avoir remis le requérant à la CIA alors 
même qu’il connaissait ou aurait dû connaitre le risque inhérent à ce 
transfert : il s’agissait dans le cas d’espèce d’une «extraordinary 
rendition», impliquant – comme l’avait déjà reconnu la Cour dans des 
affaires précédentes9 – une détention «en dehors du système juridique 
ordinaire», et donc totalement incompatible avec l’Etat de droit10.  
Enfin, des garanties ultérieures en cas d’expulsion d’étrangers, de 
nature procédurale, proviennent de l’art. 1 du Protocole n. 7, de l’art. 13 
et de l’ art. 5 par. 4.  
 
3. L’expulsion de terroristes et le risque de torture ou de traitements 
inhumains et dégradants dans le pays de destination 
La Convention européenne des droits de l’homme ne prévoit pas 
d’interdiction explicite de non refoulement; toutefois, à partir de 
l’affaire Soering, de 1989 (en matière d’extradition11), la Cour 
européenne des droits de l’homme a reconnu une violation «par 
ricochet» de l’art. 3, qui interdit la torture et les traitements inhumains et 
dégradants, lorsque, en cas d’éloignement, il y a un risque réel de subir 
                                                
7 Voir par. 3. 
8 Voir N. Napoletano, “Extraordinary renditions, tortura, sparizioni forzate e 
«diritto alla verità»: alcune riflessioni sul caso El-Masri”, in Diritti umani e diritto 
internazionale, n. 2/201, p. 331 ss.; F. Mussi, “Extraordinary Renditions as Enforced 
Disappearances? The Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights”, ibidem, p. 
365 ss.; F. Fabbrini, “The European Court of Human Rights, Extraordinary Renditions 
and the Right to the Truth: Ensuring Accountability for Gross Human Rights Violations 
Committed in the Fight Against Terrorism”, in Human Rights Law Review, 2014, p. 85 
ss.  
9 Babar Ahmad et autres c. Royaume Uni, arrêt du 6 Juillet 2010, §§ 113-114. 
10 Voir aussi Al Nashiri c. Pologne, arrêt du 24 juillet 2014, § 531 et Nasr et Ghali 
c. Italie (Abu Omar), arrêt du 23 février 2016, § 302. 
11 Voir, ex multis, G. Gaja, “Rapporti tra trattati di estradizione e norme 
internazionali sui diritti umani”, in Diritti dell’uomo, estradizione ed espulsione (F. 
Salerno dir.), Padova, 2003, 125 ss. 
  
70 
un tel traitement dans le pays de destination. En outre, à partir de 
l’affaire Chahal c. Royaume Uni, du 15 novembre 1996, la Cour de 
Strasbourg a solennellement affirmé que cette interdiction a un caractère 
absolu et impératif, quelle que soit la conduite de la personne à éloigner, 
même si l’individu en question constitue un danger pour la sûreté 
nationale de l’État d’origine. 
Cependant, plusieurs États12 ont essayé de pousser la Cour 
européenne des droits de l’homme13 à modifier sa jurisprudence, en 
l’invitant à évaluer le risque de torture que l’individu encoure à la 
lumière de la menace qu’il représente pour la vie de la collectivité. Dans 
cette direction, une tentative a été faite pour la première fois dans 
l’affaire Ramzy c. Pays Bas, et introduite le 15 Juillet 200514 (voir, à cet 
effet, les observations – en tant que tiers intervenants – de la Grande-
Bretagne, de la Lituanie, de la Slovaquie et du Portugal). Toutefois, le 
premier arrêt sur le fond, dans lequel la Cour a solennellement réaffirmé 
ce qu’elle avait déjà déclaré dans l’affaire Chahal c. Royaume Uni, a été 
Saadi c. Italie, du 28 février 200815: il concerne l’expulsion d’un 
                                                
12 La position de la Grande Bretagne a été particulièrement explicite : en 2003, le 
Premier ministre de l’époque Tony Blair avait même avancé la proposition de dénoncer 
la CEDH et de la ratifier à nouveau, seulement après l’apposition d’une réserve visant à 
éviter l’applicabilité de la jurisprudence Chahal: voir à ce sujet J. Rosenberg, “Should 
Britain Twist Human Rights Law to Meet its own Ends?”, in Daily Telegraph, 30 
janvier 2003, p. 21. 
13 Voir aussi la position de la Suède et du Canada devant le Comité contre la torture 
et le Comité des droits de l’homme. Sur les décisions de ces organismes voir A. Liguori, 
Le garanzie procedurali avverso l’espulsione degli immigrati in Europa, Napoli, 2008, 
p. 193 ss. 
14 Cette requête a été rayée du rôle le 20 juillet 2010, les avocats ayant perdu tout 
contact avec le requérant. 
15 Sur cet arrêt voir D. Moekli, “Saadi v. Italy: the Rules of the Game Have not 
Changed”, in Human Rights Law Review, 2008, p. 534 ss.; F. De Londras, “International 
Decisions: Saadi v. Italy”, in American Journal of International Law, 2008, p. 616 ss.; 
G. L. Cernic, “National Security and Expulsion to a Risk of Torture”, in Edinburgh Law 
Review, 2008, p. 486 ss.; A. Gianelli, “Il carattere assoluto dell’obbligo di non-
refoulement: la sentenza Saadi della Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo”, in Rivista di 
diritto internazionale, 2008, p. 449 ss.; A. Saccucci, “Espulsioni, terrorismo e natura 
assoluta dell’obbligo di non – refoulement”, in I diritti dell’uomo: cronache e battaglie, 
2008, p. 33 ss; N. Hervieu, Terrorisme et torture, www.droits-liberts.org du 28 février 
2008 (10/15); H. Tran, “La confirmation en Grande Chambre des principes posés par 
l’arrêt Chahal en matière d’extradition et de terrorisme: CourEDH, Gde Ch., Saadi c. 
Italie, 28 février 2008”, in L’Europe des libertés : revue d’actualité juridique (Europe 
des libertés), 8e année, n° 26 (mai 2008), p. 25; A. Fornerod, “L’article 3 de la 
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terroriste présumé vers la Tunisie, pays dans lequel il risquait d’être 
soumis à la torture. Par la suite, le 24 février 2009, la Cour a adopté une 
nouvelle décision contre l’Italie (Ben Khemais c. Italie), relative à une 
affaire similaire, avec la circonstance aggravante que l’Italie avait 
exécuté l’expulsion malgré l’arrêt Saadi rendu quelques mois 
auparavant, et bien que la Cour ait ordonné au gouvernement italien le 
sursis à l’exécution de l’expulsion, en application de l’art. 39 du 
Règlement intérieur. Par conséquent, la Cour a reconnu la violation non 
seulement de l’article 3 mais aussi de l’article 34, compte tenu de la 
jurisprudence Mamatkulov c. Turquie16. Par la suite, l’Italie a subi 
plusieurs condamnations pour des affaires semblables17. Notons que 
dans les affaires Trabelsi c. Italie et Toumi c. Italie18 il s’agit également 
de la violation de l’art. 34, les expulsions ayant eu lieu malgré l’ordre de 
suspension d’exécution (comme dans l’affaire Ben Khemais, déjà citée). 
Par contre, l’affaire Cherif et a. c. Italie a été rayée  du rôle le 7 avril 
2009 en ce qui concerne le requérant (expulsé le jour même où la 
mesure d’éloignement lui avait été notifiée) pour défaut de procuration 
                                                                                                        
Convention européenne des droits de l’homme et l’éloignement forcé des étrangers : 
illustrations récentes”, in Revue trimestrielle des droits de l’homme, 2010, p. 315 ss. 
16 Par l’arrêt Mamatkulov et Askarov c. Turquie du 6 février 2003 (confirmé par le 
jugement de la Grande Chambre du 4 février 2005), la Cour européenne a affirmé pour 
la première fois l’existence d’une véritable obligation pour les États membres de la 
CEDH de respecter les mesures provisoires disposées sur la base de l’art. 39 du 
Règlement intérieur: la non observance de l’ordre de sursis de l’éloignement des 
requérants a comporté en effet une condamnation de cet État pour violation de l’article 
34 CEDH (qui prévoit le droit de recours individuel), puisque dans le cas d’espèce 
l’extradition vers l’Ouzbékistan avait empêché les requérants de rester en contact avec 
leurs avocats, ce qui avait affecté de manière significative l’exercice effectif du droit de 
recours individuel devant la Cour. 
17 Voir Abdelhedi c. Italie; Bien Salah c. Italie; Bouyahia c. Italie; C.B.Z c. Italie; 
Darraji c. Italie; Hamraoui c. Italie; Ou. c. Italie; Soltana c. Italie, du 24 Mars 2009 et 
Sellem c. Italie, du 5 mai 2009. 
18 Respectivement du 13 avril 2010 et du 5 avril 2011. Par contre, l’affaire Drissi c. 
Italie a été déclarée irrecevable le 28 septembre 2010 car le juge d’application des 
peines avait décidé le 18 décembre 2008 de convertir la mesure de sûreté de l’expulsion 
par celle de la détention dans un institut de travail, à fin de respecter les mesures 
provisoires indiquées par la Cour. Il convient de signaler que par la suite la Cour de 
Cassation a explicitement statué, par l’arrêt no 20514 du 28 avril 2010, que la 
jurisprudence de la Cour de Strasbourg, dégagée entre autre dans le cadre de l’arrêt 
Saadi c. Italie, entraînait pour les autorités judiciaires nationales l’obligation d’adopter 
des mesures de sûreté différentes de celle de l’expulsion à l’encontre de personnes 
jugées dangereuses pour la société et susceptibles d’être expulsées vers la Tunisie.  
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valide, tandis que la partie de la requête introduite par sa femme (pour 
violation de l’art. 8) a été déclarée recevable mais rejetée sur le fond: 
nous reviendrons sur cette décision dans le paragraphe n. 5. 
Un examen approfondi de l’arrêt Saadi c. Italie, montre d’abord que 
deux argumentations ont été essentiellement utilisées pour convaincre la 
Cour à réviser sa jurisprudence Chahal: en premier lieu, la Grande 
Bretagne, tiers intervenant, et l’Italie, partie défenderesse19, avaient 
affirmé qu’il faut distinguer entre des traitements inhumains et 
dégradants, directement infligés par un Etat contractant, et des 
traitements infligés par les autorités d’un Etat tiers, pays de destination: 
dans ce dernier cas, c’est seulement sur l’Etat qui adopte la mesure 
d’éloignement, qu’ incombe une «obligation positive» dont le respect 
pourrait, ou mieux, devrait faire l’objet d’une mise en balance du risque 
que court le requérant par rapport à la dangerosité qu’il représente, et 
cela en regard de la protection du droit à la vie de la collectivité. En 
deuxième lieu, le Royaume Uni demandait un seuil probatoire plus 
élevé, c’est-à-dire la preuve, plutôt que d’un «risque réel», d’un risque 
«more likely than not». 
Ces deux arguments ont été rejetés, l’un et l’autre, par la Cour qui 
réaffirme, avec force, le caractère absolu de la protection offerte par 
l’art. 320. Cependant il convient de faire quelques observations et en 
particulier  en ce qui concerne l’appel au «droit à la vie» : nous croyons, 
comme observé21, que “the invocation of the right to life is nothing more 
than an attempt by governments to appropriate human rights language 
for their own purpose and does not help to address the relevant legal 
issue”. En effet, la question n’est pas de savoir si les États doivent faire 
quelque chose pour lutter contre le terrorisme, mais plutôt comment ils 
                                                
19 L’Italie a en substance  appuyé les arguments de la Grande Bretagne (par. 115), 
même si elle a suivi une ligne d’argumentation partiellement différente, basée «sur la 
nécessité présumée de réaligner le régime applicable aux violations de l’interdiction de 
refoulement à celui applicable aux violations de l’art. 3 CEDH»: voir A. Saccucci, 
“Espulsioni …”, cit, p. 35.  
20 Spécifiquement, en ce qui concerne le premier point, la Cour affirme que le 
risque que court le requérant et sa dangerosité «ne se prêtent pas dans ce contexte à un 
exercice de mise en balance car il s’agit de notions qui ne peuvent qu’être évaluées 
indépendamment l’une de l’autre» (par. 139); sur le deuxième volet, qu’il n’y a «aucune 
raison de modifier, comme le suggère le tiers intervenant, le niveau de preuve requis en 
la matière en exigeant, dans des cas comme celui-ci, la démonstration que la soumission 
à des mauvais traitements serait «plus probable qu’improbable»» (par. 140). 
21 Voir D. Moekli, “Saadi v. Italy …”, cit., p. 541-542 
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peuvent y arriver. Le Royaume Uni ne prend absolument pas en 
considération le fait que – pour reprendre les mots du juge Myjer 
auxquels se rallie le juge Zagrebelsky – «il n’est pas permis aux Etats de 
combattre le terrorisme international à n’importe quel prix. Les Etats ne 
doivent pas recourir à des méthodes qui sapent les valeurs mêmes qu’ils 
cherchent à protéger. Et cela vaut à plus forte raison pour les droits 
«absolus» auxquels il ne saurait être dérogé même en cas de danger 
public (article 15 de la Convention)». Les observations du juge 
Zupančič vont dans ce sens et affirment d’une manière particulièrement 
tranchante que, à l’égard du premier volet de l’argumentation du 
gouvernement britannique, «La logique policière avancée par l’Etat 
contractant intervenant ne tient tout simplement pas la route» et que, 
concernant le deuxième volet «Il est en revanche intellectuellement 
malhonnête de suggérer que les affaires d’expulsion exigent un faible 
niveau de preuve simplement parce que la personne est notoirement 
dangereuse». 
En outre, selon nous, il est très important dans cet arrêt que la Cour 
se soit basée sur des rapports d’organisations non gouvernementales 
indépendantes (parmi lesquelles Amnesty International et Human Rights 
Watch), pour évaluer concrètement si le requérant courait un risque réel 
de subir des tortures et qu’elle arrive à affirmer que lorsque l’intéressé – 
sur la base de ces rapports – démontre qu’il y a des motifs sérieux et 
avérés de croire à l’existence d’une pratique contraire à l’article 3 vis-à-
vis d’un groupe, il suffira de la preuve de son appartenance à un tel 
groupe et non plus d’un risque individuel22. 
D’autre part, il est intéressant de s’arrêter sur ce que la Cour affirme 
en matière d’assurances diplomatiques. Il s’agit d’un moyen – 
initialement utilisé surtout dans les cas d’extradition, afin d’exclure 
l’application de la peine capitale dans le pays de destination – auquel les 
États ont de plus en plus recours pour contourner le principe de «non 
refoulement»23, en signant des accords ad hoc, ou des conventions-cadre 
avec les pays de destination24. Toutefois, dans la pratique, il arrive  
                                                
22 Sur ce point voir aussi A. Saccucci, “Espulsioni …”, cit., p. 36. Cette approche 
de la Cour a été confirmée dans plusieurs affaires (voir entre autres N.A c. Royaume Uni, 
du 17 Juillet 2008).  
23 Voir M. Jones, “Lies, Damned Lies and Diplomatic Assurances: The Misuse of 
Diplomatic Assurances in Removal Proceedings”, in European Journal of Migration 
and Law, 2006, p. 9 ss.  
24 C’est notamment le cas de la Grande Bretagne. 
  
74 
souvent que de telles assurances ne soient pas observées d’autant plus 
qu’elles ne prévoient presque jamais des mécanismes aptes à en 
contrôler l’efficacité; c’est la raison pour laquelle plusieurs institutions 
(Haut-Commissaire des Nations Unies aux droits de l’homme, 
Rapporteur Spécial des Nations Unies contre la torture, Assemblée 
Générale des Nations Unies, Commissaire pour les droits de l’homme 
du Conseil de l’Europe, Parlement européen25, ainsi que de nombreuses 
ONG26) ont considéré les assurances diplomatiques comme «inherently 
unreliable»27. L’attitude du Comité pour les droits de l’homme, du 
Comité contre la Torture28 et de la Cour européenne des droits de 
l’homme a été un peu différente. C’est le cas, en particulier, de la Cour 
de Strasbourg, qui pour l’arrêt Chahal avait considéré comme 
inadéquates les assurances offertes par le gouvernement indien, alors 
qu’elle les a jugées suffisantes dans de nombreuses affaires 
postérieures29. Dans Saadi, la Cour a trouvé, dans le cas d’espèce, ces 
assurances tout à fait insuffisantes. Ce qui nous semble remarquable ce 
n’est pas le fait que la Cour ait trouvé les assurances fournies par la 
Tunisie non satisfaisantes : une conclusion différente aurait été vraiment 
surprenante car la Tunisie s’est limitée à renvoyer au droit interne et à 
rappeler qu’elle avait ratifié des traités internationaux sur les droits 
humains; il est surprenant, en revanche,  que la Cour ait reconnu un 
poids décisif à l’absence d’un mécanisme apte à en contrôler l’efficacité 
                                                
25 Voir, plus spécifiquement, les observations de Louise Arbour, High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights Day statement – On Terrorists and 
Torturers, United Nations, New York, 7 December, 2005 available at: 
www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=2117&LangID=E 
(10/15); Rapporteur Spécial contre la torture des Nations Unies, Manfred Nowak, UN 
Doc. E/CN.4/2006/6 du 23 décembre 2005, par. 32; les résolutions de l’Assemblée 
générale des Nations Unies n. 61/153, 19 décembre 2006 (UN Doc. A/RES/61/153), et n. 
62/148, 18 décembre 2007 (UN Doc. A/RES/62/148); au niveau européen voir, parmi les 
autres, Report by Mr Alvaro Gil-Robles, Commissioner for Human Rights, on his visit to 
Sweden on 21-23 April 2004, adopté le 8 juillet 2004, CommDH(2004)13, parr. 17-19) 
et la résolution du Parlement européen du 14 février 2007 (notamment le considérant G). 
26 Voir le Joint Statement signé par plusieurs ONG “Call for Action against the Use 
of Diplomatic Assurances in Transfers to Risk of Torture and Ill-Treatment” du 12 mai 
2005, disponible, entre autre, sur le site www.hwr.org. 
27 Voir le Joint Statement cité à la note qui précède.  
28 Pour la pratique de ces organismes voir S. Joseph, K. Mitchell, L. Gyorki & C. 
Benninger-Budel, Seeking Remedies for Torture Victims, Genève, 2007, pp. 224-227. 
29 Voir notamment Al-Moayad c. Germania, requête n. 35865/03, décision du 20 
février 2007. 
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– d’une manière analogue à ce que le Comité contre la torture avait 
souligné dans l’affaire Agiza c. Suède30. 
La conclusion à laquelle est parvenue la Cour dans une affaire 
récente (Othman c. Royaume Uni, du 17 janvier 2012), relativement à 
l’accord (Memorandum of understanding, ci-après MOU) conclu avec la 
Jordanie au sujet du requérant, est tout à fait différente. Le demandeur – 
qui avait déjà subi dans le passé des tortures en Jordanie, d’où il s’était 
enfui en se réfugiant en Grande Bretagne qui lui avait donné le statut de 
réfugié – avait été emprisonné en 2002 sous l’accusation de terrorisme. 
En 2005, suite aux modifications apportées à l’Anti-terrorism Crime and 
Security Act, le requérant avait été libéré sous caution, mais pour faire 
l’objet, quelques mois après, d’un arrêté d’expulsion. Après 
l’épuisement des voies de recours internes, le requérant avait saisi la 
Cour de Strasbourg, en alléguant la violation de l’art. 3 CEDH (ainsi 
que de l’art. 6: voir par. suivant) dans le cas d’exécution de l’arrêté 
d’expulsion (et en demandant aussi des mesures provisoires de 
suspension de l’arrêté en question, aux termes de l’art. 39 du Règlement 
de la Cour: la Cour avait accueilli cette requête).  
Le Gouvernement britannique  affirmait qu’il n’y avait pas de risque 
de torture pour le requérant en vertu de l’existence du MOU. Après 
avoir rappelé sa jurisprudence en matière d’assurances diplomatiques, à 
savoir qu’il faut vérifier “whether the assurances obtained in a 
particular case31 are sufficient to remove any real risk of ill-treatment”, 
en considérant “both the general human rights situation in that country 
and the particular characteristics of the applicant”, la Cour avait fourni 
pour la première fois à cette fin une longue liste d’éléments à prendre en 
considération, parmi lesquels le caractère spécifique ou vague des 
assurances, mais aussi l’autorité dont elles émanent, la solidité des 
relations diplomatiques entre l’Etat d’envoi et celui de destination, 
l’existence de mécanismes de contrôle dans ce pays, la circonstance que 
la fiabilité des assurances ait déjà éventuellement fait l’objet de 
vérification de la part des juridictions internes de l’Etat d’envoi. Comme 
il s’agissait d’assurances très détaillées, fournies par le plus haut niveau 
de l’Etat, en mesure de lier le gouvernement jordanien, appuyées par le 
roi de Jordanie lui-même, et compte tenu aussi des fortes relations 
                                                
30 Décision du 20 juin 2005 (CAT/C/34/D/195/2002). Voir M. Jones, “Lies, 
Damned Lies and Diplomatic Assurances ...”, cit. 
31 Italique ajouté. 
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diplomatiques entre les deux pays, la Cour avait conclu à leur fiabilité 
dans le cas d’espèce.  
Pour finir, la Cour affirmera malgré tout que le requérant ne peut pas 
être expulsé parce qu’il risque de subir «un déni de justice flagrant » en 
Jordanie, concept que nous tenterons d’éclairer ci après. Cependant, il 
convient de souligner que, d’après la Cour il est possible d’expulser une 
personne, en présence d’assurances détaillées, même si le Pays de 
destination a systématiquement et impunément recours à la torture. Il 
s’agit sans aucun doute de l’un des points les plus controversés de 
l’arrêt32 et le plus favorable à l’Etat défendeur; le Royaume Uni a en 
effet préféré ne pas demander le renvoi à la Grande Chambre pour le 
réexamen de l’arrêt33, de crainte que ce principe ne puisse être remis en 
question: comme l’a affirmé le Ministre de l’Intérieur britannique, 
demander le renvoi «would risk reopening our wider policy of seeking 
assurances about the treatment of terror suspects in their home 
countries»34. La Grande Bretagne a par contre préféré suivre le chemin 
des assurances diplomatiques même sous l’aspect pour lequel elle s’est 
trouvée en situation de partie perdante, aspect relatif à l’art. 6; sur ce 
point voir le paragraphe suivant. 
 
4. L’expulsion et «le déni de justice flagrant» 
A partir de l’arrêt Soering, la Cour a en principe admis la possibilité 
d’une violation «par ricochet» de l’article 6 CEDH – qui consacre le 
droit à un procès équitable – en cas d’expulsion vers un pays où 
l’intéressé risquerait de subir un «déni de justice flagrant». Cette 
affirmation de principe a été réitérée dans plusieurs affaires, sans 
pourtant être suivie par des condamnations. Cela jusqu’à l’arrêt Othman 
c. Royaume Uni, déjà cité et dans lequel la Cour européenne des droits 
de l’homme a reconnu pour la première fois la violation de cet article, 
eu égard au risque réel que des preuves obtenues au moyen de la torture 
soient admises lors du procès de l’intéressé en Jordanie. 
                                                
32 Voir C. Mc Carthy, “Diplomatic Assurances, Torture and Extradition: The Case 
of Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the United Kingdom”, www.ejiltalk.org/, 18 janvier 2012 
(10/15).   
33 C’est par contre le requérant qui a demandé, le 17 avril 2012, le renvoi à la 
Grande Chambre, qui a été cependant refusé, en date du 9 mai 2012 . Sur cette dernière 
décision voir H. Labayle, “Du bon usage des délais de renvoi devant la Grande chambre 
de la CEDH … L’éloignement d’Abu Qatada est désormais possible”, in RUEDELSJ, 
11 mai 2012. 
34 House of Commons Debate 17 Février 2012, colonne 175.   
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Une analyse approfondie de cet arrêt, montre que la Cour affirme 
d’abord que “A flagrant denial of justice goes beyond mere irregularities 
or lack of safeguards in the trial procedures such as might result in a 
breach of Article 6 if occurring within the Contracting State itself. What 
is required is a breach of the principles of fair trial guaranteed by Article 
6 which is so fundamental as to amount to a nullification, or destruction 
of the very essence, of the right guaranteed by that Article”. Par la suite, 
elle examine si l’admission de preuves obtenues au moyen de la torture 
constitue un déni de justice. A cette fin elle se réfère non seulement à sa 
jurisprudence antérieure sur ce sujet, notamment l’arrêt Gäfgen c. 
Allemagne, du 1er juin 2010, mais aussi au droit international, et en 
particulier à l’art. 15 de la Convention des Nations Unies contre la 
torture, qui interdit, en termes absolus, l’utilisation de preuves obtenues 
au moyen de la torture. Elle en déduit que “the admission of torture 
evidence is manifestly contrary, not just to the provisions of Article 6, 
but to the most basic international standards of a fair trial”, en ajoutant 
que “It would make the whole trial not only immoral and illegal, but 
also entirely unreliable in its outcome”. 
Pour finir la Cour entreprend d’analyser si dans le cas d’espèce il y 
avait le risque que des preuves obtenues par la torture puissent être 
utilisées dans le procès auquel le requérant serait soumis en Jordanie. A 
cet effet la Cour, après avoir pris acte de ce qui avait déjà été constaté 
par les tribunaux internes – c’est-à-dire que l’incrimination de M. 
Othman se basait sur deux témoignages obtenus par la torture – est 
amenée à se poser la question de savoir s’il existe un «risque réel» que 
ces preuves puissent être admises dans le procès de M. Othman, après 
son renvoi en Jordanie. Après avoir affirmé que «the balance 
probabilities test» adopté par la Chambre des Lords dans l’affaire A. et  
a. (n. 2) n’était pas opportun dans ce cas35, la Cour opte pour «un 
aménagement probatoire favorable au requérant 36, et cela sous un 
                                                
35 Dans ce cas la Chambre des Lords avait condamné l’utilisation de preuves 
obtenues par la torture, mais elle avait ensuite, à la majorité de quatre juges contre trois, 
décidé que les preuves ne devaient être exclues que dans les cas où, selon «a balance of 
possibilities», il était possible d’établir qu’elles avaient été obtenues par la torture. Pour 
une critique de la position de la Chambre des Lords et des considérations sur les 
implications de la prise de position de la Cour dans l’affaire Othman voir A. Tomkins. 
“National Security Case Law: A Continuing Trend”, 
http://britgovcon.wordpress.com/category/national-security-and-counter-terrorism/ 
(10/15). 
36 Cfr. N. Hervieu, “Encadrements conventionnels des expulsions d’étrangers 
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double aspect: pour ce qui est relatif à la preuve que les déclarations 
rendues contre lui avaient été obtenues par la torture (par. 280), et ce qui 
concerne le fait qu’il existe un risque réel que ces témoignages soient 
utilisés lors du procès auquel il sera soumis en Jordanie (par. 282). La 
conclusion est que «l’expulsion vers la Jordanie violerait l’article 6».  
Par la suite le Royaume Uni a obtenu des assurances diplomatiques 
concernant spécifiquement le procès en Jordanie, et a exécuté 
l’expulsion. 
 
5. L’expulsion et la protection de la vie familiale 
La CEDH offre aux étrangers une protection «par ricochet» 
également par le biais de l’art. 8. Cependant, contrairement à l’article 3, 
qui a une valeur absolue, cette norme prévoit le droit au respect de la vie 
privée et familiale mais admet des limitations : à condition qu’elles 
soient prévues par la loi et nécessaires dans une société démocratique, 
c’est-à-dire justifiées par un besoin social impérieux et proportionnées 
au but légitime poursuivi. La marge d’appréciation dont jouit l’État 
varie en fonction du but poursuivi et la sûreté nationale implique sans 
aucun doute un pouvoir discrétionnaire assez grand, mais cela ne veut 
pas dire qu’il est sans limites. Même dans ces cas, en effet, la Cour de 
Strasbourg devra évaluer si l’expulsion est proportionnée au but 
poursuivi. 
Dans la plus grande partie des décisions concernant l’expulsion 
d’étrangers la Cour n’a pas examiné ce grief sur le fond parce qu’elle 
avait déjà conclu à la violation de l’art. 337, à l’exception de l’arrêt 
Cherif et autres c. Italie, du 7 juillet 2009. Dans cette affaire; 
                                                                                                        
terroristes menacés dans le pays de destination”, in Lettre «Actualités Droits-Libertés» 
du CREDOF, 24 janvier 2012. 
37 Déjà dans l’arrêt Chahal c. Royaume Uni la Cour avait exclu l’examen du fond 
du grief visé à l’art. 8 avec la formulation (reprise dans l’affaire Saadi et suivantes) 
« N’ayant aucun motif de douter de ce que le gouvernement défendeur se conformera au 
présent arrêt, elle n’estime pas nécessaire de trancher la question hypothétique de savoir 
si, en cas d’expulsion vers l’Inde, il y aurait aussi violation des droits reconnus aux 
requérants par l’article 8 de la Convention”. Comme l’a montré l’opinion partiellement 
dissidente, dans l’affaire Toumi c. Italie, du juge Malinverni, opinion à laquelle se 
rallient les juges Björgvinsson et Popovic, il faudrait de toute façon distinguer entre 
violation hypothétique et violation réelle. Lorsque l’expulsion est exécutée (comme dans 
les affaires Trebelsi e Toumi), et le requérant a effectivement été séparé de son épouse 
et/ou de ses enfants, «la Cour n’aurait dès lors pas dû se satisfaire, comme elle l’a fait 
dans l’arrêt Saadi, d’examiner la requête sous le seul angle de l’article 3. Elle aurait 
également dû examiner le bien-fondé du grief tiré de la violation alléguée de l’article 8».   
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l’exécution de l’expulsion s’est produite le jour même de la notification, 
et le requérant n’a pas eu le temps de contacter un avocat, ni pour saisir 
les juridictions internes (s’agissant cependant d’une mesure d’expulsion 
adoptée en application de la loi n. 155/200538, concernant «mesures 
urgentes pour combattre le terrorisme», il aurait été en tout cas forclos 
au juge italien de suspendre l’exécution), ni pour demander à la Cour 
européenne des droits de l’homme l’adoption d’une mesure d’urgence, 
aux termes de l’art. 39 du Règlement intérieur. C’est seulement par la 
suite que le requérant a introduit une requête devant cette Cour, requête 
qui cependant a été rayée du rôle, comme nous l’avons déjà souligné 
auparavant, pour défaut de procuration écrite39. Toutefois, un grief au 
titre de l’art. 8 a été également présenté par sa femme en son propre 
nom, avec une procuration valide, et pour cette partie le recours a été 
déclaré recevable et examiné sur le fond, suivant le schéma classique de 
lecture de l’art. 8, qui peut se résumer dans les cinq questions suivantes: 
1) Existe-t-il une vie familiale effective? 2) Existe-t-il une ingérence 
dans la vie familiale? 3) Est-ce que cette ingérence est prévue par la loi? 
4) Poursuit-t-elle une fin légitime? 5) Est-ce qu’elle est «nécessaire dans 
une société démocratique», c’est-à-dire justifiée par un besoin social 
impérieux et proportionnée au but légitime poursuivi? En effet, dans 
l’affaire Cherif, la Cour a d’abord reconnu l’existence d’une ingérence 
dans la vie familiale: à l’époque du renvoi, Cherif était régulièrement 
résident en Italie depuis quatorze ans et marié à une femme italienne, 
ainsi que père de trois mineurs (de 10, 7 et 3 ans); ensuite, après avoir 
rapidement observé que «l’ingérence était prévue par la loi» (sans 
s’arrêter cependant sur la «qualité de la  loi»: nous reviendrons sur ce 
point d’ici peu) et que cette ingérence poursuivait un but légitime, la 
Cour en vient à examiner la proportionnalité de la mesure, en estimant 
que «dans les circonstances particulières de l’espèce, les exigences de 
protection de l’ordre public et de la sécurité nationale l’emportent sur 
les intérêts de la famille» (par. 66). 
Selon nous, le raisonnement de la Cour est vicié et peu convaincant. 
                                                
38 Sur cette loi, voir P. Bonetti, “Terrorismo e stranieri nel diritto italiano. 
Disciplina legislativa e profili costituzionali. II parte. Il terrorismo nelle norme speciali e 
comuni in materia di stranieri, immigrazione e asilo”, in Diritto, immigrazione e 
cittadinanza n. 4/2005, p. 13 ss. 
39 L’avocat du requérant a fourni une copie de la procuration pour la procédure 
devant les juridictions internes (T.A.R.), mais non pour la procédure devant la Cour 
européenne des droits de l’homme.  
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La Cour de Strasbourg, en effet, afin d’évaluer si dans le cas spécifique 
l’expulsion était nécessaire dans une société démocratique, fait 
référence à la jurisprudence antérieure en matière d’expulsion et vie 
familiale (et en particulier à la décision Üner c. Pays Bas40), mais 
n’applique pas d’une manière cohérente les critères visés dans cet arrêt. 
En effet, pour soutenir la thèse gouvernementale de la dangerosité du 
requérant, la Cour rappelle aussi quelques condamnations pénales 
précédentes du requérant (pour possession et vente de stupéfiants41). 
Toutefois, comme l’explique l’opinion dissidente des juges Tulkens, 
Jociene et Popovič, “Par comparaison avec d’autres affaires dont la 
Cour a été saisie, on ne peut raisonnablement soutenir que le parcours 
délinquant du requérant soit d’une gravité telle que «les exigences de 
protection de l’ordre public et de la sécurité nationale l’emportent sur 
les intérêts de la famille» [par. 66 de la décision Cherif c. Italie]”. En 
outre, à notre avis, non seulement la référence aux précédentes 
condamnations du requérant n’est pas décisive pour justifier une 
condamnation, mais elle est hors de propos parce qu’en réalité le décret 
d’expulsion n’a pas été ordonné pour ces raisons, mais plutôt pour 
l’existence de soupçons d’appartenance à une organisation terroriste, 
soupçons basés entre autre sur des «données fragiles et relatives», 
comme les juges dissidents n’ont pas  manqué de le souligner (à savoir, 
la fréquentation de personnes liées à la mouvance islamique et faisant 
l’objet d’enquêtes judiciaires pour terrorisme42). Ce sont justement ces 
soupçons qui représentent le véritable motif qui pousse la majorité des 
juges à conclure que l’État – en faisant prévaloir l’intérêt public sur la 
protection de la vie familiale de la requérante – n’a commis aucun abus. 
Toutefois, comme l’observent précisément les juges dissidents «Il s’agit 
là, dans la jurisprudence de la Cour, d’un critère entièrement nouveau 
qui est susceptible de toutes les interprétations, risquant d’ouvrir la voie 
à l’arbitraire»43.  
Nous sommes ici devant un point à notre avis crucial: suffit-il de 
                                                
40 Arrêt du 18 octobre 2006, sur lequel voir C. Raux, «Les mesures d’éloignement 
du territoire devant la Grande Chambre de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme», 
e M. F. Valette, ««Double peine»: les fausses notes de la jurisprudence de la Cour 
européenne des droits de l’homme», in Revue trimestrielle des droits de l’homme, 2007, 
respectivement p. 837 ss. et p. 1101 ss. 
41 En 1996 à dix mois d’emprisonnement avec sursis pour possession de stupéfiants 
et en 1999 à un an et un mois d’emprisonnement pour possession et vente de stupéfiants. 
42 Voir par. 9 de l’arrêt Cherif. 
43 Italique ajouté. 
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simples soupçons pour expulser un étranger ou est-il nécessaire qu’il y 
ait des garanties contre les atteintes arbitraires de l’exécutif aux droits 
fondamentaux protégés par la CEDH? A vrai dire, une réponse 
partielle44 avait déjà été donnée dans un arrêt du 20 juin 2002, Al-Nashif 
c. Bulgarie45, (qui a déjà trouvé plusieurs applications)46, en ce qui 
concerne justement une expulsion pour des raisons de sécurité nationale. 
Dans cette affaire, pour la première fois en matière d’expulsion, la Cour 
a affirmé un principe fondamental – exprimé déjà en d’autres occasions 
                                                
44 Partielle parce que la Cour n’exige pas de contrôle judiciaire (ce qui, pour nous, 
est au contraire particulièrement important en matière de terrorisme). Sur ce point voir 
les conclusions. 
45 Pour un premier commentaire sur ce jugement voir A. Liguori, “Garanzie 
procedurali e rispetto della vita familiare in un’importante sentenza della Corte di 
Strasburgo”, in Giurisprudenza italiana, 2003, p. 2009 ss. Comme le remarque D. 
Bonner, (“Porous border: terrorism and migration policy”, in Irregular Immigration and 
Human Rights: theoretical, European and international perspectives, (B. Bogusz, R. 
Cholewinski, A. Cygan, E. Szyszczak dir.), Leiden, Boston, 2004, p. 93 ss.), et comme 
nous le soulignerons  par la suite, dans le cas d’espèce la condamnation  a été infligée du 
fait qu’il manquait  la qualité de la loi, tandis qu’il n’y a eu aucun examen concernant la 
proportionnalité. Auparavant, par contre, la Commission, dans son rapport sur l’affaire 
Chahal, a observé que “Whilst the Commission acknowledges that States enjoy a wide 
margin of appreciation under the Convention where matters of national security are 
concerned, with possibly lower standards of proof being required under Article 8 
compared to Article 3, it remains ultimately for the Government to satisfy the 
Commission that the grave recourse of deportation is in all the circumstances both 
necessary and proportionate” (par. 137), en concluant dans le cas d’espèce à la violation 
de l’art. 8 (parr. 139-140). Par le suite la Cour, dans l’affaire Nolan c. Russie, du 12 
février 2009, a reconnu la violation de l’art. 8 à l’égard d’une expulsion pour raisons de 
sûreté nationale, parce que dans le cas d’espèce la Russie, en refusant certains 
documents à la Cour, “did not offer any justification which could outweigh the 
legitimate interest of the applicant and his son in staying together” (la Cour a aussi 
reconnu une violation de l’art. 38: sur ce point, ainsi que sur la condamnation ultérieure 
pour violation de l’art. 1 du Protocole n. 7: voir ultra, par. 5). A propos de l’art. 8, la 
Cour ajoute que “Furthermore, the Court reiterates that the State has a positive 
obligation to ensure the effective protection of children … The manifest absence of an 
assessment of the impact of their decisions and actions on the welfare of the applicant’s 
son must be seen as falling outside any acceptable margin of appreciation of the State” 
(par. 88).  
46 Voir, ex multis, les arrêts Lupsa c. Roumanie, du 8 juin 2006, Kaya c. Roumanie, 
du 12 octobre 2006, Musa et a. c. Bulgarie, du 11 janvier 2007, Bashir c. Bulgarie du 14 
juillet 2007; Liu et Liu c. Russie, du 6 décembre 2007; C.G. et a. c. Bulgarie, du 24 avril 
2008; Raza c. Bulgarie du 11 février 2010; M. et a. c. Bulgarie, du 26 juillet 2011; 
Kaushal et a. c. Bulgarie, du 3 septembre 2010 et Geleri c. Roumanie, du 15 février 
2011; Madah et a. c. Bulgarie, du 10 mai 2012.  
  
82 
(les arrêts Klass c. Allemagne et Rotaru c. Roumanie47 que la Cour a cité 
parmi d’autres) – à savoir, que “there must be a measure of legal 
protection in domestic law against arbitrary interferences by public 
authorities with the rights safeguarded by the Convention. It would be 
contrary to the rule of law for the legal discretion granted to the 
executive in areas affecting fundamental rights to be expressed in terms 
of an unfettered power»48. Cela se traduit, toujours de l’avis de la Cour, 
par des garanties procédurales: “Even where national security is at 
stake, the concepts of lawfulness and the rule of law in a democratic 
society require that measures affecting fundamental human rights must 
be subject to some form of adversarial proceedings before an 
independent body competent to review the reasons for the decision and 
relevant evidence, if need be with appropriate procedural limitations on 
the use of classified information”49. Dans le cas d’espèce la Cour a 
ensuite effectivement condamné la Bulgarie50 parce que la loi, qui était 
                                                
47 Il s’agit de décisions rendues en matière de restrictions à l’art. 8 pour raisons de 
lutte contre le terrorisme. Dans l’arrêt Klass, en réalité, la Cour examine si les garanties 
procédurales offertes sont aptes à prévenir les abus dans le cadre de la proportionnalité, 
tandis que dans les cas postérieurs, comme pour les arrêts Malone c. Royaume Unit et 
Rotaru c. Roumanie, elle prend en considération la qualité de la loi. Sur ce point voir O. 
de Schutter, “La Convention européenne des droits de l’homme à l’épreuve de la lutte 
contre le terrorisme”, in Lutte contre le terrorisme…, cit., p. 85 ss; ainsi que P. De Sena, 
“Esigenze di sicurezza nazionale…”, cit., p. 206 ss. L’examen de la qualité de la loi, 
dans des cas de restrictions rendues nécessaires par des exigences de lutte contre le 
terrorisme, se révèle particulièrement important, comme nous le verrons, même dans le 
cadre de la jurisprudence de la Cour relativement à l’art. 5.  
48 Par. 119.  
49 Par. 123.  
50 Pour les juges Makarczyk, Butkevych et Botoucharova, par contre, l’absence de 
garanties procédurales aurait dû être examinée dans le cadre de la proportionnalité (et 
par conséquent, à leur avis, cette approche aurait amené à exclure une violation de l’art. 
8: voir par. 4 de l’opinion dissidente). Voir aussi F. Bernard et A. Berthe (“Les garanties 
procédurales en matière de reconduite à la frontière au regard de la Convention 
européenne des droits de l’homme”, Revue trimestrielle des droits de l’homme, 1997, p. 
17 ss.), qui avaient supposé, avant que l’arrêt Al-Nashif soit rendu, la possibilité 
d’examiner l’aptitude des garanties procédurales en cas d’expulsion dans le cadre de la  
proportionnalité. Toutefois, la Cour a confirmé, dans une série d’affaires ultérieures 
(citées supra, note n. 46) de vouloir effectuer une telle vérification dans le cadre de la 
qualité de la loi. D’ailleurs, alors que l’arrêt Al-Nashif avait été adopté seulement à une 
majorité de 4 voix contre 3, les décisions  suivantes ont été adoptées à l’unanimité; c’est 
la raison pour laquelle, selon nous, on peut parler d’une jurisprudence désormais 
consolidée.  
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la base légale de l’expulsion, n’avait pas une «qualité» suffisante à 
garantir «the necessary safeguards against arbitrariness» (par. 128) et 
partant elle n’a pas jugé nécessaire de vérifier si la mesure était 
proportionnée. À notre avis, même dans le cas d’espèce il aurait été 
souhaitable que la Cour approfondisse un peu plus l’examen de la 
qualité de la loi. Si elle l’avait fait, l’Italie ne pouvait qu’être 
condamnée, car la loi à la base de l’expulsion51, en excluant tout pouvoir 
de suspension de la part du juge du recours – même face à l’allégation 
de violations graves et irréversibles de droits fondamentaux – n’était pas 
du tout apte à assurer les garanties nécessaires contre l’arbitraire de la 
puissance publique.  
Pour conclure, l’affaire Cherif c. Italie est à notre avis passible de 
critiques. Déjà l’évaluation faite par la majorité des juges sur la 
proportionnalité de la mesure ne nous semble pas entièrement 
partageable (compte tenu, comme le soulignent les juges dissidents, du 
jeune âge des enfants mineurs d’un côté et de l’autre, des faibles 
éléments à la base des soupçons, ainsi que de la «place prépondérante»52 
du droit à la vie familiale). Ce qui, à notre avis, aurait dû être de toute 
façon décisif pour la constatation de violation de l’art. 8, en rendant 
superflu l’examen de la proportionnalité, c’est l’absence de la «qualité 
de la loi», autrement dit le fait que l’expulsion de Cherif ait été 
ordonnée “pursuant to a legal régime that does not provide the necessary 
safeguards against arbitrariness” (voir mutantis mutandis l’arrêt  Al-
Nashif c. Bulgarie, cité, par. 128). 
 
6. Les garanties procédurales 
L’arrêt Al-Nashif c. Bulgarie – qui reconnait, pour la première fois, 
comme on l’a dit, la violation d’un droit substantiel (droit au respect de 
la vie familiale) en raison de l’absence de garanties procédurales dans le 
cas d’une expulsion pour des raisons de sûreté nationale – nous permet 
d’entrer dans le vif du sujet car il soulève la question des limites à 
l’expulsion des étrangers à la lumière de la CEDH, à savoir les garanties 
                                                
51 Sur l’incompatibilité de cette législation avec la Constitution italienne et les 
traités internationaux voir P. Bonetti, “Terrorismo e stranieri ...”, cit.; A. G. Lana, A. 
Saccucci, “Il nuovo intervento legislativo alla luce delle norme internazionali sui diritti 
umani”, in Diritto e Giustizia, 2006, p. 149 ss.; A. Saccucci, “The Italian 2005 Anti-
Terrorism Legislation in the Light of International Human Rights Obligations”, in Italian 
Yearbook of International Law, 2005, p. 167 ss. 
52 Voir opinion dissidente citée. 
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procédurales. Il s’agit d’un aspect très important, compte tenu du fait 
que la reconnaissance de droits substantiels sans un droit d’agir 
correspondant est souvent illusoire53. En matière d’expulsion, il faut 
cependant  rappeler que jusqu’à présent la Cour européenne des droits 
de l’homme, malgré ce qu’elle a plusieurs fois réaffirmé à propos du 
rôle fondamental que revêt le droit à un procès équitable dans une 
société démocratique (caractérisée par la prééminence du droit, a 
toujours nié – avec des argumentations qui selon nous sont loin d’être 
décisives – l’applicabilité en la matière54 de l’art. 6 qui prévoit le droit à 
un  procès équitable. 
Il s’ensuit que les articles qui peuvent entrer en jeu sont l’art. 1 du 
Protocole n. 7 (qui concerne spécifiquement les garanties procédurales 
en cas d’expulsion); l’art. 5 par. 4 (qui concerne en réalité les garanties 
en matière de détention, mais qui est particulièrment utile dans les cas – 
très fréquents – de détention en vue de l’expulsion) et l’ art. 13, relatif 
au droit à un recours effectif et qui peut être invoqué seulement 
lorsqu’on allègue la violation d’un droit protégé par la CEDH 
(notamment ceux visés aux articles 3 et 8). 
En ce qui concerne l’art. 1 du Protocole n. 7, il faut pourtant 
souligner que non seulement cette disposition n’est applicable qu’aux 
étrangers régulièrement résidants (et exclusivement à l’égard des États 
qui ont ratifié ce Protocole55), mais qu’elle est en outre peu utile lorsque 
l’expulsion a été disposée pour des raisons de sûreté nationale : dans ce 
cas, en effet, la personne pourra être expulsée avant d’avoir exercé les 
garanties prévues et il est bien évident qu’effectuer une défense 
                                                
53 Sur l’importance des garanties procédurales voir aussi C. Harlow, “Access to 
justice as a Human right: the European Convention and the European Union”, in The UE 
and Human Rights (P. Alston dir.), Oxford, 1999, p. 188 (qui cite à son tour J. Hart Ely, 
Democracy and Distrust: A theory of Judicial Review, 1980, Harvard Paperbacks), selon 
laquelle “Procedural rights, notably the rights of formal equality before the law and 
access to a court, are seen as an essential buttress for substantive rights”. L’auteur 
souligne, entre autre, l’importance des garanties procédurales surtout pour les immigrés. 
54 Pour une critique de cette jurisprudence voir A. Liguori, Le garanzie 
procedurali…, cit., p. 12 ss; H. Tigroudja, “L’inapplicabilité de l’article 6, § 1 de la 
Convention à la procédure de relèvement d’une interdiction du territoire”, in Revue 
trimestrielle des droits de l’homme, 2002, p. 446 ss; N. Blake, R. Husain, Immigration, 
Asylum and Human Rights, Oxford, 2003, 242 ss; N. Sitaropoulos, “The role and limits 
of the European Court of Human Rights in supervising state security and anti-terrorism 
measures affecting aliens’ rights”, in Terrorism and the Foreigner …”, cit., p. 101 ss. 
55 Les Etats qui ne l’ont pas encore ratifié, à l’heure actuelle, sont: Allemagne, Pays 
Bas, Royaume Uni et Turquie. 
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quelconque à partir de l’étranger est beaucoup plus onéreux et difficile – 
en outre, il se peut que des dommages graves se soient déjà produits56. 
Toutefois, cet article, qui n’avait presque jamais été appliqué jusqu’à 
une époque récente, est en train d’acquérir une nouvelle vigueur dans la 
jurisprudence de la Cour57. En effet, le Rapport explicatif introduit une 
différenciation à propos des exceptions relatives à l’ordre public et à la 
sûreté nationale – exceptions qui, aux termes du par. 2, permettent de 
renvoyer l’exercice des garanties procédurales à une phase postérieure à 
l’exécution de l’expulsion: l’une et l’autre doivent respecter le principe 
de proportionnalité, mais c’est seulement dans le premier cas qu’il 
incombe à l’État de démontrer que l’expulsion est une mesure 
nécessaire; en revanche, si à l’origine de l’expulsion il y a des raisons de 
sûreté nationale, celles-ci doivent être considérées comme suffisantes58. 
Cette affirmation, qui avait déjà fait l’objet de critiques en doctrine59, a 
été récemment démentie par la Cour, qui n’a pas manqué de remarquer 
que, s’il est vrai que les États jouissent d’une vaste marge d’appréciation 
dans la détermination de ce qui est dans l’intérêt de la sûreté nationale, 
“however, that does not mean that its limits may be stretched beyond its 
natural meaning” (arrêt C.G et a. c. Bulgarie, du 24 avril 2008: dans ce 
cas la Cour exclut que la sûreté nationale puisse être invoquée pour 
justifier l’expulsion d’une personne soupçonnée d’être impliquée dans le 
trafic de stupéfiants). Par la suite, dans l’affaire Nolan c. Russie60, du 19 
février 2009, la Cour est même arrivée à exclure que cette exception 
peut être prise en considération, la Russie n’ayant pas fourni “any 
material or evidence capable of corroborating their claim that the 
                                                
56 Perte de travail, par exemple. Si, par contre, l’expulsion comporte la lésion de 
droits sauvegardés par la CEDH (tels que l’interdiction de la torture ou le droit au 
respect de la vie familiale) il sera possible d’invoquer l’art. 13, sur lequel voir ultra. 
57 Voir Kaushal et a. c. Bulgarie, du 3 septembre 2010 et Geleri c. Roumanie, du 15 
février 2011. 
58 Voir Rapport explicatif, par. 15. 
59 Voir C. Campiglio, “Espulsione e diritti dell’uomo. A proposito dell’articolo 1 
del Protocollo n. 7 addizionale alla Convenzione europea dei diritti dell’uomo”, in 
Rivista di diritto internazionale, 1985, 64 ss., selon laquelle «cependant, on ne peut pas 
se passer de remarquer que cette interprétation, quoique influente, ne trouve pas de 
vérification dans le libellé du texte conventionnel, qui ne semble pas vouloir diversifier 
les deux cas». Voir aussi P. Van Dijk, G. J. H. Van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, The Hague, p. 507, pour lesquels cette 
interprétation serait contraires aux buts du Protocole. 
60 Sur cette affaire voir aussi la note n. 45. 
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interests of national security or public order had been at stake”61. En 
fait, la Cour avait demandé à la Russie de pouvoir examiner le rapport 
du Federal Security Service (qui avait été visionné par l’avocat du 
requérant dans la procédure interne), rapport qui contenait les 
contestations, couvertes par le secret d’état, à la base de l’expulsion. Sur 
la base du refus de la Russie la Cour de Strasbourg a déduit non 
seulement le défaut de la preuve de l’existence de raisons de sûreté 
nationale, mais encore une violation autonome de l’art. 3862. 
Il convient de s’arrêter sur une autre norme très importante en 
matière de garanties procédurales: l’art. 5 par. 4, qui prévoit 
spécifiquement – contrairement à l’art. 1 du Protocole n. 7 et à l’art. 13 
– le droit de s’adresser à un juge, au cas où la personne serait privée de 
la liberté au cours d’une procédure d’expulsion. 
En ce qui concerne les détentions de personnes contre lesquelles des 
expulsions pour raisons de sûreté nationale sont en cours, la Cour a 
affirmé, à partir de l’arrêt Chahal, que les autorités nationales ne sont 
pas exemptées d’un “effective control by the domestic courts whenever 
they choose to assert that national security and terrorism are involved”63. 
Le 19 février 2009, la Cour de Strasbourg s’est prononcée sur une 
affaire très importante, définie parfois comme «le Guantanamo 
britannique»64 (A. et a. c. Royaume Uni). La Grande Bretagne, après le 
11 septembre 2001, avait approuvé une loi qui permettait d’adopter à 
l’égard d’étrangers – soupçonnés d’exercer des activités terroristes – des 
«certificates» comportant  l’incarcération sans inculpations pénales et 
sans limites de temps, en même temps qu’une dérogation (notifiée au 
                                                
61 Dans son opinion dissidente, il observe, quant à l’art. 38, que “in Grand Chamber 
judgment Stoll v. Switzerland the Court accepted the idea of “a necessary discretion” for 
some confidential official documents of the member States (see Stoll v. Switzerland 
[GC], no. 69698/01, § 136, ECHR 2007)”; en ce qui concerne l’art. 1 du Protocole n. 7, 
que la Cour a donné “a new, rather radical, interpretation (very brief, I must say) of 
paragraph 2 of this provision”. 
62 Sur la base de cet article les États doivent fournir toutes les facilités nécessaires 
aux fins d’un examen efficace de la question de la part de la Cour. 
63 Par. 131. Dans ce cas la Cour a statué que ni les procédures de habeas corpus 
devant les juridictions nationales, ni celles devant le comité consultatif n’étaient en 
mesure de satisfaire l’art. 5 par. 4.  
64 Voir N. Hervieu, “Lutte contre le terrorisme: état d’urgence et détention sans 
inculpations pénales de ressortissants étrangers”, in www.droits-liberts.org du 21 février 
2009 (10/15). Sur cet arrêt voir aussi L. Zagato, “Ancora sul rapporto tra stato di 
eccezione e divieto di tortura”, in La tortura nel nuovo millennio (L. Zagato, S. Pinton 
dir.), Padova, 2010, p. 234 ss. 
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Secrétaire général du Conseil de l’Europe) aux termes de l’art. 15 de la 
CEDH. Plusieurs personnes effectivement soumises à la détention en 
application de cette loi introduisirent un recours devant les autorités 
nationales. Toutefois, n’ayant pas obtenu satisfaction (malgré la 
décision de la Chambre des Lords65, qui en 200466 jugea la dérogation 
britannique contraire à l’art. 5 de la CEDH, en tant que disproportionnée 
et discriminatoire), elles décidèrent de saisir la Cour européenne des 
droits de l’homme, en invoquant l’art. 3 (soit tout seul soit combiné à 
l’art. 13) et l’art. 5 par. 1, 4 et 5.  Alors que le premier grief, eu égard à 
la durée indéterminée de la détention, a été rejeté (la Cour, tout en  
reconnaissant l’angoisse profonde que cela a provoqué, nie qu’ait été 
atteint le seuil minimum permettant de parler de traitement inhumain), 
le Royaume Uni a été condamné pour les autres griefs. Avant 
d’examiner la partie de l’arrêt qui concerne spécifiquement les garanties 
procédurales prévues par l’art. 5 par. 4, il est intéressant de souligner 
que, par rapport à l’art. 5 par. 1, le juge de Strasbourg affirme avant tout 
que, dans le cas d’espèce, la détention des requérants67 ne pouvait pas 
être considérée comme étant «en vue de leur expulsion», aux termes de 
l’art. 5 par. 1 lettre f, dès lors qu’il manquait «une perspective réaliste 
d’expulser les intéressés pendant la période où ils furent détenus»68 (en 
fait, la détention à durée indéterminée avait été disposée à défaut de 
l’exécution de l’expulsion car celle-ci aurait exposé les terroristes 
présumés au risque de traitements inhumains et dégradants dans le pays 
de destination, en violation de l’art. 3 CEDH). Quant à la dérogation 
notifiée à cet égard par le Royaume Uni, qui s’était rallié à la décision 
de la Chambre des Lords, la Cour conclut que «les mesures dérogatoires 
                                                
65 Comme l’a écrit C. Bassu (“Corte europea dei diritti umani e piani antiterrorismo 
nazionali. Perché l’emergenza non legittima l’oblio dei diritti”, in Diritto pubblico 
comparato e europeo, 2009, p. 1048), la décision de la Chambre des Lords – non 
contraignante – a donné lieu à une «épreuve de force institutionnelle tout à fait 
nouvelle». Pour une reconstruction de la complexité judiciaire et normative de cette 
situation voir aussi les par. 8 et ss. de l’arrêt. Parmi les nombreux commentaires voir, 
notamment, E. Sciso, “Libertà fondamentali della persona e misure di contrasto al 
terrorismo internazionale: Governo, Corti e Parlamento britannici a confronto”, in 
Rivista di diritto internazionale, 2005, p. 454 ss. 
66 16 décembre 2004 ([2004] UKHL 56). 
67 De quelques-uns d’entre eux: voir par. 170. 
68 Comme le remarque la Cour, c’est seulement en 2003 que le Royaume Uni 
commença à négocier avec l’Algérie et la Jordanie pour obtenir des garanties 
diplomatiques; il ne les a reçues concrètement qu’en août 2005 (par. 86).  
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étaient disproportionnées en ce qu’elles opéraient une discrimination 
injustifiée entre étrangers et citoyens britanniques»69. En fait, comme le 
mentionne la Cour, «En choisissant de recourir à une mesure relevant du 
droit des étrangers pour traiter un problème d’ordre essentiellement 
sécuritaire, l’exécutif et le Parlement lui ont apporté une réponse 
inadaptée et ont exposé un groupe particulier de terroristes présumés au 
risque disproportionné et discriminatoire d’une détention à durée 
indéterminée». 
En ce qui concerne plus spécifiquement les garanties procédurales 
pour contester la détention, l’arrêt permet d’éclairer un aspect crucial 
des expulsions pour raisons de sûreté nationale, à savoir l’utilisation de 
documents couverts par le secret. Déjà dans l’affaire Chahal la Cour 
avait reconnu que, s’il est vrai que l’utilisation de documents 
confidentiels peut être inévitable lorsqu’il s’agit de la sécurité nationale, 
«Cela ne signifie cependant pas que les autorités nationales échappent à 
tout contrôle des tribunaux internes dès lors qu’elles affirment que 
l’affaire touche à la sécurité nationale et au terrorisme». Elle avait ajouté 
par conséquent que toutes limitations dans l’exercice des droits de 
défense devaient pouvoir être compensées dans la procédure devant les 
autorités judiciaires. Or, dans l’arrêt A. et a. c. Royaume Uni, après avoir 
relevé que dans le cas d’espèce la loi anglaise avait effectivement prévu 
à cette fin le recours à des avocats spéciaux, autorisés à examiner les 
documents couverts par le secret, la Cour a constaté la violation de l’art. 
5 par. 4 (à l’égard des quatre requérants) du fait que «les avocats 
spéciaux n’étaient aptes à remplir efficacement cette fonction que si les 
détenus avaient reçu suffisamment d’informations sur les charges 
retenues contre eux pour pouvoir leur donner des instructions utiles»70. 
En conclusion, grâce aussi à l’interprétation offerte par la Cour de 
Strasbourg, les garanties prévues par l’art. 5 par. 4 sont très étendues. 
Toutefois, il convient de rappeler que cela ne concerne que l’hypothèse 
de détention en vue d’une expulsion.  
Par contre, dans les cas où les étrangers ne sont pas soumis à des 
mesures de privation de liberté, il est possible d’invoquer l’art. 1371, qui 
                                                
69 Par. 190. 
70 Par. 220. 
71 Article 13: «Toute personne dont les droits et libertés reconnus dans la présente 
Convention ont été violés, a droit à l’octroi d’un recours effectif devant une instance 
nationale, alors même que la violation aurait été commise par des personnes agissant 
dans l’exercice de leurs fonctions officielles».  
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prévoit le droit à un recours effectif, mais seulement s’il est question de 
droits protégés par la CEDH (il s’agira essentiellement de ceux visés 
aux articles 3 et 8, objet de protection «par ricochet»). 
Comme la Cour l’a précisé, l’article 13 garantit un recours effectif 
devant une instance nationale à quiconque allègue la violation d’un droit 
prévu par la Convention72. Selon une jurisprudence constante, il se peut 
même que l’instance mentionnée à l’article 13 ne soit pas une autorité 
judiciaire, mais, de toutes façons, elle devra être  indépendante73. 
En ce qui concerne plus spécifiquement les expulsions pour raisons 
de sécurité nationale, il convient encore une fois de se référer aux arrêts 
Chahal (pour les dispositions combinées des articles 13 et 3) et Al-
Nashif (pour les dispositions combinées des articles 13 et 8). 
Dans le premier cas, la Cour a affirmé tout d’abord que la notion de 
recours effectif au sens de l’art. 13 exige d’examiner en pleine 
indépendance s’il existe des raisons sérieuses de craindre un risque réel 
de traitements contraires à l’article 3 dans le pays de destination; ensuite 
que cet examen ne doit pas tenir compte des raisons qui ont porté à 
l’expulsion, quand bien même il s’agirait d’une menace à la sécurité 
nationale. À cet égard, un passage de l’arrêt a retenu notre attention: 
dans celui-ci la Cour de Strasbourg souligne que “the requirement of a 
remedy which is «as effective as can be» [qui avait été considéré 
suffisant, dans les affaires Klass c. Allemagne et Leander c. Suede, 
lorsque des exigences de protection de la sécurité nationale sont en jeu] 
is not appropriate in respect of a complaint that a person’s deportation 
will expose him or her to a real risk of treatment in breach of Article 3, 
where the issues concerning national security are immaterial”. Dans le 
cas d’espèce, la Cour est effectivement parvenue à la conclusion que, à 
la lumière de l’ampleur des carences tant des procédures 
juridictionnelles de contrôle, que des procédures devant l’organe 
consultatif, les recours, considérés dans leur ensemble, ne satisfont pas 
les conditions requises par les dispositions combinées des articles 13 et 
3: c’est en particulier un examen indépendant qui avait manqué, aussi 
bien de la part de l’autorité judiciaire, que de la part de l’organe 
consultatif; en ce qui concerne plus spécifiquement la procédure devant 
ce dernier, le requérant n’avait reçu qu’une communication sommaire 
des raisons de son expulsion sans avoir eu droit, en outre, à se faire 
                                                
72 Arrêt Klass c. Allemagne, du 6 septembre 1978. Le grief doit être en tout cas 
“défendable”. 
73 Arrêt Silver et a. c. Royaume Uni, du 25 mars 1983. 
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représenter par un avocat; de plus, l’avis de l’organe consultatif n’était 
ni contraignant ni public74. 
Dans l’affaire Al- Nashif, (voir supra), affaire relative à un apatride 
d’origine palestinienne, expulsé lui-aussi pour des raisons de sécurité 
nationale, l’art. 13 n’avait pas été invoqué en relation avec l’art. 3, mais 
plutôt avec l’art. 8. Or, la Cour n’a pas manqué de souligner que, s’il est 
vrai que dans ce cas (ne s’agissant pas d’un droit absolu comme dans le 
cas où l’on invoque l’art. 3), “where national security considerations are 
involved, certain limitations on the type of remedies available to the 
individual may be justified”, la garantie d’un recours effectif demande 
toutefois «as a minimum» que : 
- l’autorité indépendante compétente à examiner le recours doit 
avoir accès aux raisons à la base de la mesure d’expulsion, 
même si ces raisons ne sont pas accessibles au public; 
- cet organe doit avoir la compétence pour rejeter les affirmations 
de l’exécutif sur l’existence d’une menace pour la sécurité 
nationale, s’il les juge arbitraires ou déraisonnables; 
- la procédure doit se dérouler en contradictoire; 
- l’autorité doit pouvoir évaluer l’existence d’une proportionnalité 
entre l’intérêt collectif et le droit de l’individu à la protection de 
la vie familiale75. 
Rien n’est dit explicitement à propos de l’effet suspensif ; il s’agit 
d’un point d’importance cruciale, car les législations nationales adoptées 
vis-à-vis des étrangers pour combattre le terrorisme tendent souvent à 
faciliter l’éloignement de personnes dangereuses, au mépris des droits 
de l’homme et notamment des garanties procédurales. Une exception au 
caractère suspensif du recours – si l’expulsion est disposée pour des 
«raisons impératives de sûreté publique» – est même prévue dans la 
directive communautaire 2004/38/CE et des exceptions en ce sens sont 
également visées à l’art. 1 du Protocole n. 7 CEDH et à l’art. 13 du 
Pacte relatif aux droits civils et politiques. Toutefois, il est évident que 
ces exceptions sont particulièrement graves au cas où le renvoi 
exposerait la personne à un risque de torture dans le pays de destination: 
dans la pratique, l’interdiction de «refoulement» risque de devenir vaine 
si un recours effectif, pour contester l’expulsion et en obtenir la 
suspension, n’est pas prévu.  
                                                
74 Ces argumentations ont aussi amené à la condamnation pour violation de l’art. 5 
par. 4. 
75 Par. 137. 
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En ce sens il est fort appréciable que dans l’affaire Abdolkhani et 
Karimnia c. Turquie, du 22 septembre 2009, relative à l’expulsion de 
deux anciens membres de l’OMP, expulsion disposée pour raisons de 
sécurité nationale, la Cour se soit prononcée clairement sur la question 
de l’effet suspensif. Dans cette décision, elle affirme explicitement que 
«le contrôle juridictionnel dans les cas d’expulsion … ne peut être 
considéré comme un recours effectif, dans la mesure où une demande 
d’annulation d’un arrêté d’expulsion est dépourvue d’effet suspensif» 
(par. 116). 
Cet arrêt atteste donc, encore une fois, la capacité de la Cour “to act 
as a strong bulwark against European States unwilling or incapable of 
providing effective protection to aliens charged with or suspected of 
terrorism-related offences, especially when the latter are in the most 
vulnerable state of being subject to deportation or extradition”76. En 
outre, par cet arrêt, la Cour de Strasbourg se rallie à ce qui avait été 
affirmé précédemment par le Comité des droits de l’homme (affaire Al-
Azery c. Suède), ainsi que par le Comité contre la torture (affaire Agiza 
c. Suède)77.  
 
7. Conclusions 
Il est vrai que – même lorsque des exigences de sûreté nationale sont 
en jeu – la Cour européenne a manifesté sa fermeté en réaffirmant le 
caractère absolu78 de l’interdiction de la torture et de la conséquente 
                                                
76 N. Sitaropoulos, “The role …”, cit., p. 87.  
77 Respectivement décision du 10 novembre 2006 (CCPR/C/88/D/1416/2005) et 
décision du 20 juin 2005 (CAT/C/34/D/195/2002). Sur ce point voir A. Liguori, Le 
garanzie procedurali …, cit., p. 207 ss. Les deux comités ont non seulement souligné la 
nécessité d’employer tous les remèdes effectifs possibles avant l’exécution de 
l’expulsion – lorsque la personne risque d’être soumise à la torture, même dans les cas 
où sont en jeu des exigences de sûreté nationale – mais ils ont aussi déduit, de 
l’exécution immédiate de l’expulsion, la violation du droit de recours supranational, 
respectivement prévu par l’art. 1 Protocole n. 1 CCPR et par l’art. 22 CAT: comme le 
souligne le Comité CAT, “in order for this exercise of the right of complaint to be 
meaningful rather than illusory, however, an individual must have a reasonable period of 
time before execution of a final decision to consider whether, and if so to in fact, seize 
the Committee”. 
78 A ce propos, soulignons que la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne, appelée à 
se prononcer  sur l’interprétation des causes d’exclusion du statut de réfugié dans la 
directive 2004/83/Ce, dans l’arrêt Allemagne c. B . et D., du 9 novembre 2010, s’est 
limitée à affirmer, entre autres, que les États membres peuvent reconnaître un droit 
d’asile au titre de leur droit national à une personne exclue du statut de réfugié en vertu 
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interdiction d’expulsion vers des pays dans lesquels la personne risque 
d’être soumise à un tel traitement79. Par contre, nous considérons 
comme moins appréciables ses jugements en ce qui concerne la 
relevance accordée aux assurances diplomatiques, ainsi que l’examen du 
grief relatif à l’art. 8 (dans l’affaire Cherif). Toutefois, il faut se féliciter 
des affirmations contenues dans les arrêts Othman c. Royaume Uni et 
Abdolkhani et Karimnia c. Turquie: le premier affirmant l’existence 
d’un «déni de justice flagran», si dans le pays de destination il y a un 
risque réel que des preuves obtenues au moyen de la torture soient 
admises lors du procès de l’intéressé; le deuxième attestant la nécessité 
d’un effet suspensif même pour les recours contre des expulsions 
disposées pour raisons de sécurité nationale, lorsque ces expulsions 
exposent le destinataire d’une telle mesure au risque de torture dans le 
pays de destination80. 
Cependant sous l’angle des garanties procédurales, la jurisprudence 
de Strasbourg continue, selon nous, à prêter le flanc à une critique plus 
générale, qui ne concerne pas exclusivement l’hypothèse des expulsions 
pour raisons de sûreté nationale mais qui, relativement à telles 
situations, est particulièrement grave. Nous nous référons à l’arrêt 
                                                                                                        
de l’une des clauses d’exclusion de la directive (sur cet arrêt, cf. T. Syring, “Joined 
Cases C-57/09 and C-101/09, Federal Republic of Germany v. B & D (E.C.J.), 
Introductory Note”, International Legal Materials, 2011, p. 114 ss.). Il est, à notre avis,  
critiquable que la Cour de Luxembourg n’ait pas souligné en même temps que, 
indépendamment de l’éventuel permis humanitaire que l’Etat décide d’accorder, il existe 
une interdiction absolue de refoulement, en vertu, entre autres, de l’art. 3 de la CEDH, 
tel qu’il est interprété par la Cour de Strasbourg. Comme chacun sait l’Union 
Européenne doit respecter les droits de l’homme, tels qu’ils résultent des traditions 
constitutionnelles des Etats membres, de la Convention européenne et de la Charte des 
droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne. Cette dernière prévoit explicitement, à 
l’art. 19, le principe de non refoulement et selon les explications relatives à la Charte 
(qui sont désormais explicitement mentionnées dans le texte de la Charte: voir art. 52 
par. 7) «Le sens et la portée des droits garantis sont déterminés non seulement par le 
texte de ces instruments, mais aussi par la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des 
droits de l’homme et par la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne» (Explication ad 
article 52 – Portée et interprétation des droits et des principes). 
79 En ce qui concerne plus spécifiquement le principe de «non refoulement», plusieurs 
États européens (outre l’Italie et la Grande-Bretagne, et certainement la Lituanie, le 
Portugal, la Slovaquie, tiers intervenants dans l’affaire Ramzy c. Pays Bas) et au moins 
un Etat non européen (le Canada, dans la célèbre affaire Suresh, du 11 janvier 2002) 
soutiennent la nécessité d’un balancement. 
80 La Cour a par la suite confirmé ce principe: voir l’arrêt Auad c. Bulgarie, du 11 
octobre 2011, parr. 120-123. 
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Maaouia c. France81, qui exclut l’applicabilité de l’art. 6 – sur le procès 
équitable – en matière de séjour et d’expulsion d’étrangers. Comme le 
juge Loucaides l’a remarqué dans son opinion dissidente, opinion à 
laquelle s’est rallié le juge Traja, «il est inconcevable de garantir dans 
une Convention – qui, selon son préambule, était censée assurer «ces 
libertés fondamentales qui constituent les assises mêmes de la justice 
(...) dans le monde» et mettre en œuvre le principe de la «prééminence 
du droit» – une juste administration de la justice pour certains droits et 
obligations juridiques seulement, mais non pour les droits concernant les 
relations entre l’individu et l’Etat». 
Plus spécifiquement, il nous semble particulièrement grave que 
l’individu faisant l’objet d’un décret d’expulsion n’ait pas de droit 
d’accès à un juge, lorsque des exigences liées à la sécurité nationale sont 
en jeu. S’il est vrai, comme il a été observé82, que «dans des situations 
d’urgence, telle que la lutte au terrorisme, le processus politique risque 
d’être trop réactif face à l’urgence des préoccupations populaires, 
amenant les autorités à dissiper les craintes du plus grand nombre au 
détriment des droits de quelques – uns», c’est justement à ce moment là 
que les juges devraient remplir avec une attention accrue83 leur devoir 
de sauvegarder l’Etat de droit, principe fondamental de toute société 
démocratique. 
                                                
81 Arrêt du 5 octobre 2000 : pour la doctrine voir la note n. 54. 
82 Voir les conclusions de l’avocat général Poiares Maduro, déposées le 23 janvier 
2008, dans l’appel relatif aux affaires Kadi et Yusuf, concernant la congélation de biens 
de terroristes présumés et la violation alléguée de certains droits fondamentaux des 
requérants, parmi lesquels justement le droit à un recours juridictionnel effectif. La Cour 
de justice, dans l’arrêt du 3 septembre 2008 (C 402/05 P et C 415/05 P), a affirmé que le 
principe de la protection juridictionnelle effective empêche de soustraire complètement 
au contrôle juridictionnel un acte concernant la sûreté nationale et le terrorisme. 
83 Voir aussi, dans un sens analogue, le Comité CAT qui, dans la décision Agiza c. 
Suède susmentionnée, a justement souligné que les considérations relatives à la sûreté 
nationale “emphasize the importance of appropriate review mechanism” (italique 
ajouté).  
  
 
 
	  	  
ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE BLUE CARD 
DIRECTIVE BETWEEN CHALLENGING TRANSPOSITION 
PROCESSES, LACKLUSTRE RESULTS, AND PROPOSALS  
FOR REFORM: REMARKS FROM THE ITALIAN PERSPECTIVE 
Marco Fasciglione* 
 
1. Introduction 
In the last decades the EU has made major efforts to introduce a new 
European scheme for labour immigration and, due to the idea that it can 
contribute to the economic vitality of the EU market, it has 
progressively welcomed the creation of flexible admission systems that 
are responsive to the priorities and volumes (number of people 
admitted) set by each member State. Under the Europe 2020 Strategy, 
the EU’s ten-year growth strategy, the European Commission stressed 
the promotion of a forward-looking and comprehensive labour 
migration policy that responds in a flexible way to the needs of member 
States’ labour markets with a view to raising employment levels1 and to 
aiding the realization of the goal of the 2000 Lisbon Strategy: making 
the EU the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in 
the world. Hence, in a speech on 9 May 2013, the European 
Commissioner for Home Affairs, Cecilia Malmström, emphasised that 
Europe needs skilled workers in order to grow and, even though 
acknowledging the tough economic times, the Commissioner 
highlighted the serious labour market shortages, on the one hand, and 
the untapped pool of skills and talents of migrants, on the other one.2 
According to the point of view of EU institutions, well-managed 
migration policies aimed at attracting highly qualified migrants can 
contribute to boosting economic growth and competitiveness, 
addressing labour market shortages and offsetting the costs of 
demographic aging. It was this objective that led the EU to adopt in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* Research Institute on Innovation and Services for Development (IRISS-Cnr), 
Naples. 
1 European Commission, Communication from the Commission, Europe 2020: the 
European Union strategy for growth and employment, COM(2010) 2020, 3 March 2010, 
p. 18. 
2 Speech delivered by C. Malmström at the State of the Union Conference on 9 
May 2013, “Europe should give migrants the opportunities they deserve”, 
SPEECH/13/399. 
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2009 the so-called EU ‘Blue Card Directive’,3 in order to incentivize 
non-EU workers to enter the EU for the purpose of highly qualified 
employment. This legislation aspired to facilitating the admission and 
mobility of highly qualified migrants and their family members by 
harmonising entry and residence conditions throughout the EU and by 
providing for a legal status and a set of rights. The Directive gave birth, 
therefore, to a new work permit, the ‘European Blue Card’ to be 
released to third-country nationals aspiring to enter member States in 
order to take up highly qualified employment even in derogation to 
national rules on the entry of migrant workers, and particularly to those 
fixing quotas for the admission of third-country nationals. However, 
since the beginning the Blue Card régime has shown several 
deficiencies as to its effectiveness due to several factors. The Directive 
indeed only sets minimum standards and leaves much margin of 
appreciation to States in deciding to what extent to transpose the 
provisions of the Directive into their own legal systems. The Blue Card 
system also allows member States to leave in force domestic legislation, 
thereby accepting competition amongst national schemes and 
Directive’s on highly skilled migrant workers. As the Commission 
highlighted in its 2014 Report to the European Parliament and the 
Council on the application of the EU Blue Card Directive, this 
flexibility and the differences in the policy choices by member States in 
the implementation of the Blue Card directive at national level have led 
to wide differences between EU member States regarding legislative 
rules applicable and the number of Blue Cards issued to date.4  
Only 3664 Blue Cards were issued in 2012 and around 15,000 in 
2013. Though the number increased in 2013, this seems to be the 
consequence of delays in implementation of the Directive: the Blue 
Card scheme was in force only for few months in 2012 in most member 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Council Directive 2009/50/EC on the conditions of entry and residence of third-
country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment, 25 May 2009. 
4  See European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council on the implementation of Directive 2009/50/EC 
on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purpose of 
highly qualified employment (‘EU Blue Card’), COM(2014) 287 final, of 22 May 2014. 
The Commission also expressed concerns about flaws in the transposition, the low level 
of coherence, the limited set of rights, the barriers to intra-EU mobility and a general 
lack of communication by MS of data and measures taken in application of the 
Directive, e.g. on volumes of admission, labour market tests, ethical recruitment, salary 
threshold (see p. 10).  
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States. In practical terms, fewer Blue Cards were granted in 2013 than 
the permits issued under various national schemes the year prior (around 
20,000). In other words, the Directive did not increase highly skilled 
migration flows into the EU in the first two years of the scheme. As a 
consequence, and despite its relatively young age, several calls for a 
revision of the Blue Card legal system have begun to emerge, noting 
that the Directive has had little impact in achieving its objectives such 
as harmonization of the admission of highly qualified migrants at EU 
level and facilitating the conditions for those who wish to move to a 
second member State for highly qualified employment.  At the end of 
the day, a review of the ‘EU Blue Card’ Directive has been put forward 
by the Juncker Commission as a first step towards a new European 
policy on legal migration, one of the ten priorities of this Commission. 
Indeed, in its work program the Juncker Commission has proposed 
revising the Blue Card Directive and recommended looking at this 
legislation “with a fresh pair of eyes to identify ways and means of 
substantially broadening this initiative”.5 Such a policy could help to 
address shortages of specific skills – alongside the development of skills 
within the existing EU workforce – and attract talent to better cope with 
the demographic challenge of the EU. Its aim is for Europe to become at 
least as attractive as such favourite migration destinations as Australia, 
Canada and the USA.6 
 
2. The Directive 2009/50/ EC and the attraction of highly qualified 
workers in Europe 
The reasons underlying the creation of the European Blue Card 
system are well-known and are  already the subject of extensive analysis 
in literature.7 The Directive 2009/50/EC, indeed, is the first directive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 See www.juncker.epp.eu/my-priorities.  
6  At this time, a project of legislative initiative has been prepared by the 
Commission and is awaiting a final decision on whether this initiative will be pursued 
on, its content and structure (see European Commission, Inception Impact Assessment, 
Review of Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the conditions of entry and 
residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment 
(“EU Blue Card” Directive), of July 16th 2015.  
7 As far as legal literature see E. Guild, “EU Policy on Labour Migration: A First 
Look at the Commission's Blue Card Initiative”, in CEPS Policy Brief, No. 145, 15 
November 2007 available at www.ceps.be/book/eu-policy-labour-migration-first-look-
commissions-blue-card-initiative; S. Peers, “Legislative Update: EC Immigration and 
Asylum Law Attracting and Deterring Labour Migration: The Blue Card and Employer 
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adopted by the European Union in relation to immigration work of 
third-country nationals after several failed attempts and originates from 
a Commission proposal of 2007 aimed at implementing the 2005 Policy 
Plan on legal migration prepared by the Commission itself.8 Amongst 
the many measures recommended by the Plan, the Commission decided 
to start from the conditions of entry and of residence of high-skilled 
third-country nationals. Arguments put forward by the Commission in 
support of the adoption of an harmonized European discipline in this 
field resided substantially in the attempt to enhance the EU’s capacity to 
attract and retain high-skilled workers from third countries and 
overcome the hurdles represented by the diversity of the systems of 
admission at member States level and the complex bureaucratic 
procedures limiting the intra-Community movement of job-seekers. The 
Council of the EU adopted the Blue Card Directive on 25 May 2009 
after a laborious negotiation process; the directive entered into force on 
19 June 2009. According to Article 23 of the Directive member States 
were obliged to adopt national measures of transposition by 19 June 
2011 and by 2014 the Commission started to prepare its periodic reports 
on the implementation of the Directive. 
 
2.1. The attraction of highly qualified third-country nationals 
under the EU Blue Card régime 
The directive authorizes member States to issue a permit to enter and 
work in their territories, the ‘EU Blue Card’, at the conclusion of a 
special procedure derogating national rules on entry and residence of 
third-country nationals, when the applicant aspires to stay in the EU 
country for highly qualified employment for a period exceeding three 
months. The rationale of the Directive is to attract highly qualified 
workers in member Countries in order to sustain the competitiveness 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Sanctions Directives”, in European Journal of Migration and Law, 2009, p. 387 ff.; Y. 
K. Gümüs, “EU Blue Card Scheme: The Right Step in the Right Direction?”, in 
European Journal of Migration and Law, 2010, p. 435 ff.; L. Cerna, “The EU Blue 
Card: preferences, policies, and negotiations between member States”, in Migration 
Studies, 2013, p. 1 ff., ID., “Understanding the diversity of EU migration in practice: the 
implementation of the Blue Card initiative”, in Policy Studies, 2013, p. 180 ff.; S. 
Kalantaryan, I. Martin, “Reforming the EU Blue Card as a Labour Migration policy 
Tool?”, in Policy Brief, 2015/08, 2015, available at www.migrationpolicycentre.eu. 
8 See European Commission, Communication from the Commission on a policy 
plan on legal migration [COM (2005) 669 final, 21 December 2005. 
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and economic growth of the EU, addressing labour shortages and lack 
of skills in the European labour market.  
The Directive applies to third-country nationals employed under 
national employment law and/or in accordance with national practice for 
the purpose of exercising genuine, effective and paid work for, or under 
the direction of, someone else, who have the required adequate and 
specific competence proven by higher professional qualifications. The 
Directive makes it clear that it does not apply to third-country nationals 
wishing to engage in a self-employed activities. In short, the release of 
the European Blue Card, is valid only in situations of highly qualified, 
subordinate employment. Furthermore, the Directive does not apply to 
third-country nationals who are authorised to reside in a member State 
on the basis of temporary protection or have applied for authorisation to 
reside on that basis and are awaiting a decision on their status;9 to non-
EU citizens who are family members of Union citizens who have 
exercised, or are exercising, their right to free movement within the 
Community in conformity with Directive 2004/38/EC. 10  Similarly, 
according to Article 3 of the Directive, the granting of a Blue Card is 
excluded for the following specific categories of third-country nationals: 
researchers who apply to reside in a member State in order to carry out a 
research project; those persons who enjoy EC long-term resident status 
in a member State in accordance with Directive 2003/109/EC and 
exercise their right to reside in another member State in order to carry 
out an economic activity in an employed or self-employed capacity; 
persons who are covered by Directive 96/71/EC11 on the posting of 
workers within the framework of the provision of services as long as 
they are posted on the territory of the member State concerned; persons 
who enter a member State under commitments contained in an 
international agreement facilitating the entry and temporary stay of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 This includes third-country nationals falling under the Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 
April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country 
nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international 
protection and the content of the protection granted and under the Directive 2005/71/EC  
10 See Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within 
the territory of the member States, of 29 April 2004. 
11  See Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services, of 16 
December 1996. 
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certain categories of trade and investment-related natural persons;12 
persons who have been admitted to the territory of a member State as 
seasonal workers; and, finally, persons whose expulsion has been 
suspended for reasons of fact or law.  
As far as the ratione loci scope of application of the directive is 
concerned, the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark, have exercised 
the opt-out clause established in Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocols 
annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty establishing 
the European Community; these member States therefore are not part of 
this Directive and are not bound by or subject to its application. 
Conditions of admission are set forth in Articles 5 and 6 of the 
Directive. According to Article 5 the release of the EU Blue Card is 
dependent upon the existence of a valid work contract or a binding job 
offer for highly qualified employment of at least one year in the member 
State concerned with a salary not inferior to a threshold of at least 1.5 
times the average gross annual salary in the member State concerned. In 
the case of regulated professions, the Directive requires that the 
applicant present a document attesting fulfilment of the conditions set 
out under national law for the exercise by Union citizens of the 
regulated profession specified in the work contract or in the binding job 
offer. Also the Directive requires that third-country nationals interested 
in applying for the Blue Card present evidence of having, or having 
applied for, a health insurance for all the risks normally covered for 
nationals of the concerned member State. Finally, the Directive restricts 
the release of the Blue Card only to those third-country nationals who 
are not considered to pose a threat to public policy, public security or 
public health.  
Other provisions of the Blue Card régime leaves a wide margin of 
appreciation to member States. Article 6 the Directive clarifies that the 
determination of the volume of admission of third-country nationals 
entering EU territory for the purposes of highly qualified employment 
rests upon member States. From this perspective, the Directive does not 
affect the prerogative of member States to determine the quotas of 
foreign nationals authorized to remain on their territory for work 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 This provision, arguably, refers to those categories of migrant workers included 
within the scope of application of the GATS Mode 4 (on this subject matter see M. K. 
Solomon, “GATS Mode 4 and the Mobility of Labour”, in R. Cholewinski, R. 
Perruchoud, E. Macdonald (eds.), International Migration Law: Developing Paradigms 
and Key Challenges, The Hague, 2007, p. 107 ff.). 
	  	  
101 
purposes. Also, both the period of validity of the EU Blue Card released 
to third-country nationals and the determination of the subjects (third-
country nationals, their employers, or both of them) entitled to submit 
applications for an EU Blue Card are entrusted to member States. The 
wide margin of appreciation conceded to member States by the directive 
highlights the underlying tensions “between openness and closure 
towards labour migration policy” coexisting at both member State and 
EU levels and the circumstance that “the resolution of these tensions at 
member State level can then lead to diverse policies as the example of 
the Blue Card Directive demonstrates”.13 
Third-country nationals who have applied and fulfil the requirements 
set out in Article 5 of the Directive and for whom the competent 
authorities have taken a positive decision in accordance with Article 8 
shall be granted an EU Blue Card. The period of validity of the EU Blue 
Card may be comprised between one and four years: if the work 
contract covers a period less than this period, the EU Blue Card shall be 
issued or renewed for the duration of the work contract plus three 
months. During the period of its validity, the EU Blue Card shall entitle 
its holder to enter, re-enter and stay in the territory of the member State 
issuing the EU Blue Card and the other rights recognised by the 
Directive. 
The request for the release of the EU Blue Card may be rejected on 
the basis of a series of grounds for refusal set forth in Article 8 of the 
Directive. There are three major categories of grounds for refusal: a) 
vices and other formal or substantial defects of the application package; 
b) ground for refusal arising from internal necessities of member States 
and belonging to their sphere of margin of appreciation; c) ground for 
refusal depending from the situation of the employer. As far as the first 
category of vices is concerned, the defects can be determined both by 
the absence of the conditions required by Article 5 when the documents 
submitted have been fraudulently acquired, or falsified or tampered 
with. As far as the grounds for refusal falling within the scope of the 
margin of appreciation of member States, they may be listed, according 
to three subcategories. The first subcategory involves the needs arising 
from the national labour market and is disciplined by paragraphs 2 and 3 
of Article 8 of the Directive. According to such provisions before 
deciding on an application for a Blue Card, or when considering 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 See L. Cerna, Understanding the diversity of EU migration policy in practice …, 
cit., p. 181. 
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renewals or authorizations to be issued pursuant to Article 12 
paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Directive, member States have the right to 
assess the situation of their national labour market and verify whether 
the concerned vacancy could not be filled by national or Community 
workforce, by third-country nationals lawfully resident in that member 
State and already forming part of its labour market by virtue of 
Community or national law, or by EC long-term residents wishing to 
move to that member State for highly qualified employment in 
accordance with Chapter III of Directive 2003/109/EC.14 The second 
subcategory involves limits arising from application of Article 6 of the 
Directive which safeguards the right of member States to determine the 
volume of admission of third-country nationals entering its territory for 
the purposes of highly qualified employment. The third subcategory, 
finally, is justified by the need to prevent the so-called ‘brain-drain’ 
practices and gives member States the power to refuse an application for 
a Blue Card in order to ensure ethical recruitment in sectors suffering 
from shortage of skilled workers in the countries of origin. This 
provision, designed to preserve human resources in the developing 
countries, expresses a sort of self-restraint of the EU member States in 
this field area.  
As far as the ground for refusal of the EU Blue Card depending from 
the situation of the employer, Article 8 paragraph 5 authorizes member 
States to reject an application for an EU Blue Card if the employer has 
been sanctioned in conformity with national law for undeclared work or 
illegal employment. Finally, Article 9 of the Directive regulates those 
situations in which EU member States are obliged to withdraw or refuse 
to renew the Blue Card. This may occur in the following circumstances: 
a) when the Card has been fraudulently acquired, falsified or tampered 
with; b) when it appears that the Card-holder did not meet or no longer 
fulfils the conditions for entry and residence laid down in the Directive; 
c) when it is clear that the Card-holder resides for purposes other than 
that for which he was authorized to reside; d) finally, when it appears 
that the Card-holder has violated the rules applicable to the change of 
employment, as set forth in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 12, or when he 
is in a state of non-temporary unemployment as set forth in Article 13. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14  See Council Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the status of third-country 
nationals who are long-term residents, of 25 November 2003. 
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2.2. The rights recognized by the EU Blue Card 
Articles 12 to 17 of the Directive recognize a series of rights to third-
country nationals who have been granted the release of the EU Blue 
Card. These provisions are aimed at ensuring the basic economic and 
social rights and namely: access to the labour market; the treatment to 
ensure to the Card holder in the event of unemployment; recognition of 
equal treatment with nationals of the member State which has issued the 
Blue Card; the rights of family reunification  and recognition of the 
status of long-term resident for Blue Card holders. 
The release of the Blue Card grants the person concerned the right to 
access the labour market of the member State and the enjoyment of 
equal treatment with national work force; this applies, in particular, with 
regard to working conditions (including salary, dismissal, and the 
workplaces’ health and safety provisions), freedom of association and 
participation in organizations representing workers, education and 
vocational training, recognition of diplomas and professional 
qualifications, social security, access to goods and services available to 
the public, the information and advice provided by the centres for the 
employment. According to Article 12, recognition of the right of access 
to the labour market is limited, for the first two years of legal 
employment in the member State concerned, exclusively to the exercise 
of the activities indicated in the initial request pursuant to Article 5. In 
other words, during this period any change of employer is prohibited, 
unless authorization of the competent authorities is obtained. Similarly, 
any other change that is likely to affect the initial conditions of 
admission is subject to prior notification or, if provided by national law, 
prior authorization by competent authorities. 
In any event, paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 12 authorise member 
States to restrict the access to labour market of  Blue Card holders, if the 
work activities concerned involve, even on an occasional basis, the 
exercise of public authority, or the general interests of the State; the 
same applies for those situations in which these activities are reserved 
by the legislation to nationals or to Union citizens.  
After eighteen months of legal residence in the first member State as 
an EU Blue Card holder, the person concerned and his family members 
may move to a member State other than the first member State for the 
purpose of highly qualified employment under the conditions set out in 
Article 18. The procedure in this case is identical to the procedure 
applied in relation to the first entry of the Card holder. The Blue Card 
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holder or his employer, must submit an application for an EU Blue Card 
to the competent authority of the second member State, as soon as 
possible and however no later than one month after entering the territory 
of the second member State. The request must include all the documents 
proving the fulfilment of the conditions set out in Article 5 of the 
Directive. The second member State may decide, in accordance with 
national law, not to allow the applicant to work until a positive decision 
on the application has been taken by its competent authority. The 
Directive expressly recognises that in such situations applications may 
also be submitted to the competent authorities of the second member 
State while the EU Blue Card holder is still residing in the territory of 
the first member State. The second member State is obliged to process 
the application fairly and to inform the applicant and the first member 
State, in writing, of its decision to either issue an EU Blue Card and 
allow the applicant to reside on its territory for highly qualified 
employment or refuse to issue the Blue Card and oblige the applicant 
and his family members to leave its territory. It is important to note that 
in this situation the first Member State is obliged to immediately 
readmit without formalities the EU Blue Card holder and his family 
members. This provision also applies if the EU Blue Card issued by the 
first member State has meanwhile expired or has been withdrawn during 
the examination of the application. After the readmission the provisions 
set forth in Article 13 as to temporary unemployment shall apply, if 
applicable. 
 
3. The difficulties of the process of transposition of Directive 
According to Article 23 of the Directive member States were obliged 
to complete the transposition of the EU Blue Card régime into national 
law by  June 19th 2011. However, since its adoption, it has become 
apparent that the process of transposition would have been not an easy 
task. Indeed, between June and October 2011 the Commission launched 
the first of a series of infringement proceedings for the failure to 
transpose the Directive by six member States. Three of these member 
States (Italy, Malta and Portugal) had not even replied to the letters of 
formal notice (the first step of the infringement procedure) sent on July 
18th 2011 by the Commission. The remaining three member States 
(Germany, Poland and Sweden) replied to the letters of formal notice 
but indicated that new implementing legislation would not enter into 
force before the following year. Accordingly, on October 27th 2011 the 
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Commission decided to issue reasoned opinions under Article 258 
TFEU requesting these member States to take action.15 Subsequently, on 
February 27th 2012, the Commission sent another series of reasoned 
opinions to another group of three countries (Austria, Cyprus and 
Greece) which had delayed the implementation of the Directive, 
requesting them to bring their laws in line with EU legislation.16 Similar 
complaints were addressed also to Romania and Luxembourg. In the 
end, all member States completed the transposition process of the 
directive; however the wide margin of appreciation left by the Directive 
has contributed to the adoption of various ‘national versions’ of the EU 
Blue Card with in-depth differences mainly concerning admission 
requirements and conditions.  
In Spain, for instance, the legislation transposing the Blue Card 
Directive was adopted with the royal decree of June 30th 2011. 
According to this legislation the Card may be released only where 
applicants demonstrate they are in possession of a higher education 
qualification of at least three years or a five-year work experience in the 
relevant occupation. According to Spanish legislation the salary 
threshold is at least 1.5 times the average annual salary (about Euro 
33,767 per year). Apart from the existence of particular situations, prior 
exhaustion of the labour market test is necessary. The Blue Card is valid 
for one year (renewable), and family members are authorized to 
accompany the permit holder and seek employment. 
As far as Germany is concerned, according to the transposition 
legislation passed in this country applicants for a Blue Card permit must 
prove they are in possession of a university degree and provide proof of 
earnings of at least Euro 44,800 per year (instead of Euro 63,600 per 
year fixed under general domestic rules). However, for engineers and 
technicians operating in sectors with severe skills shortages (such as IT, 
medicine and engineering), the annual earnings threshold is lowered to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 See European Commission, European Commission Press Release, Blue Card – 
Work permits for highly qualified migrants 6 Member States fail to comply with the 
rules, IP/11/1247, 27 October 2011. 
16 See European Commission, European Commission Press Release, Blue Card: 
Commission warns Member States over red tape facing highly qualified migrants, 
IP/12/167 of  February 27th 2012. Austria had even passed a domestic legislation 
providing for a régime to attract highly skilled foreign workers (so-called Red-White-
Red Card) competing with the EU system (see www.migration.gv.at/en/types-of-
immigration/permanent-immigration-red-white-red-card.html) and delaying the transpo-
sition of the directive. 
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Euro 34,900 per year. Release of the Card entitles the holders to a 
temporary residence permit, which could become permanent after three 
years in a given job. According to German legislation prior exhaustion 
of the labour market test is not required, except for shortage 
occupations. In Bulgaria applicants for the Bulgarian Blue Card need to 
demonstrate possession of a higher education certificate and at least five 
years of experience in the job position, with an annual salary threshold 
of at least Euro 8,280. Furthermore, it is necessary that the so-called 
‘resident labour market test’ be satisfied: in other words, it is necessary 
that no suitable Bulgarian worker be available for the vacant position. In 
France, the legislation of transposition requires that third-country 
applicants to the EU Blue Card must be in possession of a three-year 
degree or five years of work experience and an employment contract of 
at least one year. The remuneration must be at least 1.5 times the 
minimum salary set by the government (which is about Euro 47,898 per 
year). On the contrary, no labour market test is required. The Blue Card 
is valid for three years, or may coincide with the duration of the 
employment contract if this last is of a lesser duration. According to 
French legislation family members of the Blue Card holder are granted 
combined residence and work permits for one year; these permits may 
be renewed. Finally, as far as Romania is concerned, applicants to the 
Blue Card must demonstrate possession, of at least a post-secondary 
educational qualification and an annual salary of at least four times the 
average gross annual salary for a similar position in Romania (about 
Euro 24,000 per year). In the case of regulated professions, the 
applicant must prove possession of relevant educational qualifications 
or work experience. The transposition legislation gives a certain priority 
to EU Blue Card applications over applications for other permits, thus 
Blue Card requests are processed much more quickly than requests 
regular permits. The Blue Card is valid for two years (this duration is 
renewable), and family members are authorized to accompany the 
holder and seek employment.17 
What is important to stress here is the circumstance that several 
member States have enacted domestic legislation to attract highly 
skilled third country nationals that is alternative to and in competition 
with the Blue Card régime: these competing legislations set forth 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 A broader analysis of the differences between the different national versions of 
the Blue Card is available in L. Cerna, Understanding the diversity of EU migration 
policy in practice, cit., and in particular pp. 188-193. 
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requirements and conditions that are often broader than those of the 
Blue Card Directive and national legislations adopted for its 
transposition. Apart from the already mentioned competing Austrian 
Red-White Scheme, a good example is provided by The Netherlands’ 
Knowledge Migrant Scheme. This scheme co-exists with the EU Blue 
Card but it is more convenient from several aspects. It does not involve 
any skills or education test, and the salary threshold amounts to Euro 
50,619 for those aged 30 or over, and Euro 37,121 for those under 30 
(contrary to the salary threshold requested by the Dutch legislation 
transposing the Blue Card amounts to Euro 60,000 per year). Second, 
the Blue Card application process is particularly lengthy and slow 
compared to the fast procedure (two weeks) requested for completing 
the application under the Knowledge Migrant Scheme. Another 
interesting examples is the Belgian competing legislation on the 
attraction of highly skilled third country nationals. Indeed, while under 
the Blue Card transposed régime applicants need to have higher 
professional qualifications (diploma attesting to at least three years of 
higher education), and to hold a contract of indefinite duration or a 
minimum of one year with an annual gross salary amounting to at least 
Euro 49,995, the co-existing national legislation disciplining the so-
called ‘work permit type B for highly qualified personnel’ 18  only 
requires that applicants demonstrate they possess a diploma of higher 
education or university degree and an annual gross salary amounting to 
Euro 38,665. The differences between national transposition legislations 
for the Blue Card, as well as the co-existence of national parallel 
régimes competing with the Blue Card in attracting highly skilled 
foreign workers, risk lowering the appeal of the EU Blue Card for non-
EU  workers and may impact negatively on its effectiveness if such a 
co-existence is not ‘governed’ by coordinating supranational and 
national regulations. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 The work permit B category is disciplined by Article 9, paragraph 6 of the Royal 
Decree of June 9th 1999 concerning the implementation of Law of 30 April 1999 (Law 
relating to the employment of third-country nationals). For more information see J. 
Antoons, A. Pirotte, Attracting Highly Qualified and Qualified Third-Country Nationals 
to Belgium, EMN Focussed Study, 2013, available at 
www.emnbelgium.be/publication/attracting-highly-qualified-and-qualified-third-country 
-nationals-belgium-and-eu-emn. 
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4. Entry and residence for work purposes of highly qualified third-
country nationals and the transposition of the Blue Card Directive in 
Italy  
As far as Italy is concerned, Article 27 of law No. 286/199819 (the 
so-called Testo Unico sull’Immigrazione) regulates a series of situations 
in which the entry of non-EU citizens for reasons of work may derogate 
from the discipline of annual planning and annual quotas established by 
law. The rationale of Article 27 provisions resides in excluding from the 
immigration quotas those categories of workers that fulfil special needs 
of the national economic system, justifying ‘out of quota’ admissions. A 
simplified procedure is foreseen for delivery of the work permits in such 
circumstances. Also, in some special situations (seconded managers, 
university professors, skilled workers seconded to Italy, maritime 
workers, trainees and journalists) the work permit procedure is further 
simplified, and application for a visa can be filed with Italian Embassies 
or Consulates abroad. The procedure for out of quota admissions ends 
with the signing of the job contract and release of the permit which 
generally corresponds to the duration of employment. Such duration 
may not exceed two years but can be renewed for an equivalent period.  
Directive 2009/50/EC was transposed by law No. 108 of June 28th 
2012, entered into force on August 8th 2012, setting forth amendments 
to the Testo Unico sull’Immigrazione by adding two new provisions: a 
first provision (Article 9-ter) concerning the status of long-term 
residents in the EU for EU Blue Card holders, and a second provision 
(Article 27-quarter) on the entry and residence of highly qualified 
foreign workers and the release of the EU Blue Card. As far as highly 
skilled third country nationals admission is concerned, with the 
transposition a general and broader regime for the admission of 
qualified immigration has been introduced within the Italian legal 
system, provided that the criteria fixed by the law are satisfied.  
In order to be considered ‘highly qualified’, the applicant must 
demonstrate having completed a high school course of study of at least 
3 years in the country of origin, and must have obtained, consequently, a 
professional qualification recognized in Italy. A further condition for the 
application of the provisions of Article 27-quarter resides in the 
circumstance that authorization for the admission of foreign workers 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 See Legislative Decree No. 286, of 25 July 1998 setting forth the Testo Unico 
delle disposizioni concernenti la disciplina dell'immigrazione e norme sulla condizione 
dello straniero.  
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depends on the existence of a paid work activity to be performed “under 
the direction and coordination of natural or legal person”. The 
abovementioned provision, therefore, excludes self-employment by the 
scope of application of the amended legislation and transposes Article 2 
(b) of the Directive 2009/50/EC. According to paragraphs 2 and 3 of 
Article 27-quarter these new rules on  the attraction of highly skilled 
workers apply to third-country nationals who demonstrate possession of 
the requirements set forth in paragraph 1, whether they are resident in a 
third country or in a member State; to highly skilled third-country 
nationals already in possession of a Blue Card issued by another 
member State; to all third-country nationals already residing in the 
Italian territory on the basis of a permit for visits, business, tourism and 
study, provided that they satisfy the requirements set forth by Article 
27-quater.  
As far as the procedure for obtaining the Blue Card visa is 
concerned, Article 10 of the Directive leaves to the margin of 
appreciation of member States to decide whether  to attribute this task to 
the employers, or to leave it up to the concerned employees, or both; the 
Italian legislation of transposition, according to the paragraph 4 of 
Article 27-quarter, attributes to the employer the task of initiating the 
procedure and submitting the application before the competent 
territorial Sportello unico per l’Immigrazione. 
In order to be validly submitted, the application must include a series 
of documents listed in Article 22 of the Testo unico sull’Immigrazione20 
and in addition: a work contract or a binding job offer of at least one 
year’s duration; certificate or other evidence of formal qualifications 
issued by a competent authority of the country of origin proving the 
level of education achieved and the professional qualifications obtained; 
the gross annual salary resulting from the monthly or annual salary 
specified in the work contract or in the binding job offer and its 
consistency with the amount fixed by the legislation of transposition. 
More important is the fact that the higher education and professional 
qualifications submitted by concerned foreign nationals must be 
recognized in Italy; these qualifications must be included within levels 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 This documentation includes: the declaration of conformity with the law for the 
accommodation of the foreign worker; the work contract and its relevant clauses; the 
declaration of commitment by the employer to pay costs of repatriation of the foreign 
worker if necessary; the declaration of commitment of the employer to communicate 
any change in the employment status. 
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1, 2 and 3 of the national classification of the profession.21 The binding 
condition that professional and education qualifications be recognized in 
Italy may make it particularly difficult to obtain the EU Blue Card in 
this country. This is due both to the large number of foreign professional 
qualifications that are still unregulated in Italy and to the lengthy and 
cumbersome mechanism of recognition of foreign qualifications 
existing in Italy. It is for this reason, therefore, that Italy has introduced 
a special procedure, under the supervision of the Ministry of Education, 
obligating domestic authorities to quickly accomplish recognition of 
foreign qualifications when this is requested for the purpose of 
obtaining an EU Blue Card.  
Following the signing of a work contract and the notification of the 
start of employment to the competent authorities, highly qualified third-
countries nationals authorized to work in Italy are entitled to obtaining 
the release from the local police authorities of the EU Blue Card permit. 
Pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article 27-quater the permit has a duration 
of two years if the work contract is of indefinite duration; in all other 
cases the duration of the permit is equal to the duration of the 
employment, plus three months.  
Paragraphs 9 and 10 of Article 27-quarter regulate grounds for 
refusal and the circumstances for withdrawal or non-renewal of the 
authorization to work under the national EU blue Card scheme. From 
this perspective, national rules fully transpose the provisions set forth by 
Articles 8 and 9 of the Directive and their grounds for refusal, 
withdrawal and non-renewal. However, it must be noted that in the 
transposition legislation the grounds concerning reasons of public 
policy, security or public health, those related to the lack of notification 
of address by the person concerned as well as those concerning the 
request for social assistance of the concerned person have not been 
transposed. Accordingly, national authorities may refuse the EU Blue 
Card, in accordance with paragraph 9 of Article 27-quater, if the 
documents submitted have been obtained through fraud or have been 
falsified or tampered with. The same applies when the concerned 
foreign national who has successfully applied for the Blue Card fails to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21  See the ISTAT national classification of profession CP 20111, at 
www.cp2011.istat.it. The first level includes high-profile managers and entrepreneurs; 
the second level includes intellectual and scientific professionals such as engineers, 
doctors, researchers, academicians; the third level includes other experts (i.e., computer 
programmers, airplane pilots, nurses, artists, athletes, trainers, police officers, etc.). 
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appear, within eight days, before the Sportello unico per l’Immigrazione 
in order to sign the residence contract, provided that this delay is not 
due to force majeure. Some particular grounds for refusal or withdrawal 
concern the status of the employer and, in particular, his conviction, in 
the last five years, for serious offenses, and namely: the crime of aiding 
and abetting illegal immigration to Italy (or emigration from Italy to 
other states); the recruitment of persons for prostitution, the exploitation 
of prostitution, and the exploitation of minors for illegal activities; the 
crime of labour exploitation foreseen in Article 603-bis of the Criminal 
Code (also known as the crime of capolarato); the crime of employment 
of illegally staying third-country nationals, pursuant to Article 22 
paragraph 12 of the Testo unico sull’immigrazione as amended by 
Legislative Decree 109/2012, transposing Directive 2009/52/EC 
providing for minimum standards on sanctions and measures against 
employers of illegally staying third-country nationals.22  
The specific case of the withdrawal or non-renewal of the Blue Card 
in the event of a protracted unemployment status of the concerned 
foreign workers merits further analysis. Indeed, Italian legislation 
correctly transposes Directive principles according to which the 
unemployment status should not be considered per se a valid reason for 
withdrawing the Card: such an eventuality is made possible by the 
Directive only in the presence of a protracted unemployment status. 
However, in a major departure from the provisions of Article 13 of the 
Directive envisaging a period of unemployment exceeding three 
months, Article 27-quarter does not quantify the permissible period of 
unemployment. This legal gap may be filled by applying, by way of 
analogy, general provisions fixed by Article  22 paragraph 11 of the 
Testo unico sull’immigrazione, quantifying the minimum period of 
unemployment tolerated in case of loss of the employment, or 
resignation by the employee, in 12 months. According to us this solution 
is to be preferred to the application of the shorter time-limit foreseen by 
the Directive. Several reasons support this conclusion: first,  the need to 
ensure consistency amongst provisions inside the national legal system 
avoiding unjustifiable differences of treatments; second, the need to 
respect the principle of the most favourable rule in interpreting gaps and 
vacuums when the personal status and human rights of migrant persons 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 See Directive 2009/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, 
providing for minimum standards on sanctions and measures against employers of 
illegally staying third-country nationals, of 18 June 2009. 
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are at stake; third, the fact that provisions of Directive 2009/50/EC 
constitute only minimum standards that States are obliged to ensure; 
and, lastly, the fact that on this specific issue the 1977 Convention on 
the legal status of migrant workers, which has been ratified by Italy, 
prescribes a time-limit of no less than five months.23 
Paragraph 13 of Article 27-quater, transposes Article 12 of the 
Directive and the ban, for the first two years of legal employment in 
Italy, on the exercise of paid employment activities different from those 
matching the conditions for admission and change of employer. While 
the first ban is absolute, the change of employer, even before the 
expiration of the two year period, may be admitted subject to prior 
approval by the competent labour market offices. 
Furthermore, paragraph 14 of Article 27-quater explicitly prohibits 
Blue Card holders from performing activities involving direct or indirect 
exercise of public powers, even when carried out on an occasional basis, 
or concerning the protection of the national interest or other activities 
reserved to nationals, Union citizens or EEA citizens.  
Except for the aforementioned restrictions to the labour market 
access, the transposing legislation incorporates the entire system of 
rights granted by the Directive, including the principle of equal 
treatment of Blue Card holders with Italian citizens. Indeed, according 
to paragraph 15 Article 27-quarter, after the expiration of the two year 
period, EU Blue Card holders enjoy equal treatment with nationals of 
the member State issuing the Blue Card, as regards access to any highly 
skilled work activity. Furthermore, after eighteen months of legal 
residence in another member States the Card holder may enter Italy for 
the purpose of highly qualified employment without the need to apply 
for a visa. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 See Council of Europe, European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant 
Workers, CETS No. 093, adopted in Strasbourg on November 24th 1977 and entered into 
force on May 1st 1983. The Convention has been ratified by several EU member States 
and quite all the EU funding members. Italy signed the 1977 Convention in 1983 and 
ratified it on February 27th 1995. According to paragraph 4 of Article 9 of the 
Convention: “[i]f a migrant worker is no longer in employment, either because he is 
temporarily incapable of work as a result of illness or accident or because he is 
involuntarily unemployed, this being duly confirmed by the competent authorities, he 
shall be allowed for the purpose of the application of Article 25 of this Convention to 
remain on the territory of the receiving State for a period which should not be less than 
five months” (emphasis is added). 
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Among the other rights recognized by the EU Blue Card scheme a 
pivotal position is held by the recognition of the right to family 
reunification enshrined in paragraph 16 of Article 27-quarter. Family 
reunification may not be made dependent upon the duration of the visa 
and is recognised pursuant to Article 29 of the Testo unico 
sull’immigrazione; accordingly, the legislation grants to family 
members a residence permit for family reasons of the same duration as 
that of the holder of the EU Blue Card. 
Particular attention must be reserved to the circumstance that as far 
as the right to family reunification is concerned, the transposing 
legislation mirrors the basic rationale of the Blue Card Directive: i.e. 
introduction of a preferential system of access for highly skilled workers 
from third countries to derogate, for purposes of family reunification of 
Card holders, from the provisions of Directive 2003/86/EC,24 and, from 
the strict conditions of stability and residence required therein. 
In conclusion, as far as the Italian transposition of the Directive, 
domestic legislation shows several lights but also some shadows. In the 
first place, the transposed legislation lacks any measure to facilitate 
circular migrations; also, there is no reference to the need to ensure 
ethical recruitment in sectors suffering from a lack of qualified workers 
in the countries of origin. This is much more serious once considered 
that the prevention of practices of brain-drain and the preservation of 
human resources in developing countries, is, on the contrary, a key 
feature of the Directive. In the second place, if the purpose of setting up 
of a legal system to attract highly skilled migrant workers is, as we 
believe, instrumental to economic growth and markets, then the 
transposing legislation should have attempted to exploit any possibilities 
granted by the Directive to introduce more favourable access conditions 
than those applied in other national versions of the Blue Card: this 
might have made Italy a more attractive destination for highly skilled 
and qualified foreign workers than other EU member States. 
 
5. The lacklustre results of the Blue Card Directive and the 
perspectives for its reform 
In May 2014, the Commission adopted the first implementation 
report assessing the transposition of the Directive into the national 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 See Council Directive 2003/86/EC, on the right to family reunification, of 22 
September 2003. 
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legislation of the 25 participating member States.25 It also provided an 
initial identification of some of the main shortcomings of the Directive. 
More specifically, the report highlighted a fragmented implementation 
by member States with widely diverging rules and, furthermore, the 
circumstance that the number of Blue Cards issued has so far been 
limited. Regarding the reasons of such meagre results, analyses 
performed in the literature on this subject matter have clearly 
highlighted the main weaknesses of the Directive. In the first place, it 
sets only minimum standards, provides only a limited set of rights, and 
above all leaves much leeway to member States through many ‘may’ 
clauses and references to national legislation. Consequently, the level of 
coherence and harmonisation across member States remains low and the 
facilitation of intra-EU mobility – a clear EU-added value – remains 
strongly limited.  
In the second place, many member States continue to run parallel 
national schemes to attract highly qualified third-country nationals: 
these national schemes are in open competition with the EU Blue Card 
and with each other. This creates a fragmented and complex landscape 
of many different regimes for admitting highly qualified third-country 
nationals. In the third place, and from the point of view of the ratione 
personae scope of application of the EU Blue Card Directive, this scope 
only applies to third-country national employees. It does not include 
pivotal categories of third-country nationals currently outside the scope 
of the Blue Card whose involvement would have been suitable to 
support the attainment of the Directive’s goals. This is especially true 
with respect to entrepreneurs and service providers. Indeed, Europe’s 
economic growth and jobs depend on its ability to support the growth of 
enterprises and the expansion of the services sector with its legacy of 
well-trained and highly skilled professionals. Since entrepreneurship 
creates new companies, opens up new markets, and nurtures new skills, 
developing the entrepreneurial potential in the EU has been recognized 
as a priority task. However, in the EU the potential of third-country 
nationals from this perspective is largely untapped because qualified 
third-country nationals often face legal difficulties to access self-
employment. At the same time, some third countries have a migration 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council on the implementation of Directive 2009/50/EC on the 
conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purpose of highly 
qualified employment (‘EU Blue Card’), cit. 
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policy that is particularly attractive to entrepreneurs and service 
providers when compared to EU policies. A further reason of 
dysfunctionality of the EU Blue Card scheme resides in the fact that 
Blue Card related procedures are extremely costly for all stakeholders. It 
is ‘costly’ for the applicant through cumbersome bureaucracy. But the 
procedure is costly as well for national authorities because it requires 
case-by-case processing for which these authorities are often not 
prepared. Finally, the Blue Card is costly for the employer as well due 
to the one-year minimum contract duration (whereas national labour 
laws often establishe three to six months probationary periods) and the 
minimum salary threshold. 
Accordingly, the successive step resides in determining the 
modalities the EU may adopt to deal with the abovementioned 
shortcomings. Several policy options are on the table  and the very first 
one is that European institutions may decide to completely repeal the 
existing EU Blue Card Directive letting member States go back to 
strictly national legislation. This would mean that some member States 
would have their national schemes for attracting highly skilled third-
country nationals, other member States would have only specific 
provisions in a general migration scheme, and others would have only 
their general migration scheme for all skill levels. However, this 
alternative is neither desirable nor practicable as both the policy 
documents and the impact assessments made by the Commission have 
largely demonstrated.  
Therefore, options involving the survival of the Blue Card régime, 
even profoundly reformed, must be analysed: there are several potential 
avenues to achieve this goal. A first option may consist in amending the 
existing discipline and prescribing the abolition or the limitation, at the 
very least, of parallel national schemes that target similar groups of 
persons as the EU Blue Card Directive. Amendments may also be made 
to foster intra-EU mobility by extending, to highly qualified workers the 
provisions on intra-EU mobility contained in Directive 2014/66/EU on 
intra-corporate transfers,26 or considering other alternative solutions to 
facilitate intra-EU mobility (e.g. creating national priority lists of labour 
shortages in certain areas/sectors combined with an EU-wide database 
for Blue Card holders and a lower limitation on residence in a second 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 See Directive 2014/66/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals in the framework of an 
intra-corporate transfer, of 15 May 2014. 
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member State), or by improving residence conditions (e.g. working and 
residence rights, immediate family reunification, quicker acquisition of 
EC long-term status, accumulation of periods in different member 
States for the acquisition of EC long-term status, further facilitating 
circular migration and periods of absence). All these modifications 
would impact and reinforce the policy objectives of the European Blue 
Card discipline. Under this option, the rights attached to the Blue Card 
should also be enhanced. Specifically, family reunification for the 
relatives of Blue Card beneficiaries, the main advantage of the Blue 
Card in relation to national systems, should be granted simultaneously 
with the release of the Blue Card. Also, an extension of the maximum 
period of validity for the Blue Card would be welcomed: indeed in a 
labour market context where highly skilled labour migration needs in 
Europe seem to be largely long-term, it does not make sense to approach 
the Blue Card as a purely temporary work permit. 
Another option may consist in revising the admission system 
foreseen under the Blue Card scheme. This might be performed by 
creating fast-track admission procedures, facilitating the matching of the 
work offer and supply, creating a skill-matching database, increasing the 
role for employers in the admission process, etc. Under this option the 
de-bureaucratization and the simplification of the Blue Card procedures 
for all concerned stakeholder should be pursued. 
A third option, finally, may consist in differentiating and expanding 
the scope of the Blue Card discipline beyond highly qualified third-
country national employees to cover the abovementioned categories 
playing a pivotal role in achieving the goal of strengthening the 
competitiveness of the European economy and its labour market. This 
option might be performed by removing legal obstacles to the 
establishment of businesses and giving qualified third-country national 
entrepreneurs and service providers a stable permit. Categories include 
but are not limited to: entrepreneurs who are willing to invest in Europe 
(including start-ups) as well as business persons supplying services not 
linked to commercial presence (contractual service suppliers and 
independent professionals).27  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 This assessment will include the consideration whether the Blue Card Directive is 
the appropriate instrument for such potential expansion of scope or whether a separate 
initiative focussed on such categories might be more opportune. In addition, as to the 
possible expansion to entrepreneurs who are willing to invest in Europe (including start-
ups), the possibility and opportunity of complementing such a scheme for entry and stay 
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6. Conclusions 
The effective implementation of the Blue Card Directive has been 
inevitably influenced in all EU countries by the modalities by which two 
opposing forces that involve contemporary immigration policies in 
Europe interact: the tendency towards an increase in the level of 
openness towards migration for work purposes, driven by the need to 
attract a skilled workforce in order to fill the gaps in supply existing in 
European labour markets, and a diametrically opposite tendency, driven 
by many different reasons, and aimed at restricting, or even 
discontinuing third-country nationals access to the EU area for work 
purposes. It is this clash that has contributed to the setting up of an 
European system of attraction for highly skilled third-countries workers 
which is firmly anchored to the member States’ control and margin of 
appreciation, to the point of leaving the door ajar for member States to 
even block any admission for work purposes.  
An excellent example of this situation is represented by the exclusion 
from the scope of application of both the EU Blue card Directive and of 
national legislations transposing the Directive, of refugees and other 
persons entitled to international protection. As convincingly highlighted 
by the Commission in its impact assessment to the Directive, the 
existence of highly skilled workers holding such a status and already 
resident in the member States, usually performing activities lower than 
their qualifications, would have fully justified the enlargement of the 
personal scope of application of the European discipline on attracting 
highly skilled migrants 28 . However, the need to safeguard the 
prerogatives of member States prevented the adoption of such solutions. 
Finally, the breadth of discretion that is given to member States not 
only regarding the modes of transposition of Blue Card provisions, but 
also the introduction of parallel national schemes represents, arguably, 
the most striking features of the Directive. Indeed, the existence of 
parallel regimes, paves the way to increased competition amongst 
member States in attracting a highly qualified labour force rather than 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
for entrepreneurs with an EU support scheme for high-skilled entrepreneurial innovators 
could be explored. 
28 This position is shared by the European Economic and Social Committee that had 
already had occasion to emphasize the importance of such issue (see European 
Economic and Social Committee, Opinion of 12 March 2008 on the Green Paper on the 
future Common European Asylum System, Rapporteur Le Nouail-Marlière, adopted at 
the plenary session on 12 and 13 March 2008). 
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strengthening the competitiveness of the European economy and its 
labour market. In other words, member States may feel authorized to 
continue to act as individual players in the ‘global competition for 
talent’, prioritizing national interests over a proper and previously 
agreed upon implementation of EU measures.  
	  	  
THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE BUSINESS MODEL  
OF MIGRANT SMUGGLING AND HUMAN TRAFFICKING  
TO MAINTAIN INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY  
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 
Giorgia Bevilacqua* 
 
1. The Mediterranean Migration Crisis 
The Mediterranean sea has become a firm and fatal dividing border 
between ‘North’ and ‘South’.1 Even though a minor percentage of the 
global phenomenon, immigration by sea entails a wide range of serious 
risks, some applicable to persons at sea generally, and others specific to 
unauthorized migrants, due, for instance, to overcrowding, 
inexperienced crew and captain, and substandard quality of the boats.2 
Most migrants and asylum seekers who attempt to cross the 
Mediterranean sea depart from Libyan coasts. In Libya, the political 
crisis of 2014 has created various changes to the environment for 
migrants in the country, to the protection of asylum seekers, and to the 
characteristics of the flows entering and departing Libya.3 Additionally, 
the absence of routes for legal migration, as well as safe and legal access 
to the right to seek asylum in Europe,4 have also led a growing number 
of persons to migrant smuggling5 and human trafficking.6 These two 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* Second University of Naples. 
1 See International Organization for Migration (IOM), Migration Trends Across the 
Mediterranean: Connecting the Dots, June 2015, p. 1. 
2 See IOM, Fatal Journeys: Tracking Lives Lost during Migration, 2014, IOM, 
https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/fataljourneys_countingtheuncounted.pdf 
(12/15). 
3 IOM, Migration Trends Across the Mediterranean: Connecting the Dots, cit. 
4 On the different definitions of ‘irregular immigrants’, see S. Trevisanut, 
Immigrazione irregolare via mare. Diritto internazionale e diritto dell’Unione Europea, 
Naples, 2012. 
5 Pursuant to article 3 of the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, 
Sea and Air, the Smuggling of migrants is: ‘the procurement, in order to obtain, directly 
or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a 
State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident’. See the 
Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants, supplementing the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, New York, 15 November 2000, in 
United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 2241, Doc. A/55/383, p. 507. 
6 Pursuant to article 3 of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking 
in Persons, especially Women and Children, the Trafficking in persons is: “the 
recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the 
threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of 
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different phenomena in the hands of transnational criminal networks 
share the common feature of exploiting the migratory movements for 
personal gain and disregard for human life. 
In order to enhance the transit by sea of unauthorised immigrants, 
minimizing the risk of being intercepted by naval forces, migrant 
smugglers and human traffickers have devised a complex criminal 
system. A significant part of the illegal conducts takes place at sea and, 
specifically, partly in spaces under the national jurisdiction of the 
coastal States and partly in international waters, where no claims of 
sovereignty can be validly purported by any State. Their classical modus 
operandi involves the use of stateless vessels leaving the North African 
coasts to reach the high seas. Once there, hundreds of persons are 
transferred to smaller unsafe life-boats, that are supposed to bring them 
to Europe.7 
For the purpose of managing the Mediterranean migration crisis, 
exacerbated by the unstable situation in Libya,8 different routes have 
been undertaken national, European and, ultimately, international level. 
Over the past two years alone, we have witnessed a rapid shift from 
saving lives at sea under the Italian-led Mare Nostrum Operation,9 to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of 
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another 
person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the 
exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced 
labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of 
organs”. See the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational organized Crime, New York, 15 November 2000, in United 
Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 2237, Doc. A/55/383, p. 319. 
7 For a punctual description of the illicit conducts undertaken by migrant smugglers 
and human traffickers, see G. Cataldi, “Traffico dei migranti nel Mediterraneo”, in 
Giurisprudenza italiana, 2015, pp. 1498-1502; in particular, the author examines the 
decision of the Italian Supreme Court, Criminal proceedings against Radouan Hai 
Hammouda, No. 3345, 23 January 2015. 
8 On the critical situation in Libya, see Resolution 2213 (2015), adopted by the 
Security Council at its 7420th meeting, on 27 March 2015, Doc. S/RES/2213 (2015), 
preamble; Resolution 2238 (2015), adopted by the Security Council at its 7520th 
meeting, on 10 September 2015, Doc. S/RES/2238 (2015), preamble. 
9 The search and rescue naval operation Mare Nostrum was launched by Italy 
following the tragedy that occurred off the coast of Lampedusa on 3 October 2013 and 
was fully operational from October 2013 till October 2014 in a vast area of the 
Mediterranean. See S. Carrera, L. den Hertog, “Whose Mare? Rule of Law Challenges 
in the Field of European Border Surveillance in the Mediterranean”, in Liberty and 
	  	  
	  
	  
121 
border control operations10 coordinated by the European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of 
Member States of the European Union (Frontex).11 Recently, with the 
specific aim of disrupting the business model of migrant smuggling and 
human trafficking networks in the South Central Mediterranean, the 
European Union (EU) opted for a military crisis management operation, 
EUNAVFOR MED.12 Renamed Operation Sophia on 28 September 
2015 (hereinafter EUNAVFOR MED-Sophia), this new undertaking has 
also received the unexpected13 support of the United Nations Security 
Council which on 9 October 2015 adopted Resolution 2240 (2015) 
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations in order to 
maintain international peace and security in the region.14 
Against this dramatic, complex and unresolved background, this 
article aims to verify the legal conditions under which international law 
authorizes the use of force at sea against migrant smugglers and human 
traffickers. For this purpose, we will first examine the mandate of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Security in Europe, 79, 2015, Centre for European Policy Studies: 
www.ceps.eu/system/files/LSE_79.pdf (12/15). 
10 The current border control operations coordinated by the European Agency for 
the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of Member States 
of the European Union (Frontex) in the Mediterranean sea are ‘Triton’ and ‘Poseidon 
Sea’.  
11 Frontex was established by Council Regulation (EC) 2007/2004 establishing a 
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External 
Borders of the Member States of the European Union (EU). This Regulation was later 
amended by the Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of 11 July 2007 establishing a 
mechanism for the creation of Rapid Border Intervention Teams and amending Council 
Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 as regards that mechanism and regulating the tasks and 
powers of guest officers. It was then amended by the Regulation (EU) No 1168/2011 of 
25 October 2011 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 establishing a 
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External 
Borders of the Member States of the EU. 
12 See Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/778 of 18 May 2015 on a European Union 
military Operation in the Southern Central Mediterranean, Official Journal (2015) L 
122/31. 
13 This support was unexpected since the UN Secretary General has often stressed 
the importance of focusing the European action on saving lives when dealing with 
migration rather on military actions. See, for instance, the speech of Ban Ki-Moon at the 
European Parliament in plenary session on 27 May 2015, European Parliament News: 
www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/ne ws-room/20150526STO59634/Ban-Ki-moon -on-
migration-%E2%80%9Csaving-lives-should-be-the-top-priority%E2%80%9D (12/15).  
14 See Resolution 2240 (2015), adopted by the Security Council at its 7531st 
meeting, on 9 October 2015, Doc. S/RES/2240 (2015). 
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EUNAVFOR MED-Sophia operation, outlining the three sequential 
phases of the first military naval mission undertaken to disrupt the 
business model of smuggling and trafficking networks in the 
Mediterranean (section 2). As the activation of the second and the third 
phase of the EUNAVFOR MED-Sophia operation in the territorial and 
internal waters of Libya requires an authorization of the UN Security 
Council and/or the consent of the coastal State concerned i.e., Libya, we 
will consider the specific conditions necessary under international law 
to legally exercise coercive powers against migrant smugglers and 
human traffickers in different jurisdictional marine areas (section 3). 
The European military mission will operate in a complex legal 
environment of overlapping rules of international refugee law, human 
rights law, and the law of the sea. This article discusses the relevance 
both of the Security Council authorization and the permission of Libya 
under the international law of the sea as well as under the 2000 Protocol 
against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing 
the 2000 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime (the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants).15 We will 
conclude by considering the various systematic efforts to be carried out 
in order to effectively manage the Mediterranean migration crisis and to 
restore international peace and security in the region. 
 
2. EUNAVFOR MED-Sophia and the Limited Scope of the EU 
Military Response 
Whilst in the past immigration control programs were implemented 
unilaterally by the most affected Mediterranean coastal States, since 
2005 an increasing role has been played by Europe, through Frontex.16 
This Agency plans, coordinates, implements and evaluates joint 
operations conducted by European Member States’ staff and equipment 
at the external borders (sea, land and air). The focus of the vast majority 
of Frontex joint operations has been border control and as a result of 
these operations hundreds of unauthorized migrants, while attempting to 
cross the European external sea border, have also been forced to return 
to the State from which they departed or were presumed to have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 For references on the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants, see supra note 
5. 
16 On Frontex regulations, see supra note 11. 
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departed.17 While the delicate issues raised by most of Frontex missions 
are well-known, especially with respect to violation of the ‘non-
refoulement principle’,18 the increasing fluxes of migrants and asylums 
seekers, together with the increasing number of deadly shipwrecks of 
the past few years proves that the European migration control practice 
has been ineffective. According to the International Organization for 
Migration, since the year 2000 close to 25,000 migrants have perished 
in the Mediterranean, making it the world’s deadliest border.19 
Vis-à-vis such ineffectiveness and after a series of mass drownings 
off the Libyan coasts, the EU tried to come up with a new and more 
comprehensive strategy to deal with the persistent Mediterranean 
migration crisis.20 The common denominator of several extraordinary 
European Councils between April and June 2015 was the possible 
deployment of a military mission targeting the vessels and the other 
assets used by smugglers and traffickers to transfer persons from the 
Southern to the Northern Mediterranean shores. Having regard to article 
42 of the European Union Treaty and to the proposal from the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, on 
18 May 2015 the Council adopted Decision 2015/778 (Council 
Decision) approving the Crisis Management Concept for a Common 
Security and Defense Policy operation to identify, capture and dispose 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 On the practice of ‘push-backs’ in the Mediterranean, see S. Borelli, B. Stanford, 
“Troubled Waters in the Mare Nostrum: Interception and Push-backs of Migrants in the 
Mediterranean and the European Convention on Human Rights”, in Review of 
International Law and Politics, 2014, pp. 29-69. 
18 On the broad interpretation of the “non-refoulement principle”, see the European 
Court of Human Rights, Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy, Judgment of 23 February 2012. 
In the literature, see A. Liguori, “La Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo condanna 
l’Italia per i respingimenti verso la Libia del 2009: il caso Hirsi”, in Rivista di diritto 
internazionale, 2012, p. 415 ff. 
19 See IOM, Migration Trends Across the Mediterranean: Connecting the Dots, cit. 
20 In sum, on 20 April 2015 the European Commission proposed to the Council a 
10-point action plan. Then, on 23 April 2015, the European Council committed, at its 
extraordinary meeting, to strengthen the EU’s presence at sea to fight human smugglers 
and traffickers, to prevent illegal migration flows and to reinforce internal solidarity and 
responsibility. On 13 May 2015, the Commission presented a European Agenda on 
Migration with both internal and external policy measures, including a possible 
Common Security and Defence Policy operation in the Mediterranean to dismantle 
traffickers’ networks and fight smuggling of people, in accordance with international 
law. 
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of vessels and other assets used or suspected of being used by migrant 
smugglers and/or human traffickers.21 
The EUNAVFOR Med-Sophia operation reached its full operational 
capability on 25 July 2015, but its mission is intended to be conducted 
in three sequential phases.22 Whereas the first phase is focused on 
detection and monitoring of migration networks i.e., the surveillance 
and assessment of existing smuggling and trafficking organizations,23 
the two subsequent phases involve the exercise of direct enforcement 
actions against the boats carrying unauthorized migrants. More 
specifically, pursuant to article 2 of the Council Decision, in the second 
phase, the EUNAVFOR Med-Sophia naval forces may conduct 
‘boarding, search, seizure and diversion on the high seas’ of suspected 
boats, in accordance with international law;24 as well as in the territorial 
and internal waters of the coastal State, if a UN Security Council 
mandate and/or the consent of that State i.e., Libya, is obtained.25 The 
third phase, also dependent on a UN Security Council authorization 
and/or Libyan consent, would enable EUNAVFOR MED-Sophia forces 
to “take all necessary measures” against suspected vessels, “including 
through disposing of them or rendering them inoperable”, in the 
territory of that State i.e., in territorial waters, internal waters, and also 
in ports and coastal areas.26 
In short, according to the Council Decision, which is probably 
inspired by ATALANTA, the first EU’s naval force operation against 
piracy off the Horn of Africa and in the West Indian Ocean,27 a UN 
Security Council resolution and/or Libyan consent are necessary to 
launch two fundamental activities: extend enforcement actions to 
Libyan waters28 as well as disrupt vessels and assets used or suspected 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 See the Council Decision, supra note 12, specifically article 1. 
22 See Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/972 of 22 June 2015 launching the European 
Union military operation in the southern Central Mediterranean, Official Journal (2015) 
L 157/51. 
23 See article 2.2(a) of the Council Decision. 
24 See article 2.2(b)(i) of the Council Decision. 
25 See article 2.2(b)(ii) of the Council Decision. 
26 See article 2.2(c) of the Council Decision. 
27 See the EU Council, Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP of 10 November 2008 on a 
European Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and 
repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast, 10 Nov. 2008, 
Official Journal (2008) L301/33. 
28 See article 2.2(b) of the Council Decision. 
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of being used by migrant smugglers and human traffickers.29 Both 
activities are extremely important to achieve the general objective of 
this military mission. Notably, the first action would be clearly aimed at 
intercepting the vast majority of boats carrying unauthorized migrants 
before they depart from Libyan coasts. The second action would be 
similarly aimed to weaken the criminal transnational smuggling and 
trafficking organizations based in Libya.  
In the absence of at least one of these requirements, however, 
EUNAVFOR MED-Sophia’s objective is rather limited. Its first phase 
i.e., the surveillance and assessment of migrant smuggling and human 
trafficking networks is already possible through the European Border 
Surveillance System, which is specifically designated to the surveillance 
of the European external borders, “including the monitoring, detection, 
identification, tracking, prevention and interception of unauthorized 
border crossings for the purpose of detecting, preventing and combating 
illegal immigration and cross-border crime and contributing to ensuring 
the protection and saving the lives of migrants”.30 Similarly, with 
respect to the second and the third phase, many enforcement actions can 
already be unilaterally undertaken by the participating States. In this 
respect, and from a purely practical perspective, it seems worthy to note 
that, even though EUNAVFOR Med-Sophia is a European operation, 
military assets and personnel are provided by the twenty-two 
contributing States31 with the operational and personnel costs being met 
on a national basis.32 
 
3. The Legal Requirements to Use Enforcement Powers at Sea 
against Vessels Suspected of Migrant Smuggling and Human Trafficking 
Following the political guidance provided by the defense and foreign 
affairs ministers at their informal meetings on 3 and 5 September 2015, 
the EU Foreign Affairs Council, within the Political and Security 
Committee, established that the conditions for the second phase of the 
EUNAVFOR MED-Sophia operation have been met but only insofar as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 See article 2.2(c) of the Council Decision. 
30 See Regulation (EU) No. 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 22 October 2013 establishing the European Border Surveillance System 
(Eurosur), Official Journal (2013) L 295/11. 
31 Contributing States are: Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Spain, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Sweden. 
32 See article 11 of the Council Decision. 
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actions in international waters are concerned.33 While Libya has not 
given its consent to enter its territorial sea, with fourteen votes in favor 
and one abstention34 the UN Security Council has adopted the 
Resolution 2240 (2015) (Security Council Resolution) to put an end to 
the recent “proliferation of, and endangerment of lives by the smuggling 
of migrants and trafficking of persons in the Mediterranean sea off the 
coast of Libya”.35 
The use of enforcement actions against certain illicit conducts at sea 
is regulated by specific provisions of international law. The following 
section assesses the legal relevance of both options: the UN Security 
Council Resolution, which apparently provides the EU with the 
requested legal guarantees to activate the second and the third phases of 
the EUNAVFOR MED-Sophia operation, and the consent of the coastal 
State, in accordance with the applicable legal framework. 
 
3.1 Continued: The (Ordinary) Enforcement Powers 
granted by the UN Security Council Resolution 
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations (UN 
Charter),36 the Security Council has adopted a Resolution to maintain 
international peace and security, condemning, in particular, “all acts of 
migrant smuggling and human trafficking into, through and from the 
Libyan territory and off the coast of Libya, which undermine further the 
process of stabilization of Libya and endanger the lives of thousands of 
people”.37 
The core paragraphs of the Security Council Resolution stipulate the 
mandate to inspect vessels suspected to be used for migrant smuggling 
or human trafficking38 and to seize and dispose of those vessels that are 
confirmed as being used for such criminal purposes.39 To carry out these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 See the Council of the European Union, EUNAVFOR Med: Council adopts a 
positive assessment on the conditions to move to the first step of phase 2 on the high 
seas, Press Release No. 643/15, 14 September 2015, available at: 
www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/09/28-eunavfor (12/15). 
34 Venezuela. 
35 The Security Council resolution, cit., preamble. 
36 The Charter of the United Nations signed on 26 June 1945, in San Francisco, at 
the conclusion of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, and 
came into force on 24 October 1945. 
37 See paragraph 1 of the Security Council Resolution. 
38 See paragraph 7 of the Security Council Resolution. 
39 See paragraph 8 of the UN Security Council Resolution. 
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activities, the Security Council authorizes “to use all measures 
commensurate to the specific circumstances in confronting migrant 
smugglers or human traffickers”. These authorizations are for a period 
of one year from the date of the adoption.40 
At first glance, this Security Council Resolution is the legal response 
expected by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy, who had officially informed the UN Security 
Council of the need for the EU to work with the support of the UN 
Security Council in order to manage the Mediterranean migration 
crisis.41 Three elements indicate that the Resolution goes unequivocally 
in this direction. First of all, even though migrant smuggling and human 
trafficking are criminal phenomena challenging several geographic 
areas of the world, the Security Council condemns specifically “all acts 
of migrant smuggling and human trafficking into, through and from the 
Libyan territory and off the coast of Libya”.42 Second, its paragraphs are 
expressly addressed to “Member States acting nationally or through 
regional organizations, including the EU”.43 Third, the Security Council 
makes specific reference to the European Council statement of 23 April 
2015, which underlined the need for effective international action to 
address both the immediate and long-term aspects of human trafficking 
towards Europe.44 
From a broader perspective, however, this Resolution is not a 
sufficient legal basis to activate the crucial active phases of the 
EUNAVFOR MED-Sophia operation. As requested by Russia at the UN 
Security Council’s preparatory meetings, the authorized operational area 
is only the high seas.45 Consequently, under the Council Resolution, 
European naval forces are authorized to inspect and seize suspected 
vessels only in international waters off the coast of Libya, rather than in 
the Libyan territorial sea. Furthermore, according to the Security 
Council, while operating on the high seas, military units shall 
distinguish between flagged and stateless vessels. According to this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 See paragraph 7 of the Security Council Resolution. 
41 See the Council Decision, preamble. 
42 See paragraph 1 of the Security Council Resolution. 
43 See paragraph 2 of the Security Council Resolution. 
44 See the Security Council Resolution, preamble. 
45 See the Security Council meeting records adopted at the 7531st meeting on 9 
October 2015, Doc. S/PV.7531 and the Press Release of the Security Council Resolution 
2240 (2015), including Statements after action, United Nations Meetings Coverage and 
Press Releases: www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12072.doc.htm (12/15). 
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distinction, in the first case, if the vessel suspected to be engaged in 
migrants smuggling and human trafficking is flying a flag, naval forces 
are authorized to inspect them but only provided that they have made 
good faith efforts to obtain the consent of the vessel’s flag State.46 In the 
opposite and more frequent case and, hence, if the ship suspected to be 
engaged in smuggling and trafficking is without nationality, States and 
the EU are invited to inspect them.47 
In other words, according to the Security Council, while acting 
against vessels suspected of migrant smuggling and human trafficking 
on the high seas, naval forces may act under the conditions provided for 
by the applicable international legal framework, including provisions of 
the international law of the sea and the Protocol against the Smuggling 
of Migrants.48 As regards the law of the sea, several provisions, as 
reflected in customary international law and codified by the 1982 United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),49 are relevant in 
discussing questions of migration at sea.50 In particular, in order to 
determine which State can exercise powers over ships found in the 
different areas into which the sea is divided for the purposes of 
international law, the traditional approach of international law of the sea 
revolves around the question of jurisdiction. On the high seas, ships are 
free to navigate and are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag 
State51 and no claims of sovereignty can be validly put forward by any 
State.52 Allegedly, according to these norms, the boarding of a foreign 
private ship can take place only in exceptional cases, and specifically, in 
the exceptional circumstances specified in article 110 UNCLOS. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 See paragraph 7 of the Security Council Resolution. 
47 See paragraph 5 of the Security Council Resolution. 
48 For references on the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants, see supra note 5. 
49 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was signed on 10 
December 1982, in Montego Bay, entered into force on 16 November 1994 and was ratified 
by 165 States as of 19 July 2013, in United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 1833, p. 3. 
50 On the rule establishing which State has jurisdiction to prosecute crimes 
committed on board or from a ship on the high seas, see L. Magi, “Criminal Conduct on 
the High Seas: Is a General Rule on Jurisdiction to Prosecute still Missing?”, in Rivista 
di Diritto Internazionale, 2015, p. 79; E. Papastravidis, The Interception of Vessels on 
the High Seas. Contemporary Challenges to the Legal Order of the Oceans, Oxford and 
Portland, Oregon, 2013.  
51 See article 92 of the UNCLOS. 
52 See article 89 of the UNCLOS. 
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Included in this list of exceptional circumstances is the reasonable 
ground for suspecting that a ship is without nationality.53 
The approach taken by the UNCLOS, which is based on the freedom 
of navigation on the high seas and on the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
flag State, is not substantially changed by the more recent Protocol 
against the Smuggling of Migrants.54 According to article 8 of this 
Protocol, on the high seas the boarding of the suspected vessel can take 
place only after having received authorization by the flag State, unless 
the vessel suspected of migrant smuggling is without nationality. 
Differently, the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, especially Women and Children,55 is silent on this aspect. 
However, it is difficult to imagine that the Security Council Resolution 
was adopted for the specific aim of covering this legal gap. Namely, we 
believe that in this latter case, the Security Council would have chosen 
to use a diverse and clearer wording. 
From the above comparative analysis between the text of the 
Security Council Resolution and the provisions of applicable 
international law, which are expressly recalled also in the Council 
Decision, it is difficult to identify the legal rationale behind the adoption 
of the Resolution. This latter does not introduce any specific 
extraordinary condition to act against migrant smugglers and human 
traffickers in the Mediterranean, neither with respect to the high seas nor 
with respect to territorial waters. On the high seas the intervention of 
EUNAVFOR MED-Sophia forces remains restricted to the case of 
suspected vessels without nationality and, if there is confirmation that 
the vessels are being used for migrant smuggling or human trafficking, 
“all measures commensurate to the specific circumstances” can be used. 
This is not an authorization to use ‘all necessary measures’ in 
confronting migrant smugglers and human traffickers, which was the 
wording originally adopted in the initial draft of the Resolution 
circulated by the United Kingdom.56 The unusual expression ultimately 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 On the provisions of international law of the sea applicable to immigration in the 
different marine jurisdictional zones, see T. Scovazzi, “Human Rights and Immigration 
at Sea”, in R. Rubio-Marín (ed.), in Human Rights and Immigration, Oxford, 2014, p. 
216. 
54 For references on the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants, see supra note 5. 
55 For references on the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, especially Women and Children, see supra note 6. 
56 See “Vote on a Resolution on Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling in the 
Mediterranean”, in What’s in Blue. Insights on the Work of the UN Security Council, 8 
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adopted in the final version of the Resolution is the result of the 
amendments wanted by some Security Council States concerned that the 
Resolution could mean, as it namely means in the language generally 
used by the Security council, a blanket mandate to the use of force. 
Different cases remain subject to the prior consent either of the flag 
State, if the suspected ship sails a flag and navigates on the high seas, or 
of the coastal State, if the military units intend to intervene against a 
suspected vessel navigating in its territorial waters. In all remaining 
cases, however, bearing in mind the current practice of smugglers and 
traffickers in the Mediterranean sea, we can presume that the flag State 
and the coastal State coincide and should be notably represented by 
Libya. 
 
3.2  Continued: Access to Territorial Waters and the 
Requirement of Consent of the Coastal (Sovereign) State 
As far as Libyan waters are concerned, the Security Council, aware 
of the reluctance of the Libyan government to authorize foreign vessels 
to access its waters, invites Member States and the EU to assist Libya 
“to secure its borders and to prevent, investigate and prosecute acts of 
smuggling of migrants and human trafficking through its territory and in 
its territorial sea”,57 but only upon the express request of Libya. 
The key legal issue revolves around the principle of territorial 
sovereignty. The boarding, search, seizure and diversion activities 
envisioned by the EUNAVOR MED-Sophia’s mandate58 are 
enforcement measures that involve the potential use of coercive powers. 
The exercise of coercive powers by foreign authorities may interfere 
with the principle of territorial sovereignty. According to this customary 
principle codified by the UNCLOS, the authority of a coastal State is 
extended to its territorial and its internal waters. As known, in fact, the 
territory of a coastal State includes also a maritime portion. In this 
marine area, the coastal State enjoys the exclusive right to exercise 
coercive powers just like on the territory of the mainland. Accordingly, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
October 2015, What’s in Blue: hwww.whatsinblue.org/2015/10/vote-on-a-resolution-on-
human-traffickin g-and-migrant-smuggling-in-the-mediterranean.php (12/15). 
57 See paragraph 2 of the Security Council Resolution. 
58 See article 2 of the Council Decision. 
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the principle of territorial sovereignty does not allow for other States to 
participate in this exercise, unless expressly authorized.59 
An interesting precedent that proves the relevance of the coastal 
State’s consent in order to exercise police powers within the territorial 
waters of a foreign coastal State is provided by the Exchange of Notes 
of 25 March 1997 between Albania and Italy.60 In that case, Albania had 
expressly authorized Italian naval forces in Albanian territorial waters to 
intercept ships flying any flag and carrying Albanian citizens which had 
evaded controls exercised by Albanian authorities. Similarly, and more 
recently, the Transnational Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia 
(replaced in 2012 by the new Somali authorities) explicitly asked for 
international assistance to address the phenomenon of maritime piracy.61 
On the basis of this request and thus with the consent of the coastal 
State, a number of Security Council resolutions were adopted to ensure 
implementation of the rules of international law concerning piracy on 
the high seas also in the territorial sea and even on the mainland of 
Somalia.62 Therefore, according to this State practice, the consolidated 
principle of territorial sovereignty may interdict the EU naval forces 
from exercising any enforcement powers against suspected migrant 
smugglers and human traffickers in the territorial sea off the coast of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 See T. Scovazzi, Human Rights and Immigration at Sea, cit., p. 213 ff. On the 
specific case of EUNAVFOR Med Sophia, see S. Mananashvili, “The Legal and 
Political Feasibility of the EU’s Planned ‘War on Smuggling’ In Libya”, in EJIL:Talk!, 
10 June 2015, EJIL:Talk! Blog of the European Journal of International Law: 
www.ejiltalk.org/the-legal-and-political-feasibility-of-the-eus-planned-war-on-
smuggling-in-libya/ (12/15). 
60 See the Exchange of Notes of 25 March 1997 between Albania and Italy, 
published in the Italian Official Journal No. 163, Supplement of 15 July 1997. 
61 According to paragraph 9 of Resolution 1816 (2008) “the authorization set out in 
paragraph 7 has been provided only following receipt of the letter from the Permanent 
Representative of the Somalia Republic to the United Nations to the President of the 
Security Council dated 27 February 2008 conveying the consent of the TFG”. Similar 
formulations, referring to further letters conveying the consent of the TFG, are in 
Security Council Resolutions 1846 (2008) and 1851 (2008). 
62 On the relevance of the State’s consent, see D. Wippman, “Military Intervention, 
Regional Organizations, and Host-State Consent”, in Duke Journal of Comparative & 
International Law, 1996-1997, p. 209; with specific reference to the coastal State’s 
consent in the context of piracy in Somalia, see T. Treves, “Piracy, Law of the Sea, and 
Use of Force: Developments off the Coast of Somalia”, in The European Journal of 
International Law, 2009, p. 406; A. Tancredi, “Di pirati e stati ‘falliti’: il Consiglio di 
sicurezza autorizza il ricorso alla forza nelle acque territoriali della Somalia, in Rivista 
di diritto internazionale, 2008, p. 937. 
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Libya if Libyan authorities do not expressly authorize them to exercise 
such powers. 
At the same time, however, we consider important to analyze the 
principle of territorial sovereignty also from another perspective. 
Admittedly, State sovereignty is based on the ‘effective’ control of the 
territory. From this feature of the principle of sovereignty derives also 
the obligation of a State to adopt all measures necessary to prevent and 
repress on its territory (and on its territorial and internal waters) private 
conducts which may infringe the interests of other States, especially 
when such conducts consist of violent acts or aggressions.63  
As mentioned in the first section of this article, since 2014 Libya has 
been facing a grave political crisis and we wonder whether the 
‘effectiveness’ of its sovereignty may be placed in doubt in light of a 
number of facts. Above all, the fact that in many parts of the State, 
Libyan authorities seem to lack the capacity to ‘effectively’ control the 
territory. De facto Libyan authorities are omitting to adopt measures 
capable to prevent and repress on its territory a wide range of serious 
violent threats such as, the rising trend of terrorist groups in Libya 
proclaiming allegiance to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (also 
known as Da’esh) and the continued presence of other Al-Qaida-linked 
terrorist groups and individuals operating in Libya.64 Also, Tripoli and 
its ports, from which most smugglers and traffickers depart, are subject 
to dangerous militias. Additional concerns regarding stability in Libya 
and in the Region derive from the uncontrolled proliferation of 
unsecured arms and ammunition. On these grounds, the Security 
Council has recently affirmed that “the situation in Libya constitutes a 
threat to international peace and security”.65 
The possible lack of effective authority in Libya might lead to 
extreme consequences also in its territorial sea. The question, at this 
point, is whether the absence of authority and the consequent 
development of criminal transnational activities in waters near the coast 
of a territory without an effective government may lead to consider the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 See International Court of Justice, Corfu Channel case, Judgment of April 9th, 
1949 I.C.J. Reports 1949, P. 4. 
64	   On the use of force against terrorism and other violent activities of non-stae 
actors in acquiescent States, see A. Tancredi, “Il problema della legittima difesa nei 
confronti di milizie non statali alla luce dell’ultima crisi tra Israele e Libano”, in Rivista 
di diritto internazionale, 2007, p. 969 ff.  
65 See Security Council Resolutions 2213 (2015) and 2238 (2015), cit. 
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external intervention of foreign naval forces as illegal. This is not 
simply a theoretical and hypothetical question as very recently Libya’s 
government claimed that three Italian military vessels entered its 
territorial waters without permission.66 
If we assume that the legality of the intervention is a simple 
consequence of the fact that sovereignty over the territorial sea is 
dependent upon sovereignty on coastal land, and that without such 
sovereignty no territorial sea would exists, it may be argued that the 
high seas regime could extend up the coastline.67 The high seas, indeed, 
include all parts of oceans and seas in which there is no effective 
exercise of jurisdiction by any State.68 On the high seas, as seen above in 
section 3.1, the exercise of coercive powers against stateless ships may 
find its legal basis in article 110 UNCLOS, and in the specific case of 
migrant smuggling, in article 8 of the Protocol against the Smuggling of 
Migrants. Therefore, on the assumption that Libyan authorities are not 
able to exercise their sovereignty on the coastal land as well as on 
territorial waters, it could be argued that the consent of the coastal State, 
as required in the mandate of the EUNAVFOR MED-Sophia operation, 
is not necessary and, consequently, all EU naval forces may enter 
Libyan waters to counter transnational illegal activities in compliance 
with international law. 
The extension of the high seas regime and the consequent entry of 
naval forces up to the coastline would determine a clear practical 
advantage: smugglers and traffickers would be intercepted before they 
depart and, in turn, before they jeopardize the lives of hundreds of 
persons.69 On the other hand, however, the international community 
prefers to accept the idea that the Libyan government is able to 
effectively exercise authority on its territory and on its territorial waters 
in order to preserve the sovereignty of the Libyan State and the political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 See Italy Denies Ships in Libyan Waters, 2 November 2015, ANSA: 
www.ansa.it/english/news/politics/2015/11/02/italy-denies-ships-in-libyanwaters_1503 
9f4f-bfc0-4b00-92dc-0ee74896aea6.html (12/15). 
67 On the extension of the high seas regime on piracy, see T. Treves, “The Fight 
against Piracy and the Law of the Sea”, in The Italian Yearbook of International Law, 
Brill/Nijhoff, 2012, p. 23. 
68 See article 87 and 89 of the UNCLOS. 
69 On the need to have forces close to the Libyan shore, see J. Lehmann, “The Use 
of Force against People Smugglers: Conflicts with Refugee Law and Human Rights 
Law”, in EJIL:Talk!, 22 June 2015. 
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equilibrium in the region.70 Similarly in Somalia, the international 
community has, for numerous years, attributed effectiveness to this 
State even though Somalia has been traditionally defined as the locus 
classicus of a Failed State.71 And, in effect, also in the context of piracy 
and armed robbery in Somalia, foreign naval forces have intervened in 
Somali territorial waters on the basis of the consent of the TFG (and 
afterwards on the basis of the consent of the new Somali authorities) and 
various subsequent Security Council resolutions rather than on the basis 
of the extension of the high seas regime on piracy.72 
 
4. Critical Concluding Remarks 
By implementing the EUNAVFOR Med-Sophia operation, Europe 
has tried to adopt a new strategy to react to the Mediterranean migration 
crisis. In addition to the previous border control management’s 
operations, the EU is now committed to a military mission having the 
specific goal of disrupting smuggling and trafficking routes and 
capabilities. In effect, the transnational organizations of migrant 
smugglers and human traffickers play a crucial role in the current 
escalation of migratory movements towards Europe. In the absence of 
alternative legal channels to escape hunger, civil wars and other 
unimaginable situations in the countries of origin, they are increasing 
their profits day by day in parallel to the increasing number of people 
clamoring for an opportunity to cross the Mediterranean sea. 
In order to activate the real military phases of its new strategy, 
however, the EU needed a Security Council mandate and/or the consent 
of Libya. The notion of obtaining the support of the United Nations, in 
the absence of authorization by the State concerned, is in line with a 
consolidated State practice of past decades according to which States 
attempt to legitimize unilateral interventions through the label of 
Security Council resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the UN 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 See Security Council Resolution 2213 (2015), cit., preamble. 
71 For a reconstruction of the Somali crisis, for doctrine see G. B. Hemam, S. R. 
Ratner, “Saving Failed States”, in Foreign Policy, 89, 1992-1993, pp. 3-20; M. Di 
Liddo, “Le incognite della transizione Somala”, in Osservatorio di politica 
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Charter.73 Thus, like other Security Council Member States acting 
unilaterally in other circumstances, with the EUNAVFOR MED-Sophia 
operation the EU tried to legitimize its military mission against migrant 
smugglers and human traffickers in Libyan waters through a mandate of 
the United Nations. 
From a different perspective, by means of the resolutions under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council tries to maintain 
exclusive control of the sole cases in which the use of force is permitted 
by the international community. To this purpose, the Security Council 
uses the powers granted by articles 39 and 42 of the UN Charter which 
stipulates that if the Council determines the existence of a threat to 
peace, it may authorize the use of force to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.74 With the adoption of Resolution 2240 
(2015), the Security Council confirms a consolidated trend of using very 
wide discretionary powers to identify the situations triggering articles 39 
and 42 of the UN Charter.75 However, it seems important to stress that 
in previous resolutions dealing with piracy off the coast of Somalia, this 
phenomenon was not deemed to constitute a threat to international peace 
in itself. Rather, piracy was characterized as a factor exacerbating the 
situation in Somalia which, in turn, constituted a threat to international 
peace and security in the region. Differently from the resolutions 
concerning Somalia in the context of piracy as well as other more recent 
resolutions concerning Libya,76 Resolution 2240 (2015) makes no 
reference to the situation in Libya as representing a threat to 
international peace and security.77 Instead, it is the “recent proliferation 
of, and endangerment of lives by human trafficking and migrant 
smuggling in the Mediterranean Sea off the coast of Libya” that is 
regarded as the situation that needed to be addressed through the 
Security Council’s action under Chapter VII. Additionally, the Security 
Council expresses concern that the situation in Libya is being 
exacerbated by these transnational crimes. It is therefore the repression 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 On the use of force and erga omnes obligations, see P. Picone, “Gli obblighi erga 
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76 See Security Council Resolutions 2213 (20145) and 2238 (2015), cit. 
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of these crimes, and its impact on human lives, which seems to be used 
as justification for the Security Council’s powers.78 Therefore, 
confirming its wide discretionary powers to interpret the notion of 
threats to international peace, the Security Council tends to address its 
authorizations towards the repression of criminal activities by non-state 
actors, such as international terrorism,79 piracy and armed robbery80 and 
migrant smuggling and human trafficking.81 
At the same time, Resolution 2240 (2015) also presents some 
unusual aspects that may make it ineffective. As per above, the mandate 
of the Security Council Resolution covers only the high seas. In this 
marine zone, States can already act against stateless ships of migrant 
smugglers and human traffickers under applicable provisions of the 
international law of the sea as well as under the Protocol against 
Smuggling. Furthermore, the Resolution does not appear to be a blanket 
mandate authorizing the use of force as resolutions adopted under 
Chapter VII usually are. Allegedly, notwithstanding the adoption of the 
Security Council Resolution, the essential coercive parts of 
EUNAVFOR Med-Sophia’s mandate risks remaining unaccomplished, 
unless Libya decides to authorize the international fight against migrant 
smugglers and human traffickers. The recent UN-led formation of a 
government of national unity may go in this direction. In a persisting 
scenario of mass drownings, however, we still do not know who, at 
national, European or international level, is concretely going to 
undertake actions to prevent further loss of life at sea. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 See M. Bo, “Fighting Transnational Crimes at Sea under UNSC’s Mandate: 
Piracy, Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling”, in EJIL:Talk!, 30 October 2015.  
79 For recent resolutions adopted by the Security Council on threats to international 
peace and security caused by terrorist acts, see Resolutions 2255 (2015), 2253 (2015), 
2249 (2015) and 2199 (2015), cit.  
80 For resolutions adopted by the Security Council on Somalia in the context of 
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1. Introduction 
Every year hundreds of thousands of irregular migrants, including 
asylum seekers and refugees, cross the Mediterranean Sea to enter 
Europe, many of whom are victims of migrant smuggling1 and human 
trafficking.2 These are two different criminal phenomena, each having 
                                                
* University of Parma. 
1 Smuggling is the facilitation, transportation, attempted transportation or illegal 
entry of a person across an international border, in violation of one or more countries 
laws, either clandestinely or through deception, such as the use of fraudulent documents. 
Migrant smuggling is a criminal commercial transaction between two willing parties, 
even if migrants are often unaware of their fate. They may in fact become victims of 
trafficking or other crimes. Article 3 (a) of the Protocol against the Smuggling of 
Migrants by Land, Sea and Air (New York, 15 November 2000 in United Nations 
Treaty Series, vol. 2241, p. 507) supplementing the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime, defines smuggling of migrants as: “the procurement, in 
order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal 
entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent 
resident”. See J. Gallagher, “Human rights and the new UN Protocols on Trafficking 
and Migrant Smuggling: A Preliminary Analysis”, in Human rights quarterly, 2001, p. 
975 ff.; S. Burra, “Protocols against trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants: 
Implications for Refugee Protection”, in ISIL Year Book of International Humanitarian 
and Refugee Law, 2003, p. 163 ff.; N. Ollus, Protocol against the Smuggling of 
Migrants by Land, Air and Sea, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime: A Tool for Criminal Justice Personnel, Resource 
Material Series, 2004, p. 31 ff.; T. Obokata, “The Legal Framework Concerning the 
Smuggling of Migrants at Sea under the UN Protocol on the Smuggling of Migrants by 
Land, Sea and Air”, in R. Bernard, M. Valsamis (eds.), Extraterritorial Immigration 
Control: Legal Challenges, Leiden, 2010, p. 181 ff.; J. Coppens, Migrant Smuggling by 
Sea: Tackling Practical Problems by Applying a High-level Inter-agency Approach, 
Ocean Yearbook, 2013, p. 323 ff.; J. Gallagher, “Migrant Smuggling”, in N. Boister, R. 
Currie (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Transnational Criminal Law, New York, 2015, p. 
187 ff. 
2 Trafficking in persons can be compared to a modern day form of slavery. It 
involves the exploitation of people through force, coercion, threat and deception. It 
includes, moreover, human rights abuses such as debt bondage, deprivation of liberty, 
and lack of control over freedom and labour. Human trafficking is often an international 
crime that involves the crossing of borders. Human trafficking is defined by the Protocol 
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its own legal framework. The reasons for crossing the Mediterranean 
Sea are numerous. Some migrants are fleeing conflict and persecution; 
others simply seek a better life in Europe. Regardless of motivations, 
crossing is not without perils. The United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that over 1,000,000 refugees died 
crossing the Mediterranean Sea in 2015.3 The International Organization 
for Migration (IOM) reports 1,800 deaths since the beginning of 2015, 
more than 800 of them during a single incident in April.4 
Government disorder fosters smuggling and trafficking because 
criminal organisation can manage migrants and victims of trafficking in 
its territory undisturbed. The United Nations Security Council recently 
authorized strong measures to contrast both phenomena. Acting under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Council further decided, by means 
of Resolution 2240 (2015), to authorize Member States to use all 
necessary means to repress migrant smuggling or human trafficking in 
full compliance with international human rights law. The reference to 
the rules of international law and human rights protection is a formula 
often used when the Security Council adopts coercive measures against 
individuals and criminal organisations such as pirates or terrorists. 
                                                                                                        
to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children 
(New York, 15 November 2000 in United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 2237, p. 319), 
supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. 
According to Article 3(a) of the mentioned Protocol, human trafficking is: “The 
recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the 
threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of 
the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of 
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another 
person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the 
exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced 
labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of 
organs.” See J. Satvinder, “Human Trafficking, Asylum and the Problem of Protection”, 
in J. Satvinder (ed.), The Ashgate Companion to Migration Law, Theory and Policy, 
Farnham, 2013, p. 281 ff.; A. Balch, “Assessing the International Regime against 
Human Trafficking”, in L. Talani, S. Mcmahon (eds.), Handbook of the International 
Political Economy of Migration, Cheltenham, 2015, p. 98 ff.; T. Kyriazi, “Trafficking 
and Slavery : the Emerging European Legal Framework on Trafficking in Human 
Beings - Case-law of the European Court of Human Rights in Perspective”, in 
International Human Rights Law Review, 2015, p. 33 ff.; T. Obokata, “Human 
Trafficking”, in N. Boister, R. Currie (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Transnational 
Criminal Law, New York, 2015, p. 171 ff. 
3 Cf the information available at www.unhcr.org/5683d0b56.html. 
4 Cf report available at www.iom.int/news/iom-libya-aids-migrants-rescued-sea. 
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These measures may entail the use of force, but its limits are not 
specified.  
This paper aims to analyse the maritime law enforcement measures 
applicable at sea and the limits to the use of force against human 
traffickers and migrants smugglers by sea, both from the law of the sea 
and from human rights law perspectives.  
 
2. Enforcement jurisdiction and its limits according to the law of the 
sea 
Vessels are subject to the jurisdiction of their flag State, whose 
exercise differs according to the maritime zone in which the vessel is 
sailing.5 As is well-known, the relevant maritime zones include internal 
waters, territorial sea, contiguous zone (CZ) and exclusive economic 
zones (EEZ) if declared by the coastal state and the high seas.6 As a ship 
sails away from a State’s coastline, the extent of jurisdiction shifts in 
favor of the flag State, until it becomes exclusive on the high seas. 
Conversely, as the ship approaches a State’s coastline, the balance shifts 
in favor of the coastal State.  
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea7 establishes 
the current subdivision in maritime zones and codifies states’ 
jurisdiction, including the jurisdiction to enforce. Article 8 of the 
UNCLOS provides that a state’s full sovereignty and jurisdiction 
extends into its inland waters, which form part of its territory. States 
also have full sovereignty within their territorial waters, which may 
extend up to 12 nautical miles from the baselines (UNCLOS, Articles 2-
4).8 The coastal State maintains restrictions on entry and has the right to 
‘intercept’ migrants at sea within the limits of their territorial waters or 
to prevent them from entering without mandatory documents. The 
coastal State may further exercise enforcement jurisdiction, such as 
taking immigration measures, within its CZ, which may not exceed 24 
                                                
5 See H. Ringbom, Jurisdiction over Ships: post-UNCLOS Developments in the 
Law of the Sea, Leiden, 2015. 
6 See S. Subedi, Land and Maritime Zones of Peace in International Law, Oxford, 
1996; C. Symmons, The Maritime Zones of Islands in International Law, The Hague, 
1979.  
7 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Montego Bay, 10 December 
1982, UNCLOS) UNTS vol. 1833, p. 3 ff. 
8 T. Treves, “Coastal States Rights in the Maritime Areas under UNCLOS”, in 
Revista de Direito Internacional, 2015, p. 40 ff. 
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nautical miles from the baselines (UNCLOS, Article 33).9 In the EEZ, 
which could be a maximum of 200 nautical miles from the baselines 
(UNCLOS, Articles 55, 56 and 57), the coastal State has functional 
jurisdiction over the exploration and exploitation, conservation and 
management of natural resources.10 In immigration and trafficking 
matters, the legal regime of the high seas is applicable also to the EEZ 
of the coastal State. The high seas are free for all States and are reserved 
for peaceful purposes (UNCLOS, Article 88).11 The State jurisdiction 
applies to vessels flying their respective flags (e.i. floating state 
jurisdiction). However, freedom of navigation must be exercised by all 
States with due regard for the interests of other States in the exercise of 
freedom of the high seas (UNCLOS, Article 87(2)). The principle of 
exclusive jurisdiction of the flag State on the high seas impedes any 
interference with the navigation of foreign ships without the permission 
of their flag States.12 However, in exceptional circumstances regulated 
by Article 110 of the UNCLOS, the “right to visit” may be exercised by 
a State over foreign vessels suspected to be involved in certain 
activities, namely piracy, slave trade, unauthorized broadcasting, sailing 
without nationality, practicing deception with regard to nationality.  
With respect to the enforcement jurisdiction exercised by a State on a 
foreign vessel suspected of smuggling or trafficking on the high seas, 
the transportation of the persons in question is very often carried out 
using non-registered small vessels without any flag (i.e. stateless 
vessels). The “absence of nationality” seems to be the most relevant 
legal basis for intercepting vessels carrying migrants or involved in 
                                                
9 See K. Aquilina, “Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone”, in D. Attard, M. 
Fitzmaurice, N. Gutiérrez (eds.), The IMLI Manual on International Maritime Law, 
Oxford, 2014, p. 26 ff.; J. Noyes, “The Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone”, in D. 
Rothwell, A. Elferink, K. Scott, T. Stephens (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Law of 
the Sea, The Hague, 2015, p. 91 ff. 
10 See U. Leanza, M. Caracciolo, “The Exclusive Economic Zone”, in D. Attard, M. 
Fitzmaurice, N. Gutiérrez, The IMLI Manual, cit., p. 177 ff.; G. Andreone, “The 
Exclusive Economic Zone”, in D. Rothwell, A. Elferink, K. Scott, T. Stephens, The 
Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea, Oxford, 2015, p. 218 ff. 
11 See D. Attard, P. Mallia, “The high seas”, in D. Attard, M. Fitzmaurice, N. 
Gutiérrez, The IMLI Manual, cit., p. 239 ff.; D. Guilfoyle, “The High Seas”, in D. 
Rothwell, A. Elferink, K. Scott, T. Stephens, The Oxford Handbook cit., p. 270 ff. 
12 On the freedom of high seas principle, see B. Conforti, Il regime giuridico dei 
mari, Napoli, 1957, p. 9 ff.; M. Giuliano, Lo sviluppo e gli aspetti attuali del diritto del 
mare, Valladolid, 1960, p. 25 ff.; D. Brown, The International Law of the Sea, vol. I, 
Aldershot, 1994, p. 51 ff. 
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human trafficking. According to Article 110 (1, d) of the UNCLOS, a 
vessel without nationality may be boarded by any warship.13 Moreover, 
the right of visit could apply to cases of trafficking in persons, because it 
is often referred to as a modern form of slavery. However, Article 110 
(b) concerning ships engaged in slave trade has never been used to 
exercise a right of visit for suspected situations of human trafficking.  
By virtue of the UNCLOS, there is further legal basis for interfering 
with migrant smuggling or human trafficking on the high seas. More 
specifically, Article 110 (1) contains a further exception “where acts of 
interference derive from powers conferred by treaty”. This means that 
powers of interference can be conferred by a treaty on a variety of 
activities, including the suppression of migrant smuggling and 
trafficking. States have entered into numerous multilateral and bilateral 
agreements that provide the right of visit in respect of irregular 
migration on the high seas.14 Such agreements grant interference powers 
to State parties on a reciprocal basis. The most important multilateral 
treaty providing for the right to visit on the high seas for counter-
migration purposes is the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by 
Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime.15 According to its Article 8: “2. 
A State Party that has reasonable grounds to suspect that a vessel (…) 
flying the flag or displaying the marks of registry of another State Party 
is engaged in the smuggling of migrants by sea may so notify the flag 
State, request confirmation of registry and, if confirmed, request 
authorization from the flag State to take appropriate measures with 
regard to that vessel. (…) A State Party shall take no additional 
measures without the express authorization of the flag State, except 
those necessary to relieve imminent danger to the lives of persons or 
those which derive from relevant bilateral or multilateral agreements.” 
                                                
13 See U. Leanza, F. Graziani, “Poteri di ‘enforcement’ e di ‘jurisdiction’ in materia 
di traffico di migranti via mare: aspetti operativi nell'attività di contrasto”, in La 
Comunità Internazionale, 2014, p. 163 ff. 
14 Ibid. 
15 See F. Crépeau, “The Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants: the Crowning 
of an Intense Cooperation on Migration Containment”, in Canadian Council for 
International Law, Globalism: People, Profits, and Progress: Proceedings of the 30th 
Annual Conference of the Canadian Council on International Law, Ottawa, October 18-
20, The Hague, 2002; X. Hinrichs, “Measures against Smuggling of Migrants at Sea : a 
Law of the Sea Related Perspective”, in Revue belge de droit international, 2003, p. 413 
ff. 
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Unlike the Protocol against smuggling, which contemplates maritime 
enforcement measures, the Protocol against trafficking does not. 
The flag state’s consent for maritime enforcement measures on the 
high seas off the Libyan coasts is one of the main issues relating to the 
migrant smuggling and human trafficking phenomena. In order to 
obviate this problem, the UN Security Council issued Resolution 2240 
(2015) authorising Member States, for a period of one year, to inspect 
vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya if they had reasonable 
grounds to suspect they were being used not only for migrant 
smuggling, but also for human trafficking from that State. In relation to 
the use of force, the initial draft circulated by the UK included an 
authorisation to use ‘all necessary measures’ in confronting migrant 
smugglers or human traffickers.16 Some State Members wanted further 
guarantees that this was not a blanket mandate to use force. As a result 
of the Members’ concerns compromise language was added to authorise 
member states to use “all measures commensurate to the specific 
circumstances” in confronting migrant smugglers and human traffickers. 
Resolution 2240 (2015) actually provides a formal ‘UN umbrella’ to the 
European Union military operation in the Southern Central 
Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED), renamed Operation Sophia on 28 
September 2015.17 This operation, which was launched in June 2015, is 
aimed at disrupting ‘the business model’ of human smuggling and 
trafficking networks in the Southern Central Mediterranean by making 
systematic efforts to identify, capture and dispose of vessels used or 
suspected of being used by migrant smugglers or traffickers. A 
subsequent phase of the operation in the territorial waters and on the 
shores of Libya is likely to be contingent upon the formation of a 
government of national accord in Libya. 
Member States thus have the right to exercise control over navigation 
and to intercept vessels involved in smuggling and trafficking on the 
high seas. They also have obligations to treat smugglers and traffickers 
according to international norms different from those that are contained 
in the UNCLOS.  
 
 
                                                
16 The unofficial text of the UN Security Council Resolution 2240 (2015) is 
available at www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12072.doc.htm. 
17 The EUNAVFOR MED was launched by European Council with the decision 
(CFSP) 2015/972 of 22 June 2015, in Official Journal of the European Union L 157/51.  
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3. The UNCLOS tribunals and the application of (other) rules of 
international law 
The UNCLOS does not contain express provisions on the use of 
force in the arrest of ships nor any specification on its limits. Indications 
regarding the use of force are provided by Article 293 of the UNCLOS 
and other rules of international law that, are not incompatible with the 
Convention.18 The final paragraph of the UNCLOS preamble, moreover, 
admits the applicability of general international law, affirming “that 
matters not regulated by this Convention continue to be governed by the 
rules and principles of general international law”.19  
The practice of international tribunals has confirmed this 
interpretation. Two judgements appear particularly relevant to this end: 
the MV Saiga No. 2 case20 and the more recent Arctic Sunrise case 
settled respectively by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
(ITLOS) and the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA).21 In the first 
case the ITLOS interpreted Article 293 as authorising not only the 
application of the UNCLOS, but also the norms of customary 
international law, including those relating to the use of force.22 
Moreover, the CPA in the Arctic Sunrise arbitral award stated: “(…) 
some provisions of the UNCLOS directly incorporate other rules of 
international law”.23  
                                                
18 Article 293, paragraph 1, of the Convention stated that: “A court or tribunal 
having jurisdiction under this section shall apply this Convention and other rules of 
international law not incompatible with this Convention”, including, of course, those 
relating to the use of force. See supra, footnote 7.  
19 See, supra footnote 7.  
20 ITLOS, MV Saiga No. 2 case, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea, 
judgement of 1 July 1999, in ITLOS Reports 1999. 
21 Cf. Arbitral Tribunal, Kingdom of Netherlands v. Russian Federation, Award on 
the Merits no. 2014-02 of 4 August 2015, available at www.pcacases.com/web/view/21. 
This award is particularly important, because it is the first time that an UNCLOS 
tribunal has deliberated on protest acts at sea and the coastal State’s right to board the 
vessels of the activists. For comments, M. C. Noto, “Atti di protesta violenta in mare: 
pirateria, terrorismo o fattispecie autonoma?”, in Rivista di Diritto Internazionale, 2015, 
p. 1198; M. C. Noto, “The Arctic Sunrise Arbitration and Acts of Protest at sea”, in 
Maritime Safety and Security Law Journal, 2016, forthcoming.  
22 According to the MV Saiga No.2 judgement “In considering the force used by 
Guinea in the arrest of the Saiga No. 2, the Tribunal must take into account the 
circumstances of the arrest in the context of the applicable rules of international law”. 
ITLOS, MV Saiga No. 2 case cit., § 155.  
23 PCA, The Kingdom of Netherlands v. Russian Federation cit., § 188. 
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Although Article 293 permits the application of “other rules of 
international law” than those contained in the UNCLOS, this Article 
does not constitute a source of jurisdiction over claims beyond the scope 
of the UNCLOS.24 The Tribunal in the Arctic Sunrise case stated that 
Article 293(1) of the UNCLOS does not extend its jurisdiction, but 
authorises the application of other rules of international law, which are 
integrated into the norms contained in the Convention. Although 
international law reformists are trying to expand the compulsory 
jurisdiction of international tribunals, the international legal order 
depends on the consent of the States. Article 288(1) limits the 
jurisdiction of the UNCLOS tribunals to disputes relating to the 
interpretation or application of the Convention, and the words “other 
rules of international law” in Article 293(1) can only refer to secondary 
rules of international law that help to interpret how to apply the 
UNCLOS provisions.  
This approach is in conformity with Article 31 (3, c) of the 1969 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which provides that for the 
purposes of interpretation of a treaty, there shall be taken into account, 
together with the context, “[a]ny relevant rules of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties”.25 
 
4. Limits to the maritime law enforcement measures according to 
(other) rules of international law 
In order to identify the limits of the use of force applicable to the 
maritime enforcement measures, the UNCLOS tribunals have frequently 
applied the rules of international law different from the Convention. The 
CPA in the Arctic Sunrise case considered that, if necessary, it may have 
regard to general international law in relation to human rights in order to 
determine whether law enforcement action, such as the boarding, 
seizure, and detention of a vessel and the arrest and detention of those 
on board, is reasonable and proportionate.26 The ITLOS in the Saiga No. 
                                                
24 In addition, the Philippines did not seek to assert jurisdiction under Article 
293(1). See PCA, Philippines v. China, Case No. 2013-19, Jurisdiction Hearing of 8 
July 2015 Day 2, Final Transcript, p. 97. ITLOS, MOX Plant case, Ireland v. United 
Kingdom, Procedural Order No. 3 of 24 June 2003, § 19, in PCA Award Series, 2010, p. 
52; ITLOS, “ARA” Libertad case, Argentina v. Ghana, Order No. 20 of 15 December 
2012, Separate Opinion of Judges Wolfrum and Cot, § 7.  
25 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna, 23 May 1969), United 
Nations Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331. 
26 PCA, The Kingdom of Netherlands v. Russian Federation cit., § 197. 
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2 case instead stated “[a]lthough the Convention does not contain 
express provisions on the use of force in the arrest of ships, international 
law, which is applicable by virtue of article 293 of the Convention, 
requires that the use of force must be avoided as far as possible and, 
where force is unavoidable, it must not go beyond what is reasonable 
and necessary in the circumstances”.27 The use of force should be the 
last resource.28 The normal practice used to stop a ship at sea is first to 
give an auditory or visual signal to stop, using internationally 
recognized signals. Where this does not succeed, a variety of actions 
may be taken, including the firing of shots across the bows of the ship. 
The pursuing military vessel may, as a last resort, use force if the 
appropriate actions fail. Even then, appropriate warning must be issued 
to the ship and all efforts should be made to ensure that life is not 
endangered. Firing without warning and creating danger to human life 
on board without proven necessity exceeds legitimate use of force.  
International law requires that the use of force must be avoided as far 
as possible and, where unavoidable, it must not go beyond what is 
reasonable and necessary in the circumstances. These principles have 
been followed over the years in maritime enforcement operations.29 
Force must be used only when strictly necessary and it must be always 
proportional to lawful objectives. Restraint may be exercised in the use 
of force, in order to minimise damages and injuries. In the exercise of 
the enforcement jurisdiction any warship (or any authorised ship) 
applies its domestic laws and national rules of engagement, which state 
the limits to the degree of force. The proportionality principle requires 
the enforcing State to balance the gravity of the offence with the value 
of human life. Moreover, according to the Saiga No. 2 case 
“considerations of humanity must apply in the law of the sea, as they do 
in other areas of international law”.30 This important remark of the 
ITLOS, rather than amounting to a rule of law,31 seems to be a moral 
                                                
27 ITLOS, MV Saiga No. 2 case cit., §155. 
28 ITLOS, MV Saiga No. 2 case cit., § 156. 
29 ITLOS, S.S.“I’m Alone” case, Canada v. United States, award of 30 June 1933 
and 5 January 1935, in United Nations Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Vol. 
III, p. 1609; ITLOS, The Red Crusader case, Commission of Enquiry, Denmark v. 
United Kingdom, arbitral award 23 March 1962, in International Law Reports, Vol. 35, 
p. 485. 
30 ITLOS, MV Saiga No. 2 case cit. § 155.  
31 There is a certain amount of disagreement concerning the source, scope and 
function of the notion of ‘humanity’. See Carpanelli, “General Principles of 
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principle which should guide a State in the adoption of appropriate 
maritime enforcement measures. The notion of ‘humanity’ includes all 
common human values, such as the respect for human life and dignity, 
which cannot be disregarded by a State when using force to board a 
ship.  
The basic principle concerning the use of force in the arrest of a ship 
at sea has been reaffirmed by the United Nations Agreement for the 
Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea relating to the Conservation and Management of 
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks.32 Article 22, 
paragraph 1(f), of the Agreement states: “1. The inspecting State shall 
ensure that its duly authorized inspectors: ... (f) avoid the use of force 
except when and to the degree necessary to ensure the safety of the 
inspectors and where the inspectors are obstructed in the execution of 
their duties. The degree of force used shall not exceed that reasonably 
required in the circumstances”. 
The agreement contains clear limits regarding force, the use of which 
must take place only when the safety of inspectors is in danger or when 
they are obstructed in their activities in a manner proportionate to the 
circumstances. According to the Basic Principles on the Use of Force 
and Firearms, likewise, force may be used “only in self-defence or 
defence of others against imminent threat of death or serious injury, or 
to prevent a particularly serious crime that involves a grave threat to 
life, or to arrest or prevent the escape of a person posing such a threat 
and who is resisting efforts to stop the threat, and in every case, only 
when less extreme measures are insufficient”.33  
                                                                                                        
International Law: Struggling with a Slippery Concept”, in General Principles of Law – 
The Role of the Judiciary, L. Pineschi (ed.), Heidelberg, 2015, p. 125 ff. 
32 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation 
and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (New 
York, 4 August 1995), in UNTS, vol. 2167, p. 3 ff. 
33 Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 of 7 September 1990. According to the ITLOS, 
“The Guinean officers also used excessive force on board the Saiga. Having boarded the 
ship without resistance, and although there is no evidence of the use or threat of force 
from the crew, they fired indiscriminately while on the deck and used gunfire to stop the 
engine of the ship. In using firearms in this way, the Guinean officers appeared to have 
attached little or no importance to the safety of the ship and the persons on board. In the 
process, considerable damage was done to the ship and to vital equipment in the engine 
and radio rooms. And, more seriously, the indiscriminate use of gunfire caused severe 
injuries to two of the persons on board. 159. For these reasons, the Tribunal finds that 
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Applying the above mentioned findings regarding limitations to the 
use of force against migrant smuggling and human trafficking, 
reasonable force, including the use of firearms, may be used in self-
defence, defence of others, or to prevent a serious crime involving a 
threat to human life being committed. In other words, the intentional 
lethal use of force and firearms are allowed only when strictly 
unavoidable in order to protect human life. In cases other than those 
mentioned, the use of force would pose problems of necessity and 
reasonableness. Elementary considerations of law, humanity and 
practicality simply dictate that in most cases of suspected vessels, a 
military rescue operation will involve an unacceptable risk of death or 
injury to the persons on board in any firefight.  
 
5. The application of human rights at sea: the notion of jurisdiction 
and control at sea 
Most human rights treaties consider ‘jurisdiction’ as a parameter to 
define their scope of application.34 The notion of jurisdiction is 
essentially territorial (e.i. spatial model of jurisdiction), but in 
exceptional cases could be extraterritorial.35 The human rights law is 
applicable to State enforcement and control operations upon the internal 
waters and territorial sea of a State, when the law of the sea gives 
jurisdiction to States Parties or when they exercise effective control over 
individuals.36  
The human rights law applies to the maritime law enforcement 
operations put in place in the zones under the sovereignty of the States 
parties, such as ports, internal waters and territorial sea (e.i. territorial 
                                                                                                        
Guinea used excessive force and endangered human life before and after boarding the 
Saiga”. 
34 For instance see Article 1 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (Rome, 4 December 1950), in European Treaty Series n. 5, and 
Article 2.2 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (New York, 16 
December 1966), in United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171.  
35 See K. Zatucki, “Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in International Law”, in 
International Community Law Review, 2015, p. 403 ff. 
36 J. Kapelańska-Pręgowska, “Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of National Courts and 
Human Rights Enforcement: “quo vadis justitia”?”, in International Community Law 
Review, 2015, p. 413 ff.; E. Karska, “Introduction: Extraterritorial Scope of Human 
Rights”, in International Community Law Review, 2015, p. 395 ff.; M. Szuniewicz, 
“Problems and Challenges of the ECHR’s Extraterritorial Application to Law-
Enforcement Operations at Sea”, in International Community Law Review, 2015, p. 445 
ff. 
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jurisdiction).37 Moreover, in its contiguous zone the coastal State has, 
under the law of the sea, functional competence in migrations matter. In 
its EEZ the coastal State has sovereign rights regulations in matters of 
management of natural resources, research and protection of marine 
environment, installation and the use of artificial structures (Article 58 
UNCLOS). The ECtHR has interpreted these ‘sovereign rights’ to be 
constitutive of an exercise of jurisdiction under Article 1 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.38 
As a result the Convention is applicable to the maritime law 
enforcement measures conducted by the Coastal State in its EEZ. In 
immigration and trafficking matters, which are excluded by the 
functional jurisdiction exercised by the coastal State in its EEZ, the legal 
regime of the high seas, where the flag State exercises its exclusive 
jurisdiction over vessels flying its flag, is applicable. A ship on the high 
seas is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of its flag State and the law 
of that State applies, including the rules on human rights to which it is 
party.  
Where the law of the sea gives no jurisdiction to the States parties, 
human rights treaties are, prima facie, not applicable. However, the 
jurisprudence of the principal human rights organisms have recognized 
that, in exceptional cases, actions of the States Parties performing, or 
producing, effects outside their territories can constitute an exercise of 
jurisdiction for the purposes of human rights law, if the persons were 
respectively under the State’s “full and exclusive control” (e.i. personal 
model of jurisdiction).39 As a result, the flag State shall respect the 
human rights – both international customary and treaties laws – of 
persons on board vessels flying its flag, and over individuals who are 
under the effective control of State agents.40 The personal model of 
                                                
37 The European Commission of Human Rights (EcomHR), Consorts D v. France, 
Decision of admissibility 31 August 1994; EComHR, Antonsen v. Norway, Decision of 
admissibility 15 January 1997 and European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), Pressos 
Compania Naviera SA v. Belgium, Judgement 20 November 1995; ECHR, Federation of 
Offshore Workers’ Trade Union and others v. Norway, Decision of admissibility of 27 
June 2002 and EComHR, Edgardo Ty v. Netherlands, Judgement 21 October 1996; 
ECHR, Geert Drieman v. Norway, Decision of admissibility of 4 May 2000. 
38 European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Rome, 4 
November 1950), European Treaty Series n. 5. 
39 Medvedyev and others v. France, Judgement 29 March 2010, § 67. 
40 Cf. for instance ECHR, Hirsi Jamaa v Italy, Judgement Grand Chamber 23 
February 2012, “Whenever the State through its agents operating outside its territory 
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jurisdiction has been conceived in order to retain control over 
individuals, instead of control over areas, as a founding element of a 
state’s human rights obligations, covering the situations left without 
protection by the spatial model. This model has been sustained, for 
example, by the EcomHR in its Lopez-Burgos decision and, using the 
same wording of the EcommHR, by the ECtHR in Issa. Nevertheless, 
both these organs failed to provide general criteria for determining the 
extent of the control to be exercised over individuals for the purposes of 
human rights treaties.  
Several scholars have proposed an innovative approach to the 
extraterritorial application of human rights, which bears in mind the 
distinction between positive and negative obligations. According to this 
doctrine, only the negative obligations ought to be always binding upon 
States, regardless of whether or not they exercise effective control over 
a territory or over individuals. In other words, States can never commit a 
direct violation of human rights. Some commentators, especially after 
Al-Skeini, have interpreted the personal test of jurisdiction as the ‘state-
agent’ test.41  
 
6. Limits and standards relevant to the use of force at sea from the 
perspective of human rights law 
The UN Security Council in Resolution 2240 (2015) authorised 
Member States, acting nationally or through regional organisations, to 
use all measures commensurate to the specific circumstances in dealing 
with migrant smugglers or human traffickers. Moreover, the Security 
Council has recommended to provide for the safety of persons on board 
as an utmost priority. Migrants should be treated with humanity and 
their rights fully respected in conformity of international law, including 
international human rights law and international refugee law, as 
applicable. The measures authorised by the UN Security Council against 
                                                                                                        
exercises control and authority over an individual, and thus jurisdiction, the State is 
under an obligation under Article 1 to secure to that individual the rights and freedoms 
under Section I of the Convention that are relevant to the situation of that individual”. 
According to the General Comment 31 (U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 of 29 
March 2004) of the Human Rights Committee the Covenant rights are applicable “to 
those within the power or effective control of the forces of a State Party acting outside 
its territory, regardless of the circumstances in which such power or effective control 
was obtained (…)”.  
41 See M. Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties Law, 
Principles, and Policy, Oxford, 2011, p. 67 ff.  
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smugglers and traffickers may entail the use of force, but the conditions 
and its limits have not been specified. Even though the States maintain 
ample discretion on the maritime enforcement measures to be taken, 
they must always be in conformity with international standards, 
especially international law and human rights protection.42 Moreover, 
the operations conducted by regional organisations, such as the EU 
operation EUNAVFORMED Sophia, must take rules of engagement 
into account as well as internationally recognised standards of human 
rights law.  
The principal human rights bodies and mechanisms have examined 
several cases concerning the use of force by security officers, 
identifying the limits within which they may conduct maritime 
enforcement operations. In the Finogenov case, the ECtHR pointed out 
that it is “a duty to take specific preventive action (...) only if the 
authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of 
a real and immediate risk to the life of individual or individuals”.43 In 
the Miguel Castro case the IAcomHR established that “[t]he police and 
other officers in charge of enforcing the law must protect the rights to 
life, liberty, and security of the person, being able to employ force, only 
in a case of direct or imminent danger of death or injuries for the agents 
themselves or other people”.44 Although States have a duty to arrest 
migrant smugglers or human traffickers, the use of force must be 
exceptional and necessary. In Zambrano Vélasquez and others case, the 
IACHR established that resorting to force on behalf of state agents must 
be defined ‘by exceptionality’45 and that force or coercive means can 
only be used once all other methods of control have been exhausted and 
have failed.46 The IACHR, in this sense, has clarified that in peacetime 
situations, State agents must distinguish between persons who, by their 
actions, constitute an imminent threat of death or serious injury and 
persons who do not present such a threat. The use of force is admitted 
only against the former.47 In the Andronicou e Constantinou case,48 the 
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ECtHR decided that rescue operations in which persons and criminals 
had died had not violated the right to life of those individuals, if the 
enforcement officials had tried to convince them to surrender, and had 
intervened solely when the life of the persons on board was seriously in 
peril. 
In the event that the use of force is necessary, planning operations 
must aim primarily to save persons smuggled or trafficked and secondly 
to arrest the smugglers or the traffickers. In this sense, principle n. 5 of 
the UN Basic Principles sets forth that “Whenever the lawful use of 
force and firearms is unavoidable, law enforcement officials shall: (a) 
Exercise restraint in such use and act in proportion to the seriousness of 
the offence and the legitimate objective to be achieved; (b) Minimize 
damage and injury, and respect and preserve human life.”49 In 
McCann,50 and Andronicou and Constantinou cases,51 the ECtHR 
determined that resorting to direct force against individuals should be 
‘absolutely necessary’ for the purpose it is intended to fulfil.52 This 
expression indicates that a stricter and more compelling test of necessity 
must be employed than that normally applicable when determining 
whether State action is necessary in a democratic society. In other 
words, the evaluation of the necessity of the direct force by national 
authorities against individuals is subject to more rigorous standards than 
those normally used to evaluate the legitimacy of other enforcement 
measures. In this field, the IACHR has identified necessity as a limit to 
the use of force by authorities against individuals. In the Zambrano 
Vélasquez case, the Court has established that the exceptional 
circumstances under which firearms and lethal force may be used shall 
be determined by the law and restrictively construed, so that they are 
used to the minimum extent possible in all circumstances and never 
exceed the use which is ‘absolutely necessary’ in relation to the force or 
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threat to be repealed.53 According to the Court “when excessive force is 
used, any resulting deprivation of life is arbitrary”.54 Moreover, the 
force must be “strictly proportionate”55 to the aim pursued, in light of 
the circumstances of the case and the high value attributed to the right to 
life. In Neira-Alegria and Perù the IACHR, in addition to requiring 
necessity and proportionality, considered humanity as a principal guide 
to evaluate the conformity of conduct of police officers against their 
duties to protect the right to life.56  
Finally, when the use of force is inevitable, the State should adopt all 
possible measures to avoid any injury and suffering to the victims. 
Indiscriminate use of force against a group of persons smuggled or 
traffickers and criminals does not fit well with the aforementioned 
severe limits imposed by both the use of force, on the one hand, and the 
duty to avoid or reduce to the minimum the loss of lives, on the other. 
On this issue, the ECtHR has established that the massive use of 
indiscriminate weapons is in contrast with the aim, and cannot be 
considered compatible with the standard of care that is a prerequisite to 
an operation involving use of lethal force by state agents.57  
 
7. Conclusions 
Resolution 2040 (2015) was adopted by UN Security Council in 
response to the mass migrations across the Mediterranean and the 
rapidly soaring number of migrants drownings at sea. Resolution 2240 
(2015) does not criminalise migrants and persons trafficked or prevent 
them from seeking protection under international human rights law and 
international refugee law, but is intended to contrast smuggling and 
trafficking.  
The UN Security Council, with Resolution 2040 (2015), has 
provided the possibility for Member States to conduct anti-smuggling 
and anti-trafficking operations in the territorial sea of Libya. However, 
such operations are subject to the consent of Libya, which to date has 
not given its authorisation to adopt maritime enforcement measures 
against smugglers and traffickers in its territorial sea. In order to make 
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Resolution 2240 (2015) effective, Libya may allow ships that are part of 
operation EUNAVFOR MED Sophia or military vessels belonging to 
other States to patrol its territorial waters. The Resolution simply serves 
to remind Member States of their obligations to repress smuggling 
migrants and human trafficking, without granting them any additional 
power. 
In maritime zones not subject to the jurisdiction of any State, such as 
the high seas, the principle of exclusive jurisdiction of the flag State 
applies. Apart from cases where smuggling and trafficking are carried 
out by vessels without any flag, Article 110 of the UNCLOS refers to 
the exceptions provided in other treaties. The smuggling Protocol 
provides law enforcement measures against a vessel suspected to be 
involved in migrant smuggling, but they are subordinated to the consent 
of its flag State. The trafficking Protocol instead does not contain 
maritime enforcement measures, but Resolution 2240 (2015) authorises 
the arrest of vessels suspected of trafficking on the high seas. This 
Resolution represents a legal basis to exercise enforcement jurisdiction 
against vessels involved in smuggling and trafficking. However, as the 
consent of the flag State is required, the UN Security Council does not 
introduce any new exceptions to the law of the sea. 
Resolution 2240 (2015) contemplates the possibility of adopting 
maritime enforcement measures, which can include the use of force, in 
order to board and seize vessels used by migrant smugglers or human 
traffickers and arrest them. These measures were adopted with a view to 
saving the threatened lives of migrants and victims of human trafficking 
on board such vessels as mentioned above. Migrants cannot be targeted 
by measures of law enforcement, but should be treated according to 
international human rights law and international refugee law, as 
applicable. 
Identifying the limits under which to adopt maritime enforcement 
measures is complicated because it is necessary to apply laws and 
standards belonging to different sectors, both the law of the sea and 
human rights law. The jurisprudence of the UNCLOS tribunals and the 
practice of judicial and non-judicial control mechanisms to protect 
human rights have contributed to identifying the limits to the use of 
force. The UNCLOS tribunals have applied not only the norms of the 
Convention, but also ‘other rules of international law’, which according 
to the common interpretation are used as secondary rules of 
international law to assist in interpreting how to apply the UNCLOS 
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provisions. This approach is in conformity with Article 31 (3, c) of the 
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which provides that 
for the purposes of the interpretation of a treaty there shall be taken into 
account, together with the context, any relevant rules of international 
law applicable in relations between the parties.  
The jurisprudence of the primary control mechanisms to protect 
human rights have identified several limits to the use of force. 
According to that jurisprudence, the use of force must be avoided as far 
as possible. It is admissible in the case of real and immediate risk to the 
life, liberty or security of agents or other persons. However, the force 
used must not go beyond what is necessary and proportional in relation 
to the circumstances. Those limits are often mentioned in the decisions 
of the human rights control mechanisms. Moreover, they were endorsed 
by UNCLOS tribunals in a jurisprudence which is now constant. Such 
standards of protection of human rights are applicable during the arrest 
of migrants smugglers and human traffickers, safeguarding not only the 
human rights of the migrants and victims of trafficking, but also of the 
criminals.  
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MIGRATION FLOWS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN  
AND THE ITALIAN CROSSROAD 
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1. Premise  
Italy is today – and has been in various historical periods of the past 
– a cross-road for migration movements of various origin and nature in 
and out of the country [Corti, Sanfilippo 2009]. This essay analyses the 
Italian situation in the context of migration movements in the 
Mediterranean with reference to the conditions and role of the 
immigrants in the Italian economy and society. The policies of access 
and frontier control, as well as the welfare policies for immigrants, shall 
also be discussed. Finally the integration processes of the immigrants 
and asylum seekers shall be taken into account.  
The essay moves from the issue of geographic location of the 
country at the center of the Mediterranean basin and its proximity to 
areas with high demographic pressure to the strong attraction it exerts 
on the population and the labor supply of the southern shore.  
In this premise it is also necessary to mention two further points. The 
first is that the Italian migration space – that is the geographic area 
where the migration dynamics affecting Italy take place – is much larger 
than the countries of the Mediterranean basin because the pull factors, 
the migration channels and the connecting agencies are able to lead 
towards the country also immigrants from very distant areas. The 
second – which is particularly relevant in some specific moments such 
as the present one – is Italy’s role as a country of transit for people who 
do not necessarily intend to settle in the country or who plan to move on 
to other well identified destinations. And this latter factor concerns both 
the traditional international labor migrants as well as the people who are 
on the move trying to escape from wars and individual or collective 
persecution.  
A further consideration to keep in mind when analyzing the role of 
the country in the international migration scene is that Italy has always 
been a sending as well as a receiving country: the former role 
undeniably prevailing in the last two centuries (Bonifazi 2013). Today, 
after several decades of relevance and great expansion of immigration a 
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new, and for some aspects unexpected, trend is emerging: a resumption 
of Italian emigration towards European and other destination.  
This last phenomenon – the coexistence of emigration and 
immigration – concerns all countries of the Mediterranean northern 
shore. And it is no coincidence that Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal 
have many characteristics in common as far as migration is concerned. 
From the second half of the seventies onwards they all began to develop 
into countries of immigration while they were still countries of 
emigration, though with a substantial reduction in emigration flows 
(King, Black 1997). In general, over the past few decades they have 
undergone significant changes in their demographic composition. 
 Their economic, demographic and social structure have significant 
analogies and determine particular aspects of the labour demand that 
also explain the composition of the immigrant flows (Ponzini 2008). On 
the basis of these considerations the essay puts forward the hypothesis 
that it is possible to claim the existence of a Mediterranean model of 
international migration or – perhaps even better – of a Southern 
European model for immigration and immigration policies concerning 
all countries of the ‘Southern Europe’. 
The paper begins with a presentation of this model and of its main 
features, proceeding to a more detailed analysis of the Italian position 
and role. It concludes with some comments on the transformation 
induced by the economic crisis and recession and the implications of the 
so called refugee crisis. 
 
2. What do we mean when we say “Mediterranean” 
Although it may seem obvious, a clarification is needed concerning 
the space we are referring to when studying Mediterranean migration. 
What exactly do we mean by Mediterranean? Just as the current south-
north flow is not the only relevant one because sending countries are 
located in a much larger area and the routes are many and varied, in the 
past also the areas considered part of the Mediterranean were much 
more extensive than those located along its shores (Calvanese 1992).  
On this issue it is important to consider the Braudelian innovation 
(Braudel 1977) which consists, amongst other things, in seeing the 
Mediterranean not as a simple geographical space but also as a specific 
and autonomous entity: a complex of phenomena and processes, with 
tensions that, on a spatial level, continue to shift borders and central 
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gravity points with an impressive continuity that can be explained only 
through the long durée approach.  
From the perspective of space and borders, as far as migration is 
concerned, only 40 years ago, as noted by Aymard (2003), there was an 
important border (limes) within Europe between South and North (not 
incidentally almost cutting Italy in half) (Aymard 2003) and it was very 
difficult to imagine a different one at that time. Now the new border is 
the sea. It is a border dangerous to cross as those coming from the 
southern shore (or from countries even more to the south) have 
experienced in attempting to enter Europe seeking work. At the 
beginning of the new migration wave of the late 20th century (the one 
that has seen the countries of the northern shore as receiving countries) 
the primary migration flow was the one linking the northern shore to the 
southern one. This flow was specifically directed toward Italy and Spain 
while Greece attracted immigrants coming from different places and 
through different routes.  
International literature on migration of the time described the 
Mediterranean as the space of south-north migration. For example, 
Baldwin-Edwards (1994), his own understanding of Mediterranean 
migration, providing also an empirical basis using the data available in 
the 1980s, on the impact that immigration from the Maghreb had on 
each southern European country. Baldwin-Edwards’ analyis was not 
incorrect for that period and to a certain extent the data presented, the 
situation as it actually was at the time. What was missing was the fact 
that this was a situation soon to be changed by the reduction in 
incidence of the Maghreb component, as proven later by Mattia Vitiello 
using the same statistical sources.  
Such a reduction accelerated with new arrivals from the Eastern 
countries. In effect, what was missing in the Baldwin-Edwards analysis 
(and other similar ones) was the fact that the presence and the escalation 
of the intra-Mediterranean flows were the product of a temporary 
situation. In other words, such studies did not consider the continuities 
and discontinuities that suddenly take place in the Mediterranean 
migratory space, amplifying and making it more complex. From the 
beginning of the 90’s onwards new immigrants from Eastern European 
countries that had not taken part in the early immigration flows arrived 
in Western Europe, including the Mediterranean countries. The 
immigrant workers from the East now represent the largest component 
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of the incoming flows. Hence the current Mediterranean migratory 
space is now larger and has with new focal points.  
Some fundamental aspects of the incorporation process of 
immigrants in countries of the northern shore can be traced back to the 
‘Mediterranean’ character of the history, culture and institutions of these 
countries, and this allows us to talk of a Mediterranean model. 
 
3. The Mediterranean migration model and its characteristics 
A Mediterranean model for a phenomenon such as immigration 
implies singling out aspects and characteristics of immigration that can 
be found in all Mediterranean countries of the northern shore. Aspects 
that are specific to those countries and that do not undergo any 
meaningful changes over time.  
On the basis of such a definition, a temporal aspect must be is 
introduced. We are talking about countries of ‘new immigration’ in the 
sense that the immigration phenomenon on a vast scale began roughly in 
the past forty years. And, as already mentioned, we are talking about 
countries that, until very recently, were emigration countries.  
Immigration in these countries happens in the post-fordist phase of 
economic development, characterised by significant processes of 
‘tertiarisation’ of the economy, amongst others. Countries with an 
historic immigration tradition are also involved in these same processes. 
There is also the fact that the new immigrants (and a large part of the 
old ones) have changed occupational location and placed themselves in 
the tertiary sector. While Mediterranean Europe has been witness only 
to the new post-industrial immigration, other countries have experienced 
intra-European migrations furthered by industrial development.  
Other characteristics of the model primarily concern aspects of 
employment, especially employment in agriculture, which was rather 
exceptional in the old intra-European migration of the fordist age. We 
must also note the existence of other variables, such as demographic 
composition, with a female presence that is higher than elsewhere, even 
during this phase. 
Finally, there is the time factor. Mediterranean immigration is taking 
place in an age in which borders are closed and legal immigration on a 
vast scale is limited. This has significant implications both on the 
situation of the immigrants (very often illegal) and the way in which 
migration policies are developed and applied. The presence of a high 
quota of clandestine (and, in general, irregular) immigrants and the 
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practice of amnesty laws for illegal immigrants is a common feature of 
all Mediterranean immigration countries.  
Not all the variables that are taken into consideration to define the 
model must be exclusive. Neither are they all present in the same way in 
all the countries. What is important is that they are predominantly 
present and that they tend to characterise the model in a more stable 
manner.  
Let us now consider the characteristics of Mediterranean 
immigration in more detail. We must reiterate that, first, we are talking 
about countries where, starting from the 70’s, immigration has 
progressively replaced emigration without their, ceasing to be countries 
of emigration. This is due both to the presence of large communities of 
citizens resident abroad and to the constancy of outgoing flows which, 
even though equal in number to incoming ones, still show a strong 
population turnover. If we take the case of Italian emigration to 
Germany, starting in 1973 we the total number of departing and 
incoming individuals (officially re-entered people) to be at least two 
million. That was the time of the Anwerbenstop, which usually indicates 
the end of the great inter European mass migration phase. And this 
shows how much a Mediterranean country like Italy continues to be a 
crossway of great movements of arrivals and departures (Carchedi, 
Pugliese 2007).  
Second, in all the Mediterranean countries, especially in the initial 
phases of the immigration experience, an important employment 
opportunity for immigrants is represented by seasonal agricultural 
labour. Agriculture had not been effected, or only marginally so, by 
immigration during the great inter European migrations of the preceding 
decades. Seasonal agricultural immigration, that not infrequently 
evolves into a definitive immigration, has analogies with other 
experiences such as the Mexican immigration into California. The 
opportunities offered by seasonal work, with frequent returns to their 
homelands, was initially favoured by a lax control of the borders and, in 
general, by more permissive admission policies. This was particularly 
significant in those regions not unlike southern Italy where agricultural 
work, especially during the harvest season, required male immigration. 
The same holds also true for the building trade, a typical occupational 
landing ground for male immigrants, but which tends more and more to 
become a definitive location. In the agricultural and building industries, 
the so called informal work (or undeclared employment) tends to be 
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predominant in all countries. Contrary to what happened during the post 
war decades of economic expansion, the labour demand in the industrial 
sector is not as strong. At that time, international migrations were 
encouraged by the industrial development. Such a development was also 
characterised by steady employment and long term employment 
contracts (often in large enterprises). These are characteristics that are 
seldom encountered in the Mediterranean immigration model (Vitiello 
2008).  
Third, in all Mediterranean European countries such irregular 
working conditions, at least in the initial phase, are strictly linked to the 
forced status of illegal immigrant. The issue of the high incidence of 
illegal workers must be linked to the initial absence of rules regulating 
immigration and the more recent enactment of rather restrictive laws 
concerning immigration and admission policies. There is a certain 
similarity in the migratory policy experience of Mediterranean 
countries: they have all experienced a shift in border policy (or rather, a 
non-policy) previously more aligned with the European Union 
orientation of closed borders which we will discuss later. This explains 
the condition of prevalent illegality typical of the model. 
Fourth, still from a labour market perspective, the characterising 
element of Mediterranean immigration is the concentration of 
immigrants in the tertiary sector. As previously stated, although this can 
hold true for countries, including those of long time immigration, this 
sector (particularly domestic work but also and mainly care of the 
elderly and home services of various kinds) is especially characteristic 
of the Mediterranean. This means that the immigrant workforce in the 
Mediterranean countries also fills the deficiencies in those countries’ 
welfare systems. In fact, their activities (as private jobs) fulfil needs and 
a demand for services that would otherwise be met by the welfare state, 
especially in the realm of childcare and, increasingly so, in caring for 
the elderly. Finally, one must not forget that the presence of immigrants 
is particularly noticeable in regions characterised by a low rate of 
unemployment and strong labour demand and in regions (such as the 
Italian south) with a high unemployment rate related to a weak local 
economic structure. This feature leads to a complex interpretation of the 
role of immigrants in the labour market, so much so as to overtake the 
traditional dichotomy between immigration led by labour demand or by 
labour supply.  
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The segmentation of the labour market explains the paradox of the 
co-existence of immigration and unemployment, particularly evident in 
agricultural regions where the immigrant workforce plays an 
increasingly significant role. 
Five, composition on the basis of gender and the significant presence 
of women in some of the principal immigrant groups (those placed in 
the sphere of the domestic work or linked to similar activities) is very 
peculiar and sometimes overriding. Such a phenomenon began with the 
arrival of immigrant women to work as cleaners and domestic helpers. 
Now, their presence has become far more evident and on a mass level in 
the realm of elderly care. We can say that it is one of the principle 
novelties of Italian immigration starting from the second half of the last 
decade. It is a novelty that reflects relevant social and demographic 
transformations within Italian society (as far as Italy is concerned), but 
this is also true for other countries. Initially the renewed diffusion of full 
time domestic workers (living in the houses of their masters 24 hours a 
day) in the 70’s and 80’s in middle class homes, seemed to be due to 
traditional social relations. But things seem to have changed with time. 
Female immigration, especially from the Eastern Countries, is destined 
to work in the field of elderly care (Bettio, Simonazzi, Villa).  
As previously mentioned, the presence and the development of such 
immigration must be understood within the framework of the 
transformations and crisis of the Mediterranean family. But the crisis of 
the traditional family, hence the difficulty/impossibility of caring for the 
elderly within the family itself, does not mean the overcoming of 
traditional Mediterranean familism. The contradiction is that the elderly 
in need keep relying on the family in any case, in the absence of other 
supports. But the family is no longer able to care for their elderly 
members directly. Hence the need for commodified domestic help paid 
by the family but indirectly by the state (mainly or in part) through 
pensions and subsidies. And this is a very interesting aspect of the 
Mediterranean welfare mix.  
A final characteristic of immigration in Mediterranean countries, 
though related to the above, concerns the still scarce access to social 
benefits by immigrants, not only due to the inadequate policies and their 
actual implementation but also because of the more complex nature and 
the instability of immigration nowadays. The implementation deficits, 
represent one of the main problems of the Italian immigrant policy, that 
is of the social policies for immigrants (Morris 2003, 2006). But these 
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implementation deficits also concern border control policies, with the 
resulting mass entrances by clandestine immigrants and the consequent 
need for amnesty laws and mass regularisation. In addition, the costs for 
border control and to combat illegal immigrants in Italy are much higher 
than those for social policies for the immigrants. 
Another closely connected aspect that characterises immigration in 
the above mentioned countries is the fact that it is taking place in a 
period of closed borders (for non-Eu citizens). It is a known fact that, to 
a greater or lesser extent, immigration comes to pass in any case. Those 
who enter illegally go through an extended phase of illegality, followed 
by an amnesty which, at least temporarily, rectifies the situation. It is no 
coincidence that in Italy the amnesty norms are called ‘sanatorie’, a 
term which implies healing. In sum, in Italy, as well as in other 
countries of the northern shore, there is a border policy that is strict on 
paper but quite lax in reality. And social policies legislation for 
immigrants are rather advanced but generally not applied.  
Recently an element of complication emerged that contradicts some 
of the aforementioned aspects of the model, such as the prevalence of 
non-legal entry of immigrants: it is the growing importance of a new 
component which is legal by definition because composed of EU 
citizens. Until the admission of Romania and other Eastern countries to 
the EU immigrants from that area did not normally have a legal status at 
least in the first period of their immigration experience. As EU citizens 
they can now enter other countries without a visa and are therefore in a 
privileged situation compared to other older components coming from 
non-EU countries. On the other hand, they do not seem to be able to 
enjoy the privileges they are entitled to as far as their condition in the 
labour market and access to welfare benefits are concerned.  
To conclude with the Mediterranean model and its features we must 
underline that the factors of attraction are determined by a labour 
demand that reflects not only the characteristics of the economy but also 
the characteristics of the local society. The employment of immigrants 
in the agricultural or building sector is the expression of the first feature, 
while work in the service sector (in particular elderly assistance) is the 
expression of the second.  
Finally, the role of geographic proximity must be mentioned again. 
The ties between the southern and northern shores have varied in the 
course of time as have the south-north flows. In general from the early 
90’s onwards these flows had been overtaken by incoming flows from 
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Eastern countries such as Albania. In very recent years, the flow coming 
from Eastern Europe has escalated, including not only the Balkans but 
also other nations such as countries of the former Soviet Union, 
especially the Ukraine that are very relevant now with Greece and the 
Balkan countries as areas of transit. 
The ties between the northern and the southern shores are stronger 
when push factors of an economic nature are added to the social 
political ones: in particular, the effects of wars and persecutions in the 
countries of origin, such as (once) the wars in  the former Yugoslavia 
and (now) the Syrian and the Libyan wars. And this holds true also for 
the east-west flows. 
The situation has become increasingly complex in the past few years, 
starting with the period of the Arab Spring and with an acceleration of 
the changes following the Libyan and the Syrian crisis. The re-
activation of the Mediterranean flows after 2012 was not triggered as 
much by ‘economic immigrants’, that is by people in search of work, as 
it was by the great number of people seeking asylum. At any rate the 
Mediterranean route is the same for ‘economic’ and ‘political’ 
immigrants – assuming that a clear cut distinction between the two 
might be possible.  
As far as Italy is concerned, at the time of the ‘Arab Spring’ the 
official forecast – announced by the Italian Ministry of the Interior of 
the time – of a large number of immigrants from the southern shore 
expected to land in Italy proved to be highly exaggerated. The greater 
possibility to leave Tunisia or Egypt or Libya – well consolidated 
sending or transit countries given the loss of legitimacy of the local 
rulers and their reduced ability to exert control on the borders – did not 
imply any ‘invasion’ as predicted or threatened by many. But more 
recently the relevant inflow through the Balkan route, effect of the 
Syrian crisis, has become one of the main problems in countries of the 
Mediterranean Europe and one of the main points of the political agenda 
of the EU. The former have always played the role of transit area for 
migrants since the beginning of the ‘new migration’.  
Both economic immigrants and refugees have often landed on 
Mediterranean shores with the intent of continuing their travel towards 
other European destinations. A very representative case is that of the 
Turkish Kurds mostly directed to Germany who landed in Italy 
following a migration chain made more difficult by the restriction to 
mobility introduced by the EU countries. This was a minor issue until 
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recently. Quite the contrary now, for the refugee crisis represents not 
only an important issue but also a great paradox: Italy as well as Greece 
– the two countries most effected by the flows of migrants escaping 
from wars and persecution – are not the desired destination for these 
migrants, for they plan to reach those places where their relatives and 
acquaintances are already living. 
 
4. Italy as a country of immigration 
All the principal dimensions of the Mediterranean model apply very 
well to Italy, in particular the coexistence of emigration and 
immigration flows that allows us to characterise Italy a migration 
crossroad. In fact, contrary to the widespread belief “Italy, a former 
country of emigration, has become a country of immigration” it is 
important to underline that over the past decades Italy has continued to 
be a country of emigration. And now, because of the crisis, we are 
witnessing a reduction in the immigration flow, at least as far as labour 
migration is concerned, and a relevant increase in the emigration flows. 
The slowing down of labour immigration does not signify a reverse 
trend in Italian immigration. The characteristics of the labour demand 
and the demographic structure have not changed in the past few years 
and a pull effect is still relevant although weaker than before. Apart 
from this the total number of foreign residents in the country has kept 
growing, mostly because of the process of family reunion and, in much 
more limited numbers, the arrival refugees and asylum seekers. 
But let us go back to the beginning of Italian immigration and its 
evolution, providing some basic information on its nature and 
composition. The first arrivals – as already mentioned – took place in 
the second half of ‘70s while ltaly was still an important country of 
emigration (Pugliese 2006, Bonifazi 2013). It is interesting to 
note that the first immigrants came in large part – but not 
predominantly – from the southern Mediterranean shore. In fact they 
came from many distant areas, such as Latin Ameri ca and the 
Philippines, but also from East African countries that were once, Italian 
colonies. This implies that the majority did not come to Italy for reasons 
of geographic proximity. There were two main components in this flow: 
a) female component from Catholic countries (or belonging to Christian 
minorities in non-Christian countries), mostly to be employed in 
domestic work, b) a male component, mostly from Islamic countries 
(Mediterranean and not) to be employed as daily workers in agriculture, 
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as construction workers or as street peddlers (the majority coming from 
Senegal or Morocco). 
The second phase – the nineties – starts with the ‘fall of the Berlin 
wall’. The first mass arrivals are from Albania, but in the following 
years other nationalities from the former socialist bloc appear on the 
scene. The Chinese component also becomes important in these years. 
A process that deserves to be mentioned as far as this stage is concerned 
is a change in the occupational composition of male immigrants: many 
of them start working in industry and this phenomenon can be 
considered a very positive step in the process of integration.  
The third stage – that is the stage of consolidation – starts at the 
beginning of the century and also includes the present situation, apart 
from some specific phenomena resulting from the crisis. In terms of 
national composition and resident foreign population, the Eastern 
European component becomes more and more predominant. Today, 
with more than one million residents the Romanians are the largest 
group in Italy, followed by the Albanians. The Moroccan component 
that for almost thirty years had been the largest group, is now only the 
third largest. The Chinese, whose presence has grown moderately but 
steadily are in fourth place, followed by the Ukranians. The 
demographic composition in terms of gender has not changed much in 
the course of the time: women have always made up 50% (or slightly 
less) of the total foreign population. And this has to do with the labor 
demand that comes not only from the enterprises but, as far as the 
female labor force is concerned, from the families. What has changed is 
the specific task of women working for Italian families. Originally they 
were employed as cleaners and in general as family helpers while the 
majority now work as care givers for the elderly.  
The other relevant demographic aspect is the large and increasing 
component of minors, both as family members and as unaccompanied 
minors, arriving from many places in search of asylum, work, or simply 
independence: a very composite group from all points of view. While 
the early groups of immigrants were young adults, male or female, only 
exceptionally accompanied by family members or dependents, we are 
now witnessing the effects of family reunion allowed since 1998. 
Immigrant families with children at school are not an exception as they 
were thirty year ago but a very common reality in Italian cities.  
The various waves of immigrants and their insertion in the Italian 
society and economy have been regulated not only by the labor 
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demand but of course also by Italian immigration policies in its 
broadest sense. More precisely, one should speak of ‘immigration 
policies’ and of ‘immigrant policies’ as a separate and distinct matter. 
While the first include issues of admittance, border control, quota 
systems, amnesties, access to permanent status and finally access to 
citizenship, immigrant policies (that is social policies for the 
immigrants) include welfare provisions (school, housing, social 
security), labor protection and regulation, antidiscrimination policies, 
protection of immigrants, minors etc. 
For these reasons a very short digression on the Italian immigration 
legislation and policies is necessary. Italian legislation – like the 
legislation of other Southern European countries – has been formally 
very restrictive in terms of legal admission. But this has not reduced the 
inflow to any significant extent with the effect of causing illegal (or 
a-legal) mass immigration, which in turn implied frequent ‘amnesty’ 
policies. These have given regular status to immigrants (already present 
in the country) so that it can be said that in almost every immigrant 
family in Italy at least one member has experienced non-legal entry, 
followed by the acquisition of a regular status through the amnesties. 
These paradoxes can be explained in a different way. First of all, 
the lack of experience and tradition of Italian institutions in this area. 
Not having a relevant immigration tradition in modern times, Italy 
did not have a tradition of immigration policy. This also explains 
why at the very beginning this country, as well as other European 
Mediterranean countries, was very attractive to potential immigrants 
from the South of the World at a time when traditional European 
immigration countries were introducing restrictive measures. This 
may help to understand various aspects of the mmigrants’ 
conditions: for example, the vast presence of non-legal immigrants 
forcefully employed in the informal (market) economy.  
Italian legislation is very progressive in general terms, at least as far 
as social policies are concerned. Various laws have been introduced in 
the past decades all of which include issues of immigrant policy and of 
immigration policy. The early legislation introduced equal treatment for 
national and foreign workers on labor issues and a first amnesty was 
intended to regularize the status of irregular immigrants (Law n. 943 
1987), early partial norms concerning refugees, new and more 
comprehensive amnesty measures, early welfare measures for 
immigrants but at the same time the first border restrictions and 
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introduction of the requirement for a visa for those arriving from non 
EU countries (Law n. 39 1990). 
At this time the immigration policy in Italy is based on the principles 
and orientation of Law n. 40 (1998), known as ‘Legge Turco 
Napolitano’ which is the basis for the Testo Unico (TU), the 
Consolidated Act for immigration of the Italian Republic. Law n. 40 is 
the most important legislative act concerning immigration, and is very 
comprehensive as it includes restrictive measures as far as admittance 
policy and border control are concerned (with the institution of 
detention centers for non legal immigrants), as well as progressive ones 
such as measures for family reunion or larger welfare provisions and 
humanitarian measures. All the more recent acts aimed at modifying the 
Testo Unico consist of important or minor amendments that have 
certainly worsened the general structure of the TU (as is the case of the 
so-called Bossi-Fini Law) – making the situation of the immigrant more 
difficult – but have not been able to disrupt it.  
 
5. The Italian crossroad in times of crisis and the economic 
recession 
The recent decade has witnessed a normalization of Italian 
immigration from a social, economic and demographic perspective. But 
at the same time new phenomena of marginality and the failure of many 
individual projects of the immigrants have occurred because of the crisis 
and the recession. On the other hand, these have been difficult times for 
Italians also, especially in the South, with an increase in unemployment 
and in relative and absolute poverty. These phenomena have caused a 
decrease in the immigration inflows but have also stimulated a 
reactivation of Italian emigration. 
With reference to the first point, normalization, one of the 
characteristics of Italian and Mediterranean immigration noted by 
researchers at the early stage of the phenomenon was a high job-sex 
segregation whereby some occupations were almost entirely taken only 
by males and others almost exclusively by females. Segregation on the 
basis of gender also reflected an ethnical and/or national segregation. In 
this framework the high female presence meant an autonomous 
migratory experience, and sometimes a leading role of the women in the 
migration chain. The other, less surprising, aspect, specific to the 
Mediterranean model, was the highly precarious employment and ‘post 
industrial’ occupational collocation with a presence in the informal 
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economy, in an environment of high instability. With the passing of 
time, these aspects, together with initial demographic characteristics 
(young adult males and females from different countries) of the 
immigrant population changed significantly: the job sex segregation 
persisted but the number of women arriving as dependents (wives or 
daughters) increased. As mentioned, the starting point for this new 
pattern dates to the arrival of the Albanians (often in family groups) in 
the early nineties, while its institutionalization came later with the 
family reunions made possible by Law n. 40, and the increasing 
importance of the second and now third generation. As far as the male 
component is concerned the areas of employment expanded and many 
were also able to obtain more stable jobs, especially in the regions of the 
North. These processes of normalization and stabilization have been 
permitted by the integration policies carried out at the institutional level 
but are primarily the result of the efforts and initiatives of the 
immigrants themselves. This does not imply a widespread, fully 
successful process of integration for all but certainly means a lower 
degree of precariousness and uncertainty. In particular, the policies 
concerning family reunions – carried out by the Mediterranean 
countries, although with a series of limitations – have strongly 
influenced this trend. The presence of immigrant families is no longer 
an exception as it once was in the past.  
On the other hand the crisis has introduced new trends and, for some 
aspects, unexpected events. First of all the industrial crisis has led to 
loss of jobs for many immigrants occupied in the industrial sector. The 
immigrant component still has the highest union density in the Italian 
labour force. And this is a clear example of successful stabilization. On 
the other hand the processes of upward and geographic mobility from 
precarious employment in agriculture and construction to steady and 
protected jobs in industry, from the South to the North, are much more 
limited. On the contrary, as far as some migrants are concerned there is 
now a reverse trend: from the North to the South, from industry to 
precarious employment. 
But the new relevant phenomenon concerning Italy, a new 
demonstration of its nature as a migration crossroad, is the reactivation 
of Italian emigration abroad. In fact there has been a steady increase in 
departures from the country throughout the decade but in the past few 
years there has also been an acceleration which implied greater attention 
by the Italian public. The main destinations are the western and northern 
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European countries where the effects of the crisis have been less 
devastating and where the recovery has been going on for several years. 
A recent analysis by Istat (the National Institute for Statistics) indicates 
the dimensions of the flows, the main directions and their composition. 
An unexpected result was the presence of a very traditional ‘proletarian’ 
component. In fact the distribution of the emigrant population by level 
of education indicates that one third has a high school or college degree, 
one third has completed basic education and one third lacks even a 
junior high school degree. This show that it is not a matter of brain drain 
or of international circulation of cultural and professional elites but 
simply a renewed push effect caused by the crisis.   
 
6. The “refugee crisis”: Italy and the Mediterranean  
In this complex and contradictory frame of migration movements 
concerning Italy a new element has emerged over the past few years: a 
new role of the Mediterranean with the re-activation of south-north 
paths in the direction of Hispanic or more frequently Italian shores: a 
path which is mostly followed by migrants seeking asylum. 
The expected invasion from countries of the Southern shore in 2011 
proved to be the effect of an alarmist policy: only a few tens of 
thousands of immigrants arrived at the time of ‘Arab Springs’ from 
Egypt or Tunisia. But a relevant flow of migrants leaving from the 
southern Mediterranean shores and other areas reached the Italian coasts 
after 2012, strongly escalating in the following two years.  
A simple analysis of the social and national composition of this 
movement proves that it originates mostly in areas of war and political 
and military crisis and that the class composition of the migrants is not 
that of the traditional labor migration, while the percentage of minors is 
quite impressive. Given the dangerous conditions of the journey, and in 
the absence of any form of protection, these migrants have been in the 
hands of smugglers and traffickers and risked losing their life in a 
shipwreck because of the inadequate conditions. On the other hand no 
help could be expected from Frontex, the agency whose institutional 
mission is border control and not protection of the migrants’ life.  
However, after a tragedy resulting in the death of several hundred 
migrants caused by the sinking of a ship, the Italian government, on the 
basis of the positive emotional reaction of the population and with a 
widespread sense of compassion and solidarity, launched the ‘Mare 
Nostrum’ operation aimed at rescuing migrants in difficulties. As 
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known, ‘Mare Nostrum’ saved thousands of lives but lasted only one 
year having been canceled by the Renzi government under the pressure 
of the Ministry of the Interior. High costs paid only by the Italian state 
and an active xenophobic propaganda caused the elimination of the 
program and its substitution with the Triton operation which follows the 
rules of Frontex. 
Another widespread critique of the Mare Nostrum operation was 
based on its supposed ‘calling effect’, that is, the fact that the safer 
travel conditions made possible by the Italian rescue operation, would 
have attracted new economic migrants and asylum seekers. This thesis 
did not take into serious consideration the determination of the new 
inflows and the fact that people escaping from wars and persecution do 
not have the possibility of choosing – which path they should follow. 
The activation of the south-north Mediterranean path was not caused by 
the existence of Mare Nostrum but by the war in Syria and the 
persecutions in Eritrea or the crisis in Libya. The flows started before 
‘Mare Nostrum’ and continued after it was canceled. 
As mentioned in the previous part of this essay, the social processes 
that take place in the Mediterranean have different focal points and 
origins. With the exacerbation of the crisis in the Middle East – not only 
in Syria but also in Iraq with the expansion of the so called ‘Islamic 
State’ – massive outflows of the population have taken place, with 
people escaping not only from Daesh but also from bombing, repression 
and the devastation of the local economy. This new migration followed 
another much more relevant route crossing the Mediterranean: no longer 
from south to north but from east to west. And in this case the role of 
first safe haven has been Greece rather than Italy. 
What is common to these two countries, as far as the so called 
refugee crisis is concerned, is that neither is the desired destination of 
these new Mediterranean flows. Asylum seekers are obliged to apply for 
refugee status in these countries because of the norms of the Dublin 2 
agreements. This imposition is at the basis of the migrants’ tendency to 
avoid registration, and consequent application for the status of refugee 
in Italy in order to continue their journey towards other countries. The 
attitude of the Italian government in this matter has been very 
permissive, which is positive from a humanitarian point of view but at 
the same time very opportunistic and incorrect, and not only for formal 
reasons. In fact, these migrants, forced to an informal presence, are 
abandoned to themselves or to the solidarity of volunteer organizations. 
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Over the past few years their presence has become much more 
important than in the past and it is no coincidence that the Italian basic 
legislation did not pay much attention to this issue. Now not only is the 
number of asylum seekers sizeable but their importance in the Italian 
discourse on immigration has become central. 
Labor migration and ‘political migration’ are strictly interwoven. 
And both types of migrants deserve solidarity. On the one hand, with 
Mare Nostrum, Italy has been able to provide a positive response to the 
migrants’ drama. But the social policies for immigrants in general and 
for asylum seekers in particular are still insufficient, badly managed and 
ineffectively implemented. On the other hand, a kind of syndrome of 
invasion is affecting Europe, including Italy making it makes difficult to 
develop more advanced policies. 
Finally, as Catherine Wihtol de Wenden (2013) puts it, in the last 
century people have obtained the right to emigrate (though not 
everywhere) but they are still far from obtaining the right to immigrate. 
And this is at the basis of the conditions according to which 
international migrations are taking place today. 
  
 
References 
 
M. Ambrosini, Sociologia delle migrazioni, Bologna, 2011 
M. Accorinti, “Centri di accoglienza varietà tipologiche e dibattito 
collegato”, in RPS: la Rivista delle Politiche Sociali, n. 2/3, 2015  
M. Aymard, “Perché e come, parlare di Mediterraneo”, in Q.A.: La 
Questione Agraria, n. 4, 2003  
M. Aymard, Il mediterraneo: Ancora Mare Nostrum, Rome, 2000  
M. Baldwin-Edwards (ed.), The politics of immigration in Western Europe, 
Newbury Park, 1994 
F. Bettio, A. Simonazzi, P. Villa, “Change in care regimes and female 
migration: the ‘care drain’ in the Mediterranean”, in Journal of European 
Social Policy, n. 3, August 2006 
C. Bonifazi, L’Italia delle migrazioni, Bologna, 2013 
F. Braudel, La Mediterranèe, Vol. I: Les espaces et les hommes, Vol. II Les 
hommes et l’heritage, Paris, 1977 
D. Bubbico, E. Morlicchio, E. Rebeggiani (eds.), Su e giù per l’Italia, 
Speciale issue of Sociologia del lavoro (121), Milano, 2011 
  
174 
F. Calvanese, “Spazi e tempi delle nuove migrazioni: L’Italia, l’Europa, i 
paesi extra-europei”, in G. Mottura (ed.) Arcipelago immigrazione, Roma, 1992 
S. Castles, G. Kosak, Immigrant work and class structure in Western 
Europe, London-Oxford, 1973 
P. Corti, M. Sanfilippo (eds.), Migrazioni. Storia d’Italia (Annali 24), 
Torino, 2009 
F. Carchedi, E. Pugliese (eds.), Andare, restare tornare: cinquant’anni di 
emigrazione italiana in Germania, Campobasso, 2007  
Fondazione Migrantes, Rapporto Italiani nel Mondo, Todi, 2013 
A. Geddes, The politics of migration and immigration in Italy, London, 
2003  
I. Gjergji, La nuova emigrazione italiana, Venezia, 2014 
D. Joly, “I parametri del nuovo regime di asilo in Europa”, in La critica 
Sociologica, n. 143-144, 2003 
R. King, B. Black, Southern Europe and the New Immigration, Brighton, 
1997 
L. Morris (ed), Rights, New York, 2006 
L. Morris, Managing migration: Civic stratification: Civic Stratification 
and Migrants’ Rights, London, 2002 
G. Ponzini, “Il sistema di welfare nei paesi mediterranei”, in G. Ponzini, E. 
Pugliese (eds.), Un sistema di welfare mediterraneo, IRPPS, Report, 2008  
E. Pugliese, L’Italia tra migrazioni internazionali e migrazioni interne, 
Bologna, 2006  
S. Turcio, “La famiglia sud europea tra mutamento sociale, vecchio e nuovo 
welfare”, in G. Ponzini, E. Pugliese (eds.), Un sistema di welfare mediterraneo, 
IRPPS, Report, 2008 
M. Vitiello, “Les politiques d’entrée en Europe et la frontière 
méditerranéenne”, Italies : Littérature, civilisation, société (n. 14), 2010 
C. Wihtol de Wenden, Le droit d’émigrer, Paris, 2013 
C. Wihtol de Wenden, Atlas des migrations; un équilibre mondial à 
inventer, Paris, 2012 
COLONIAL OBJECTS, POSTCOLONIAL SUBJECTS,  
MIGRATING MODERNITIES 
Iain Chambers* 
 
In the montage of intersecting temporalities and territories that come 
together in considering migration, modernity and the Mediterranean we 
need to remember that contemporary Mediterranean crossings constitute 
only a moderate percentage of the so-called illegal immigration into 
present-day Italy. Increasingly it is composed of refugees fleeing war 
zones in Syria, Afghanistan and sub-Saharan Africa (particularly Eritrea 
and Somalia). Most of the migrants, particularly those fleeing war zones 
do not arrive in Europe at all. The biggest concentration of such dis-
placed persons are to be found in Pakistan, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Ken-
ya and Turkey.1 European media and political attention is of course 
fuelled by the drama of the mounting figures of drownings and death at 
sea. Behind these representations of dark, often Muslim, bodies, there 
exists another narrative that is rather less about the contemporary and 
planetary significance of modern migration, and altogether more to do 
with the construction and defence of local, national, European and Oc-
cidental framings of the world. So, what does present-day migration say 
about our understanding of modernity and ourselves? To answer this 
suggests that we think not so much of migration as with migration, as 
the latter becomes a critical instrument and interrogation. This leads into 
a deeper and altogether more extensive history of our time. 
The contemporary figure of the migrant and refugee does not simply 
represent a juridical and socio-economical figure, often destitute and 
temporarily stateless. She carries within herself a series of historical and 
cultural interrogations that invest modern forms of belonging: from the 
nation state and citizenship to what we understand when we speak of 
democracy and rights. These are questions sustained within a modernity 
that seemingly awards the mobility of capital, labour and production, 
and therefore inevitably, even if it is ideologically reluctant to do so, the 
migration of bodies, histories and cultures…  
Inscribed on the body of the modern migrant is not simply the power 
of European law regulating her situation, and frequently transforming 	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1 UNHCR figures for mid-2013, reported in The Guardian, 10 June 2014. If the 
figures are now clearly out of date the tendencies remain in place. 
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her subjectivity into an ‘illegal’ objectivity, but also the indelible wa-
termark of a colonial past. Here the altogether more preponderant, sys-
tematic and violent migration of Europeans towards the rest of the plan-
et in the course of several centuries, invariably forgotten and repressed, 
is re-ignited in the clandestine histories of today’s migrants who return 
to shadow the complex coordinates of the modern world. Here we con-
front the intricate making of a constellation called modernity in which 
the past does not simply pass away. Here, migration as a central element 
in the making of the West renders unstable, even unsustainable, the lin-
ear explanation that would consign the colonial migrations of Europe – 
realised through the racial and racist subordination of the rest of the 
world to its economical, political, religious and cultural will – to a 
closed and obsolete chapter in the narrative of its ‘progress’. To re-open 
these histories, allowing them to spill into the present, means to propose 
profound interrogations of the historical and political nature of the mod-
ern nation state, its modalities of democracy and government, and the 
pretensions of its juridical premises and practices. For migrant bodies, 
invariably considered ‘out of place’, put in question the very sense of 
place and belonging upon which these definitions depend: in the ongo-
ing processes of globalisation who has the right to define and direct this 
‘place’? 
To consider contemporary migration, and the racism that invariably 
accompanies it, as being woven into the web of Western democracy, is 
to consider far more than a set of emergencies. With death spilling out 
of the headlines – from drownings in the Mediterranean to shootings in 
America’s inner cities and the violent surveillance of territories and 
lives in Palestine – the limits and hypocrisies of the moral economy of 
the Occident are continually exposed. These are the limits of a precise 
history and its structures of power. They speak of the critical and politi-
cal responsibilities for those processes that have brought us to where we 
are today. This means to understand the present movement of migration 
from the multiple souths of the planet, or the consistency of racism, as a 
historical condition, not as an simply as an ‘emergency’ that require ex-
ceptional measures.  
For these are not temporary phenomena or accidental pathologies; 
they are structured, historical processes. If these processes are hidden in 
the fetish of global commodification they nevertheless consistently 
ghost the making of the modern world. The spectral presence of invisi-
ble lives and anonymous labour in the global logistics of capital is both 
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there in yesterday’s slave ships plying the Atlantic and in today’s over-
crowded boats crossing the Mediterranean. Insisting that such questions 
are central, and not peripheral, brings us to confront the very mecha-
nisms of knowledge and power that legitimate the present state of af-
fairs. The presumptions that surround and sustain such concepts as the 
‘individual’, ‘citizenship’, ‘democracy’ and ‘freedom’ are themselves 
the products of such mechanisms. While they continue to be presented 
as neutral ideals and universal values, their practices tell us a very dif-
ferent story. Precisely here, the figure of the migrant exposes the present 
to unauthorised questions and opens up another archive. This produces a 
radically diverse critical horizon. 
What is repressed in the representation points us to other maps and 
temporalities in a planetary modernity that is never merely ‘ours’ to de-
fine. If the politics of explaining and managing the modern world can 
only be sustained though maintaining unequal relations of power and 
the negation of other voices and histories, then we should ask ourselves 
in what precisely does this universality and its modernity consist of? All 
of this implies extracting the discussion and understanding of contempo-
rary migrations from its more predictable coordinates. This means to in-
sist, against prevailing representations, that migration is neither merely a 
marginal socio-economical phenomenon nor a social ‘problem’ or polit-
ical ‘emergency’. On the contrary, migration is one of the constitutive 
processes in the making of modernity, both in its Occidental inception 
and its subsequent planetary realisation. The centrality, and not margin-
alisation, of migration to the making of the modern world was already 
passionately argued for more than 40 years ago by John Berger in A 
Seventh Man.  
As a structural and historical condition, intrinsic to the political 
economy of the modern world and its violent cartographies, migration 
needs to be considered in terms of a cultural, historical and epistemolog-
ical challenge. In other words, the modern migrant with her history, cul-
ture and life actively questions the citizenship, national belonging and 
understandings of the European polity in a manner that invites us to 
consider their colonial fashioning and postcolonial configurations. Such 
considerations open up deeper historical temporalities and altogether 
more extensive and unstable archives than those associated with the 
homogenous time of national belonging. Clearly all of this cuts into and 
interrogates our very understanding of the present, forcing us to register 
the limits of a certain European and Occidental exercise of modernity. 
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At this point, and thinking with migration, we can begin to elaborate 
a different critical key with which to open and interprete the archives of 
modernity. This is an invitation to reconsider the temporal-spatial coor-
dinates of modernity and to consider the rhythms and configurations 
that resist and persist in the folds of deep historical time. Here migration 
turns out to be the very motor of modernity itself. Given that the West 
insists on globalisation and its wording of the world in order to achieve 
its aims then points of origin and ownership begin to evaporate. Or, ra-
ther, there opens up an epoch characterised by the explicit struggle for 
its definition and management. All of this suggests the necessity of rec-
ognising different languages and adopting a diverse critical compass 
with which to navigate these emerging questions. Giving attention to 
subordinated, subaltern and subjugated memories we confront a politics 
and poetics that exceeds our reasoning and the presumption that we are 
always able to render the world transparent to our premises, needs, 
knowledge and power. 
It is precisely in this context, as is illustrated in the essays by Celeste 
Ianniciello and Annalisa Piccirillo, that it becomes pertinent to propose 
certain contemporary art practices in terms of a critical activity. Involv-
ing historical and cultural research, secured in an incisive postcolonial 
re-narration of modernity, this art deliberately pursues a significant po-
litical mandate. Challenging the existing geography of powers leads to 
the dissemination of a semantics, with its sentiments and affects, that 
escapes the mechanisms of institutional narration to propose other flows 
of understanding, other maps of knowing, other ways of seeing. With 
this in mind it becomes possible to repeat the dominant narration of the 
nation in an altogether more critical key.  
The radical revaluation, sustained in the theme of migration, exposes 
the institutional tale to those histories and cultures that have been struc-
turally excluded and negated, reduced exclusively to objects of our 
knowing gaze. The exhibition of our ‘progress’ and the power of our 
modernity to reduce the world to a series of objects that reconfirm the 
centrality of our subjectivity – continually on display in national muse-
ums and history text books – is now intercepted by a series of unauthor-
ised questions that persist and resist. The questions that emerge from 
these unregistered and unrecognised archives are destined to arrive from 
a truly postcolonial future. 
In the intersection of broken territories and bleeding wounds, the 
Mediterranean itself proposes a seascape that is itself the ultimate ar-
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chive (I draw this suggestion from the Libanese artist Akraam Zaatari). 
How do can we critically cross this space and associated temporalities? 
To cross and conceive them requires the dis-assembling of a belonging 
guaranteed by a fixed, stable and rooted identity. We are pushed into a 
journey in a mobile geography, composed of movement, slippages and 
interruptions: both space and time become discontinuous, cut up by the 
heterogeneity of conflicting forces and desires. Moving between the 
representations of such spaces and the repression that shadows the act of 
being represented we find in postcolonial art an anthropology of the pre-
sent. Clearly, such art does not provide us with a stable object to analyse 
and explain according to the abstract logic of artistic canons – the insti-
tution of aesthetics, the history of art – but rather proposes a critical 
means with which to think and live and thereby interrogate the discur-
sive order – aesthetics, art history – that believes itself capable of ex-
plaining the art object. 
In this situation the past, with its memories and archives, proposes a 
diverse archaeology and a different manner of comprehending its pres-
ence in the present. The isolated and authentic object no longer exists, 
nor does a definitive explanation of the past. In the counter-histories and 
counter-memories that inhabit the image we now register that the image 
itself contains more time and horizons of meaning that any one of us can 
ever absorb or understand (Didi-Huberman 2000). Here we pass from a 
formal archaeology of objects to an ongoing genealogy composed of re-
lations, ruptures and discontinuities, where the past works up new criti-
cal configurations of the present. For what counts is not so much an ob-
ject discovered as the processes exposed in the excavation. 
The frontiers, borders and confines registered in steel walls, barbed 
wire, documents and bureaucracy, produce a wound, a scar that will 
never heal and is destined to remain open as an interrogation. Here we 
register the necropolitics that directs the brutal confines of Occidental 
humanism and what Frantz Fanon continually labelled as its hypocrisies 
(Mbembe 2001). Here we also touch the epistemological limits of an 
idea of citizenship and belonging articulated exclusively in the terms of 
the nation state which, and not by chance, is also the privileged place 
holder of modern historiography. The art that is discussed in the follow-
ing pages narrates a very different critical landscape. The echoes and 
spectres sustained in these works cut up time and refuse the simple line-
arity of ‘progress’ and the unilateral beat of the Occident. Here we find 
ourselves insisting, in the wake of Walter Benjamin, that historical time 
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does not pass but rather accumulates. The past insists in the present in 
the form of ruins. Our silence in their presence is a hole in time. Here 
there emerge other histories and other lives, the others. The dissolution 
of institutional time into multiple rhythms and accents sustains critical 
spaces that lie at our side: frequently unregistered and unrecognised. 
These are the heterotopias that a postcolonial art practices and promises. 
They propose a folding of time, its simultaneous deepening and exten-
sion to render proximate other places and bodies in a cartography that 
exceeds the more predictable maps of modernity. Here, in the interrup-
tion and discontinuity of a uniform temporality and space, the syntax of 
art announces the ethics of a world yet to come. 
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HOSPITALITY, ALTERITY AND FEMININITY 
Silvana Carotenuto∗ 
 
After Iain Chamber’s intense postcolonial framing of the 
contemporary question of migration, my intervention would like to 
emphasise what form of ‘hospitality’ we should all offer to l’arrivant. I 
will here briefly introduce my reasoning: the world today – and Europe 
in particular – even more critically now, only a few months after the 
conference, is debating the forms of acceptance, restriction and/or 
refusal of the fluxes of migrants who reach the coast of Southern Italy or 
of Greece, who cross the Easter sides of Fortress Europe, in order to 
progress towards the northern lands of promise and progress. The 
debate mainly refers to the different and optional legislations meant to 
employ, guard, secure, protect, resist; its normative languages speak of 
restrictions, identifications, quotes of acceptance, barriers around the 
perimeter of Hungary, the ‘crime’ of hospitality, the economic resources 
of the Syrians in Germany…  
The horizon is complex, and it certainly constructs a perimeter of 
epochal change: in populations, cultures, economies, survivals – the 
future. Against this complex socio-political background, exposed to the 
destinies of thousand people/s who insist, persist and resist, on their 
own sides, the limits of European security and its embedded politics of 
seclusion and refusal, also encouraged by the grassroots’ 
demonstrations of general solidarity and friendship. In what follows I 
would like to bring back to memory some of the critical interventions of 
the most radical critical thought of contemporaneity, Deconstruction, 
through the signature of its inventor, Jacques Derrida, who, at the end 
of last century, proclaimed the precious puissance of the hidden 
unconscious of the migratory phenomena: ‘unconditional hospitality’, 
the archaic Law of welcoming as an ethos, a culture, and an ethics, the 
ancient sensibility that, nowadays more than ever, needs to be restored 
at the core of all necessary legislations meant to respect and welcome 
the other.  
My short paper will share this appeal, trying to remind the PhD 
students of this interesting teaching week, of the Law without the force 
of law, that opens the doors of the house to the guest without any 
economy of exchange, the principle and the praxis of ethical 	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responsibility towards the other, the militant excess and exception of 
unconditional hospitality from the enforced laws of pragmatic, dogmatic 
and interested security. Mine will be a sort of reminder of what some 
years ago deconstructive critical thought already indicated as a priority 
of action, thinking and sentiment, at the same time proving the point in 
the political intervention-invention of a system of cities which would 
provide refuge and shelter to the endangered writers among the fluxes 
of migrants, asylum seekers, sans papers, the masses of humans who, by 
necessity or choice, thread the difficult roads of exile, displacement, and 
abandonment. Why the writers? Why should we care about writing, 
showing concern for what is, generally, considered ineffective, fictional, 
abstract, secondary if and when compared to the impossible conditions 
of life and death affecting the survival of children, women, old people, 
men who encounter so many menacing forms of horror in their 
migratory routes? Derrida enters the scene once again, with a text The 
University without Conditions, where he not only suggests the 
necessary belief into the unconditionality of the academia, but also and 
mainly explains the intervening strength of the unconditionality of 
literature, the last resort for a freedom that needs to be supported and 
traced along in all possible militant ways. Literature, writing, reading, 
the first and most sensitive spaces for the welcoming of the other, the 
lucky chance – even in conditions of seclusion and apartheid, violent 
displacement and utter confinement – of vindicating creation, 
inscription and expression.  
Any kind of literature? All forms of creative utterance? Yes, in 
principle, praxis and human love. Yes, writing – oral, vocal, gestural, 
visual, pictorial…  I will briefly conclude here with a reference to my 
own understanding of the kind of literature that I teach and try to 
convey to my students: if today we need to claim the Law of 
unconditional hospitality, if, in times proving resistant to the excess of 
such Law, we still find a possible place for its articulation in the 
unconditional freedom of literature and writing, I will maintain that it is 
female literature, female writing, female creativity, that offers the most 
acute and precious opening to the arrival of the other, without 
conditions but proving another economy, the (un)management of the 
house or home that women extend to the whole universe: aware of their 
own alterity, women (de)construct here the creative space where the 
encounter with the other is allowed and permitted, enjoyed and 
appreciated, as an event of complexity, difference and dialogue… 
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At the end of this short introduction, I would like to apologise for the 
velocity and the eclectic approach of the notes that will follow. The 
argument would indeed need long pages of articulation, intense 
readings of texts, deep heterogeneity of critical references and 
theoretical interpretations. I can only have faith in the fact that the 
deconstructive appeal to unconditional hospitality will remind my 
readers of the archaic aspect of its law; that they will practice their 
specific literatures in the present of their researches as the difficult but 
rewarding unconditionality of others’ and their own writings; that my 
final reference to the literature of women will open, for the ones who 
have never crossed its doors, a universe of novelty and transformation, 
and for the ones who already enjoy the opening of female maisons of 
creative writing, the confirmation that the archaic embedded in the 
unconditional hospitality will necessarily enter the doors of the future – 
if not to change the world, certainly to provide refuge and peace for the 
ones who still believe in the survival of life against all horrors of death. 
 
Dedicated to  
… the ones who, by boarding on the coasts in Calabria or Puglia, or 
by climbing mountains, thus crossing the imaginary frontiers that 
separate the south from the north, the east from the west, neither 
simulate a right they know not to have, nor dissimulate, not even 
honestly, a condition that should be hidden. They enunciate in clear 
letters their clandestinely as an ethos, that is, a way of inhabiting the 
world, which precedes or proceeds the norm they should elude or fight 
against… 
Collective 33, “Nostra compagna clandestina” 
 
In the notes that follow, I will try to show how and why the female 
oikos – here identified with the place of femininity, female literature, the 
home of creativity, innovation and change – can be interpreted as the 
‘opening’ from where to offer unconditional hospitality to the other, to 
absolute alterity. In this sense, I will refer to the relationship between 
Deconstruction and hospitality, the deconstruction of hospitality and the 
hospitality of deconstruction. 
Two texts are remarkable to my question, and they are both signed 
by the father of Deconstruction, the French-Algerian philosopher 
Jacques Derrida: Annie Dufourmantelle invite Jacques Derrida, à 
répondre “De l’hospitalité” (Derrida Dufourmantelle 1997); and 
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Cosmopolites de tous les pays, encore un effort! (Derrida 1997b). The 
first text is the editorial choice of two fragments (“Question d’étranger: 
venue de l’étranger”: quatrième séance, le 10 Janvier; “Pas 
d’hospitalité” cinquième séance le 17 janvier) of the seminar given by 
Derrida in 1996 at L’Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Science Social; the 
other text is the opening speech to the first conference of the ‘refuge-
cities’ at the Council of Europe in Strasburg in the same year, as an 
initiative of the International Parliament of Writers.  
Of Hospitality – in this text, Derrida brings the political-
philosophical thought back to the relation of difference between the 
‘Law’ and the ‘laws’ of hospitality: the laws on hospitality are those 
which I imagine the students here gathered have investigated for the 
whole teaching week; very rarely, however, will they hear of the appeal 
to the Law of unconditional hospitality.1 One possible reason for such 
generalised omission is that the generalised emphasis on the legislation 
– rather than on the universal – of hospitality is specifically linked to the 
‘scandal’ that the Law of unconditional hospitality brings along with 
itself. It, indeed, is destined to offer hospitality to the one who arrives 
without asking for his/her name, without posing the question on his/her 
identity; it is hospitality offered to the anonymous other, without 
patronymic or social status, beyond any pact or contract provided and 
enforced by the laws of hospitality. The Law of Hospitality breaks with 
the name, the family, the generation, the genealogy, placing itself 
beyond any right of nationality or citizenship by rule of birth, soil and 
blood, beyond any reciprocity.  
It is an archaic law, which is absolute, which does not force, which is 
culture, ethos, and ethics:  
 
…entre, entre sans attendre, fais halte chez nous sans attendre, hâte-
toi d’entrer, ‘viens au-dedans’, ‘viens en moi’, non seulement vers moi, 
mais en moi: occupe-moi, prend place en moi, ce qui signifie, du même 
coup, prend aussi ma place, ne te contente pas de venir à ma rencontre 
ou ‘chez moi’. Passer le seuil, c’est entrer et non seulement approcher 
ou venir…(Derrida 1997, 109) 
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The Law of unconditional hospitality is rarely – it could even be 
said, never – evoked, remembered, or simply recalled. Indeed, Derrida 
thinks that, even if the two laws are different, contradictory, and 
antonymic, they are also, at the same time, inseparable and 
indissociable: without a specific legislation, the Law of absolute 
hospitality would turn ‘abstract’; without the Law, the laws would not 
be perfectible, that is, they would not be historical and thus 
transformable. The philosopher writes Cosmopolitans of all countries, 
still an effort as a proof of such indissociability: by appealing to the law 
of absolute hospitality, the creation of the refuge-cities critically enters 
into the actual crisis of the nation-state and its sovereignty, asking for 
the renovation of international right, or/and for the invention of a new 
cosmopolitanism. Indeed, the creation of a system of refuge-cities is an 
experiment which marks an exception and an excess compared to the 
norm, in a present when, with increased insistence, every politics stays 
within the logos of the paterfamilias, the potestas and the possession of 
the guest, in his/her identity, generation and genealogy. Ipse, potis, 
potens – le maître de maison chooses, filters, and selects the guest, 
giving and/or negating the right to visit. This is what characterizes our 
present: the violence or the force of laws remains on one side of power; 
absolute hospitality stays hidden on the ‘other’ side of life. Everything 
is ruled and thrust to the becoming-right of justice. We even reach the 
condition in which what is called ‘a geography of absolute proximity’ 
within the law of absolute hospitality, transforms itself, through the 
enforcement of the laws, into the ‘crime of hospitality’. 
A specific question thus arises: where can we still find a space for 
the ‘scandal’ of unconditional hospitality? The question of the place, 
soil, home, utopia as topos, is an integral part of the question of 
hospitality (the two interventions after me will deal with creative 
‘cartographies’). Where is it still possible to find hospitality offered to 
l’arrivant before any anticipation or/and identification, to the one who 
arrives as a human being, an animal or a divine creature, alive or dead, 
male or female, to whom to thrust everything of oneself, all my proper, 
our whole proper, without asking for his/her name, expecting no 
counter-gift, without or beyond condition? Once again, it is Jacques 
Derrida who offers a possible answer in a text that, already in its title, 
evokes the unconditionality of hospitality: L’universitè sans condition 
(Derrida 2001). I have no time here to articulate the unconditionality of 
the university in general, if not to say that, in his reasoning, Derrida 
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believes that, even if the university is certainly not unconditional, we 
must do ‘as if’ it were unconditional. ‘As if’/‘comme si’: it is the power 
of literature, its profession of belief, the power of new and 
contemporary humanistic studies able to debate everything, the horizon 
of truth and the proper of man, proving a critical resistance to all powers 
of dogmatic and unjust appropriation, determined to create all possible 
public spaces for the “performative discourses that produce the event of 
which they speak” (Derrida 2001, 20). It is the essential modality of the 
creative experience: writing, together with reading, is the first form of 
hospitality, the form of literature which, in principle and in its letters, 
types, alphabet and imaginary, has the power of saying and inventing 
everything and the contrary of everything. Fiction and fictionality testify 
the overcoming of all frontiers, the absolute and unconditional opening 
to the other, the law as the text of the other,2 the space of the ‘yes’ to the 
other, his or her affirmation in “the precise, fragile itinerary, which is 
life”(Elalami 2015, 16 my translation). 
I should now tell you of female literature, female writing, female 
fiction. Time is indeed tyrannical; I can only remind you of some of the 
female thinkers and writers who, in contemporary times, have offered 
their ‘as if’ to the unconditional hospitality of the other. I would like to 
remember the philosopher Hannah Arendt in her important The Origin 
of Totalitarism (1951); on the plane of theory, I would like to read with 
you the militant insights that Judith Butler offers in her Antigone’s 
Claim. Kinship between Life and Death (2002); in the realm of 
literature, I would like to turn to the works by Assia Djebar and Fatima 
Mernissi.3 Let me, indeed, end with a quotation by the French-Algerian 
writer who, in my intellectual and teaching experience, embodies the 
most intense female deconstruction of hospitality, Hélène Cixous. I will 
quote a sentence that explains why and how femininity can be 
interpreted as the absolute space of unconditional hospitality in itself, 
for itself and for the other.4 Cixous here speaks of a different economy, 
which refuses to essentialise but, by returning to women, 	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2000), F. Mernissi, Karavan. Dal deserto al Web, Firenze Milano, 2004. 
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unconditionally opens the doors of their home – oikos – to the arrival of 
absolute other:  
 
“If there is a ‘propriety of woman’ it is paradoxically her capacity to 
depropriate unselfishly: body without end, without appendage, without 
principal ‘parts’. If she is a whole, it’s a whole composed of parts that 
are wholes, not simple partial objects but a moving, limitlessly changing 
ensemble, a cosmos tirelessly traversed by Eros, an immense astral 
space not organized around any one sun that’s any more of a star than 
the others”. (…) 
 
Her libido is cosmic just as her unconscious is worldwide. Her 
writing can only keep going, without ever inscribing or discerning 
contours, daring to make these vertiginous crossings of the other(s) 
ephemeral and passionate sojourns in him, her, them, whom she inhabits 
long enough to look at from the point closest to their unconscious from 
the moment they awaken, to love them at the point closest to their 
drives; and then further, impregnated through and through with these 
brief, identificatory embraces, she goes and passes into infinity. She 
alone dares and wishes to know from within, where she, the outcast, has 
never ceased to hear the resonance of fore-language. She lets the other 
language speak – the language of 1,000 tongues which knows neither 
enclosure nor death… she doesn’t defend herself against these unknown 
women whom she’s surprised at becoming, but derives pleasure from 
this gift of alterability. I am spacious, singing flesh, on which is grafted 
no one knows which I, more or less human, but alive because of 
transformation. (Cixous 1976, 889) 
Does the quotation speak for itself? Does it prove the female 
capacity, in her fictional or autobiographical creation, to offer another 
form of unconditional hospitality to alterity? I imagine this affirmation 
would need long pages of critical articulation; I am glad, however, that 
the two essays that follow my notes will testify to the art and critical 
positions (dis/location, dis/placement, re-mapping, re-rooting) of 
women desiring to express their other sense of being in the world, their 
different legacy to change, welcoming and survival. 
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CHANGING BORDERS, DISORIENTING MAPS:  
MONA HATOUM’S ART OF DISPLACEMENT 
Celeste Ianniciello* 
  
The production of borders and the obsession for what we could 
define as a ‘geography of fortifications’ has dominated Europe’s 
political agenda for decades, and can now be also considered a global 
phenomenon. As Wendy Brown points out, the border has become the 
material institution through which the declining power of the nation-
state seeks to defend its presumed integrity against what are perceived 
as external menaces coming from contemporary reality: terrorists, 
poverty, epidemic viruses and, above all, poor migrants (Brown 2010). 
In an age where the global fluxes of migration have gained the strongest 
intensification ever, borderlands are paradoxically turned into spaces of 
containment, regimes of arrest and immobility. The Italian critic Sandro 
Mezzadra defines today’s borderland as the space of bio-power and 
‘thanatopolitics’, a space where State power exercises control over 
migrants through a capitalist dynamics of inclusion/exclusion based on 
the erection and patrolling of frontiers that often cause death (Mezzadra 
2008). The concept of ‘thanatopolitics’ and the way it is exerted is 
strictly connected to colonial power and the concept of ‘necropolitics’ 
elaborated by Achille Mbembe. It highlights the fundamental racist trait 
and the lethal domain over bodies inscribed in that politics (Mbembe 
2008). This is what happens in the Mediterranean Sea, in the desert 
borderlands between Mexico and the United States or in the Palestinian 
Occupied Territories, just to name three of the most obvious examples.  
In this neoliberal and colonial logic a subject such as a poor migrant 
woman represents a body over which to exercise the power of selection 
or, in Mezzadra’s words, the power of ‘differential inclusion’. From the 
point of view of cultural representation, the migrant woman is 
configured as a foreign body to be repulsed, or else tolerated and 
hypothetically integrated into the social tissue. Beyond this logic she is 
considered as a subject out-of-place. But, is it possible to think of the 
border(land) as other than the place where people are instrumentalised 
or die, where life is mortified and arrested? Is it possible to undermine 
and rewrite this deadening cartography of limits drawn by, and drawing 
on, Western power? I wish to argue that some artistic productions and 
processes, where it seems impossible to separate space from time, 	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geography from history, present from past, here from elsewhere, may 
represent an affirmative answer, proposing alternative cartographies of 
memory and belonging. In this spirit, I will consider some artworks by 
the Beirut-born, Palestinian, London-based artist Mona Hatoum in terms 
of the living archives of migrant memories and associated border-
crossing geographies. 
In Hatoum’s aesthetics the exploration of the relation between place, 
space, identity, memory are profoundly informed by the experiences of 
exile, displacement, and the multiple languages and cultures to which 
the artist herself is differently related. Far from promoting itself as 
representative of a people, a land, a history, Hatoum’s art evokes the 
heterogeneous, differential, vertiginously ambiguous nature of an 
identitarian in-betweenness, that can clearly be referred to the artist’s 
lived experiences, but it also concerns life experience as such. Hence, 
Hatoum’s art, simultaneously, evokes the risk of being too strongly 
rooted in our ‘home’, reminding us of Edward Said’s observation that 
“borders and barriers, which enclose us within the safety of our familiar 
territory, can also become prisons” (Said 2000).  
The culture and geopolitics of closure, confinement, and walls, is 
impiously questioned by Hatoum’s aesthetics of border-crossing. This is 
particularly evident in the different maps the artist has produced, of both 
Palestine and the world. Here she blurs any distinction between 
closeness and distance, familiarity and strangeness. The memory of a 
‘double vision’, of simultaneous dimensions and overlapping territories 
is imprinted in Hatoum’s cartography. Time and space become 
inseparable, as in Present Tense (1996) that reproduces a map of the 
occupied territories to be returned to the Palestinians, drawn up at the 
Oslo Peace Agreement of 1993. Exhibited at the Anadiel Gallery, East 
Jerusalem, it consists of a grid of soap blocks, placed on the floor, like a 
carpet, on whose surface small red glass beads are impressed, like drops 
of blood, to delineate the land borders, and an immobile present with 
them. 
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Present Tense 
Installation Anadiel Gallery, Jerusalem, 1996 
Soap and glass beads 
1 3/4 x 94 7/8 x 117 3/4 in. (4.5 x 241 x 299 cm) 
Courtesy White Cube and Anadiel Gallery, Jerusalem 
 
 
The process of restitution has never taken place, Yasser Arafat 
having refused to sign the agreement whose map he was not allowed to 
see. In the secret, unilateral maps and projects of Israel and the United 
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States is inscribed an imperialist desire of exclusive decision-making 
and possession that affirms the constant nexus between cartography, the 
constitution of property and colonial power. This is how Irit Rogoff 
(2000) puts it: 
 
“Maps make property – they do so through … laws, contracts, 
treaties, indices, covenants as well as plain old deals. Following on this 
same logic maps produce the ‘Law’ … through the establishment of 
such parameters as ‘the border’ which sustains division between those 
privileged with rights and those outside of them” (Rogoff 2000, 75). 
 
Hatoum draws maps too, but nothing in them responds to a colonial 
logic of division and control; rather they recall the dangerous desire of 
free movement. Significantly, the soap functioning as a map in Present 
Tense is a traditional artisanal product of Nablus, whose fabrication has 
never halted, even in wartime. For this, and also for its provisional 
materiality, it functions as a symbol of resistance against the barriers of 
power: the soap is destined to dissolve, washing away those bloody 
borderlines encapsulated in an eternal present.  
Hatoum’s predilection for evanescent and slippery materials with 
which to draw maps is emblematic. Her Map (1998) consists of a big 
glass carpet, made of small clear marbles delineating the world map. 
But the high fidelity of the reproduction is under constant threat. A false 
step, a light touch, even the most imperceptible vibration of the floor is 
sufficient to decompose the territorial coordinates. This is a map with 
unstable borders, yet insidious, as the possibility of losing balance and 
falling down can hardly be avoided. The idea of the decomposition of 
borders as an effect of movement is also what seems to emerge from the 
installation Continental Drift (2000). Here the fragile stability of the 
terrestrial surface, once again made of glass, is constantly menaced by 
the sea, consisting of thin layer of iron filings, ruffled by a rotating 
magnetic arm placed below the work’s circular structure. The viewer 
has the sense that the iron wave could shatter the continental borders, 
thus irremediably altering the world’s physiognomy. Hatoum’s land is 
constantly adrift, under the inevitable erosive action of fluxes and 
movements, and their unpredictable effects. This artwork, like the more 
recent Shift (2012), evokes Jean Baudrillard’s observation that “There is 
nothing left but shifting movements that provoke very powerful, raw 
events. Events can no longer be seen as revolutions, or effects of the 
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superstructure, but as underground effects of skidding, fractal zones in 
which things happen. Between the plates, continents do not quite fit 
together, they slip under and over each other. there is no more system of 
reference to tell us what happened to the geography of things. We can 
only take a geoseismic view” (Baudrillard and Lotringer 1986, 141). 
 
 
 
Shift 2012, Wool 59 1/16 x 102 3/8 in. (150 x 260 cm) 
Photo: Murat Germen Courtesy ARTER, Istanbul and White Cube 
 
Hatoum inaugurates a new system of reference that questions the 
solidity of the land beneath our feet, where it seems impossible to plant 
and cultivate the roots of belonging. This ‘new geography of things’ is 
rhizomatic, to use a metaphor dear to Deleuze and Guattari: it crosses 
borders, tears out the roots, stirs up the codes, being simultaneously 
composed of spaces of dispersion and convergence, deterritorialization 
and territorialization; that is, of folds, fluxes, currents, vapours (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1987). 
Rather than relying on fixed points, beyond any logic of precision 
and ‘established’ coordinates, Hatoum’s maps display what is rendered 
invisible by official cartography: the experience of geography, the 
personal geography of a life-path exposing the precariousness of borders 
and the decomposition of spaces. This is a ‘subversive’ route that leads 
to the threshold between the known and the unknown, the familiar and 
the untimely, the proper and the improper. It exceeds any clear 
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correspondence between territorial delimitation and identitarian 
identification. Such a relation between geography and biography is 
often, emblematically, recurrent in Hatoum’s art.  
 
 
 
Projection, 2006, Cotton and abaca 35 1/16 x 55 1/8 in. (89 x 140 
cm) 
Photo: Ela Bialkowska Courtesy Galleria Continua, San Gimignano - 
Beijing and White Cube 
 
The map Projection (2006) reproduces in two different kinds of 
paper pulp the perimeters of the continents according to the cartographic 
projections elaborated by the German historian Arno Peters in 1973. It 
reconfigures, for the first time, the Mercatorian cartography, which 
dates back to the Renaissance period, that is, the official map of the 
world that mirrors the colonial and imperial perspective. In the Peters 
projections the South is much more extensive than its traditional image, 
and underlines how our image of the world corresponds to a distorted 
vision of its real proportions. Today’s world’s map imposed by the 
colonial West countries remains the political and economic image that 
endorses the North and its privileged point of view.  
Yet, it is precisely when the artist seeks to establish a just order of 
things that she paradoxically takes distance from any attempt to 
precision. In Hatoum’s artwork the earth becomes visible through the 
different nuances created by the different qualities of the paper pulp 
used – thin and transparent Manila hemp forming the recessed 
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continents and thick white cotton for the surrounding areas: nothing but 
a shadow, a quite insubstantial shape, a hardly perceptible drawing, a 
light mould of an absent body, of a migrant. A connection between 
geography and biography opens up here: the historical and ideological 
marginalization of the South of the world is interlaced with the 
processes of migration and the bodies of the migrants themselves. 
Projection, for instance, is reminiscent of some previous artworks where 
the Hatoum ‘projects’ herself through the traces of her body: in Skin, 
Nail and Hair (2003), Hair Drawing (2003), Blood Drawing (2003), the 
artist impresses her skin, blood, hair, nails into the paper pulp of what 
can be considered self-portraits. She announces in a way the aesthetics 
and technique of her maps, unfolding through fullness and voids, the 
rough materiality and the fragile indeterminacy of the trace, as a 
presence that affirms herself defiantly through her losses, her remains, 
her imprecise identity. Recalling the feminist politics of location and the 
observations of the Palestinian philosopher Elias Sanbar, it is possible to 
think of both Hatoum’s maps and self-portraits as figures of a situated, 
material, yet becoming identity, where a political and existential agency, 
a form of resistance against the threat of appropriation, erasure and 
absence is inscribed (Sanbar 2004). Here any pretention of neatly 
defining the borders of both the self and the world, any attempt to 
possess them, is destined to succumb to the limits of the recognizable 
and appropriable. 
What Hatoum seems to propose is an ‘uprooted geography’ 
(Chambers 2008) whose disorienting maps can also be considered as 
‘acts of memory’ (Bal, Crewe, Spitzer 1999). They directly recall the 
existing maps of knowledge and power established by the cultural and 
political economy of both past and present Occidental colonialisms. 
They question the violent maintenance of ‘center’ and ‘peripheries’, 
hegemonic and subaltern areas, ‘First’ and ‘Third’ worlds. Hatoum 
produces a counter-geography of estrangement that undoes and 
continually re-defines this persisting cartography of power. Another 
example working bluntly across and along the ‘struggle over geography’ 
and its contested territories is the installation 3-D Cities (2008-2009), 
where printed maps of cities present geometrical cuts forming paper 
depressions and elevations, similar to roses or cones. But any 
association with beauty, choreography or playfulness results 
inappropriate, even disquieting, when, at a closer look, it is possible to 
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see that the maps refer to Beirut, Kabul and Baghdad. Those cuts are 
more likely signs left by war, signs of violence. 
 
 
 
 
3-D Cities 
2008-2009 
Printed maps and wood - Dimensions variable 
Photo: Kleinefenn - Courtesy Galerie Chantal Crousel,  
Paris and White Cube 
 
Against the modern cartography of differentiated powers, and in 
harmony with a feminist ‘politics of location’ (Rich 1984), it is possible 
to consider Hatoum’s maps as figures of a becoming yet positioned, 
immanent, material identity. An existential and political agency is 
inscribed, as a form of resistance against the threat of appropriation, 
cancellation, and absence. The artist creates zones of ontological 
slippage, time-space interlacements, bonds between distance and 
proximity, personal and collective memories. Interrogating our position, 
our established procedures of recognition and definitions, the artist 
draws us into an alternative critical heterotopic space (Foucault 1986) 
made up of the migrations of bodies and senses. Here, overcoming 
barriers, borders, enclosures, divisions in favour of traces, signs, folds, 
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and unpredictable currents, we are propelled into the emergence of 
another challenging configuration. 
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FEMALE CORPO-GRAPHIES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 
PERFORMANCE ZONE 
Annalisa Piccirillo∗ 
 
Trespassing into the Mediterranean cartography, through the critical 
map of Mona Hatoum drawn by Celeste Ianniciello, I would like to 
propose further configurations of female artistic practices and poetics, 
with the aim of offering a personal response to the themes of migration 
in the contemporary Mediterranean. I will then briefly discuss the 
performative experimentations carried out by some female artists who 
move, write and dance inside and outside the aesthetical and political 
borders of the Mediterranean Sea. In this sense, I will highlight the 
bodily tension of their languages, their compositional desire of re-
mapping and re-imagining new corporeal geographies, proposing 
alternative sensorial and identitarian modes of inhabiting the Euro-
Mediterranean space. 
The material and symbolic construction of the Mediterranean as a 
borderland, among which, the institutional politics of management of 
migration, and the subalterns’ strategies of adaptation, contestation and 
subversion of ‘Fortress Europe’, enable the space of its sea to become a 
potential imaginary zone of performance for the activism and the 
experimentation of different art practitioners. As the French feminist 
writer Catherine Clèment reminds us, “… somewhere, every culture has 
an imaginary zone for what is excluded, and it is that zone we must try 
to remember today” (Clèment and Cixous 1986, 6). To echo this, I 
explore the Mediterranean as the methodological resource for 
alternative gender-critical investigations, envisioning its performance 
zone as the imaginary-actual-virtual space that serves to retrieve back 
excluded bodies, forgotten voices, hidden movements, and negated 
traces of otherness. In my interpretation, this marks the emergence, out 
of the sea’s liquidity, of unfixed and fluid forms of female agency, the 
choreo-politics of bodily location-affirmation that interrupt and 
interrogate the history of Mediterranean modernity (Chambers 2008).  
 
Against the backdrop of this, the female body – rather than being 
considered as a surface of inscription, an ‘object’ ruled by migration 
policies and restrained by measures of controlled mobility – becomes a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
∗ University of Naples “L’Orientale”. 
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transversal ‘subjectivity’ that inscribes and invents new ways of 
existing, moving and surviving through-and-as-performance. I will 
present the corpo-graphies of two Mediterranean video-performance 
artists: Nisrine Boukhari who lives and works between Syria and 
Austria, and Filomena Rusciano who began her artistic career in the city 
of Naples, after completing her degree in African Studies at the 
University “L’Orientale”. Their choreographic digital interventions 
offer the instances of a rethinking of the contemporary ‘politics of 
location’ that they conceive as the poetical-political positioning of a 
body inside/outside a national geography, a cultural space and a 
temporal juncture commencing from their – and, at the same time, our – 
corporeal territory.  
Differed and dislocated in time and space, Boukhari and Rusciano’s 
aesthetical examples dialogue across the spectre of their differences, 
thanks to the liquid space of digitality the artists both share and inhabit. 
Located in Damascus and in Naples, crossing the Mediterranean Sea, 
their corpo-graphies engage with the language of choreo-graphy so as to 
be able to compose dancing counter-narratives which respond to the 
European technocratic ‘utopias’ of controlling mobility, their pretention 
to manage the established borders and their rigid limits to hospitality. 
By the term corpografia, Sara Marinelli means the symbolic and 
tangible act of ‘writing with the body’, also suggesting this body should 
be conceived as a territory, the map where to inscribe and locate the 
individual memory of women in a precise configuration of historical 
time and geographical space (Marinelli 2004, 15). The scholar, in 
particular, explores the inadequacy of European national mapping in 
hosting identities always in transit, in movement, ‘out of place’, and 
which, consequently, cannot be ‘contained’ within any constructed 
corpo-geographical frontier.  
By taking up Marinelli’s reasoning, my question would then be: 
which specific geography might incorporate and situate a body that is 
‘out of place’? What happens when we explore the critical intersection 
between the bodies of the migrants, excluded and rejected by the Euro-
Mediterranean politics of containment, and those female subjectivities 
marked as ‘indomitable’ and ‘uncontainable’ within the patriarchal 
geography – the system, the law – which still endures across cultural 
and national borders? The ‘migrant’ body and the ‘female’ body are 
mapped as entities on the edge, as ‘abject’ bodies. The post-structuralist 
Julia Kristeva, in Powers of Horror, describes the ‘abject body’ as the 
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object of ‘primal repression’, referring to the moment in our 
psychosexual development when we establish a border or a separation 
between the human and the animal, culture and what precedes it 
(Kristeva 1982). Kristeva maintains that, on the level of our individual 
development, the ‘abject’ marks the instance when we begin to 
recognize a boundary between ‘me’ and the ‘other’, between ‘me’ and 
the ‘(m)other’. This, specifically concerns those bodies epitomised 
today as anti-social, anti-national, that material and bodily substance 
that “disturbs identity, system, order. What does not respect borders, 
positions, rules…” (Kristeva 1982, 4). 
The abject of the feminine and the monstrous body of the migrant, 
indeed, resist and react against national, sexual and gender confinements 
through ‘writing’. The most influential critical proposal in this sense 
comes from Hélène Cixous, who advances l’écriture feminine as a 
model of feminine desire, the language of body writing that 
reconstitutes her expression as a revolutionary movement against the 
male rhetorical ruling language. Cixous invites women “to write. An act 
which will …. give her access to her native strength, it will give her 
back her goods, her pleasures, her organs, her immense bodily 
territories which have been kept under seal…” (Cixous 1976, 880).  
An alternative female corpo-graphy – which asks for a more 
conscious politics of location and body affirmation – is drawn by the 
feminist American poet Adrienne Rich who, in an except of her “Notes 
Towards a Politics of Location”, writes:  
 
“I need to understand how a place on the map is also a place in 
history within which as a woman, a Jew, a lesbian, a feminist I am 
created and trying to create. Begin though, not with a continent or a 
country or a house, but with the geography closest in-the body”. (Rich 
212) 
 
If the closest geography is ‘in-the’ body, these theoretical and critical 
thoughts  – glimpsed here in the form of fragmented traces or as steps 
for an imaginary map – can be absorbed into the feminine gestures of 
the choreographies created by Boukhari and Rusciano. Here the 
‘choreographic’, meant as the intertwining of body movement and 
writing par excellence, proves a conceptual and corporeal practice that 
re-orients the established and normative relationship to space and 
language, to the ethics of what is identified as ‘out-of-place’ (Joy 2014). 
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Boukhari and Rusciano’s inventive choreographic languages seek to 
place, on the creative scene, first and foremost, one subject in relation to 
another, allowing the dancing body movements, and their boundless 
gestures, to mark the emphatic contact between corporealities and 
narratives, even when they are involved across geographical distances 
(Foster 2011). It is a choreographic critical force that takes particular 
relevance in the Mediterranean performance zone, where dance extends 
beyond aesthetics into the social realm, exposing both a geographical 
specificity – Syria and Italy – and a wider geo-political horizon – the 
Global South.  
In The Veil, Nisrine Boukhari signs the im-materiality of the digital 
screen with a corporeal matter emerging from the light surface of a red 
veil.1 Behind this fabric dances an un-discernible figure, choreographing 
ephemeral gestures to the rhythms of fractal sonorous vibes. Jacques 
Derrida would say that what emerges here is “an a-physical body, that 
could be called… a technical body or an institutional body”, but which 
has no materiality (Derrida 1994, 127). The viewer can perceive with 
her eyes, the traces left by the body when it pushes, weighs, crushes, 
squeezes, slips, grabs and stretches, appearing and disappearing, a 
spectre inside/outside the monochromatic texture.  
It is a corpo-graphy that aligns to the multitude of disembodied 
spectres – or ‘no-bodies’ – of the anonymous corpses dispersed in the 
necropolis of the Mediterranean today. Nevertheless, as if in an 
imaginary dialogue, the ghostly female body connects with the not-yet-
born, the corporealities of the ones who have survived the transit, and 
who are now looking for possibilities of existence and dignity in the 
new geography of arrival. In this sense, it becomes a metamorphic body 
whose incompleteness offers its potential for the transformation of 
national, identitarian and sexual specificity. It is like a silkworm in 
véraison, that is, “in the moment of ripening and the moment of 
maturation” (Derrida 2001, 91); an identity emerging in new forms of 
in-corporation, whose fluxes push towards the future. The inspiration 
for such à-venir might come from the imaginary encounter between 
Boukhari’s dancing hands and Jean-Luc Nancy’s thinking body, when it 
casts the idea of dance as an instance of birth: “… the detachment of the 
body from the plane of the ground through its multiple unfoldings that 
open up toward the world” (Nancy 2000). Behind and beyond the veil of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Nisrine Boukhari, The Veil, 2007. Link to the video: https://vimeo.com/11463913. 
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The Veil, the perception of the eye across the malleability of Boukhari’s 
corpo-graphy, allows for the becoming of a new, potential and eventual 
Syrian identity – out-of-place, boundless, extended in her transit, a body 
wanting to escape, gesturing towards a form of refuge and hospitality 
within the Euro-Mediterranean geographical and aesthetical borders. In 
conclusion, indeed, Boukhari displaces the tactile weight of her corpo-
graphy onto the liquid-digital milieu, here, in this space of free 
movement, she entrusts the resistance of her poetical-political image to 
the public eventfulness of her work – beyond the corporeal frontiers of 
her established Syrian identity and belonging. 
On a different shore of the Mediterranean performance zone, the 
Neapolitan coast, Filomena Rusciano choreographs her Liquid Path.2 
Referring to this video-dance piece, she writes:  
 
“I embodied the migrant’s courage, as I wore her clothes, her 
hope, floating in the sea, unsettled as a message stored in a bottle…I 
travel towards uncertain paths”. (Rusciano 2013). 
 
Fig. 1 Filomena Rusciano, Liquid Path, 2013 
Video-choreography, video stills. Courtesy of the artist 
 
These words affirm the urgency of another perspective, the necessity to 
consult a different map that would mark irregular routes and unusual 
trajectories. Through the experimental dissimulation of her bodily 
gestures into the watercolour technique, Rusciano dilutes abstract 
movements, symbolic images, and maritime rhythms on the digital 
screen. Unsettling the corporeal paths behind and beyond, inside and 
outside a glass bottle, her body turns liquid, blurred, opaque, fragmented 
and, eventually, boundless; the in-definite contours of her corporeality 
make her subjectivity indomitable, and ungraspable. Nobody can 
control, define or categorize the malleable shapes of her dancing body.  
 
Fig. 2 Filomena Rusciano, Liquid Path, 2013 
Video-choreography, video stills. Courtesy of the artist 
 
Rusciano commences by composing from her body, from the tragic 
geography and the historical contingency she experiences, confronting 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Filomena Rusciano, Liquid Path, 2013 – link to the video (short version): 
https://vimeo.com/74490969. 
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her ability, as a European-body, to provide a personal and political re-
action to what she sees and in-corporates. Indeed, this peace is her 
recalling of the collective and traumatic memory of those who 
experience the tragic crossings, and of those who witness the event from 
the other side of the divide, placed in the archive of migration into 
Fortress Europe World, exposed to the news and the images of thousand 
migrants drowning on flimsy boats or washing up, dead or alive, along 
the shores of the sea…. Looking at her African or Syrian sisters crossing 
the Mediterranean, Rusciano composes an ‘empathic’ geography that 
embodies the kinaesthetic journey of the other, hopefully giving, at least 
in the imaginary geography of her-self, a sense of female agency and 
new hospitality.  
Evocated in fragmented memories, the two female corpo-graphies 
here briefly presented, bear witness and re-perform the recent history of 
the Mediterranean. The being-body-identity, located behind and beyond 
The Veil by Boukhari, re-enacts the survival ‘movement’ of Syrian 
refugees, who, escaping the deadly tangles of war, are seeking freedom; 
on the other hand, the asylum requested by the infinite fluxes of exiled 
people arriving in Lampedusa, is embodied by the corporeal Liquid Path 
created by Rusciano. Both the works offer the performative locus for the 
thinking of a more dignified – cultural and artistic – hospitality to those 
‘others’ who hopefully land on the Mediterranean shore.  
In times of traumatic emergency such as ours, these interpretative 
considerations, in truth, constitute my own personal and political 
responsibility – at least in the research practice realm – in assuming the 
not-yet-elaborated trauma experienced today by European and, 
specifically, Italian memory. It is high time that we Italians experienced 
a historical and political corpo-graphy hosting the lost memories and 
subjectivities from our colonial past, which still cross and configure the 
modernity of our present. This is to invoke the necessity to re-route the 
Mediterranean region towards a future-to-come, where and when new 
corporealities might be located, respected and finally saved ‘otherwise’. 
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MIGRATION AND MEMORY: DISPLACEMENT NARRATIVES 
OF SYRIAN WOMEN REFUGEES ON STAGE 
Monica Ruocco*   
 
“Hecuba is just like me. She was the wife of the King of Troy. Then 
she lost everything she owned. She lost loved ones and family. It’s like 
us, she was a queen in her home. Hecuba said: I used to run this place 
but now I am nothing. That’s us now”1. Fatima is the Syrian woman 
who has pronounced these words during the drama therapy workshop2 
Syria Trojan Women Project.3 In this paper I will examine two drama 
therapy workshops that has given contributors – mainly Syrian refugee 
women –, the chance to tell their stories more widely and help alleviate 
their trauma. The two theatrical experiences are: the above mentioned 
Syria Trojan Women Project that began by creating drama workshops in 
Jordan in autumn 2013 with a group of Syrian women, all of whom 
were refugees living in Amman; and Antigone of Syria, 4  a drama 
workshop with Syrian women living in the Sabra, Shatila, and Bourj el-
Barajneh refugee camps in Lebanon. Syrian stage director Omar 
Abusaada and his team supervised both performances.5  
                                                
* University of Naples “L’Orientale”. 
1  From Queens of Syria, a film by Y. Fedda, 
www.syriatrojanwomen.org/documentary---queens-of-syria.html (07/2015). 
2 The contemporary practice of drama therapy claims its roots in western forms of 
psychoanalysis (R. Landy, The Couch and the Stage: Integrating Words and Action in 
Psychotherapy, Lanham, MD, 2008; id., “Drama as a Means of Preventing Post-
Traumatic Stress Following Trauma Within a Community”, in Journal of Applied Arts 
and Health, n. 1, 2010, pp. 7-18), psychodrama (J. Levi Moreno, Psychodrama, New 
York, 1946), and educational drama (see P. Jones, Drama as Therapy. Theory, Practice 
and Research, London, 2007).  
3 www.syriatrojanwomen.org (07/2015). 
4 www.apertaproductions.org/current-project/ (07/2015). 
5 Omar Abusaada completed his theatrical studies at the High Institute of Dramatic 
Arts in Damascus. He started his career working as a playwright and later he devoted 
himself to stage direction. He is the co-founder of The Studio Theatre Company and for 
years worked in remote villages in Syria establishing interactive workshops. In 2004 he 
directed Insomnia, his first performance and went on to direct Afish and Forgiveness, an 
improvisation work with a group of boys in a juvenile prison. Then he worked in prisons 
and refugee camps in Egypt, Yemen, Iraq and Jordan, and took part to Arab and 
European festivals. In 2012 he directed Could You Please Look into the Camera?, 
written by Syrian playwright Mohammad al-Attar, www.apertaproductions.org/t he-
team/ (07/2015). 
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According to Douglas Robinson, displacement is a “social 
phenomenon that disrupts people’s lives and identities”.6 The central 
issue of this paper is to examine how displacement narratives of Syrian 
refugee women can be transformed into art practices in order to re-
arrange migrants lives and identities in the host countries. Secondly, this 
paper will draw attention to the growing importance of memory, real-
life testimonials and subjective experiences “in a particular style of 
Arab theatre that is becoming very common these days, with its heavy 
infusion of meta-commentary, autobiographical experiences, and 
scrutiny of the medium, society, and the self, and in which fact and 
fiction bleed together”.7 Through re-enactments of migration memories, 
these performances intended to give a response to the current events in 
Syria, through a kind of artistic experience that has been “an important 
space for documenting past wrongs and imagining the future”.8 
These theatrical practices can be explored through different 
approaches: 
- The challenges that Syrian refugees are currently facing; 
- The role of the artistic and theatrical experience as a resilient 
response to migration and displacement; 
- The power of “digging up” stories9 that become crucial to the 
processes that we are discussing, as well as the importance of 
(re)memory and (re)enact stories of migration; 
- How theatre has become an important means of articulating the 
problems of contemporary Arab world in a post-dramatic perspective. 
The Syria Trojan Women Project began by holding a 6-week drama 
therapy workshop in Amman in autumn 2013, with a group of fifty 
Syrian women, none of whom had never acted before, to perform their 
own adaptation of Euripides’ anti-war play. The Syria Trojan Women, 
produced by the Syrian filmmaker Itab Azzam and the American actor 
Hal Scardino and directed by Omar Abusaada, was premiered in 
                                                
6 D. Robinson. Displacement and the Somatics of Postcolonial Culture,, Columbus, 
2013, p. xx. 
7 Y. al-Saadi, “Experiencing the Tragedy of ‘Antigone’ Through the Eyes of Syrian 
Women”, in Al-Akhbar English, December 16, 2014, http://english.al-
akhbar.com/node/22917 (04/2015). 
8 E. Ziter, Political Performance in Syria from the Six-Day War to the Syrian 
Uprising, London, 2015, p. 193. 
9  J. Thompson, Digging up Stories: Applied Theatre, Performance and War, 
Manchester, 2006, p. 5. 
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December 2013, in Amman’s National Theatre. 10  The filmmaker 
Yasmin Fedda documented the process and the women’s experience in 
the documentary film Malikàt Suriyya (Queens of Syria), that has been 
premiered at the Abu Dhabi film festival in 2014 and has been awarded 
a SANAD grant for post production.11 
With the help of Charlotte Eagar and William Stirling, both 
filmmakers, and Georgina Paget, the team has also produced We Are All 
Refugees, an audiodrama series about Syrian refugees in Jordan, 
supported by the UNHCR, to be broadcast on SouriaLi radio and on the 
internet.12 This series highlights and explores issues facing refugees and 
the Jordanian host community. Written, directed and produced by a 
team of Jordanian and Syrian refugees the drama explores and explains 
issues arising from the Syrian refugee crisis on both sides of the line 
through dramatic story lines and well drawn characters. According to 
the producers “The theme We are all refugees reflects the fact that 75% 
of Jordanians have refugee origins from Palestine, Iraq and Syria”.13 
Itab Azzam and Hal Scardino, with the help of the Syrian playwright 
Mohammad al-Attar,14 the Syrian actress Hala Omran, and the direction 
                                                
10  The first performances met a great success and were widely covered in 
international media. The original play and Syrian refugee cast performed at CERN, in 
Geneva, Switzerland, in October 2014, courtesy of the Talberg Institute. Where a tour 
was not possible, the play virtually toured the US with two live-link events at 
Georgetown University, Washington DC, and at Columbia University, New York, in 
September 2014, www.syriatrojan women.org/about-us.html (07/2015). 
11 SANAD is the Development and Post-Production Abu Dhabi Film Festival Fund 
of “twofour54”, providing talented Arab filmmakers with meaningful support towards 
the development or completion of their narrative and documentary feature-length films. 
12  C. Eagar, “Life in a Jordanian Refugee Camp Inspires Soap Opera”, in 
Newsweek, 6/12/2014, www.newsweek.com/2014/12/12/life-jordanian-refugee-camp-
inspires-soap-opera-289079.html (11/2015). 
13 www.syriatrojanwomen.org/about-us.html (07/2015). 
14 Acclaimed Syrian playwright Mohammed al-Attar graduated with a degree in 
English Literature and Theatrical Studies from Damascus, then he received his Masters 
in Applied Drama from Goldsmiths, London. He lives in Beirut. His work explores 
social relations, personal conflicts and everyday life. He wrote Withdrawal, his first 
work after graduating in 2007. His most recent works include Online, Look at the 
street... this is what hope looks like, Could You Please Look into the Camera?, A 
Chance Encounter, Intimacy and focus on the political situation in his home country.  
They have been performed in Damascus, London, New York, Seoul, Berlin, Brussels, 
Edinburgh, Glasgow, Seoul, Tunis, Athens, Beirut, and elsewhere, 
www.apertaproductions.org/the-team/ (07/2015). 
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of Omar Abusaada, also produced Antigone of Syria. Just like Syria 
Trojan Women Project, Antigone’s idea was “to run an open workshop 
where Syrian women refugees [could] have a safe place to express their 
bodies and their minds”.15 The final result was a 21st century Syrian 
adaptation of Sophocles’ tragic tale. The work culminated in three 
performances presented at the al-Madina Theatre of Beirut in December 
2014.  
In both cases the women who participated in the project engaged 
“with one another in many ways, including by recounting their personal 
stories from Syria”, while the playwright’s and director’s rule was to 
work together “to blend some of these stories into the ancient Greek 
text”.16 
The staging of both the Syria Trojan Women and Antigone of Syria is 
very similar. On a very minimalist stage, the women are dressed in 
black and white abayas in Syria Trojan Women and black and red in 
Antigone of Syria. One at a time, each of them tells her own story, 
which are mainly “stories of the dispossessed”, recreating the 
experience of trauma, while audience is asked to consider their relation 
to that text and the subjects within.17  These personal recounts are 
combined with the original Greek texts in a form of monologue. At the 
centre of the stage the rest of the cast sits in a row of chairs, playing the 
role of the Greek chorus. Behind the women, a screen projects videos, 
texts, and images in the background.18  
These theatrical experiences represent one of the different forms of 
challenges that Syrian civil society is currently facing since the 
beginning of the uprising in 2011. As Edward Ziter affirms, early in the 
Syrian uprising, “performance played a significant role in galvanizing 
resistance”.19 The workshops held in Jordan and Lebanon represent a 
political, social and artistic response to the increasingly difficult 
circumstances in the country, and the constantly growing number of 
Syrian refugees in the neighbouring countries of the region. Lebanon 
has received, according to UNHCR, over 1.1 million registered Syrian 
                                                
15 www.apertaproductions.org/current-project/ (07/2015). 
16 Ibidem. 
17 K. M. Powell, Identity and Power in Narratives of Displacement, Routledge 
(Routledge Studies in Rhetoric and Communication), London, 2015, p. 9. 
18 Y. al-Saadi, Experiencing the Tragedy of ‘Antigone’, cit. 
19 E. Ziter, Political Performance in Syria, cit., p. 193. 
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refugees at the start of 2015.20 Jordan, where Syrian refugees number 
more than 600,000 in March 2015, has granted them access to services, 
such as health and education, in host communities.21 
The producers of the two workshops and the director Abusaada have 
defined the several objectives of the projects as follows: 
1. The primary aim was to produce a piece of theatre that could 
speak to the world on behalf of Syrian women, giving “these women the 
opportunity to speak their mind and express themselves in a way they 
never thought possible”.22  
2. Preservation of memory: the play will survive as a film and as a 
written text, preserving for posterity the memory of what is happening 
to women during the Syrian conflict. 
3. The process aims to empower women refugees intellectually and 
psychologically. 
4. The project will build community and support networks for those 
taking part. 
 
By socializing and working with the same group of women every 
day, the participants will gain a sense of community in the midst of 
dislocation. They are currently in a foreign place with little opportunity 
to integrate into society. The same is true for their children. This project 
will offer the women and children a sense of belonging. This is a 
community project in the broadest sense; yes, we are directly working 
with Syrian refugees from the camps, but by performing in the biggest 
and most popular theatre in Beirut we are inviting the Lebanese 
community to be a part of the experience. The idea here is that, by 
exposing locals and expatriates to the plight of these women, we are 
attempting to integrate worlds that have until now been divided.23 
 
                                                
20  In Lebanon there are 1,172,753 registered refugees, 
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=122 (07/2015). On the impact of the 
Syrian crisis on Lebanon see www.unhcr.org/pages/49e 486676.html (07/2015). 
21  In Jordan there are 629,128 Syrian registered refugees, 
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=107 (07/2015). The Syrian refugee 
camps of Azraq and Zaatari were built on land provided by the authorities where they 
also ensure security, www.unhcr.org/pages/49e48 6566.html (07/2015). 
22 www.apertaproductions.org/project-objectives/ (07/2015). 
23 Ibidem. 
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5. The projects intend to leave behind a legacy of artistic 
development in the women who participate in the performance. 
6. The producers aim for this project and the performances to draw 
attention to the reality of life for Syrian women refugees in mainstream 
international media.24 
These Syrian modern versions of two Greek tragedies represent, as 
Rebecca Schneider affirms, “a critical mode of remaining, as well as a 
mode of remaining critical”,25 and a resilient response to the violence of 
war through a process of archiving and re-enacting refugee women’s 
real stories and traumas. In both performances, through a process of 
self-narration or re-narration of the self, 26  each personal story is 
juxtaposed with lines from the original Greek story. The concept of 
story is crucial in these performances. More specifically, the power of 
‘digging up’ stories, to borrow an expression used by James Thompson 
in his study on the problems of theatre practice in communities affected 
by war and exclusion.27 The Trojan Women is set at the fall of Troy, and 
it is about the fate of the defeated and exiled. There are enormous 
parallels between the fate of refugees from Syria today – who still carry 
inside them the danger they have experienced –28 and that of the women 
of Troy. As one of the non-professional actresses of The Trojan Women 
states: “We left our home town. There was a lot of shelling. I wanted to 
find a better life for my children. The play talks about something real to 
us. It’s old, but history repeats itself”.29 
                                                
24 Ibidem. 
25  R. Schneider, Performing Remains: Art and War in Times of Theatrical 
Reenactment, London, 2011, p. 7. 
26 P. J. Eakin, “Breaking Rules: the Consequences of Self-Narration”, in Biography, 
XXIV, 1, 2001, pp. 113-127. 
27 J. Thompson, Digging up Stories, cit., p. 5. 
28  “The general problems are anxiety, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and 
depression. Despite the fact that they have moved away from danger, they still carry that 
danger inside them i.e. the fears that they had when they fled. And one of the main 
triggers of their fears is uncertainty about the future. This is all tied into the loss they 
have suffered in the process of experiencing revolution, war and displacement. With this 
they are dealing with the loss they have suffered- loss of relatives, friends and loved 
ones, loss of their homes, jobs, communities and all that goes into making a normal 
life”. See 12/12/13 Psychologist’s Story, www.syriatrojanwomen.org/blog.html 
(04/2015). 
29 www.syriatrojanwomen.org/documentary---queens-of-syria.html (07/2015). 
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However, this experience helped those women in becoming aware of 
their situation and of the Syrian refugee crisis and, on the other hand, 
helped refugees and their host communities to understand each other. 
Interpreting their own stories, each one of those women learnt about the 
life of the others, developing a strong female solidarity.30 Fatima, the 
woman who played the role of Hecuba in The Trojan Women adds: “My 
participation in this play has revitalized me, it gave me a sense of 
responsibility. … Since I started this project my life has been 
renewed”.31 Suad, a mother in her twenties, lived in Damascus, in 
Sayyda Zaynab district, an area being destroyed by the fighting. Her 
husband was a soldier in the Syrian army who decided to desert. Suad 
and her husband left Damascus for Deraa, and then came across the 
border into Jordan. They went first to the Zaatari Camp, the main Syrian 
refugee camp for Syrians in Jordan, then they settled in Amman. 
Concerning her participation in the project Suaad affirms:  
 
“When Hecuba turns to have a last look at Troy she makes a speech 
about never seeing her country ever again, and I cry when I read it, 
because when we were at the border about to cross into Jordan my 
husband told me to look back at Syria for one last time, because we 
might never see it again. That for me is the most heart wrenching part of 
the play”.32 
 
So, through repeating, revisiting, re-enacting the memory of their 
past, these women witness their situation and participate in 
understanding their present to build their future, putting into practice 
what Rebecca Schneider’s statement: “re-enactment is a battle 
concerning the future of the past”.33 
As for Antigone of Syria, one of the most powerful stories of the play 
is the one narrated by 28-year-old Mona, whose son died of cancer at 
the age of 5. On the stage she explains the audience how she risked her 
                                                
30 On the link between narration and feminist movements Rebecca Schneider 
affirms that “the important recuperation of ‘lost histories’ has gone on in the name of 
feminism”. See R. Schneider, Performing Remains, cit., p. 99. 
31 www.syriatrojanwomen.org/documentary---queens-of-syria.html (07/2015). 
32 See “Suad’s Story”, 12/08/2013, www.syriatrojanwomen.org/blog.html 
(11/2015). 
33 R. Schneider, Performing Remains, cit., p. 4. 
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own life to bury her son in an unmarked grave in war-racked Syria.34 
Like Antigone, many of the refugees have lost brothers: “During the 
play one of the actresses told of her brother's disappearance and how she 
desperately – though futilely – tried to find him at a government prison, 
a base for the rebel Free Syrian Army and even al-Qaeda’s Syria wing, 
the Nusra Front”.35 For the Syrian refugee women participating in the 
project, Antigone is a way to inform the world about their condition, as 
Rasha, 22 years old, states:  
 
“I want our voices to be heard. That people hear our stories and 
know that we were oppressed in our country and we are oppressed here. 
We live in sadness and how long the sadness will last I don’t know. 
We’re not happy. In Syria we were afraid of the bombings and 
shootings, we came here and we’re oppressed. We’re not comfortable in 
any way”.36 
 
The project represents for those refugee women a way to express the 
trauma of forced migration and displacement: “When we came here I 
didn’t like it, Wala affirms. We experience racism, people don’t like us 
but being involved in this project I feel like I have returned to Syria 
because we are all together sharing stories”.37  
It is interesting to observe how Greek tragedies have become a 
means of articulating the problems of contemporary Arab world in a 
new post-dramatic perspective.38 In the history of contemporary Arab 
culture, Greek tragedy has obviously retained a great deal of resonance 
to audiences, even in translation. 39  Taha Husayn translated all 
                                                
34  I. Stoughton, “Drama Therapy Workshop in Lebanon Helps Heal Wounds for 
Displaced Syrians”, in The National, March 23, 2015, http://www.thenational.ae/arts-
lifestyle/on-stage/drama-therapy-workshop-in-lebanon-helps-heal-wounds-for-
displaced-syrians (07/2015). 
35 O. Holmes, “Syrian Refugees Tell Their Stories of Loss Through Ancient Greek 
Play”, in Reuters, December 12, 2014, www.reuters.com/article/2 014/12/12/us-
mideast-crisis-syria-play-idUSKBN0JQ16I20141212 (04/2015). 
36 www.apertaproductions.org/meet-the-actresses (11/2015). 
37 Ibidem. 
38 P. A. Campbell, “Postdramatic Greek Tragedy”, in Journal of Dramatic Theory 
and Criticism, XXV, 1, 2010, p. 56. 
39 A. Etman, “Translation at the Intersection of Tradition: The Arab Reception of 
the Classics”, in L. Hardwick, C. Stray Malden (eds.), A Companion to Classical 
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Sophocles’ plays40 except one, after having studied Greek and Latin in 
Paris, as “classical subjects enjoyed some fame and favour in the late 
1890s and 1930s and 1940s”.41 Furthermore, we know many Arab plays 
based on the Oedipus legend, 42  which in Egypt has known four 
important versions between the 1950s and the 1970s,43  as well as 
different versions of Lysistrata. 44  Lebanese-Canadian playwright, 
director and actor Wajdi Mouawad presented in the late Nineties his 
version of King Oedipus and The Trojan Women and, more recently the 
trilogy Des Femmes (2011) which contains Antigone, The Women of 
Trachis, and Electra.45 We also have several versions of Antigone: in 
Egypt the Brecht’s Antigone has been represented in 1965, followed by 
the production of Anouilh’s version in 1978. In 2002 Frank Bradley set 
the play Antigone in Ramallah... Antigone in Beirut in modern Palestine, 
and in 2003 the play Once Upon a Time staged a fictional meeting 
between Scheherazade of the Arabian Nights and Antigone that 
investigated patriarchy.46 In Syria, the well-known star of film and 
                                                                                                        
Receptions, Oxford, 2008, pp. 141-152, cit. in M. Almohanna, “The Ichneutai in 
Modern Arabic World”, in New Voices in Classical Reception Studies, V, 2010, pp. 1-
14, www2.open.ac.uk/newvoices (11/2015). 
40 P. E. Pormann, “The Arab ‘Cultural Awakening (Nahda)’, 1870-1950, and the 
Classical Tradition”, in International Journal of the Classical Tradition, XIII, 1, 2006, 
p. 10. 
41 Ibidem, p. 12. 
42 A conference was held in Ghent, on December 2003, dealing with “Tragedy as a 
literary genre within Western and Arabic drama: Reading Oedipus as an example of 
cultural differential thinking”. See F. Decreus, M. Kolk, “Rereading Classics in ‘East’ 
and ‘West’: Post-colonial Perspectives on the Tragic”, in Documenta, XXII, 4, 2004, 
and, in particular, A. Etman, “The Greek Concept of Tragedy in the Arab Culture: How 
to Deal with an Islamic Oedipus”, pp. 281-299; and M. Carlson, “Egyptian Oedipuses: 
Comedies or Tragedies?”, pp. 368-375.  
43 M. Carlson, “The Arab Oedipus: Four Plays”, Martin E. Segal Theatre Center 
Publ., New York, 2006; S. M. Mahfouz, “The Arab Oedipus: Oriental Perspectives on 
the Myth”, in Modern Drama, vol. 55, n. 2, 2012, pp. 171-196. 
44  M. Kotzamani, “Lysistrata on the Arabic Stage”, in PAJ: A Journal of 
Performance and Art, XXVIII, 2, 2006, pp. 13-18. 
45 See A. Rodighiero, “La promessa del sangue: motivi edipici in Incendies di 
Wajdi Mouawad”, in F. Citti, A. Iannucci (eds.), Edipo classico e contemporaneo, 
Hildesheim/New York, 2012, pp. 359-384. 
46 H. Hassan, “The Influences of Ancient Greek Drama on Modern Egyptian 
Theatre”, in P. N. Šipová, A. Sarkissian (eds.), Staging of Classical Drama Around 
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television, Jihad Saad, staged Antigone’s Emigration in 2006.47  As 
Helene Foley suggests in her Female Acts in Greek Tragedy: “The 
gendering of ethical positions permits the public exploration of moral 
complexities that would not otherwise have been possible”.48 Arab 
playwrights and directors have shown a deep interest towards 
Sophocles’ Antigone probably because she offers an alternative mode of 
ethical reasoning to that adopted by Creon.  
In the case of the performances we are examining, the original Greek 
texts have been adapted, remade, remixed with the refugees’ testimonies 
in order to analyse the Syrian situation in its complexity and its effects 
on women. According to director Omar Abusaada, the Syria Trojan 
Women Project and Antigone of Syria represent two different stages of 
the conflict: 
 
“There are many differences between the two texts, and actually 
Antigone feels more relevant to the Syrian context in many 
ways. Firstly, the wars they talk about are different. In The Trojan 
Women, the war is coming from outside – the Greeks invaded Troy. But 
in Antigone, the war is coming from within, between two brothers. 
Secondly, The Trojan Women takes place after the war has happened, 
the women’s destiny and fate is decided and they have no agency, no 
decisions to take. Antigone is not like this. … Antigone is more 
complex. Creon has some right on his side too – he can be seen as trying 
to protect the city. This is more similar to the Syrian situation, 
especially now that it has started to be more complicated. It is hard to 
follow one course of action and be sure it is the right one.49  
 
                                                                                                        
2000, Newcastle, 2007, pp. 102-121; N. Selaiha, “Antigone in Egypt”, in E. B. Mee, H. 
P. Foley (eds.), Antigone on the Contemporary World Stage, Oxford, 2011, pp. 343-372. 
47 The play – which literally depicts a woman persecuted and forced into flight by 
war between two brothers – was performed in a city reeling from an influx of Iraqi 
refugees as the result of violence between Sunni and Shi’a Muslims. See E. Ziter, “No 
Grave in the Earth: Antigone’s Emigration and Arab Circulations”, in E. B. Mee, H. P. 
Foley (eds.), Antigone on the Contemporary World Stage, cit., pp. 289-306. 
48 H. P. Foley, Female Acts in Greek Tragedy, Princeton/Oxford, 2001, p. 172. 
49 T. Ross, Interview with Omar Abusaada, Antigone Director, 4 October 2014, 
www.apertaproductions.org/news/2014/11/5/interview-with-omar-abu-saada-antigone-
director (07/2015). 
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The main theme of Antigone is, according to Omar Abusaada, 
tamarrud – insurgency, rebellion, and disobedience – because Antigone 
defies Creon, who is a man. This, as Abusaada observes, “was one of 
the most important things in the Syrian revolution at the beginning 
…”.50  
As emphasized by John Dillon and S.E. Wilmer in their study on 
Rebel Women. Staging Ancient Greek Drama Today, “modern 
production [of Greek tragedies] have often exploited these dramas to 
serve female ends”51. The plays directed by Omar Abusaada break the 
silence also on the situation of the Syrian women during the conflict. 
Sexual violence and other forms of violence and crimes against women 
and girls, used by both pro-regime and opposition armed forces, have 
progressively intensified since the beginning of Syrian uprising and 
after the development of the crisis into an internal armed conflict.52 In 
this situation “Re-vision – the act of looking back, of seeing with fresh 
eyes, of entering an old text from a new critical direction – is for women 
more than a chapter in cultural history; it is an act of survival”.53 As 
well as Antigone or Hecuba, the Syrian refugee women can insert 
themselves “into history in order to rescript it, and in order to enact new 
histories”.54 In Abusaada’s plays, the non-professional actresses – like 
Greek heroines – “take their fate into their own hands and plot a reversal 
in their fortune or in the fortune of others”.55 
                                                
50 Ibidem. 
51 J. Dillon, S. E. Wilmer (eds.), Rebel Women. Staging Ancient Greek Drama 
Today, London/New York, 2005, p. xiv. 
52 In December 2012, the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), in 
collaboration with the Arab Women Organisation (AWO), sent an international fact-
finding mission to meet with Syrian women who had fled the crisis to seek refuge in 
Jordan. The mission focussed on the impact of the ongoing conflict on women and 
sought to document specific forms of violence targeting women. The FIDH delegation 
visited three refugee camps, al-Zaatari, King Abdullah Park and Cyber City and held 
meetings with 80 refugees living outside “official” camps in Amman, Rusaifa, Dhleil 
and Sama Sarhan (Zarqa Governorate). See Violence Against Women in Syria: Breaking 
the Silence. Briefing Paper on a Fidh Assessment Mission in Jordan in December 2012, 
April 2013, n. 606a, p. 6.  
53 R. Schneider, Performing Remains, cit., p. 6. 
54 S. Bemba, “Black Wedding Candles for Blessed Antigone”, in E. B. Mee, H. P. 
Foley (eds.), Antigone on the Contemporary World Stage, cit., p. 31. 
55 J. Dillon, S. E. Wilmer (eds.), Rebel Women, cit., p. xiv.  
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Therefore, the stories narrated on the stage during these 
performances express an alternative representation of the “History” 
outside of political propaganda. As Paul Ricoeur observed in his 
Memory, History, Forgetting, the personal narratives can produce a 
“sense of history” 56  (sense de l’histoire) or, moreover, these lived 
experiences can even “make history”57 (faire histoire). So, it seems – as 
Ricoeur suggests – that memory and history are now “condemned to a 
forced cohabitation”.58 This is particularly true if we consider that, not 
exclusively but particularly in the Arab world, “the primary reference of 
historical memory continues to be the nation”. 59  Nevertheless, the 
proliferation of memory in stories and interpretations be that in 
literature, theatre,60 film or other art forms, magazines, blogs,61 graffiti 
or intellectual debates, is a crucial phenomenon in the more or less 
recent history of Arab culture.62 
                                                
56 P. Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, Chicago, 2004, p. 398. 
57 Ibidem, p. 259. 
58 Concerning the relationship between ‘history’ and ‘memory’, Ricoeur formulates 
the question “Has history finally melted into memory? And has memory broadened 
itself to the scale of historical memory?”, see P. Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, 
cit., pp. 397. 
59 Ibidem, p. 396. 
60 Focusing on the theatrical production from the middle of the 20th century 
onwards, many historical events, such as the anti colonialist struggles in the Maghreb, 
the Nakba and the following Palestine-Israel conflicts, the Lebanese Civil war, the Iraq 
crisis etc. have inspired a rich amount of texts and performances based on memory 
accounts. Among them Haflat Samar min al 5 haziran by Saadallah Wannus; the 
workshops by Arna Meir and Juliano Mer Khamis in Palestine; Majdalun and Fatima by 
Roger Assaf; and Rabih Mroue’s performances about the Lebanese civil war. See J. 
Alam, “Real Archive, Contested Memory, Fake History: Transnational Representations 
of Trauma by Lebanese War Generation Artists”, in D. Dean, Y. Meerzon, K. Prince 
(eds.), History, Memory, Performance, London, 2014, pp. 169-186. 
61 The potential of blog as alternative narrative has been examined in C. N. Fadda-
Conrey, “Writing Memories of the Present: Alternatives Narratives about the 2006 
Israeli War on Lebanon”, in College Literature, XXXVII, 1, 2010, pp. 159-173. See also 
the unusually chronicles of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution written by Y. Rakha in his 
blog and published in the volume Revolution for Real, London, 2013. 
62 In Syria some activists established a website called Creative Memory Project. 
This project “aims to archive all the intellectual and artistic expressions in the age of 
revolution; it is writing, recording, and collecting stories of the Syrian people, and those 
experiences through which they have regained meaning of their social, political and 
cultural lives. … The promoters of this project believe that it participates in the 
documentation of contemporary history, so it is crucial that the revolution and its 
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Concerning nowadays Syria, the cultural urge to document the 
situation in the country since 2011 has produced many performances 
based on true stories.63  Syrian playwright Mohammad al-Attar and 
Omar Abusaada, besides The Trojan Women and Antigone in Syria, 
have produced two interesting plays in 2012: Look at the street…this is 
what hope looks like, and Could You Please Look into the Camera?64 
The former was based on a collage of Facebook entries of Syrian 
revolutionary activists and excerpts of articles from the Egyptian 
novelist and journalist Ahdaf Soueif, who reported on the events on 
Cairo’s Tahrir Square for the Guardian. The second production Could 
You Please Look into the Camera? was based on “interviews with 
arbitrarily detained and sometimes tortured victims of the Syrian 
security forces”.65 Al-Attar dramatized them in the fictional story of a 
                                                                                                        
realities are explicitly described, for both contemporaries and makers of the revolution, 
for the coming generations, for the whole world. It is an archive of national legacies; to 
protect it is to preserve the Syrian memory, a duty because of its total consideration of 
historical accounts of all Syrian people”, www.creativememory.org/?lang=en (07/2015). 
A similar project has been conceived by Malu Halasa, Zaher Omareen and Nawara 
Mahfoudh, who edited the volume Syria Speaks, a celebration of the work of over fifty 
artists and writers who, through their literature, poems, songs, cartoons, document the 
political situation in Syria. See M. Halasa, Z. Omareen, N. Mahfoudh (eds.), Syria 
Speaks, London, 2014.  
63 Lebanese playwrights and directors also drew their attention to the Syrian 
conflict. In The Pixelated Revolution, Rabih Mroué investigates about videos of civil 
victims of the current conflict in Syria. See M. Ruocco, “al-Ṯawrah al-mubaksalah / 
The Pixelated Revolution: punto di arrivo del postdramatic theatre di Rabih Mroué”, in 
La rivista di Arablit, II, 4, 2012, pp. 5-18, www.arablit.it/rivista_arablit/ 
numero4_2012/1_ruocco.pdf (01/2016). Lucien Bourjeily’s 66 Minutes in Damascus 
(2012), is conceived as an ‘interactive theatre’ performance where the audience is 
plunged into a recreation of what it might be like to be detained in Syria,  
www.theguardian.com/stage/theatreblog/2012/jul/12/theatre1 (07/2015). Zeina 
Daccache, founder of the NGO Catharsis and the pioneer of drama therapy in Lebanon 
organized, since April 2014, weekly workshops for a mixed group of Syrian and 
Lebanese women. I. Stoughton, Drama Therapy Workshop in Lebanon Helps Heal 
Wounds for Displaced Syrians, cit. 
64 E. Ziter, M. Al Attar, L. Wedeen, “Could You Please Look into the Camera?”, in 
TDR The Drama Review, 58, 3, 2014, pp. 124-155. 
65 “I was interested in writing a piece about the current detention that is happening 
in Syria” – says al-Attar – “I was haunted by this idea mainly because I have many 
friends who were detained during the uprising”. See J. Nathan, “A Flood of Plays by 
Middle-Eastern Writers are Revealing the Dark Side of the Arab Spring”, The 
Independent, April 14, 2015, www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/theatre-
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female Syrian documentary maker who is trying to make a film on the 
basis of corresponding victims’ stories.66  
Syrian stage director Waël Ali, who fled from Syria and now lives 
and works in exile in France and Germany, presented his theatrical 
performance entitled You Know I Do Not Remember at the Maxim 
Gorki Theater in 2015. 67  The theatrical performance is based on 
revisiting the story of the musician Hassan Abd al-Rahman, a Syrian 
political prisoner imprisoned for eight years during the 80s in the 
notorious Sidnaya prison in Damascus. Through the lens of personal 
recollection and interpretation, the play questions the issue of personal 
memory and its relation with collective memory at a critical stage in 
Syrian history. This personal narrative takes place in nowadays time, 
when the country is shocked by the violent political upheavals. Thus the 
narrator, the witness, tries to reconstruct his memories and his life story 
in a ceaselessly destroyed and dismantled geographical, political, social 
context.  
To sum up, since 2011 in Middle East we assist to the proliferation 
of a huge number of plays that re-enact different forms of ‘exception’ 
violence.68 In Syria people have been living a constant state of crisis and 
emergency long before the 2011 uprising. However, since 2011 
displacement and forced migrations are a result of enduring endemic 
violence and human rights violations. Also thanks to those theatrical 
                                                                                                        
dance/features/a-flood-of-plays-by-middleeastern-writers-are-revealing-the-dark-side-
of-the-arab-spring-7711834.html (07/2015). 
66 The play had its premiere in April 2012 in Seoul, South Korea.  
67 Together with actor Ayham Majid Agha, the protagonist recounts not only the 
brutality and violence that defined his life, but also the attempted resistance in prison. 
Excerpts from the video interviews that director Wael Ali conducted with Hassan ‘Abd 
al-Rahman in 2013 are shown, questioned and re-evaluated. The play has been produced 
in cooperation with YAF Young Arabe Theatre Fund, British Council, Freemuse, 
Citiziens Artists Association und Culture Resource, 
http://english.gorki.de/programme/you-know-i-do-not-remember/ (07/2015). 
68 See G. Potter, “Foreign Texts and Domestic Politics: Making Torture Public in 
Contemporary Egyptian Drama,” in R. Shimko, S. Freeman (eds.), Public Theatres and 
Theatre Publics, Cambridge, 2012, p. 136; A. Serlenga, Testimonianza ed evasione: 
stato d’eccezione e creazione performativa. Il teatro contemporaneo tunisino all’epoca 
della “transizione democratica”, Ph.D. Thesis, Studi Culturali Europei (XXIV ciclo), 
Università degli Studi di Palermo, 2013. The concept of “permanent states of exception” 
as a normal mode of operation even for democratic nation State has been borrowed by 
Giorgio Agamben. See G. Agamben, State of Exception, Chicago, 2008. 
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experiences I tried to describe in this paper, the stories of refugee about 
their forced migration and displacement, violence, torture, and violation 
of human rights echoed outside the country. Now these stories ‘belong 
to the stage’69 beginning a process – as Edward Ziter affirms – of  
‘imagining a different Syria’.70 
                                                
69 R. Schneider, Performing Remains, cit., p. 43. 
70 E. Ziter, Political Performance in Syria, cit., p. 236. 
  
 
GUESS WHO’S COMING TO DINNER. 
REPRESENTATIONS OF AFRICA AND IMMIGRATION POLICIES 
IN POST-COLONIAL ITALY 
Silvana Palma∗ 
 
Bonjour, je m’appelle Adou. 
According to press reports, these are the words little Adou uttered to 
stunned border guards on May 7, as he crawled out of the wheeled 
suitcase where he was hiding, after a baggage check had revealed his 
unexpected presence. The security x-ray image taken at the border 
checkpoint in Ceuta – a Spanish enclave in Morocco – made the front 
page of major news outlets all over the world. It showed eight-year-old 
Ivorian Adou Ouattara curled up in a fetal position, his legs tight against 
his chest in a makeshift plastic womb, waiting to be re-born in Europe. 
The reddish silhouette of that little person, almost reminiscent of an 
alien, wrapped in an unlikely cocoon, was shown across all media. No 
other image could better convey the struggle of our contemporary age: 
the hope of millions for a new life and a viable future, almost a rebirth.  
The picture is all the more effective because rather than calling to 
mind the recurring tropes of ‘migrant onslaught and invasion’ the media 
have flooded us with over the last few years, it portrays instead a lonely 
and silent attempt at defying  ate on tiptoe from within an ingenious and 
desperate shell.  
Other children – and men and women of all ages – have tried before 
him: entrusting their lives and their fortunes to the bottom of a lorry, 
perching perilously on its axle a few inches from the ground; or 
crammed into trucks, in the hold of a cargo ship, under dashboards, in 
the rotten unseaworthy boats that almost daily brave the sea. They 
walked across the deserts, climbed mountains and risked the dangerous 
sea crossings, their journeys often lasting years and taking an enormous 
toll on their lives, their health and their savings. They landed in a 
Europe that, lacking both firm roots and historical memory, responds by 
surrounding itself with walls and Frisian horses and resorts to barbed 
wire, baton-wielding police and tear gas or, as is the case with Britain, 
even calls to ‘send in the Gurkhas’. 
The same Europe that celebrated itself, the idea of a common area 
and a world of shared peace at the fall of the Berlin Wall, now 
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frantically excels at the construction of barriers, protection systems and 
shields around its small spaces of privilege and comfort. 
For reasons of geographical proximity, most immigrants to Italy 
come from Africa, driven by political, economic, social or religious 
turbulence, war and totalitarian regimes.   
Notwithstanding the extraordinary rescue efforts carried out over the 
years by both the Coast Guard and Sicilian fishermen, and especially by 
the residents of Lampedusa, our country is divided between the (rare) 
welcoming embrace to migrants and those who urge the use of 
gunboats. Yet, in the midst of such alarming prospects, migrants have 
become the source of a profitable business for many: from the 
diversified chain of ‘brokers’ who organize departures and arrivals in an 
economic and human exploitation of migrants, to managers of 
‘Reception’ centres who profit from, and sometimes misappropriate, 
allocated funds. And for politicians as well, who fuel the public’s ‘fear 
of invasion’ as they jostle for votes, some conjuring up an 
‘Africanization’1 of Italy (thus inadvertently evoking fears of hybridity, 
miscegenation and attacks on racial purity that are reminiscent of fascist 
rhetoric) or even the ‘genocide’ of Italians2 (thereby revealing their 
lexical inadequacy and ignorance of history). Finally, migrants 
contribute to the economic growth of the country, and this is especially 
true for those towns that were most affected by recession and now host 
Reception Centres in their territories.3  
     For years, the media have been describing the migrants’ arrival 
with an increasingly worrisome and anxiety-inducing vocabulary to 
convey the feeling of being under siege, often resorting to animal-
related images and metaphors: ‘overflow’ and ‘flood’ are commonly 
used collocations, so are ‘human tsunami’, ‘swarms’, and ‘herds’. In the 
past few years the word ‘emergency’ has been used almost daily, and 
even the category ‘race’ has been resurrected. It is no wonder, then, that 
online blogs or newspaper reader comments offer suggestions such as 
the enforcement of birth control in Africa4 or invitations – such as this 
one from an Angela Nastasi-University of Milan – to “sink all the 
                                                
1 www.secoloditalia.it/2015/06/zaia-libero/ (08/15). 
2 www.ilgiornale.it/news/politica/salvini-attacca-ancora-genocidio-italiani-i-
vescovi-non-romp-1160721.html (08/15). 
3 www.internazionale.it/notizie/2015/07/14/migranti-accoglienza-economia (07/15). 
4 www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2015/05/19/spagna-il-bimbo-ivoriano-nascosto-nel-
trolley-ritrova-la-mamma-a-ceuta/1697475/ (07/15) 
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suitcases”.5 More radical solutions are also being proposed, such as 
forced sterilization of Africans, and, at least as regards immigrants, they 
have some success with European right-wing parties and even obtain 
official endorsement. Last May, Olli Sademies – a City of Helsinki, 
Finland, deputy councillor and member of the True Finns Party - wrote 
on his Facebook page that African immigrants should be sterilized 
because “they have too many children”.6 
Less threatening but equally eloquent approaches promoting racial 
safeguard and cultural identity have been emerging in countries like 
France, where racism was institutionalized with the creation of a 
Ministry for Immigration and National Identity (2007) and the presence 
of immigrants is explicitly associated with a challenge to national 
identity. In the picture that emerges, Italy and Europe appear barricaded 
and unwelcoming in their closed-minded fears. 
 
The image of Africa 
‘Africanity’ is some sort of label imposed upon migrants when they 
arrive to Europe with which they learn to associate themselves. In their 
homeland, states Njubi Nesbitt, the majority of the population, mostly 
peasants who live in rural areas, normally think of themselves in ethnic 
terms, and only those with a higher level of education and living in 
urban areas may see themselves as members of a nation. In practice, it is 
in the West that an Acholi from Uganda or a Masai from Kenya loses 
his original identity to become, more generally but irrevocably, an 
‘African’.7 
In a recent interview, Ugandan writer Moses Isegawa gave a very 
effective rendition of this feeling:   
                                                
5 www.huffingtonpost.it/2015/05/08/abou-nascosto-valigia-ceuta_n_724 0002.html 
(08/15). 
6 it.sputniknews.com/mondo/20150528/456106.html#ixzz3hMaYfM5D (08/15). 
Yet, this procedure is not unheard of in the West. Between 1984 and 1991, three 
sensational and highly publicized mass rescue operations, akin to a ‘return to the 
Promised Land’, transferred Bēta-Esrā’ēl (Ethiopian Jews, better known as Falashas) to 
Israel. Ethiopian female immigrants were sterilized against their will or through 
deception. Israeli newspaper Haaretz first reported the news: cf. 
www.haaretz.com/opinion/an-inconveivable-crime.premium -1.484110 (08/15). The 
first experiments in mass sterilization were carried out in Georgia between 1967 and 
1978. Even then the procedure was tested on black women. 
7 F. N. Nesbitt, “African Intellectuals in the Belly of the Beast: Migration, Identity, 
and the Politics of Exile”, in African Issues,1, 2002, pp.70-75. 
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“When you first leave Uganda for Europe you think, “At last, I’m 
free to do what I want” But when you arrive there, you become an 
African for the first time, in a sense. 
Because you are responsible for Somalia! They call you up and say, 
“What do you think about Somalia?” And you can’t say, “I’m Ugandan, 
I have nothing to say about Somalia”. 
You have this big, huge chunk of experience to defend-and you will 
defend it, because nobody else is defending it.  
You become some sort of an ambassador and for the first time you 
become conscious of what Africa means”.8  
 
On the contrary, when referring to other diasporas from Europe or 
Asia we normally talk about Italian, German, Irish, Chinese or Indian 
immigration. Moreover, the entire African continent, despite its vast 
complexity and environmental, political, social and cultural diversity, is 
usually presented by the media, and conceived by the public opinion, 
like an undifferentiated and indistinct whole. Notwithstanding its 
numerous ‘tribes’,9 their representation of Africa features a 
homogeneous social, political and economic background, essentially 
made of backwardness-conflict-corruption-primitiveness. In the eyes of 
the West, Africa is above all a continent out of time (the extraordinary 
beauty of its scenery certainly plays a role), whose rare contacts with 
modernity are the result of interactions with the ‘benevolent’ west, and a 
land marked by an archaic religiosity, linked to immutable traditions 
and whose cultural and intellectual potential doesn’t go much beyond 
singing, music and dance.10 
It’s an image that comes from far away, the result of the 
crystallization of stereotypes and prejudices that governed the discourse 
on Africa especially during the colonial period – with its ‘rewriting’ of 
                                                
8 M. Colin Vasquez, “Hearts in Exile: A Conversation with Moses Isagewa and 
Mahmood Mamdani”, in Transition. An International Review, n. 2, pp. 126-150.  
9 The same word tribù (tribe) – or its derivatives tribalismo (tribalism) and tribale 
(tribal) – are used in the media to indicate in a pejorative sense those who are different 
from Westerners, basically ‘primitive’ backward people. Postcolonial African 
governments often denounce and dismiss the constant use of such disparaging terms. 
10 According to Mbembe, in France this stereotype is reinforced by the way black 
men are projected on screen, as they are usually relegated to music and sports shows (as 
for movies, black men usually appear in American movies, not in the French ones). 
Things are a little better in the sports field, where blacks are seen as an updated version 
of the tirailleurs, whose bodies and physical prowess are devoted to the country. 
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the world and hierarchy of cultures – and that nowadays still governs, 
almost unchanged, the way we perceive Africa’s otherness. Today, as 
yesterday, the image of Blackness is a hotchpotch of the same 
stereotypes that in colonial times justified subjugation by Whites in the 
name of a supposed civilizing mission. Laziness, poverty – as if this, 
and nakedness in the colonial era, were a ‘genetic’ given – infantilism, 
polygamy, sexual licentiousness, lack of initiative and entrepreneurship 
are just a few examples. Savagery and barbarism are, however, the 
dominating stigma deployed for years by the media, which associate 
migrants from Africa to news-stories of prostitution and rape, 
infibulation, AIDS, witchcraft, murder rituals and drug dealing. When it 
comes to Africa, the narrative feeds on itself. 
No longer populated by ‘headless beings’, Lotus Eaters, ‘cephi’ with 
‘backward legs and front hands’ and incestuous women who only give 
birth to quintuplets,11 Africa – however – keeps generating an updated 
version of its unusuality and being the land of oddities, mysteries and 
monstra. Paradoxically, the full knowledge of what was once referred to 
as  terra incognita, the subject of the most imaginative fabrications, has 
not done much to change the way Africa is narrated and experienced: 
it’s still the land of oddities, wonders and  mysteries. The African 
continent is still a prisoner of darkness.  
In the press, too often the adjective ‘black’, today as in centuries 
past, continues to indicate, more than the sub-Saharan part of the 
continent, its impenetrability, its primitiveness and the surrounding 
darkness, making Fanon’s reflection more relevant than ever, even after 
fifty years: “we wear our exclusion on our skin”.12  
In the 90’s, anthropologist Paola Tabet collected more than seven 
thousand primary school essays for a research on racist thinking, which 
was markedly on the rise with the increase in immigration from Africa. 
The essays revealed how deeply rooted and widespread the negative 
image of Blacks is in Italian collective representations. “What if your 
parents were black?” was the title of the assignment. “I would teach 
them about life among human beings”, wrote a fifth-grade student from 
Arezzo.13 
                                                
11 G. Benzoni, “L’Africa affabulata”, in G. Benzoni et al. (eds), Africa. Storie di 
viaggiatori italiani, Milano, 1986, p. 95. 
12 F. Fanon, Black skin, white masks, New York, 1952. 
13 P. Tabet, La pelle giusta, Torino, 1997. 
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Between exoticism, repulsion and inferiorization, today, as in the 
past, the prevailing belief seems to be that the white man, and his 
civilizing mission at best, always take centre stage, even in young 
children’s mental images. Exclusion, refusal of any possible exchange 
and hybridization between different worlds, and unsurmountable 
boundaries are the hallmarks of what Ugandan writer Sinan B. Wasswa, 
aptly defined the “white circus of the Knights of the Round Table”: 
 
“[...] I see it as some sort of circus where the rule of the strongest 
prevails, as thin as an elastic band on top of which  you have to walk in 
line with the circus’ needs. The white circus of Knights of the Round 
Table, the lineage from which came a noble people, of transparent heart 
and spirit pure as snow. You get to join only when you become a full-
fledged member of the clan in every little detail. No one has ever yet 
gotten a foot in from the outside. What we’re living today is coming  
from there”.14 
 
The Extracircolari (outside the club/circus), as Wasswa defines 
Africans – in Italy they are commonly referred to as extracomunitari 
(outside the European Union) – feel a sense of exclusion while their 
representation always implies marginality and negativity. Africa’s social 
transformations, scientific advances and literature remain unknown (the 
works of African scholars and writers are rarely translated into Italian, 
unless they win a Nobel Prize). As for the media, Africa is newsworthy 
only when disaster strikes, wars of vast dimensions break out or 
particularly gruesome or bizarre events happen. A few examples: fifteen 
women burned to death in Kenya on charges of witchcraft (La 
Stampa);15 the King of Swaziland chooses his wives among hundreds of 
parading virgins (il Giornale);16 human flesh served in a Nigerian 
restaurant (Il Messaggero).17 All without checking and referencing 
                                                
14 S. B. Wasswa, “La mia tradizione in valigia”, in A. Ramberti, R. Sangiorgi (eds), 
Memorie in valigia, Santarcangelo di Romagna, 1996, p. 179. 
15 http://www1.lastampa.it/redazione/cmsSezioni/esteri/200805articoli/33007gi 
rata.asp (08/15). 
16 www.ilgiornale.it/news/mswati-re-dalle-dieci-mogli-che-fa-sfilare-verg ini-
piazza.html (08/15). 
17 www.ilmessaggero.it/primopiano/esteri/nigeria_ristorante_carne_uman a_arresti/ 
notizie/524573.shtml (08/15). See also: S. Ragusa, “La rappresentazione delle realtà da 
cui provengono i migranti – dalla versione integrata della Linee Guida Carta di Roma”, 
www.cartadiroma.org/news/la-rappresentazione-delle-realta-da-cui-provengono-i-
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sources or any attempt at analysis and contextualization, eventually 
reinforcing in the reader’s mind the idea that African immigrants occupy 
a lower rung of the human ladder. In his provoking article-manifesto, 
Kenyan writer and journalist Binyavanga Wainaina offers advice on 
How to Write about Africa, 
 
“Always use the word ‘Africa’ or ‘Darkness’ or ‘Safari’ in your title. 
Subtitles may include the words ‘Zanzibar’, ‘Masai’, ‘Zulu’, ‘Zambezi’, 
‘Congo’, ‘Nile’, ‘Big’, ‘Sky’, ‘Shadow’, ‘Drum’, ‘Sun’ or ‘Bygone’. 
Also useful are words such as ‘Guerrillas’, ‘Timeless’, ‘Primordial’ and 
‘Tribal’.  
Never have a picture of a well-adjusted African on the cover of your 
book, or in it, unless that African has won the Nobel Prize. Prominent 
ribs, naked breasts: use these. If you must include an African, make sure 
you get one in Masai or Zulu or Dogon dress [...]”18  
 
effectively dissecting, confronting and summing up the outdated 
Western clichés and representations of Africa. 
The creative, enchanted storytelling of the Middle Ages, when all 
that was known about Africa was its geographic shape, has been 
replaced by shoddy and often grotesque caricatures – loaded with 
contempt and arrogance but still rife with ignorance of places, 
institutions and history.  
By virtue of their inescapable membership of the mythological 
African or Black ‘race’ born from colonialist imagination, the Acholi, 
the Mende or the Igbo who arrive in our country take on a collective 
identity that speaks of barbarity, poverty, war, disease, corruption and 
hunger. 
Among the many untruths about Africa, spread by the media to feed 
the public opinion, are its supposed propensity for conflict (in actual 
fact, Asia has the highest rate); the role of ‘tribalism’ as the root of all 
conflicts (thereby nullifying their significance and all political, 
economic, social and ideological explanations); and informal economy 
as the only viable economic development model in a continent that is 
                                                                                                        
migranti-dalla-versio ne-integrata-della-linee-guida-carta-di-roma/ (09/15); R. van Dijk, 
‘‘‘Voodoo’ on the doorstep: young Nigerian prostitutes and magic policing in the 
Netherlands”, in Africa, 71(4), 2001, pp. 373-90. 
18 B. Wainaina, “Come scrivere d’Africa”, in Internazionale, 24/02/2006.   
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characterized by archaic farming methods, where modernity needs to be 
imposed or taught.  
Again, according to the media, Africa is an overpopulated continent 
or at least the most populous one. In fact, its population is slightly 
higher than Europe’s19 (and on balance there are more whites in Africa 
than Africans in Europe). Last but not least, there is the alleged invasion 
of Italy and Europe by African migrants, while all data so far show that 
most African migrations (93%) are directed towards other Third World 
countries, Asia, and the Gulf countries.20 Alongside this idea, we find 
the supposed burden that immigrants place on European State budgets, 
and Italy’s in particular – which concerns us more closely. On balance, 
Italy earns instead a substantial profit thanks to immigrants. Not only 
does it withhold some of the funds allocated for them (on top of EU 
funding), but it also enjoys legal immigrants’ significant contribution to 
the nation’s GDP (nearly 9%).21  
One of the most common clichés is that African migrants - regardless 
of the reasons for their expatriation or escape – come from their 
country’s poorest ranks22 and are the least educated among all migrants 
arriving in Europe. This belief is unfounded. Official data for Ghana, for 
instance, reveal that 70% of doctors, 45% of pharmacists and 20% of 
nurses trained between 1995 and 2002 reportedly left the country for the 
United Kingdom or the United States in particular.23 
The African diaspora (generally speaking, at least three need to be 
considered: the trans-Mediterranean, the transatlantic and the one 
towards the Indian Ocean, in addition to internal migration across the 
continent) is a complex phenomenon. So complex indeed that the study 
of its historical, geographical and  intellectual itineraries (as well as 
                                                
19 African population is projected to reach 17% of world population in 2025, the 
same percentage it had at the beginning of the 17th century, before  the slave trade and 
the ensuing demographic stagnation. Cf. G. Courade (ed), L’Afrique des idées reçues, 
Paris, Berlin, 2006.  
20 For further analysis of these themes see G. Courade (ed), L’Afrique des idées 
reçues, cit.  
21 Fondazione Leone Moressa, Il valore dell’immigrazione, Milano, 2015, whose 
intent is to debunk some of the stereotypes related to the economic burden of 
immigrants and show they are actually a resource for our country. 
22 C. Follana, “Ce sont les Africains les plus pauvres qui migrent vers l’Europe”, in 
G. Courade (ed.), L’Afrique des idées reçues, cit., pp.84-89. 
23 The State of the Ghanaian Economy, University of Ghana, Institute of Statistical, 
Social and Economic Research (ISSER), Accra, 2003. 
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political-economic, given that diaspora remittances are reportedly 
estimated  between 50 and 150 billion USD), led to the creation of  
study centres and programs, magazines and special book series (that our 
country seems to ignore). 
Poor, violent, illiterate and primitive: African migrants arriving in 
our country are preceded and marked by this stigma. Among the many 
barriers against the alleged invasion, ignorance and the prejudices we 
inherited from our colonial past are the most powerful, and our 
hospitality standards follow accordingly. 
African immigrants are welfare-charitable recipients at best, and at 
worst they become targets for ferocious racist attacks, not only verbal. 
They are exemplary figures who embody the defining features of the 
stranger, the unwelcome, and the enemy. For years the media have been 
reinforcing this image, portraying them as a threat (to our way of life, 
well-being and  access to employment), selecting and emphasizing news 
of  criminal acts or repeatedly using a series of images, words and 
expressions that turn immigrant landings into dangerous invasions.  
An analysis of the discourse on migration conveyed over the years 
by Corriere della Sera, not a tabloid but an establishment newspaper, 
reveals its dramatic contribution to the reinforcement of  decidedly 
racist feelings of alarm and rejections among Italians  in the period 
1992-2009, not only because of its articles style but for their particular 
lexicon. The repetitive use of words like ‘die’, ‘massacre’, ‘missing’, 
‘wreck’, ‘sink’, ‘tragedy’, ‘drowning’, ‘victim’, ‘horror’, as well as 
descriptions of human trafficking (e.g., ‘traffickers’, ‘smugglers’) with 
respect to immigrant landings, without any insight into the reason for 
the exile, the pitfalls and dangers of the journey, or  the reality of their 
countries of origin, ended up reinforcing the belief of a threat from 
illegal immigration and generating hostile  feelings. The parallel use of a 
judiciary lexicon (e.g., ‘blitz’, ‘arrest’, ‘denounce’, ‘trials’, ‘judge’ or 
‘expelled’, ‘expulsion’, ‘hunting’, ‘controls’) connoted the issue as a 
problem of public order and security, justifying repressive actions 
without regard to their arbitrariness.24 
Government decisions were consistent with this framework: stepped- 
up security measures and surveillance systems, simplified detention and 
                                                
24 L. Montali et al., “The representation of migrants in the Italian press. A study on 
the Corriere della Sera (1992–2009)”, in Journal of Language and Politics 12, 2, 2013, 
pp. 226-249. 
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custody procedures, special detention camps, and the reactivation of old 
practices of racial separation. 
The distorted representation of Africa – made of caricatures and 
partial or simply grotesque but decidedly racist images –  conveyed by 
the media and now part of the collective imagination, while masking the 
complex realities of the continent from which migrants originate, also 
unmasks fears, fantasies and ignorance of our country and of Europe in 
general.  
The existence of conflicts, failures and deep social, political and 
economic crisis in Africa cannot be denied. But it is this blending of 
myth and reality where everything becomes a commonplace, and mostly 
the lack of depth and the absence – the exclusion – of African voices, 
that actually prevents us from focusing on reality, and this is not without 
consequences on the political or economic choices and on  international 
cooperation.  
 
The case of Eritrea 
Over the last three years, Eritreans reportedly formed the largest 
group of refugees to Italy: in 2014, they accounted for 27% of total 
arrivals.25 
Yet, it is curious to note that Eritrea appears to have met UN’s 
health-related Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), introduced in 
2000, and to be on track to achieve others such as Food Security, 
Gender Equality and Empowering Women, and Universal Primary 
Education. 
Hence, the UN considers countries such as Eritrea a development 
model. Nevertheless, every year thousands of people flee the country. 
UNHCR data reveal that 350,000 Eritreans altogether have obtained 
refugee status in various parts of the world. However, this figure, while 
certainly remarkable for a country with a population of just over five 
million, does not disclose how many young Eritreans actually left, 
especially in light of the number of those who have followed other paths 
– not always related to a request for refugee status – or, above all, did 
not survive a journey fraught with endless pitfalls.26 
                                                
25 www.UNHCR.CR/ARRIVALS/italy (08/15). However, ours is not among the 
destination countries in their migration project: data confirm that countries in Central 
and Northern Europe, e.g., Germany and Sweden, receive a higher number of asylum 
applications (UNHCR global trend). 
26 UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2013: www.unhcr.org/54cf9bd69.html (07/15).  
	  	  
	  
233 
 Just a little over twenty years ago, the picture was very different: 
thousands of Eritreans were returning home to support the 
reconstruction of the country, finally independent after the thirty-year-
long war of liberation against Ethiopia (1961-1991). But the conclusion 
of that conflict did not return a lasting peace to the country, whose 
troubled history has enjoyed only brief periods of respite in the 
postcolonial period. The disastrous outcome of the 1998-2000 border 
war against Ethiopia erased hopes for a future of peace, stability and 
development. At the same time, the illiberal and repressive regime’s 
increasing rigidity turned the dream of independence into a  progressive 
restriction on freedoms of press, expression, association and religion, 
along with a  strengthening of what many call a permanent, albeit 
unofficial, state of emergency.  
According to A. Poole, a ‘culture of fear’ reigns in Eritrea, where 
rumours can sometimes constitute the sole basis for an arrest.27 
The country’s extraordinary militarization, denounced by scholars, 
international organizations and exiles, is the most obvious feature of the 
security policy established by the regime and of the illiberal decline 
experienced by the country. Its defence system requires all citizens 
between the age of 18 (recently lowered to 16) and 50 (40 for women) 
to serve in the Eritrean Defence Force and the National Service – War 
of Independence veterans and the physically and mentally disabled are 
exempted.28  
Established in 1995 (see National Service Proclamation 82/1995), 
the National Service consists of six months of military training29 and 
twelve months of work aimed mainly at the reconstruction of the war-
                                                
27 A. Poole, “Ransoms, Remittances, and Refugees: The Gatekeeper State in 
Eritrea”, in Africa Today, 60 (2), 2014, p. 77. 
28 Human Rights Watch, Service for life. State repression and indefinite 
conscription in Eritrea, 2009; T. Redeker Hepner, D. O’Kane (eds), Biopolitics, 
militarism and development. Eritrea in Twenty-First Century, New York-Oxford, 2011, 
“Introduction”. 
29 During this period, the conscripts also receive political-ideological training aimed 
at fostering the sharing of the following values: the liberation fight, obedience to 
authorities, patriotism and sacrifice for the nation. The added goal is a shared identity 
based on clerical and patriotic principles that may go beyond any of the country’s  
religious or ethnic differences. As noted by G. Kibreab, Eritrea does not have military 
service, but hagerawi agelglot (the national service), far more ambitious and wider in 
scope: G. Kibreab, The Open-Ended Eritrean National Service: The Driver of Forced 
Migration, Paper for the European Asylum Support Office Practical Cooperation 
Meeting on Eritrea 15-16 October 2014, La Valletta, Malta. 
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torn country. However, after the 1998-2000 border war, few of those 
enrolled were discharged and since then, conscripts have been forced to 
serve almost indefinitely.30  Most of the recruits fear being detained for 
life31 and see their underpaid work, which  includes  building roads, 
dams, schools, hospitals, plants and infrastructures, as forced labour.32 
Their extremely low monthly wages, called by the Government ‘pocket 
money’, range from 10 to 25 USD, depending on whether the conscripts 
live within the barracks or in their own homes. Conscripted labour was 
introduced in 2002 with the Warsai-Yikealo Development Campaign, 
“literally, the campaign (or collective works) of the heirs (warsay) of the 
braves (yka a. lo). The braves are freedom fighters, of whom 
conscripts are heirs, according to the official credo”.33  
Students are not exempted: since 2003, at the end of their 11th grade 
year, all students are transferred to the Warsai Ykealo School in Sawa – 
a militarized school – where they must complete their final 12th grade 
year and get their military training. Since its foundation in 2003, the 
school has hosted 170,000 students.34   
Reports on living and working conditions at the school and 
elsewhere in the country from Human Rights Watch and Amnesty 
International35 have been denouncing for years the systematic violation 
of human rights and the brutal repression of dissent with the use of 
punishment, torture and imprisonment without process.  
In light of this reality, escape and exile remain the most significant 
option for any young Eritrean in search of a viable future.  Many are 
fleeing not the national service in itself, but its duration and degrading 
                                                
30 Human Rights Watch, Service for Life: State Repression and Indefinite 
conscription in Eritrea, April 16, 2009, p. 83. Available at: www.hrw.or 
g/reports/2009/04/16/service-life-0 (10/14). 
31 D. M. Bozzini, “Low-Tech Surveillance and the Despotic State in Eritrea”, in 
Surveillance and Society, 9, 2011, pp. 93–113; G. Kibreab, Eritrea: A Dream Deferred, 
London, 2009; D. O’Kane, T. Redeker Hepner, Biopolitics, Militarism, Development: 
Eritrea in the 21st Century, cit.; R. Reid, “The Politics of Silence: Interpreting Stasis in 
Eritrea”, in Review of African Political Economy, 120, 2009, pp. 209-21. 
32 G. Kibreab, “Forced Labour in Eritrea”, in Journal of Modern African Studies, 
47(1), 2009, pp.41-72. 
33 D. M. Bozzini, “The Catch-22 of Resistance: Jokes and the Political Imagination 
of Eritrean Conscripts”, in Africa Today, 60 (2), 2014, p. 59, n. 5. 
34 Eritrea Ministry of Information www.shabait.com/news/local-news/195 08-
warsai-yikalo-secondary-school-in-sawa-concludes-20142015-academic-ye ar- (08/15). 
35 www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/eritrea (08/15). 
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conditions,36 which often require them to interrupt their studies and 
survive on almost no income, unable to raise a family or be of help to 
their  parents. In this condition of servitude many report having been 
“frequently humiliated, sexually abused if women, and brutally 
punished at the slightest hint of criticism or doubt”.37 
Unable to openly express their opinions, Eritreans vent their 
frustration and criticism through underground dissent, conveyed through 
jokes, political satire and bitter stories and, knowing the risk involved, 
secretly circulate them among trustworthy people only. These are 
formidable indicators of the loss of legitimacy of the State and its 
President: 
 
“It’s a very hot day in paradise. In one of the offices of the divine 
administration, an official is doing the inventory of a collection of 
clocks. Every clock represents a president in power on earth. Every time 
one of them commits a crime, the hand of the clock advances by a 
minute. This is how God keeps track of presidential misdeeds. All the 
clocks are there except for Isayas’s. The official searches and then 
panics because he can’t find it anywhere. Finally, he decides to report 
the disappearance to God personally. Surprised by the well-working air 
conditioning in God’s office, our official reconsiders his actions and 
excuses himself for having bothered God for nothing. 
Isayas’s clock was in fact standing on the divine desk, with its 
minute hand nicely ventilating the office”.38 
 
Another joke says:  
 
“God surveys the world one day, seeing the mountains, valleys, seas, 
and all there is. Suddenly, God stops and exclaims: “Why is Eritrea so 
green? I specifically made that country dry and yellow!” The angel 
Gabriel leans over and whispers: “My Lord, those are army uniforms”.39 
 
                                                
36 D. Connell, “Escaping Eritrea Why They Flee and What They Face”, in Middle 
East Report, 264, FALL 2012, p.3. 
37 Ivi. 
38 D. M. Bozzini, “The Catch-22 of Resistance: Jokes and the Political Imagination 
of Eritrean Conscripts”, cit, p.47. 
39J. Kimball, In Eritrea, Youth Say Frustrated by Long Service, Reuters, 17 July 
2008 www.reuters.com/article/2008/07/18/us-eritrea-military-idUSL14124755200807 
18 (10/14). 
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Not surprisingly, Eritrea is one of the world’s top refugee-producing 
countries. According to estimates from Human Right Watch, 
approximately 4,000 Eritreans flee the country each month and more 
than 313,000 – more than 5% of the population – have left since the 
middle of 2014.40 Those who escape are mainly young, male and fairly 
educated. According to B. Conrad, the fact that it is the younger and 
better educated who choose the exile path has resulted in depriving the 
Eritrean cause of the influential voice of those who might be agents of 
change in the country, inadvertently strengthening the regime also 
through cash remittances from abroad.41 Even Mussie Zerai – an 
Eritrean priest and founder of the NGO Habeshia who’s committed to 
defending the rights and the lives of asylum seekers and migrants – 
believes that the flight of so many young people may actually result in a 
gain for the regime and  
 
“be indeed used as an outlet to avoid a potential for social unrest. 
Keeping the youth at home, with no prospects for change, would 
probably put the country at risk, similarly to what happened in North 
Africa with the Arab Spring”.42  
His opinion is quite convincing, especially in light of the fact that the 
July 2001 regime crackdown was triggered by youth-led dissent: a 
student leader at the University of Asmara was arrested after publicly 
criticizing the oppressive conditions of national service. 
For its part, the government is able to profit from both those who flee 
the country and those who stay, and even from those who leave the 
country for work reasons, such as athletes. On December 13, 2009 the 
national football team’s escape caused a sensation. In fact, the twelve 
players who sought refuge in Kenya were not the only ones who took 
advantage of a trip abroad to take flight. Between 2006 and 2012, 58% 
of Eritrean athletes reportedly went missing, despite the 2007 imposition 
of a deposit of  100,000 nakfa (about US $ 6,700) required from all  
                                                
40 Human Right Watch - World Report 2015: Eritrea www.hrw.org/worl d-
report/2015/country-chapters/eritrea (08/15). 
41 B. Conrad, “‘We Are the Prisoners of Our Dreams’: Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in 
the Eritrean Diaspora in Germany”, in Eritrean Studies Review 4(2), 2005, p. 255. 
42 “Eritrea: Inferno Sinai – Dossier”, Rivista Missioni Consolata, marzo 2013: 
www.rivistamissioniconsolata.it/new/articolo.php (08/15).   
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athletes leaving the country to participate in international 
competitions.43 
The Eritrean diaspora is the major source of foreign currency for the 
government.      
For years, analysts have been scrambling to explain the system put in 
place by the Eritrean government. Some have been referring to the 
theory of ‘bifurcated state’, as developed by Mamdani;44 others seem to 
believe that Cooper’s analysis45 and the concept of ‘gatekeeper state’ 
better explain the Eritrean policy and provide the best framework for 
understanding resource co-optation; others instead quote Aihwa Ong’s 
‘graduated sovereignty’.46  
Still, its distinctive trait is the Eritrean government’s ability to secure 
economic resources expanding its sovereignty over the territorial 
boundaries of the state.  
The government is primarily committed to tapping into the 
diaspora’s resources, encouraging and channelling its loyalty to the 
country. 
Indeed, a significant part of the State revenue derives from the 
‘diaspora tax’, introduced in 1995 (Diaspora Income Tax, Law n. 67) at 
the time of reconstruction after the Thirty Years War against Ethiopia, 
and calling on all expatriates to pour into state coffers 2% of their 
annual income. The tax, in fact, had its roots in the financial support 
provided by the diaspora during the war. During the 1998-2000 conflict, 
this source of revenue and currency became increasingly necessary for 
the country’s economy. Since then, demands have increased and the 
conditions imposed on immigrants – although the tax is technically 
voluntary – have tightened to the point of denying non-compliant 
expatriates the possibility of renewing travel documents, buying and 
selling real estate at home, sending money to family members or even 
returning home (Switzerland just opened criminal proceedings against 
the Eritrean consulate in Geneva for the alleged  ‘extortion’ on Eritrean 
expats). Thanks to the profits from the diaspora tax, Eritrea reportedly 
                                                
43 A. Welde Giorgis, Eritrea at a Crossroads: A Narrative of Triumph, Betrayal 
and Hope, Houston, 2014, p. 265. 
44 M. Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late 
Colonialism, Princeton,1996.  
45 F. Cooper, Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present, Cambridge, 2002. 
46 A. Ong, Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality, Durham, 
1999.  
 	  
238 
ranks fifth in Africa in remittances received per capita and  first in 
proportion of remittances in relation to GDP.47  
But the state, as has been said, can also profit from those who flee 
the country through reprisals on their families, including financial 
penalties.48 
This system would eventually result in a policy of ‘graduated 
citizenship’, according to which Eritrean expatriates who have paid all 
fees related to the diaspora tax eventually enjoy full rights that are 
denied to Eritreans who stayed in the country, whose only opportunity 
to enjoy the same rights lies in completing their national service whose 
duration is, however, indefinite.49 
In this situation, leaving the country illegally seems to be the only 
available option, though the risks involved are enormous for both the 
fugitives and their families.  
The journey to Italy is a long and painful odyssey. Libya is 3,500 
kilometres away, and before facing the last leg in the open sea on 
ramshackle boats – frequently with tragic implications – Eritreans often 
have to endure months, if not years, of harassment in Libya, where they 
are exploited, imprisoned, blackmailed, raped, bought and sold by 
police and local criminals. They are often deported back to Eritrea, and 
Italy, having entrusted Libya with the task of putting a stop to 
immigration, is indirectly responsible.50 Many Eritreans, in fact, were 
forced to return to their country because of the Italian-Libyan Treaty of 
Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership, signed in 2008 between 
Berlusconi’s government and Libya’s Qaddafi. 
The collaboration between the two countries followed Italy’s official 
‘apology’ for its colonial past, definitely instrumental in entrusting 
Libya with the control of migratory flows in the Mediterranean and with 
the wicked rejection policy. Thousands of migrants, many of whom 
                                                
47 A. Poole, “Ransoms, Remittances, and Refugees: The Gatekeeper State in 
Eritrea”, cit., p. 74. 
48 D. Styan, “The Evolution, Uses, and Abuses of Remittances in the Eritrean 
Economy”, in Eritrea’s Economic Survival: Summary Record of a Conference Held on 
20 April 2007, Chatham House, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 
2007, pp.13-22. 
49 David M. Bozzini, “Low-Tech Surveillance and the Despotic State in Eritrea”, in 
Surveillance and Society, 9, 2011, pp. 93–113; G. Kibreab, Eritrea: A Dream Deferred, 
cit. 
50 Cfr. the documentary directed by A. Segre, D. Yimer, R. Biadene, Come un uomo 
sulla terra, 2008.  
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come from former Italian colonies in the Horn of Africa, have paid the 
price for this. 
An alternative to the Libyan route, though equally dangerous, is 
provided by Israeli one, via Egypt and the Sinai, where there the risk of 
being kidnapped by Rashaida criminal organizations or other Berber 
groups involved in human and organ trafficking in Sudan is very high.51 
For years, Sinai has been the scene of the most tragic human trafficking 
practices and, according to UN reports, the involvement of senior 
officers in the Asmara regime cannot be excluded.52 Despite the death of 
nearly a quarter of those who end up in torture camps, annual estimated 
revenue is over $ 600 million. 
These events are now in the public domain, and they are frequently 
investigated in documentaries broadcasted by BBC and CNN and in 
reports from the more qualified press outlets. Hence, Europe’s and 
Italy’s silence and inaction leave us stunned. The report on international 
human trafficking drafted by Dutch researchers (see footnote 51) was 
presented on 11 December 2013 at a conference hosted by Italy’s 
Chamber of Deputies (and a few days earlier by the European 
Parliament).  
A new disconcerting agreement was instead signed during the Italian 
Presidency of the Council of the European Union. 
The crisis in Libya has led our country to shift its migration 
containment system and externalize the European Union’s southern 
border towards other countries: Tunisia, Egypt and Sudan, where 
migrants from the Horn of Africa usually transit. The agreement, known 
as the ‘Khartoum Process’, signed on 28 November 2014 in Rome 
between the EU member countries and countries of origin and transit of 
migrants,53 provides for the control of migration flows through 
partnerships with the same countries from which migrants, especially 
Eritreans, are fleeing. Among its provisions are the strengthening of 
border and national police forces, and the establishment of reception 
centres in transit countries. As an added measure against human 
                                                
51 Cfr. the book-report by A. Fessaha, Occhi nel deserto, Prato, 2014, and the report 
by M. van Reisen, M. Estefanos, C. Rijken, Human trafficking in the Sinai: refugees 
between life and death, Oisterwijk, 2012 e Id., The Human trafficking cycle: Sinai and 
beyond, Oisterwijk, 2014. 
52 La Repubblica, 12 novembre 2014. 
53 www.corrieredellemigrazioni.it/2015/03/24/processo-di-khartoum-sape te-cose/ 
(08/15). 
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trafficking, Sub-Saharan countries are also required to welcome back  
their citizens. 
The Khartoum Process also provides funding of nearly 300 million 
Euros for Eritrea from the European Commission. Eritrea will also 
receive other funds directly from the Italian government for 
development projects to be announced.54  
The agreements between Italy and Libya have essentially resulted in 
migrants having to endure abuse, torture and extortion just to come out 
alive from the detention centres that Libya tries to pass off as reception 
camps. 
It is then difficult to understand how anyone could now possibly 
believe that migrants’ human rights – and Eritreans’ more specifically – 
will be guaranteed by their countries of origins. Moreover, Eritrea has 
been for years the subject of UN investigations, and charges were 
pressed by international organizations for its violation of human rights. 
It is hard not to see in the obligation to welcome returning migrants – as 
underlined in the Agreement – a dramatic incitement to deportation 
practices. As emphasized by A. Morone,  
 
“the great hypocrisy of the Italian and European politics is to say 
they will stop thousands of fleeing people, especially from the Horn of 
Africa, for their own good and to shield them from human traffickers 
while, in the name of that same rhetoric, they are supporting autocratic 
regimes charged with violating human rights”.55 
 
Conclusion 
Refugees, asylum seekers and migrants from Africa, whose only 
fault is to strive for a better life when they arrive in our country, chasing 
a dream built on a precise idea of the West56 and high expectations, are 
the tragic heroes of the new millennium.   
Their hopes are shattered and disappointed by Italy, where the 
government’s welcome, featuring the absence of any plans whatsoever, 
services outsourced to private contractors and a scourge of mob 
                                                
54 www.nigrizia.it/notizia/roma-khartoum-accordi-sui-migranti (08/15). 
55 A. Morone, Il processo di Khartoum: l’Italia e l’Europa contro le migrazioni, 
Ispi-Analysis N. 286, June 2015, p. 7. 
56 A. Appadurai, Il futuro come fatto culturale. Saggi sulla condizione globale, 
Milano, 2014. 
	  	  
	  
241 
infiltrations, has only recently started being reported – and also as a 
result of strict investigation abroad.57 
Compared to other migrants, those who arrive in Italy from Eritrea 
have an unhappy privilege: the humanitarian residence permit, valid for 
one year. Actually, it’s the only thing being granted. The wait can last 
indefinitely. Refugees and asylum seekers turn into ghosts without any 
rights, certainties and identities: no housing, no real support, no 
assistance aimed at gaining social inclusion or entering the workforce 
are provided. Thus, they end up occupying abandoned buildings or 
living a miserable homeless life. Their only alternative is to be placed, 
depending on availability, in one of the of so-called ‘reception’ centres 
(while having different purposes and functions, whether they are called 
CDA, CIE or CARA they do not differ as to the treatment of those who are 
locked up. The CARA – reception centres for asylum seekers – are 
governed by the same rules drafted in 2004 for CIEs, the centres for 
identification and expulsion). These are essentially structures where all 
rights are temporarily suspended. Despite the reassuring word ‘reception’ in 
their name, they are “spaces of indistinct juridical jurisdiction”, as G. 
Agamben calls them,58 where migrants become “bare life in front of the 
sovereign power”59 (after all, even Nazi concentration camps were 
established as a form of Schutzhaft, or “preventive custody”). 
Repressive, discriminatory and segregationist measures govern 
Italian migration policies. The Italian reception, deportation, and 
‘containment’ policies, first with Libya and now with the Khartoum 
process, reveal both the focus on security and the bio-political 
dimension in managing migrations from Africa. These are the same 
racial body politics that were most pronounced in the colonial apartheid 
system and in the racist shift experienced by Italy in Africa. The 
removal of the Colonial page from the nation’s autobiography led many 
to forget  that Italy was the first country to re-establish its legal and 
institutional system by basing it on ‘race’, racializing social 
relationships and public spaces to better manage them, while separating, 
                                                
57 See the investigation by two German lawyers, D. Bender and M. Bethke, and the 
related scandal-provoking report published in 2011, proving the absolute “lack of human 
dignity guarantees” for refugees in Italy www.proasyl.de/fileadmin/fm-
dam/q_PUBLIKATIONEN/2011/Italienbe richt_FINAL_15MAERZ2011.pdf (08/15). 
58 G. Agamben, Homo sacer. Il potere sovrano e la nuda vita, Torino, 1995, pp. 
189-191. 
59 B. Gaggia, “Non più cittadini ma solo nuda vita”, Il Manifesto, 24 ottobre 1998, 
interview with G. Agamben.  
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moving away, segregating. Back then, this was (also) done in the name 
of its civilizing mission, now it’s the humanitarian principles. As for its 
domestic policy, Italy has not shown to be able to implement past 
integration or current reception policies. Tens of thousands of 
immigrants, working mainly in farming and construction, are exploited 
under slave-like conditions. Immigrant women are sexually exploited. 
Not only are schools not integrated, it has actually been suggested that 
separate classrooms for immigrants should be arranged. It is extremely 
difficult, if not outright impossible for Italian-born children of 
immigrant parents to obtain citizenship, and outrageous red tape is not 
the only barrier. 
Has anything really changed since the colonial era? 
 
 
 
IMMIGRANT ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN ITALY 
Immacolata Vellecco* 
 
1. Introduction 
Over the past decade in Europe, focus on immigrant entrepreneurship 
has progressively increased. Immigrant entrepreneurs contribute to 
economic growth and employment, often recovering craft and 
commercial activities that have fallen into disuse, and provide goods 
and services that add value. Frequently the result of stabilization, 
immigrant entrepreneurship reinforces processes of integration and 
supports immigrants in reaching their social and economic goals by: 
developing ‘successful’ social models within an ethnic community; 
strengthening identity and visibility; creating conditions for greater 
immigrant participation in institutional processes (Zhou, Cho, 2010). In 
addition to these benefits, which are mainly non-economic in nature, 
immigrant entrepreneurship also serves as a major link to global markets 
and is thus essential for the integration of immigrants within the labor 
market, insofar as immigrant entrepreneurs create jobs not only for 
themselves but also, increasingly, for the rest of the immigrant and 
native populations.  
As a point in fact, immigrant entrepreneurs help create commercial 
opportunities for their host countries by reducing the costs of 
commercial transactions with their countries of origin by deploying their 
networks and knowledge of these countries’ markets. Immigrants can 
play an important role in stimulating foreign trade by reducing implied 
barriers between the host and origin nations. This type of 
entrepreneurship can, therefore, create jobs in countries of origin and 
produce advantages in terms of the integration of immigrants and the 
development of international commerce. 
However, the economic activities of immigrant businesses seem to 
have slower growth rates than their counterparts in native economies 
(Chaganti R., Greene PG, 2002) for the following reasons: 
• immigrant entrepreneurs operate in areas in which barriers to 
entry are not present and as a result, they are subject to strong 
competition, low profit margins and limited cash flows; 
• market demand is a demand for niche, or not overly important, 
products; 
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• the purchase of resources depends on relations with the ethnic 
community, which often offers some resources but impedes the 
availability of others needed for growth. 
The authors point out that it is mainly the lack of financial resources 
that prevent ethnic businesses from growing at the same rates as native 
ones. 
A research project conducted in Canada (Brenner et al., 2010) also 
found that: 
• the characteristics of entrepreneurs vary according to group and 
location; 
• immigrant businesses require the same support / incentives as small 
native businesses; 
• the main challenges for immigrant entrepreneurs lie in 
understanding the local community and integrating with it; 
• the use of capital varies according to ethnic group. 
The immigrant contribution to an economy through the direct 
creation of new jobs is an issue that has received limited attention. 
Moreover, it is difficult to compare EU countries in terms of the 
contribution of immigrants to entrepreneurship and job creation due to 
the heterogeneity of available data sources for the single countries and 
the lack of an internationally agreed-upon definition of ‘immigrant 
entrepreneur’. 
The phenomenon has developed significantly in Italy in recent years. 
Indeed, until 1990, immigrants could become entrepreneurs only if they 
hailed from countries bound to Italy by reciprocal self-employment 
agreements. Italian Law 39/1990 mandated that immigrants could 
benefit from self-employed status regardless of the existence of bilateral 
agreements. Subsequently, Law 40/1998 definitively liberalized 
immigrant access to self-employment. 
This article will first illustrate some theoretical issues regarding 
immigrant entrepreneurship. It will then focus on the phenomenon in 
Italy and evaluate its size and distribution, mainly through data and 
statistics. Finally, it will describe and discuss some initiatives 
undertaken to support immigrant entrepreneurs. Concluding remarks 
offer some insights for further research. 
 
2. Immigrant entrepreneurship: definitions and theories 
The study of immigrant entrepreneurship is a recent field of research 
in Italy. On the contrary, international research has long demonstrated 
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great interest in the issue; the debate is so open and varied that some 
authors have underscored the difficulty in reaching generalizable results 
(E. Razin, A., Langlois, 1996; Masurel et al., 2002).  
In order to better understand the topic, it is useful to point out (Drori 
et al., 2009) the differences between international entrepreneurs, ethnic 
entrepreneurs, business owners who have returned to their countries of 
origin, and transnational entrepreneurs. 
International entrepreneurs create and manage business activities that 
extend beyond the borders of their countries of origin and are 
particularly geared towards exporting manufactured goods to 
international markets. Ethnic entrepreneurs are those who, in their 
countries of destination, begin freelance work in formal, informal or 
illegal ways, and for whom there is a strong cultural characterization 
due to their ethnic origins. In particular, ethnic entrepreneurship lies in 
the exploitation of intangible assets (such as language, network and 
skills) by the entrepreneur who seeks to commercialize his/her products 
both within an ethnic community as well as in the indigenous 
community, maintaining his/her ethnic identity; this becomes a strong 
point in their business strategies (Drori et al., 2009). 
Entrepreneurs who have returned to their countries of origin are 
those who, after a given amount of time in their destination nations, start 
up a new business in their native countries. The most interesting 
characteristic of this type of business is the process of creating the new 
economic entity. Research can adopt two perspectives on the issue: the 
first refers to the importance of social and human capital that 
entrepreneurs acquire during their stays in their adoptive countries and 
if/how/how much it affects new business forms. The second regards the 
benefits that these entrepreneurs bring to their countries of origin.  
Transnational entrepreneurs conduct business in different countries. 
The most interesting aspect of this case lies in understanding how such 
subjects discover and exploit business opportunities that arise in 
different contexts. 
Most of the studies conducted internationally investigate the 
determining factors in the entrepreneurial phenomenon among 
immigrants and formulate different theories. 
According to ‘disadvantage’ and ‘blocked mobility’ theories, 
businesses are started up because of  the difficulties immigrants face in 
entering the labor market. The theory of disadvantage stresses self-
employment as an alternative to extreme unemployment, whereas 
	  246 
‘blocked mobility’ focuses on entrepreneurship as an attempt to escape 
discrimination in career development when subjects are employed in 
other organizations: it is therefore a step towards independence and 
higher earnings, and has a positive correlation with education and 
experience.  
A different theory, proposed by Bonacich (1973; Bonacich, Modell, 
1980), takes into account the social role of the immigrant as 
intermediary between producer and consumer, elites and popular classes 
in some societies. This theory places greater focus on the structural 
elements of the economy and society.  
The idea of immigration as a temporary choice favours a high degree 
of internal solidarity with the formation of organized communities that 
are very resistant to assimilation; such groups maintain their distinctive 
cultural traits (often including a religion that is different from the 
majority of the population) and ensure the efficient allocation of 
resources (including labour) as well as the control of competition within 
the group. 
Studies by Portes et al. (Wilson and Portes, 1980; Portes and Stepick, 
1985; Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993; Portes and Manning 2005) have 
furthered the analysis of enclave economies or areas in which there is 
great concentration of businesses founded and run by immigrants. A 
basic element of the enclave is the fact that a significant proportion of 
the immigrant workforce is employed in businesses owned by other 
immigrants designed to first serve their specific market, (especially 
specific and difficult-to-find products) and then the general population.  
One explanation placing greater emphasis on structural factors 
regards ‘ecological succession’ (Aldrich and Reiss, 1976; Aldrich et al., 
1985) is the withdrawal of native operators from some market segments 
that are less attractive; they tend to move to safer and more profitable 
assets thus leaving space for new operators and new national groups. 
Institutional factors can also inhibit or facilitate the creation of small 
businesses in general and, more specifically, immigrant 
entrepreneurship. In this framework, the transformation of the 
economies of host societies plays a role in immigrant self-employment. 
The interpretative model explicitly emphasizes the ‘opportunity 
structure’ that works against immigrants as well as the distribution of 
resources and how they are made available to ethnic minorities. 
Therefore, immigrant economic activity is “the result of the pursuit of 
interactive opportunities through a mobilization of resources mediated 
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by ethnic networks in unique historical conditions” (Waldinger et al., 
1990). The informal resources of an ethnic group are of paramount 
importance in ensuring survival and competitiveness.  
Immigrant entrepreneurs are facilitated in the recruitment of labor 
and the formation of human capital because they can tap into the 
network of their own groups, more easily establish relationships of 
mutual loyalty and trust, obtain commitment and flexibility from co-
national workers while delivering substandard working conditions, as 
compared to those determined by contracts or corresponding lifestyles 
commonly accepted in Western societies. 
Kloosterman (2010), in another recent attempt to integrate the 
explanations based on supply with a careful analysis of both the demand 
side and the institutional environment, proposed a theory regarding the 
mixed embeddedness of immigrant entrepreneurship. This author sought 
to move beyond the study of the incorporation of economic networks of 
interpersonal relationships mediated by common ethnic origin to 
consider the more abstract and general process of business creation 
within larger social systems and include the demand side and market 
functioning.  
The model presented expanded on the one proposed by Waldinger, 
McEvoy, and Aldrich (1990) by distinguishing between dead-end and 
promising sectors and by taking into account the role of highly-skilled 
immigrant entrepreneurs. 
 
3. Immigrant entrepreneurship in Italy 
Italian studies have examined various immigrant communities in 
different geographical areas. A sociological perspective (Ambrosini, 
1994; Palidda, 2000) adds the territorial one, obviously investigating 
areas in which the phenomenon is more significant or is in its initial 
stages: Lombardy (Chiesi and Zucchetti, 2003), Piedmont (Luciano, 
1995), Tuscany (Savino, Valzania, Bruscaglioni, 2005). 
Immigrant groups from specific nations have also been explored: 
Senegal (Riccio, 2002), Romania (Cingolani and Piperno, 2005), Egypt 
(Ceschi, Coslovi, Mora, 2005), China (Ceccagno, 2003).  
The phenomenon is also of interest to Immigration Observatories on 
the regional and provincial levels. More recently, however, the horizon 
expanded to the national scale in an attempt to quantify the phenomenon 
and monitor its evolution from a macro-economic perspective 
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(Fondazione Ethnoland, 2009; CNEL, 2011) which should be 
considered the background for further investigation. 
Different surveys agree upon the high growth rates of the number of 
businesses but the determining factors regarding start-ups have not been 
sufficiently investigated.  
The latest Annual Report on Migrant Workers (2015) carried out by 
the Italian Ministry of Labor and Social Policies offers updated 
information, avoiding the overlap of entrepreneurship and other types of 
self-employment. 
In 2014, the report counted 335,452 businesses owned by foreign 
entrepreneurs born in non-EU countries, mainly located in the Northern 
and Central regions: Lombardia (18,7%), Tuscany (10%), Emilia 
Romagna (9,1%), Lazio (11,4%).  
Non-EU, sole ownership enterprises grew by 6,2% (an increase of 
approximately twenty thousand units) between 2013 and 2014, mainly 
in Lazio and Campania; they represent 10.3% of sole-ownership firms 
in Italy. 
Non-EU entrepreneurs work in the wholesale, retail or in motor 
vehicle repair sectors (44,9%), as well as in construction (22,3%); other 
important industries are manufacturing (8,5%), hospitality and 
restaurants (5,3%), freight, travel agencies, business support (5,7%).  
A gender approach reveals that female entrepreneurship is higher for 
Ukrainians (56,7%) Nigerians (46,2%) and Chinese. 
The Report also highlights other forms of self-employment: artisans, 
traders, independent agricultural workers, co-workers and free-lance 
workers, referring to data from the National Pension Fund.  
Non-EU artisans number 125,590 (6.6% of the national total) and are 
increasing. They are younger than national counterparts, with half under 
the age of 40. These workers are mainly from Albania (26.1%), China 
(13.8%), and Morocco (10.26%). 
Shop owners born in non-EU countries number 193,033 and are 
7.7% of total trade workers in Italy. They mainly work in the Northern 
Regions. Among them, 46.9% hail from Morocco and China. 
Analyses of other categories are also interesting: independent 
agricultural workers number 1,614 (0.4% of the national total) and 
reside mainly in Tuscany and Piedmont; non-EU co-workers and free-
lancers number about seventeen thousand and represent 2.1% of the 
total number of workers in these categories. Only 6% of co-workers and 
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freelancers reside in the Southern Regions; women represent 38% of the 
total. 
 
4. Services and projects supporting business start-ups 
Despite the growth of immigrant entrepreneurship, there may be 
further impediments for immigrants to setting up business or growing 
existing ones. Such impediments relate both to internal and external 
factors. On the one hand, immigrants more likely lack human, financial 
or social resources. On the other, they may experience greater barriers 
and constraints within the institutional environment, the political and 
economic context of the receiving society. 
The Italian national plan for integration, Identity and encounter, 
seeks to define the main lines of action to promote effective processes of 
immigrant integration; it reiterates its support for business creation, 
calling upon banking, insurance and business associations to devote 
specific attention to immigrant entrepreneurial initiatives including 
those aimed at supporting entrepreneurship in their countries of origin 
which allow decisions to prevent migration or facilitate repatriation. 
European Union policies (European Commission, 2005; European 
Economic and Social Committee, 2012) also booster ethnic 
entrepreneurship and recognize the need to provide legal support, 
facilitate bureaucracy and loans, and strengthen managerial skills, 
keeping in mind the cultural characteristics of potential users. European 
policy also recommends expanding both the range of services provided 
as well as the number of operators involved. However, major integration 
and coordination efforts are recommended in order to avoid excessive 
fragmentation of supply and related facilities.  
Some European projects have sought to adapt the incubator service 
model, originally geared to high-tech industries, to support immigrant 
entrepreneurship. 
Traditionally, in fact, incubators offer multi-purpose facilities located 
in contexts of high knowledge intensity (typically Science-Parks, 
Universities, etc.): bridging institutions seeking to encourage technology 
transfer by creating businesses spin-offs relating to the industrialization 
and commercialization of innovation deriving from applied research.  
Access to an incubator is usually ‘regulated’ and subject to a 
selection process based on the presentation of a business plan and the 
assessment of the personal attributes of the aspiring entrepreneur, and 
tend to favour initiatives with the highest probability of success. New 
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businesses are hosted, guided and assisted for a pre-determined period 
of time: 
• in terms of management, thanks to service management training, 
market research, legal and tax assistance provided by the incubator to all 
new / emerging companies that are located in it; 
• in terms of technology, by means of physical proximity or 
continued contact with sources of innovation, such as universities, 
possibilities for adapting to the market or the needs of specific 
customers/users can be studied together. 
The first such experience in Italy was in Turin in 2000 where the 
National Confederation of Crafts and Small and Medium Enterprises 
(CNA) launched Project Daedalus: intercultural mediation for the 
creation and development of businesses with economic support from the 
Piedmont Region and the Province of Turin. The Daedalus Project 
offered completely free consultancy support to entrepreneurs from non-
EU countries, assisting them in drawing up business plans, evaluating 
the economic sustainability of their ideas, starting up the company and 
training them to manage them. As a result, in four years time, the 
structure assisted 965 aspiring entrepreneurs (370 women and 586 men) 
and established 146 companies, which included 86 in construction, 13 in 
trade, 6 in food services. 
A permanent service organization was later established with the 
name CNA World-Dedalo, broadening the range of services offered to 
immigrants and entrepreneurs.  
Another national initiative involved 10 Chambers of Commerce, 
coordinated by Unioncamere. It was funded by the Ministry of Labor 
and Social Policy. The project Start-it-up began in 2012 and sought to 
empower 400 non-EU immigrants in Italy for business creation or self-
employment. The action was carried out over 18 months, delivering 
guidance, info-training and assistance to the business plans. 
Entrepreneurial skills and orientation to business risk were tested and 
scored. Services were delivered to individuals and groups and 
differentiated according to specific needs.  
As a result, the project created self-employment or micro-businesses 
in traditional sectors. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
Immigrant entrepreneurship has been the subject of a large area of 
research for many years especially in countries in which immigration is 
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more advanced like the United States, Canada and Australia. Studies 
have investigated a number of aspects, such as the role of the family and 
the ethnic enclave in business creation, the role of cultural factors in 
some ethnic groups, in particular the psychological, religious, 
professional, socio-cultural background that would make them more 
inclined to business creation and self-employment in general. The role 
of the business opportunities that present themselves to immigrants in 
destination countries due to the transformation of the socio-economic 
structure is very important and investigated.  
In Italy, different surveys concur when they show high growth rates 
of the number of businesses but the determining factors in business 
start-ups have not been sufficiently investigated.  
The evolution of the phenomenon may be due to increasing 
difficulties in accessing the labor market. Entrepreneurship also depends 
upon the individual will of immigrants to overcome the constraints of an 
employment context that, at best, offers the possibility of finding formal 
employment only on the lower rungs of the social ladder (Palidda, 1992; 
Fondazione Ethnoland, 2009).  
Furthermore, business creation may be a way to mitigate the effects 
of legislation on the deadlines of residence permits (CNEL, 2011), 
according to which, after a year of job loss, the immigrant falls into a 
state of irremediable non-compliance.  
Further investigation of the data should lead to deeper understanding 
of the degree of ‘ethnicization’ of certain components of the 
manufacturing base (Unioncamere, 2014) and/or the role ethnic 
entrepreneurship plays in the Italian manufacturing and service system. 
Immigrant entrepreneurship might find opportunities in a ‘vacancy 
chain’ (CNEL, 2011), filling market niches that are no longer attractive 
to indigenous businesses. It could also function as a small business 
subcontractor, pursuing flexibility and cost savings for the larger 
umbrella enterprises (Baptiste, Zucchetti, 1994).  
Initiatives to support immigrant entrepreneurship, while laudably 
attempting to stimulate the phenomenon, have developed small-scale 
projects through traditional logic-based consulting and training but are 
poorly equipped to furnish significant breakthroughs for the businesses 
created.  
There is a need for further insight into immigrant entrepreneurship. 
Research might deepen understanding of the nature of the relations 
between immigrant workers and the opportunity structure, combining 
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the micro-level of the individual entrepreneur (with his or her resources) 
with the meso-level of the local opportunity structure, linking the latter, 
in a looser way, to the macro-institutional framework.  
Futhermore, although the more commonplace immigrant profile is 
that of an individual lacking financial capital and education, a new type 
of immigrant entrepreneur is emerging in advanced economies, 
especially in the United States. Despite their origins in less developed 
countries, they are highly qualified. With the growth of global economic 
integration, this phenomenon will intensify. We may inquire as to what 
extent this trend is manifesting itself in Italy and/or the rest of Europe. 
Broader and deeper knowledge is also required to establish policy 
measures that can activate immigrants’ social and cultural capital, 
channeling it toward initiatives that produce greater economic and social 
impacts. Immigrants, in fact, play an important role in integrating 
newcomers; they can collaborate with institutions and host communities 
to deliver services or facilitate existing ones. Finally, their experiences 
and networks in destination nations might support economic and social 
initiatives in their countries of origin. 
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THE IMPORTANCE OF MIGRANTS’ FINANCIAL INCLUSION  
AS PART OF THE INTEGRATION PROCESS 
Daniele Frigeri*  and Anna Ferro** 
 
Financial inclusion refers to that part of the integration process that 
allows access and use of any product or service available on the market 
in order to respond to financial needs and accomplish a proper social 
and economic life.1 Financial inclusion therefore addresses those 
activities developed to foster an efficient access and use of financial 
services by persons and organizations not yet entirely included in the 
formal financial system. These services include: financial credit, 
savings, insurance, payment, funds’ transfer and remittances, programs 
for financial education and branch reception, along with small business 
start-ups.2  
Defining financial inclusion implies that financial exclusion also 
exists. When persons, enterprises and organizations cannot easily and 
freely access and employ financial products or services, it means they 
are – deliberately or not – impeded and excluded from the formal 
financial system. Three dimensions of inclusion can be identified 
(Barry, 1998; Ebersold, 1998):3   
- Economic dimension, as participation to the production and 
consumption process; 
- Political dimension, concerning the level of political participation; 
- Social/relational dimension, concerning social relations and 
networks. 
Financial inclusion represents an increasingly significant component 
for individuals/organizations to be entitled and able to participate to the 
economic system (production and consumption) and the social sphere. 
In the past decades and in western societies, access to basic financial 
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services has gradually been recognized as precondition to participate to 
the economic and social life, including managing current expenses; 
access to goods and services; access to welfare tools (social card, public 
benefits to support unemployment) and job market. 
Financial exclusion can affect foreign and indigenous populations, 
but migrants are normally subject to greater socio-economic 
vulnerability and risks due to the higher social costs of the hosting 
country. Deprived of credit and financial history and capitals, weak in 
terms of language skills and cultural habits pertaining to western 
financial systems, housing and occupational stability, migrants can more 
easily exit – or fail to access – the formal financial system. Financial 
inclusion reduces the risk of social and economic vulnerability, in terms 
of a stronger saving capacity and distance from the informal financial 
system.  
An additional central aspect for migrants’ financial inclusion is 
represented by remittances connected to the process of savings 
allocation in the transnational sphere. Currently the main challenge for 
any financial system is to intercept and contribute to the channeling of 
these flows (in terms of boosting formal channels and leveraging 
productive investments).  
Finally, we underline the importance of financial education in the 
process of financial inclusion, as a way to prevent the risk of exclusion. 
Financial education refers to the knowledge and consequent awareness 
to take efficient and informed decisions and to the ability to manage 
resources and use products according to the proper needs and aims. Due 
to recent technological progress, financial innovations and market 
developments, individuals have to take decisions by handling complex 
and diversified information they can only assess with great difficulty. 
The process of financial inclusion is therefore a multidimensional 
phenomenon, involving the economic and regulatory sphere, market 
access and functionality, cultural and religious spheres, transparency 
and consumer protection, education and public policies. 
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The outcome in terms of financial inclusion or exclusion in the 
country of immigration is influenced by a wide range factors. From the 
point of view of the ‘individual/migrant’: previous familiarity with 
financial institutions and tools; length of residence abroad (the more 
migrants live abroad, the more their financial needs increase); level of 
education; work/occupation, especially in the formal labour market;  
gender (generally, women tend to be more easily excluded from the 
labour market and financial inclusion); general income; house 
ownership and cultural elements. Nationality is an irrelevant factor in 
respect of impacting  financial inclusion). From the perspective country 
framework of residency: characteristics of the local and economic 
context; development of the financial system; regulatory framework; 
nature of existing public polices; level of competition among market 
operators including transparency, accessibility to information and costs. 
For these reasons, a more openly directed attention to financial inclusion 
issues should become part of any integration policy. 
 
1. The institutional scenario  
According to The World Bank estimates, more than half the adult 
world population – approximately 2.5 billion people and 450 million 
businesses – is not using official financial products because financially 
excluded.4 According to the Eurobarometer (2012),5 16% of the EU 
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population and 25% of the Italian population does not have access to a 
current account at a regular financial institution. 
Financial inclusion has become part of the international agenda since 
2009, when the G20 countries in Pittsburgh stated:  
 
“We commit to improving access to financial services for the poor. 
We have agreed to support the safe and sound spread of new modes of 
financial service delivery capable of reaching the poor and, building on 
the example of micro finance, will scale up the successful models of 
small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) financing”.  
 
The guidelines for the G20 Financial Inclusion Action Plan were 
announced, leading to the Principles for Innovative Financial Inclusion 
– later adopted during the Toronto Summit in June 2010 – and to the 
Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion (GPFI), advocating 
implementation of the agenda for financial inclusion and tangible 
enforcement of its principles. 
In recent years the European Union started to address the financial 
inclusion issue on retail payment services, providing a detailed outlook 
of the phenomenon6 and offering different recommendations7 on access 
to a basic payment account. This led to a specific Directive “On the 
comparability of fees related to payment accounts, payment accounts 
switching and access to payment accounts with basic features”, 
approved by the Parliament the 15th of April 2014.8 The Directive 
introduced new rules intended to ensure adequate transparency and 
comparability of costs related to payment services, ensuring full 
consumers’ mobility between payment services (and current account) 
providers within the Union and establishing the right to a basic payment 
account for all European citizens, regardless of their nationality, 
residency and economic-financial situation. It is worth noting that the 
European Council identified as priorities the support and initiatives of 
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Member States aimed at “pursuing active integration policies which 
foster social cohesion and economic dynamism”.9 
In 2012 in Italy, a public-private agreement was reached by the 
Ministry of Economy and Finance, the Bank of Italy, the Association of 
Italian Banks (ABI), the Italian Postal system and the Italian 
Association of Electronic Money and Payment Institutes. All parties to 
the agreement committed to offering a basic bank account (referring to 
the  individual’s right to a bank account) as a tool to support open and 
effective participation to the market and to sustain full social inclusion 
of any person.  
 
2. The National Observatory for Financial Inclusion of Migrants in 
Italy 
In 2011 the National Observatory for Financial Inclusion of Migrants 
was launched in Italy, managed by CeSPI and financially sustained by 
the Ministry of the Interior and the European Fund for Integration. The 
Observatory undertook different agreements with the main Italian 
operators such as: ABI, ANIA (Insurance Companies Association), 
ASSOFIN (Italian Association for Estate and Consumers’ Credit), and 
Banco Posta in order to elaborate annual data reports on the financial 
inclusion process.  
This represents a unique experience in Europe, responding to the 
objective of increasing knowledge and sensitivity towards financial 
inclusion of migrants among the main stakeholders, the civic society 
and migrants themselves, through concrete initiatives and a stable 
research/data documentation. In particular, four quantitative and 
qualitative yearly Reports on the Financial Inclusion of Migrants in Italy 
were published (from 2011-2015) regarding: 
- The offer of banking and financial services for migrants, in 
collaboration with ABI and Banco Posta, analyzing savings, credit, 
money transfer services and microfinance information. All this helped to 
formulate an annual index of banking services. 
- The demand of banking and financial services from the point of 
view of migrants. This research relies on a statistically significant 
survey sampling (1.212 migrants) and includes qualitative research tools 
(focus groups) involving 180 migrants.10 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Conclusions of the European Council, 26-27th of June 2014. 
10 This information refer to the latest survey of the Observatory on Financial 
Inclusion of Migrants in Italy, 2015, www.migrantiefinanza.it. 
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- Entrepreneurship: analysis to identify migrant entrepreneurship 
models, financial behaviors and needs and relations with Italian banks. 
In three years, more than 150 immigrant entrepreneurs were 
interviewed. 
- In depth analysis also focusing on other financial intermediators 
such as insurance companies, payment services etc.  
As for other activities, a group of experts has been established as an 
opportunity for debate and interaction, including representatives from 
the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Labour 
and Welfare, Ministry of Economy and Finance, Bank of Italy, ABI, 
ANIA, Assofin, Banco Posta, Unioncamere and CRIF. In 2015, two 
territorial laboratories for the migrants’ financial inclusion were 
launched in Rome and Milan to identify and eventually test local 
policies to be replicated on a national level. 
In this article we present results and data from the various Reports of 
the Observatory on the Financial Inclusion of Migrants in Italy, from 
2011 to 2015.11 
 
3. Profiling the migrant population in Italy in terms of financial 
needs and integration process 
Italy continues to be a destination country for current migratory 
flows (+12% in 2013 and 3% in 2014, ISTAT), but the phenomenon is 
also gradually modifying, with a more stable migrant population living 
in Italy for the long term. Evidence is provided by family reunifications 
representing the most significant quota in recent flows (44% of new 
arrivals in 2009-2012). The number of residency years in Italy is 
gradually increasing (10,8 years according to the sample of the 
Observatory survey in 2014) and data related to minors (almost a 
million, accounting for the 15% of newborns in Italy) give evidence of a 
settling population. Moreover, the percentage of house owners from 
2009 to 2011 increased from 14% to 23%.12 Immigrant entrepreneurship 
represents 8.6% of total enterprises (2014), contributing with 5.5% of 
the GDP (2013). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 All reports, data and information here mentioned are available online: 
www.migrantiefinanza.it. 
12 C. Daminat, N. Kulic, “Living Inequality and differences”, in Chiara Saraceno, 
Nicola Sartor and Giuseppe Sciortino (eds), Foreigners and inequalities. The 
inequalities in the rights and living conditions of immigrants, Bologna, 2013. 
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Although reality is obviously more complex and articulated, the 
following scheme exemplifies the relationship between the migration-
integration stage in Italy (being new arrivals; settling down; fully 
integrated) – and the financial needs expressed. 
 
The arrival stage is mainly characterized by the regularization 
process/need and linguistic and socio-cultural integration. The migrant 
community/family represents the main reference and source of 
information and financial support. From a financial aspect, this stage is 
characterized by high fragility and vulnerability and risks connected to 
reliance on informal circuits. Financial needs are limited, consisting 
mostly of accessing the payment system and saving services and 
remittances.  
The settlement stage marks the beginning of the process of 
integration. Job stability is the main trigger. Financial needs change 
along with the individual and family life, with the predominance of the 
credit and savings components. The relationship with the country of 
origin in terms of remittances continues. Financial inclusion becomes a 
crucial tool to support and accelerate the ongoing process and to avoid 
the social exclusion phenomenon. 
Finally, the integration stage highlights the decision of the migrant 
family to plan its life in the hosting country in the long term. Buying a 
house, allocating and managing capitals for the future (i.e. pension 
funds). As confirmation, 30% of migrants declared they were planning 
to buy a house in Italy within the following years (Observatory Report, 
2015). Migrant and indigenous clients are alike in terms of financial 
needs and behavior, with the exception of remittances that can 
sometimes turn into investment opportunities in the country of origin.  
Underlying a distinction among the migration-integration stages is 
significant in order to identify and address appropriate strategies and 
policies. Upon arrival, financial inclusion policies will support access to 
basic services at reduced cost (i.e. first entry bank account). For the 
settlement phase, the interaction between public policies and operators’ 
strategies can help support credit access (i.e. with a guarantee of funds 
or private-public initiatives to provide credit to families). For the 
integration stage, the market can play a predominant role. Recognizing 
the different migrant profiles/stages helps in identifying the most 
effective policies and strategies to support financial and social inclusion 
with the proper instruments. 
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In line with the integration-financial inclusion relationship analyzed 
above, some profiles of migrant bank clients were identified13 through 
different indicators, measuring the “familiarity with the banking 
system” and the “use of the financial products and services”. 
One of the most important results is the evolution of these profiles in 
recent years, with the growing presence of a “financially evolved” migrant 
type: someone with high familiarity with the banking sector that employs at 
least six banking products. This profile rapidly grew due to job stability, 
income brackets, increased financial inclusion and bank strategies. 
 
 
 
4. Measuring Financial inclusion 
The banking services index is an important indicator in defining the 
“financial inclusion level”, measuring access to banking services 
through ownership of a bank account.14 This is widely considered as the 
entry point for financial inclusion, one that can only increase with 
further access and use to more articulated services and products.  
The table below shows the recent evolution of this index among 
migrants15 in relation to the 21 examined nationalities, representing the 
88% of the foreign resident population in Italy. The number of current 
accounts of migrants in Italian banks and Banco Posta is 2.510.927 
(national data). Additionally, the number of prepaid cards (with an 
IBAN) and PostePay cards16 owned by migrants is 1.102.133.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Since the first survey of the Observatory in 2011, on a representative sample. 
14 The index is calculated as follows: number of migrants account holders/ number 
of adult migrants formally registered. 
15 Considering residents formally registered in Italy from non-OCSE countries 
(data: 31st of December 2013). 
16 Offered by BancoPosta - limited to clients without a current account. 
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Data indicates that the financial inclusion process is constantly and 
rapidly growing – with the index increasing from 61% in 2010 to 75% 
in 2013.17 This was confirmed by two indicators: 
• The number of current account holders significantly increased 
from 2009 and 2013, although data tends to slightly overestimate the 
phenomenon, due to the possibility of multi-ownership of an account in 
different banks (different bank groups or BancoPosta).18 Also, the 
number of pre-paid cards with IBAN (that can partly substitute the 
traditional bank account) increased by 19%. 
• The increasing percentage of clients with a long-term affiliation 
to the same bank (more than 5 years). Data show a constant growth in 
the percentage of those account holders keeping the same account for 
more than 5 years. This is an important indication of a financial 
inclusion profile, expressing an increasing trust with the bank institute 
and a sign of stability for the settlement process in Italy. 
A general difference has to be highlighted in geographical terms: the 
index varies in Italy between the North (92%); the Center (85%) and the 
South (40%) (Observatory Report, 2015). 
In terms of perception, it is important to note that in the Observatory 
survey of 2009, the bank was primarily considered a safe place to save 
money and obtain credit. In more recent times, the bank is largely 
perceived as a consultant-advisor for managing and investing resources 
(Observatory Report, 2014).  
Overall, migrants show a better saving capacity19 compared to 
Italians.20 The Observatory Report (2015) indicates that 68.8% of 
migrant savings are destined to remain in Italy, and the rest (31.2%) to 
be sent to the country of origin (including remittances; solidarity 
projects or investments). Considering the medium income of migrant 
respondents (11.475 Euros), 70% is employed to cover expenses in 
Italy, 16% is directed to savings in Italy and 14% goes to the country of 
origin (remittances/investments) (Observatory Report, 2015). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 The number of bank accounts slightly decreased from 2012 to 2013 – perhaps as 
a consequence of the economic recession affecting employment conditions – but it had 
been largely compensated by the increased number of prepaid cards (with IBAN). Still, 
if we consider the evolution of  data, as of 2009 the overall trend is extremely positive.   
18 Although an estimate from the Observatory (2011) assumed the presence of only 
3.5% owners of multi-current accounts in different banks. 
19 Between 15-18% of the income (Observatory Report, 2013). 
20 Between 8% (according to ISTAT, 2012) and 12% (according to GFK Eurisko 
Prometeia, 2012).  
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Analyzing the behavior of migrant account holders in terms of credit, 
26% of the account holders have a loan in a bank or Banco Posta 
(Observatory Report, 2013). This trend suffered the consequences of the 
economic recession (with a severe downsizing between 2011-2012), but 
a recent a positive dynamism is emerging. 
Regarding the use of financial products and services, internet 
banking increased from 22% in 2010 to 48% in 2014 (Observatory 
Report, 2015).  
Considering migrant entrepreneurs, we can highlight the evolution of 
the small business segment in the banks’ portfolio (registering an 
average annual growth rate of 10.1% from 2009 to 2014, representing 
4.5% of all small business bank accounts). 
 
 
 
 
5. Indications for policy dimensions  
Thanks to the Observatory reports since 2011, different areas of 
interventions to support and strengthen the migrants’ financial inclusion 
process had been identified for national and local policies. All in all, 
migrants appear to be the most vulnerable group with higher risks of 
economic, financial and consequently social exclusion. It is therefore 
evident that any initiative directed at supporting migrants’ financial 
inclusion is welcomed and necessary in the short and the long term. 
Moreover, financial inclusion will be recognized as a constituent 
element and instrument  to grant a fully comprehensive economic 
citizenship to migrants but also to Italians. In a changing perspective, 
financial inclusion initiatives will not only be associated to market 
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operators and private sector projects, but will also be incorporated into 
migration and social welfare/integration polices.  
Following are a few indications of specific thematic areas for 
possible policy interventions. 
• A general need to better study and recognize all ongoing 
processes – in terms of financial inclusion and behavior and the 
integration process – and to correctly identify relevant targets, through 
analysis and monitoring of activities at local and national level. In Italy, 
the opportunity offered by the Observatory provides updated 
information and analysis that can be of help in planning any public 
and/or private initiative. 
• As long as migrants integrate, it is important to sustain the 
process of savings’ accumulation and protection, in order to consolidate 
and reinforce the achieved results with more flexible and better designed 
products. 
• The economic recession had severe impact on Italians and 
migrants, in terms of augmented risks of social and economic exclusion 
and vulnerability. The social costs and consequences of being excluded 
from the financial system would be very high. Credit access assumes a 
crucial value in supporting the integration process and in overcoming 
temporary income shortages. All in all, the integration of migrants will 
be pursued not only for its positive impact in terms of social cohesion 
and multicultural living, but also for its economic potential through 
financial inclusion in terms of contribution to the local/national 
productive system; ethnic entrepreneurship; further availability of 
savings and monetary resources to be intercepted and valued by 
financial operators.  
• The banking system plays a crucial role within the process of 
migrant financial inclusion. Still, the different migrant profiles cannot 
easily find on the market specific products and services according to 
their migration-integration stage and needs. Large room for joint public-
private initiatives could provide significant results. 
• Financial education – targeting the financial and integration 
needs and profiles would be a much more useful instrument – 
addressing not only migrants, but also Italians.   
• Migrant entrepreneurship is increasingly emerging and playing 
a role in contributing to the Italian economic system. It is important to 
further sustain it with scouting, start-up, training, tutoring activities, but 
also from the financial aspect – with products and services relating 
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specifically to credit access. Microcredit initiatives can also offer 
significant possibilities for the migrant segment. 
• The integration process of migrants takes place predominantly 
at the local/territorial level. Indications to experiment territorial and 
local policies on migration financial inclusion emerged, probably with 
more effective results at local-city level than at nation one. 
 	  
III PART 
The Stakeholders Point of View 
	  
  
OPERATION MARE NOSTRUM:  
CAUSES AND DEVELOPMENT 
Gianvittorio Ciolli∗ and Francesco Ruggiero∗∗ 
 
This operation was a tangible example of the commitment, 
dedication, humanity and professionalism of the Italian Navy and its 
crews in managing migratory flows. 
The purpose of this paper is to illustrate the work accomplished by 
the Italian Navy during the 378 days of Operation Mare Nostrum (from 
18 October 2013 to 31 October 2014) and the commitments it has 
undertaken for the future, describing all that has occurred in the past 
months, and that is still taking place, and attempt to put into words 
emotions that no amount of words could possibly express.  
The movement of an entire people toward a new land is a 
phenomenon that has existed for millennia but one that has yet to find a 
solution. 
Unfortunately, the phenomenon of migration is complex and exists 
in numerous and heterogeneous regions of global relevance. 
The factors described below will surely not be new to many readers 
and have already been the subject of thorough analyses and lengthy 
debate. But at this moment they have reached the apex of their 
development and have led to an incredible upsurge, an exponential 
growth of certain phenomena, among which the issue of migration 
emerges as one of the most significant.  
First, there is the problem of growing international conflicts. We 
have reached a point in the area of an expanded Mediterranean in which 
a number of questions are beginning to increasingly overlap and feed off 
each other; consider the civil war in Syria, in Libya, the instability in the 
sub Saharan countries, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the forceful 
affirmation of the Islamic caliphate, the collapse of the Iraqi regime. 
There is an increase in religious conflicts not only among Muslims 
and Christians but, in a very violent manner, also in an inter faith 
environment, such as in the Muslim world, between Sunnis and Shiite. 
Also important is the basic weakening of International 
Organizations, something that had not seemed possible but that has, in 
fact, taken place; in this context the international community has 
become the spectator and at the same time actor in the weakening of 
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various international organizations that in attempting to limit the 
decision making autonomy of individual States are being increasingly 
opposed and contested.   
Finally, the power of the media has the ability of drawing the 
attention of the world only toward events the media itself considers of 
interest, overshadowing others that, if dealt with in a timely manner, 
would not degenerate into more serious situations. 
Today, the ease with which information is sent by rapid and 
widespread means of communication, such as the web and its social 
networks, apparently without the need to confirm sources and ignoring 
any code of ethics, with the conviction that the information issuing from 
the source, from the field, or even from a single individual, is factual 
and true, amplifies and often influences in a distorted manner the 
management of crises, modifying their natural course. 
In addition, there are other elements that certainly cannot be 
disregarded and in respect of which we can do very little as individual 
nations, such as climate change, the disproportionate population growth 
and medical emergencies, of which Ebola is only the most recent 
example. 
Our planet is changing. Climate changes are producing extreme 
meteorological phenomena with an increasing frequency even in areas 
not previously subject to disastrous events. We need only recall such 
normally innocuous names, generally female, attributable to 
meteorological events that have brought death and destruction to coastal 
areas in different parts of the world (in 2012 there were 905 catastrophic 
events, 93% of which are attributable to meteorological phenomena. 
From 1980 to the present natural disasters have more than doubled and 
this tendency is increasing).1 
If we then add the fact that the world population (about 7 billion 
according to UN sources) will increase by one billion over the next 12 
years, and that about the 80 % of world population lives in an area 200 
km from the coastline, it’s easy to see that in the near future many 
inhabitants of coastal areas and the hinterland will be at risk.  
The greatest demographic growth is taking place in emerging 
countries, where living conditions are more difficult and the level of 
healthcare lower compared to the standards of industrial powers. 
                                                
1 Worldwatch institute-petra low, natural catastrophes in 2012 dominated by u.s. 
Wheatherextremes – 29 May 2013. 
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Today we are witnessing a growth in the outbreak of epidemics that 
are spreading from remote areas of a continent to other areas of the 
world with a rapidity rivaling the duration of a transoceanic flight! 
The global problems just described will intensify the phenomenon of 
migration in the coming years. The World Migration Report (2010) 
highlights that if migratory flows continue to increase as they have over 
the past twenty years, by 2050 we will reach 405 million and the need to 
guarantee the human rights of migrants will become a high priority 
much like the issue of protecting illegal immigrants. 
Focusing on the scenario that particularly affects our own nation and 
natural interests, we see that it is composed of the Mediterranean area 
and its wider dimension: the Black Sea, the Middle East, the Red Sea, 
the Persian Gulf, the Horn of Africa, the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of 
Guinea. 
This wide region of strategic interest is the common ground and also 
the cause of friction among the different realities of politics, economy, 
wealth, culture, religion, ethnicity and language. Within the enlarged 
Mediterranean therefore there are numerous destabilizing phenomena. 
In the eastern Mediterranean, civil war in Syria seems to be without 
end and is generating consequences that extend across national borders 
and spread into a Middle East that is already characterized by historical 
religious and ethnical conflicts. 
The recent deterioration of the Israeli-Palestinian crisis has only 
served to increase instability and lack of security, heavily involving the 
civilian population, and the confrontation between the different ethnic-
religious ‘souls’ of Iraq are worsening the living conditions of the local 
populations and increasing the persecution of minorities. 
The central Mediterranean is also destabilized by ethnic phenomena 
that do not allow Libya to attain a political balance to restore normalcy 
to an area toward which illegal migration is directed and where they find 
criminal organizations conducting human trafficking. It is obvious that 
domestic or international conflicts lead inevitably to the deterioration of 
social problems, such as the mass emigration of people in distress. 
It is specifically in this part of the world that a number of issues are 
concentrated, including that of illegal immigration that over the last year 
has been transformed from a persisting phenomenon to a veritable mass 
phenomenon of significantly larger dimensions. 
The flows start from as far away as Eritrea, from which the highest 
percentage of migrants comes, to Mali. Basically the entire sub-Saharan 
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area is undergoing a social dismantling, a strong migration that is added 
to the problems of Syria and of Iraq. 
With specific reference to the flow coming from the eastern 
Mediterranean (Medor) and from Libya, we note that criminal 
organizations are making frequent use of ‘mother ships’. 
The area where migrants were transferred from the mother ship to a 
towed ship is about 350 miles from Italy. Here the towed ship full of 
immigrants is abandoned, while the smugglers, usually about fifteen, 
leave with the tugboat. 
The Navy has been present in the Strait of Sicily since 1959. As part 
of its legally assigned institutional role, the Navy monitors fishing 
activities, in particular in the area used for replenishment of fish stock, 
commonly known as the ‘Hillock’ (Mammellone). In this portion of the 
international sea, unilaterally declared as an exclusive exploitation zone 
by Tunisia, various attempts were made in the past to confiscate national 
fishing boats and migration from Africa to Italy has intensified over the 
years. 
In addition, since 2004 the Italian Navy has taken part in Operation 
Constant Vigilance, monitoring flows in the Strait of Sicily. This 
operation was then superimposed by the activities conducted by 
Frontex, the European agency for border control tasked with patrol 
activities. 
The perception that has existed from the beginning is that Mare 
Nostrum has encouraged the influx of illegal immigrants to Italy. But in 
fact, according to the official data of institutional bodies, the rate of 
migrants arriving in Italy prior to Oct. 1, 2013 is higher than that 
following the activation of Mare Nostrum and thus the increase in 
migration is not linked to the presence of units at sea, but to the 
catastrophic situation of the many countries from which these poor 
migrants depart. 
The significant increase in the flow of migrants recorded especially 
in the second half of 2013 had already indicated the need to reinforce 
military air and naval surveillance to monitor migration flows. This 
increase in illegal immigration culminated, as we know, in the tragic 
events of October 3, 2013. 
On the night between 3 and 4 October 2013, 366 people died just 
two miles away from Lampedusa island. This was the drama that led to 
the activation of Mare Nostrum and that thanks to the media brought 
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what was happening to the attention of all Italian citizens. Making it 
important, and unavoidable, to intervene. 
Why was command of Mare Nostrum assigned to the Italian Navy? 
Because it is an extensive operation, conducted on the high seas, and the 
Navy is the armed force with the greatest command and control 
capability of air and naval forces on land and at sea. On land because 
the operations center of the High Command is equipped with all the 
instruments required to control and coordinate all other forces, agencies 
and organizations operating at sea; at sea, because each vessel is a self-
propelled operations center connected via satellite with the national 
communications network and represent highly important command and 
control nodes. 
Added to this is the fact that men of the Navy are trained to operate 
at sea for long periods, without any ground support; they can operate 
under adverse weather conditions thanks to the size of the ships and the 
training of personnel; and because our old ships, though primarily 
conceived for military operations, have dual capabilities. For example, 
amphibious ships designed to land Marines on the beaches at the same 
time are also the most suitable means to undertake rescue at sea because 
they have an inner basin that allows boats or vessels to moor in the belly 
of the ship. They also have a large flight deck that can be used to 
transport the injured and large operating rooms to care for the wounded 
in the event of a landing. 
Last but not least, because the Navy it carries out police functions on 
the high seas where no national sovereignty is recognized, in accordance 
with international law. 
The goal of the operation is to provide increased monitoring of the 
main routes, from Egypt but also from Libya, used by criminal 
organizations engaged in illegal immigration using a wide variety of 
boats. As we have seen, including from the images of the mass – media, 
the means used are extremely varied. Starting with inflatable rafts made 
in China, typical of the ‘Garbulli’ area of Libya, which can carry up to 
100 people but have very low resilience and thus can easily break down; 
followed by barges, very familiar to us, that are increasingly retrieved 
by fishing vessels to be used again to transport migrants; and larger 
mother ships (at least as large as fishing boat) that release small boats 
that are towed when nearing Italian waters. 
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Identifying boats filled with migrants as soon as possible is crucial to 
prevent dangerous situations for people at sea and at the same time 
obtain information the information required to prosecute traffickers. 
Geographically most of the migrants come from Eritrea, Syria and 
then Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, Pakistan, Senegal, Egypt and Tunisia. 
One of the most positive effects of Mare Nostrum has also been the 
increased cooperation with other ministries, most notably the Ministry 
of Health, the Italian Red Cross, Volunteers of the Order of Malta and 
the Rava Foundation. 
On board the ships there is a group of workers of different 
backgrounds who have achieved extraordinary results.  
Since the start of Mare Nostrum several non-governmental 
organizations and international bodies of private law have provided 
specialized staff, especially doctors and nurses, to assist rescued 
migrants on board Italian Navy ships. This cooperation was recently 
extended to include operators from the Ministry of Health and the 
Italian Red Cross military and volunteer corps. Indeed a specific 
cooperation agreement between the Ministry of Defense and the 
Ministry of Health was signed on June 18, 2014. 
Since the beginning of this fruitful cooperation, on June 21, 2014, 
fourteen doctors from the Ministry of Health – USMAF have served on 
board ships assigned to Operation Mare Nostrum. 
Together with military physicians they perform a preliminary 
epidemiological screening of migrants, identifying and isolating anyone 
suspected of infectious diseases, thus safeguarding the health of the 
crew and the entire national population. 
The activities of the USMAF doctors allow for the timely transfer of 
any individuals suspected of suffering from a disease to appropriate 
medical facilities, consequently streamlining bureaucratic procedures 
concerning the migrants’ arrival in the port of reception. 
Since the beginning of their activities, physicians from the Ministry 
of Health have checked more than 15,000 migrants rescued at sea by 
Navy ships. 
The cooperation agreement between the Navy and the USMAF has 
extended its benefits to other areas such as the ongoing briefing/training 
sessions for crews of the vessels engaged in operation Mare Nostrum. 
A protocol with the Ministry of Health has also been signed for the 
installation on board of stretchers that can be used in extreme cases, 
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such as a situation involving Ebola, and de-pressurization chambers to 
allow for medical examinations even in cases of suspected infectivity. 
On 21 November 2014 a Memorandum of Understanding between 
the Ministries of Health, Defense and Interior was signed. This protocol 
provides for the parties’ commitment to  
 
“cooperate in the activities of migrant assistance in order to 
strengthen actions and measures of health protection also 
against the risk of importation of infectious and contagious 
diseases, through health checks to be carried out directly on the 
ships and landing locations or in their vicinity”. 
 
A further agreement was signed with Save the Children, in Rome, on 
October 7, 2014, allowing for the presence of staff on board Navy ships 
to provide: 
- Direction;  
- Legal information; 
- Foreign Minors Cultural mediation. 
Other important aspects to be analyzed are related to the activities of 
the Police of the high seas, especially, in the event of illegal 
immigration, the crucial collection of evidence. 
If the vessel has not been identified as the mother ship, it is 
accompanied toward the Italian contiguous zone where it is delivered to 
units of the border police. 
If there are indications that the boat is involved in human trafficking 
activities or weapons smuggling, the competent prosecutor’s office is 
immediately informed and, when evidence collection is complete, the 
boat is stopped, boarded and inspected in accordance with the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea and the implementing procedures 
provided for by national legislation. 
If/when the office of the prosecutor orders the seizure of the vessel, 
the crew is arrested and the ship is secured and routed toward a national 
port by security forces. 
Regarding police activities on the high seas, this begins with the 
acquisition of evidence, such as photographs taken from a patrol plane 
even 700 miles from Italy or from the periscope of a submarine 
following a mother ship with its towed boat full of desperate migrants. 
Thanks to these proofs and to the authorization issued by a judge, the 
Navy has captured traffickers present on the mother ship by 
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implementing the right to visit applicable in such cases, boarding the 
vessel while the mother ship desperately tries to evade capture through 
evasive maneuvers. 
The seizure of mother ships and human traffickers is carried out by 
exercising the role of police of the high seas, assigned by international 
law and Italian law to Italian naval vessels. Operations are coordinated 
with the Public Prosecutors and submarines and air and naval assets 
collect supporting evidence also. In this manner Mare Nostrum has 
reduced lawlessness on the high seas, reduced the number of arrivals to 
our shores and allowed for improved reception. 
The increased naval presence has also improved the ability to alert 
by identifying boats before their approach toward national coasts. One 
direct consequence of the seizure of such ships has put an end to the 
route from Egypt.  
The increase in the number of migrants on boats has confirmed the 
need to use of large ships that can effectively operate even under 
adverse weather conditions. 
The drastic reduction in the number of migrants arriving on our 
shores without first being detected and controlled, has allowed the Navy 
to perform a health screening on board Navy ships prior to their arrival 
to Italy. 
Migrants have been distributed and sent to different locations, thus 
avoiding the collapse of reception centers due to overcrowding (ex. 
Lampedusa Pre-Operation Mare Nostrum). 
Unfortunately, the geopolitical context does not allow us to foresee a 
lessening of migration towards Europe, on the contrary there will 
probably be an increase in the number of persons attempting to escape 
war, persecution and hunger. These people must be helped, but the 
process must be adjusted if we are to prevent the Mediterranean from 
becoming a sea of death. 
Faced with this ongoing tragedy Italy could not remain inert. The 
Mare Nostrum’s operation was inevitable for a civilized country. 
In the meantime we must contain losses and limit the arrival of 
migrants to our shores, provide for medical examination of refugees, 
offer asylum to those entitled and prevent the unlawful use of the sea. 
Because of these actions, refugees view Italy as a civilized country that 
has not shied away from its responsibilities. 
The Commanders of Navy ships have intervened to seize the ‘mother 
ship’ and stop human trafficking by exercising specific  police powers 
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on the high seas conferred upon them by international law and the laws 
of the State.  
The presence of a significant part of the fleet, with officials of the 
Interior Ministry on board, has assured careful surveillance to check for 
possible infiltration of terrorist/subversive cells that could take 
advantage of the massive flows of immigrants as a means to enter 
European countries. 
Doctors of the Health Ministry and volunteer organizations 
embarked on Navy ships have provided on site examinations of 
migrants and, if necessary, initiated the appropriate care before the ship 
reaches land, identifying those to be sent to specialized hospitals for 
further care. 
On the 31st October 2014 the Government decreed the end of 
Operation Mare Nostrum. In 379 days of activity, this operation assisted 
156,362 individuals in 439 SAR (Search and Rescue) missions, with 
peaks of about 9,300 migrants a week. The alleged smugglers, arrested 
and handed over to judicial authorities, thanks also to the cooperation 
with local prosecutors, numbered 366. Five ‘mother ships’ were also 
seized. Submarines, covertly documenting criminal activities, 
effectively collected supporting evidence.  
The purpose of the operation was to: 
- Increase the global framework of maritime security, contrasting 
illegal activities in the central Mediterranean, with special emphasis on 
human trafficking; 
- Respond to the emergency in progress in the central 
Mediterranean, providing a “continuing naval presence on the high seas 
to protect life at sea and provide humanitarian assistance”; 
- Provide an advanced health checkpoint to examine migrants 
before reaching Italian shores. 
The technical and logistical capabilities of Italian Navy ships – 
including health/medical services – made it possible to deal with a 
humanitarian emergency and to provide assistance to a large number of 
people.  
This activity continued even after conclusion of the Mare Nostrum 
mission. With the exacerbation of the terrorist threat, it became 
necessary to reinforce the number of naval and air assets deployed to the 
central Mediterranean, in order to protect the many national interests 
that are currently susceptible to a growing risk determined by the 
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presence of extremist entities and to ensure consistent levels of safety at 
sea. 
On 1 November the European Union launched TRITON, the 
multinational border police operation to prevent and combat illegal 
migration, replacing the FRONTEX operations (Hermes and Aeneas) 
active in the central Mediterranean since 2010. The Italian Navy took 
part in operation TRITON up to March 24, with a high seas patrol vessel 
and an average of 4 patrol boats. 
At the same time, in order to maintain an adequate presence in the 
central Mediterranean and the Straits of Sicily, a Naval Surveillance and 
Maritime Security (DNSSM) mission was activated. This remained 
operational from 1 November to 31 December 2014 in order to allow 
operation TRITON to reach full operational effectiveness.  
The mission remained operational for 61 days, assisting 13,668 
migrants in the course of 38 SAR actions. 
On February 15, 2015, at the conclusion of a rescue operation 
involving a boat carrying 247 migrants, a small fast boat approached the 
Coast Guard unit CP 319 with armed people on board. They ordered the 
ship to move away from the now empty boat and opened fire about 20 
meters from the rescue vessel. The traffickers then proceeded to recover 
the boat used by the migrants. As a consequence of this event it became 
necessary to provide security to national assets engaged in SAR 
activities. 
On March 12, 2015, air naval assets were deployed and tasked, in 
accordance with national legislation and international agreements in 
force, with providing maritime surveillance and security in the central 
Mediterranean. 
The operation uses only Italian Navy assets and is called Mare 
Sicuro. 
The ships of Mare Sicuro operate in an area of about 160,000 square 
kilometers, in the central Mediterranean and off the Libyan coast. This 
mission is basically a sea version of operations performed on land by 
national armed forces called Strade Sicure. 
Because of the worsening crisis in Libya, as of 12 March 2015 sea 
air and naval assets of Mare Sicuro were deployed to the central 
Mediterranean to carry out surveillance and security activities, in 
accordance with national legislation and international agreements, in 
order to protect national interests by: 
  
281 
- Exercising oversight functions and protection of oil platforms 
located near the Libyan coast, in international waters; 
- Protecting national resources, especially Coast Guard Units 
performing SAR activities from the actions of criminal organizations; 
- Discouraging and combating the work of organized crime groups 
involved in illegal trafficking and preventing the re- use of vessels used 
for these activities. 
During operation Mare Sicuro several significant events took place:  
On 13 April 2015, at the conclusion of a SAR event, a rigid hull 
boat, flying the Libyan flag, with people in uniform on board, 
approached the barge subject of the rescue operation conducted by M/N 
Asso 21 (Italian flag), claiming to belong to the Libyan coast guard. In 
the final phase of the rescue operation, the Libyan vessel fired a few 
shots into the air, forcing the M/N Asso 21 to move away. The Libyan 
vessel then took possession of the empty barge. The SAR operation also 
included the TYR, an Icelandic Coast Guard unit (mission TRITON-
FRONTEX), which at the time was near Asso 21. 
The ship ‘Bergamini’ immediately intervened, using its own 
helicopter to restore safety.  
On 17 April 2015, the Italian fishing boat ‘Airone’, (department of 
Mazzara del Vallo), sailing inside the Fisheries Protection Zone 
unilaterally proclaimed by Libya and approximately 20 nautical miles 
from the external border of Libyan territorial waters, was confiscated by 
the armed tug ‘Al Mergheb’, a Libyan Coast Guard vessel. 
The Commander of the Naval Group, Adm. Ribuffo, ordered the 
‘Bergamini’ to intervene and, in coordination with the Prosecutor of 
Catania, acquired control of the vessel using a team of Navy 
commandos. 
On the night between 18 and 19 April, during rescue operations 
conducted by M/V ‘King Jacob’ (flag Portugal), a boat full of migrants 
sank. The ‘Orion’ intervened, as did SAR helicopters, while the ships 
‘San Giusto’ and ‘Bergamini’ threw life rafts overboard and searched 
for the castaways. All Italian fishing boats in the areas were also called 
in to assist. They rescued 28 castaways and retrieved 24 bodies. 
On May 4 the ‘Bettica’ foiled an attempt by the Libyan tug ‘Al 
Mergheb’, to seize the Italian ship ‘Regina’. 
On 7 May, at the request of the Prosecutor of Catania, an Italian 
Navy Minesweeper (the ‘Gaeta’ – with its underwater vehicle ‘Gigas’) 
located the wreckage that sank during the night of 18 and 19 April at a 
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depth of about 370 meters. Judicial authorities to reconstruct the event 
are currently examining the films. 
On Sunday, June 21, The M/V ‘Dignity 1’ (ship of ‘Doctors Without 
Borders’ organization) rescued two dinghies carrying migrants near 
Libyan territorial waters off the coast of Zuwarah. They found one 
migrant killed and another wounded by gunfire. 
The killing and injuring allegedly occurred the night before when a 
group of facilitators engaged in smuggling migrants supposedly came to 
the site of embarkation demanding additional money before the 
migrants would be allowed to leave. When the migrants refused the 
facilitators fired a few shots. 
As the ‘Dignity 1’ was completing its rescue of the migrants on the 
first dinghy a fast vessel claiming to belong to the Libyan police 
approached the site and took possession of the dinghy. 
At the request of the ‘Dignity 1’, a helicopter from the ‘Bettica’ 
present as part of operation Mare Sicuro, intervened by taking the 
wounded migrant and evacuating him to Lampedusa. 
Operation Mare Sicuro uses an average of 4/5 vessels. Since the 
beginnings of the operation there have been 166 SAR missions, during 
which 23,018 migrants have been rescued, 72 smugglers arrested and 
one ‘mother ship’ seized. 
In addition to Operation Triton, the recent activation of the European 
Union naval operation EUNAVFORMED (June 22, 2015) attests the 
renewed attention of Member States to the serious situation that is 
taking place in the Mediterranean. Countries like Germany and the 
United Kingdom have provided ships, and other states have sent 
specialized staff and will be sending additional air and naval assets as 
soon as they attain political authorization. At this time the Operation is 
tasked with monitoring and gathering information on the illegal 
activities of traffickers (Phase 1). The mission will perform a more 
incisive role as soon as the United Nations issues a specific mandate. 
THE EVOLUTION OF ENFORCEMENT POWERS ON THE HIGH 
SEAS THROUGH THE AIR-NAVAL OPERATIONS  
OF THE GUARDIA DI FINANZA AGAINST THE SMUGGLERS  
OF MIGRANTS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA 
Amedeo Antonucci, Marco Fantinato, Pasquale Caiazza* 
 
1. Introduction 
The Guardia di Finanza is a special law enforcement corps which 
has a military organisational structure and reports directly to the 
Ministry of Economy and Finance. The Guardia di Finanza (hereinafter 
referred to as the GdF) cooperates with Armed and Police Forces 
throughout the Italian territory and its main competences are established 
by Legislative Decree no. 68/2001.1 In addition to its traditional 
activities as criminal and financial police, the GdF institutional tasks 
also include, inter alia, border control, maritime patrolling and the 
countering of illicit trafficking by sea. According to the Italian legal 
framework, the GdF has an exclusive competence in terms of criminal 
and financial police at sea and, in order to perform these duties, has the 
largest naval fleet of all other Police Forces in Italy. These specific 
competences allow the GdF to coordinate air-naval operations at sea in 
cooperation with its territorial units and land patrols.  
Additionally, the GdF is responsible for the surveillance of the 
European Union borders in international waters and for this reason has 
been chosen as the point of contact for all international operations 
carried out in cooperation with various international Organisations and 
under the aegis of the European Agency Frontex. In fact, since 2006 the 
GdF has been coordinating as well as actively participating in Joint 
Operations under the overall technical coordination of Frontex (i.e. 
operations NAUTILUS, HERA, POSEIDON, INDALO, HERMES, 
                                                
* Colonel Amedeo Antonucci, Captain Marco Fantinato and Lieutenant Pasquale 
Caiazza are officers of the Guardia di Finanza. They have coordinated and participated 
in several air-naval operations in the Mediterranean Sea and have been actively involved 
in the Joint Operations carried out in the framework of the European Agency Frontex. 
The views expressed in this article reflect the opinions of the authors only and do not 
represent the official position of any international organisation, agency or government 
institution. All the materials used for the purpose of this paper are available in the public 
domain on open sources. 
1 Decreto Legislativo n. 68/2001 Adeguamento dei compiti del Corpo della Guardia 
di Finanza, a norma dell’articolo 4 della Legge n. 78/2000. 
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AENEAS, TRITON, etc.).2 In particular, as far as Joint Operations 
AENEAS, HERMES and TRITON are concerned, the GdF is in charge 
of managing these activities under the supervision the International 
Coordination Centre (ICC) located at the Air-naval Operational 
Command (Comando Operativo Aeronavale) in Pratica di Mare, and by 
the Local Coordination Centres (LCCs) of the Air-naval Groups 
(Gruppo Aeronavale) of Taranto, Messina and Lampedusa. 
 
2. Rules of engagement at sea followed by the Guardia di Finanza  
In accordance with the corps’ institutional tasks, the operational 
approach of the GdF regarding the migration phenomenon in the 
Mediterranean Sea has always been characterised by the need to ensure 
and balance whenever and wherever possible: 
- the safety of life at sea of the migrants; 
- the arrest of the smugglers; 
- collecting and gathering evidence for ensuing and connected 
criminal investigations, with possible insights into the economic and 
financial aspects related to the transnational nature of illicit trafficking 
and of the criminal organisations involved. 
However, the operational need to use law enforcement powers 
outside territorial waters, interfering with the freedom of navigation on 
the high seas, depends on the possibility of exercising Italian criminal 
jurisdiction international waters. Ever since, the GdF began to intercept 
people smugglers in these extraterritorial maritime zones, transnational 
criminal organisations have responded to the techniques and procedures 
used by the GdF by changing their criminal behavior and perpetrating 
such offences in what they believe to be areas of impunity. For this 
particular reason, in order to deal with the threats posed by these illicit 
cross-border activities, and as the GdF attempts early interception on the 
high seas, jurists have begun to acknowledge this operational approach 
by extending the application of Italian jurisdiction to international 
waters (creeping jurisdiction). In fact, it should be noted that some of 
the GdF law enforcement operations at sea have fostered the 
development of best practices, leading to an evolution of the legal 
instruments provided by the international law.  
For instance, it is worth mentioning the case of the fishing boat 
CEMIL PAMUK, used as a mother boat without nationality for the 
                                                
2 Description of these Joint Operations is available at www.frontex.europa.eu. 
	   285 
transportation of immigrants from Turkey and intercepted by the GdF 
about 150 nautical miles off the coasts of Calabria in August 2001. 
Given the relevance of this operation, several jurists and scholars 
analysed the case, considering it to be a milestone in this field. As a 
result, the sentence3 condemning the Turkish smugglers was used as 
reference in the guidelines recently published by the National Anti-
Mafia Bureau (Direzione Nazionale Antimafia, hereinafter referred to as 
the DNA), “Criminal organisations facilitating irregular immigration. 
Ships used for the transportation of migrants in international waters. 
Operational proposals for the solution of issues related to the Italian 
jurisdiction and possibility of intervention”.4 On this particular occasion, 
the issue of exercising law enforcement powers on the high seas came to 
light. Police officers and judicial authorities needed appropriate legal 
instruments in order to apprehend the smugglers who tried to escape 
after the transshipment of migrants in international waters. Basically, 
they needed to bridge a gap in the national legislation framework and 
devise a legal fiction, based on the principles provided by the 
international Law of the Sea, which allowed them to legitimately extend 
Italian jurisdiction over the high seas. 
In light of such an operational scenario, in the following paragraphs 
we will describe some law enforcement operations coordinated by the 
GdF in the Mediterranean Sea, in order to highlight the relevant legal 
and operational aspects of these activities. Recently, the operational 
approach used by the GdF at sea has been supported also by the Court of 
Cassation’s sentences. An analysis of these judgments offers food for 
thought for scholars and jurists in terms of the evolution of available 
norms, both at national and international level, to secure the arrest of 
migrant smugglers. These sentences specifically focus on the possibility 
of recognising Italian jurisdiction over international waters pursuant to 
the principles enshrined in the international Law of the Sea.  
 
                                                
3 Tribunal of Crotone, 27th September 2001, Pamuk and others, Published in the 
International Law Journal, 2001, Italian jurisprudence provided by Professor Tullio 
Scovazzi. 
4 The document published by the National Anti-Mafia Direction is available on 
open sources on the web. Unofficial translation. For a comparative analysis of the text, 
please refer to “Associazioni per delinquere dedite al favoreggiamento 
dell’immigrazione clandestine. Navigli usati per il trasporto di migranti con 
attraversamento di acque internazionali. Proposte operative per la soluzione dei 
problemi di giurisdizione penale nazionale e possibilità di intervento”. 
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3. Case study: Operation “ZORA”. Ships flying flags of convenience  
On July 6, 2011, during a nighttime surveillance mission within the 
framework of the Joint Operation AENEAS 2011,5 an Icelandic aircraft 
detected a suspicious sailboat approximately 63 nautical miles south-
east of Santa Maria di Leuca. At first, the Icelandic crew reported that 
the name of the sailboat was ZORA and that it was flying a Croatian 
flag. However, after a closer look at the radars, the crew promptly added 
that the sailboat was heading towards Italian coasts with migrants on 
board. On the basis of these inputs, a law enforcement operation was 
launched and the sailboat was monitored by the air-naval assets of the 
GdF. The following day, at about 26 miles south-west of Santa Maria di 
Leuca, 18 nautical miles beyond the baseline that identifies the historic 
bay of the Gulf of Taranto, within the contiguous zone (Fig. 1), a GdF 
helicopter reported that the sailboat had stopped the engines and halted 
abruptly while several migrants crowded the upper deck signaling for 
help. The ship had been abandoned by the smugglers and left adrift, thus 
imperiling the lives of the migrants. 
 
 
Fig. 1 - Progressive positions of the boat ZORA sailing towards the 
Gulf of Taranto 
 
                                                
5 The Joint Operation AENEAS was promoted by the European Agency Frontex in 
order to tackle the irregular immigration flows from North Africa, Greece and Turkey. 
The operational activities in the Ionian and Adriatic Sea were locally coordinated by the 
Guardia di Finanza of the Air-naval Group of Taranto. 
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At this point the GdF vessels intercepted the yacht with the migrants 
on board and the smugglers were stopped in the vicinity of the sailboat 
while trying to escape in a rubber boat. When the rescue operations 
were terminated, 89 migrants were saved, 3 Ukrainian smugglers were 
arrested and charged with “facilitating irregular immigration” pursuant 
to Article 12 of Legislative Decree no. 286/19986 and the sailboat 
ZORA was seized (Fig. 2 and 3). The ensuing investigation confirmed 
suspicions regarding nationality. During the search of the sailboat, 
police officers discovered papers related to a Ukrainian vessel named 
ANIKA-52 while no documents were found to prove Croatian 
registration. Subsequently, it was ascertained that during their voyage 
towards Italy, the crew had changed the sailboat’s name, along with the 
flag, in the Ionian Sea in order to avoid suspicion and prevent 
identification by the Italian authorities.  
 
                                                
6 Articolo 12 del Decreto Legislativo 286/1998, Favoreggiamento 
dell’immigrazione clandestina: “Salvo che il fatto costituisca più grave reato, chiunque, 
in violazione delle disposizioni del presente testo unico, promuove, dirige, organizza, 
finanzia o effettua il trasporto di stranieri nel territorio dello Stato ovvero compie altri 
atti diretti a procurarne illegalmente l’ingresso nel territorio dello Stato, ovvero di altro 
Stato del quale la persona non è cittadina o non ha titolo di residenza permanente, è 
punito con la reclusione da cinque a quindici anni e con la multa di 15.000 euro per ogni 
persona nel caso in cui: 
a) il fatto riguarda l’ingresso o la permanenza illegale nel territorio dello Stato di 
cinque o più persone;  
b) la persona trasportata è stata esposta a pericolo per la sua vita o per la sua 
incolumità per procurarne l’ingresso o la permanenza illegale;  
c) la persona trasportata è stata sottoposta a trattamento inumano o degradante 
per procurarne l’ingresso o la permanenza illegale;  
d) il fatto è commesso da tre o più persone in concorso tra loro o utilizzando 
servizi internazionali di trasporto ovvero documenti contraffatti o alterati o comunque 
illegalmente ottenuti;  
e) gli autori del fatto hanno la disponibilità di armi o materie esplodenti.”. 
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Fig. 2 – Migrants aboard the sailboat ZORA during rescue operations 
conducted by the GdF 
 
 
Fig. 3 –The sailboat ZORA flying the flag of convenience and 
displaying the false name 
 
Several other air-naval operations have demonstrated that using flags 
of convenience is a frequent practice which is regularly adopted by 
transnational criminal organisations involved in the smuggling of 
migrants by sea. In this peculiar case, taking into account the evidence 
collected by the GdF, this modus operandi was considered to be 
particularly relevant from an operational and judicial standpoint, both at 
national and international level. In fact, the nationality of a ship 
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constitutes a genuine link with the legal system of the State of 
registration and grants exclusive jurisdiction of the flag State regardless 
of the location of the ship. 
However, international law provides that States are free to determine 
the procedures to grant their nationality as established by Article 917 of 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea8 (hereinafter 
referred to as UNCLOS), ratified by Italy in 1994.  
Normally, a State grants its nationality by registering the ship in the 
public registry. This procedure authorises the ship to fly the State’s flag, 
and at the same time, permits the flag State to exercise criminal and civil 
jurisdiction over that ship. The flag State must effectively exercise its 
jurisdiction and control over administrative, technical and social matters 
for ships flying its flag, and take appropriate measures as established by 
paragraph 4 of Article 94 (“Duties of the flag State”) of the UNCLOS. 
In particular, these measures envisage, inter alia: 
(a) that each ship, before registration and thereafter at appropriate 
intervals, is surveyed by a qualified surveyor of ships, and has on board 
such charts, nautical publications and navigational equipment and 
instruments as are appropriate for the safe navigation of the ship; 
(b) that each ship is in the charge of a master and officers who 
possess appropriate qualifications, in particular in seamanship, 
navigation, communications and marine engineering, and that the crew 
is appropriate in qualification and numbers for the type, size, machinery 
and equipment of the ship; 
(c) that the master, officers and, to the extent appropriate, the crew 
are fully conversant with and required to observe the applicable 
international regulations concerning the safety of life at sea, the 
prevention of collisions, the prevention, reduction and control of marine 
pollution, and the maintenance of communications by radio. 
In addition, in accordance with the provisions of Article 92 (“Status 
of ships”) of the UNCLOS, a ship sailing on the high seas shall be 
subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag State. A ship may not 
change its flag during a voyage except in the case of a real transfer of 
                                                
7 Article 91 (“Nationality of ships”) provides that: “…ships have the nationality of 
the State whose flag they are entitled to fly. There must exist a genuine link between the 
State and the ship. Every State shall issue to ships to which it has granted the right to fly 
its flag documents to that effect”. 
8 Legge n. 689/1994, Ratifica ed esecuzione della Convenzione delle Nazioni Unite 
sul diritto del mare, firmata a Montego Bay il 10 dicembre 1982. 
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ownership or change of registry. Furthermore, as can be easily inferred 
from the second paragraph of the article, “a ship which sails under the 
flags of two or more States, using them according to convenience, may 
not claim any of the nationalities in question with respect to any other 
State, and may be assimilated to a ship without nationality”. In fact, an 
internationally recognised principle of customary law provides that 
vessels without nationality cannot invoke the protection of any flag 
State and can be subjected to the jurisdiction of any State. Under such 
circumstances, ships on government service can exercise the “right of 
visit” (Article 110 of the UNCLOS), board and search the vessel, and if 
any suspicion remains with regard to the real nationality of the 
intercepted vessel, escort it to the nearest port for further examination 
and take appropriate actions in accordance with international law. The 
adoption of these measures is justified both by the lack of jurisdiction of 
any flag State and by the fact that the authorities intercepting the vessel 
have a specific interest in preventing infringement of their domestic 
laws. 
This operational approach is further confirmed by the provision 
included in the additional Protocol of the United Nations Convention on 
Transnational Organized Crime (hereinafter referred to as UNTOC).9 In 
particular, Article 8 (“Measures against the smuggling of migrants by 
sea”),10 paragraph 7, states that: 
 
“A State Party that has reasonable grounds to suspect that a vessel is 
engaged in the smuggling of migrants by sea and is without nationality 
or may be assimilated to a vessel without nationality may board and 
search the vessel. If evidence confirming the suspicion is found, that 
State Party shall take appropriate measures in accordance with relevant 
domestic and international law”. 
 
Pursuant to international legislation, the sailboat ZORA/ANIKA-52 
sailing on the high seas was assimilated to a stateless ship and police 
officers took all the appropriate measures with particular regard to the 
boarding, searching and seizure of the vessel according to the legal 
provisions set forth in Article 110 paragraph 1 (d) of the UNCLOS. In 
                                                
9 Annex III Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, 
supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime 
ratified by Law 146/2006. 
10 See full text of the article 8 of the UNTOC. 
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fact, although the sailboat was intercepted in international waters, Italian 
criminal law is fully applicable also by virtue of the provisions of 
Article 7 of the Italian Penal Code (“Offences committed abroad”), 
which expressly provide that: “Any Italian citizen or a foreigner who 
commits in a foreign territory one of the offences listed below is 
punishable under the Italian law… any other offence for which the 
applicability of the Italian criminal law has been established according 
to special laws or international conventions”.11 The three Ukrainian 
smugglers were thus subject to detention measures in accordance with 
both domestic and international norms, using the legal instruments 
contemplated for “ships flying flags of convenience”. 
 
4. Case study: Operation NEVER MORE. Stateless ships  
On the 12th of October, 2013, during a patrolling mission over 
international waters, a Portuguese aircraft deployed to the Joint  
Operation AENEAS 201312 detected a mother boat towing a smaller 
and empty fishing boat (Fig. 4). Pursuant to a modus operandi 
                                                
11 Unofficial translation. For a comparative analysis of the text, please refer to 
Articolo 7 (“Reati commessi all’estero”): “E’ punito secondo la legge italiana il 
cittadino o lo straniero che commette in territorio estero…ogni altro reato per il quale 
speciali disposizioni di legge o convenzioni internazionali stabiliscono l’applicabilità 
delle legge penale italiana”. 
12 The Joint Operation “AENEAS 2013” was carried out under the coordination of 
the European Agency Frontex in order to tackle the irregular immigration in the Ionian 
Sea and it was locally coordinated by the Guardia di Finanza of the Air-naval Group of 
Taranto. 
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previously adopted on several other occasions by transnational criminal 
organisations involved in the smuggling of migrants, the fishing vessel 
used as a mother boat did not fly any flag nor show any distinctive 
external mark to indicate its nationality, with the express purpose of 
avoiding any identification by air-naval assets. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4 and 5 – Smugglers towing an empty wooden boat and transferring 
the migrants from the mother boat 
 
At approximately 250 miles off the coast of Calabria (Fig. 6), 
traffickers began to transfer the migrants from the fishing vessel used as 
a mother boat to the smaller vessel, with the Portuguese aircraft 
recording the activity through the optical sensors installed on board. 
When the transshipment operations were terminated, the mother boat 
started heading towards North African coasts while the fishing vessel 
with the migrants onboard proceeded towards Italian shores. Although 
lacking any basic maritime knowledge and seamanship to sail safely 
towards the coasts, the migrants manoeuvred the smaller vessel and 
started heading toward Italy. For this reason, a law enforcement 
operation was launched, the fishing vessel with the migrants on board 
was stopped at 178 nautical miles from Capo Spartivento, while the 
offshore patrol vessel (hereinafter referred to as OPV) “PV. 03 Denaro” 
of the Air-naval Group (Gruppo Aeronavale) of Taranto intercepted the 
mother boat at about 233 nautical miles (Fig. 7). Considering the 
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collective evidence of the criminal acts committed in international 
waters13 and the fact that the mother boat was allegedly without 
nationality, the captain of the OPV ordered the boarding of the ship on 
the high seas pursuant to the legal provisions set forth in Article 110 
(“Right of visit”), paragraph 1 (d) of the UNCLOS. 
 
  
Fig. 6 – The detection of the mother boat at about 250 nautical miles 
from the Italian coasts 
 
The police officers did not find any documentation proving the 
nationality, registration nor the name of the vessel, thus the vessel was 
treated as a stateless ship and the mother boat was seized. At the end of 
the law enforcement operation, 17 alleged Egyptian traffickers were 
taken into custody and later arrested upon arrival at the port of Reggio 
Calabria, charged with “facilitating irregular immigration”. Meanwhile, 
also in international waters, other naval assets of the GdF intercepted the 
fishing boat which the migrants had been forced to board and 226 
Syrian immigrants were rescued (Fig. 8). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
13 The transfer operations in the high seas, which constituted the genuine link to the 
Italian territory, were recorded by the Portuguese aircraft. 
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Fig. 7 – The OPV “PV.03 Denaro” intercepting the mother boat 
 
 
Fig. 8 – GdF naval assets rescuing the migrants 
 
 
As far as the sentence issued by the Court of Reggio Calabria is 
concerned, the judge who examined the case was confronted with 
several legal challenges. However, when faced with the question of 
“whether the Italian authorities could legally exercise their enforcement 
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powers in the high seas”,14 the judge confirmed the legitimacy of the 
police officers’ intervention in international waters with respect to the 
mother boat without nationality and sentenced the smugglers to prison. 
Also in this case, and similar to Operation ZORA, in view of Article 91 
(“Nationality of ships”) of the UNCLOS and Article 8 (“Measures 
against the smuggling of migrants by sea”) of the additional Protocol of 
the UNTOC,15 the judge affirmed that:  
 
“In this particular event, the principle of territoriality16 is fully 
applicable without any limitation in accordance with the national legal 
provisions regarding the cases which deal with stateless ships. The 
exercise of enforcement powers at sea with particular regard to the 
boarding, searching and seizure of the ship can be considered as 
legitimate acts when performed by those States Parties who have an 
interest in preventing the infringement of their domestic laws”.17 
 
The judge also acknowledged the application of national legislation 
by virtue of the legal provisions included in Article 7 of the Italian Penal 
Code (“Offences committed abroad”).18 The judge also held that 
pursuant to this article, in order to recognise Italian criminal jurisdiction, 
it is sufficient that the preparatory acts of “facilitating irregular 
immigration” be committed abroad for the sole purpose of perpetrating 
the offence in Italian territory. The preparatory acts of the crime are also 
referred to in Article 12 of Legislative Decree no. 286/199819 in which 
they are expressly considered to be punishable also pursuant to this 
norm. Furthermore, regarding the crime of “facilitating irregular 
immigration”, it should be noted that: 
                                                
14 Unofficial translation of an extract of the sentence.  
15 Supra note 9. 
16 The “principle of territoriality” (principio di territorialità) in the Italian legal 
framework is defined by the article 6 of the Italian Penal Code (unofficial translation). 
See Articolo 6: “Reati commessi nel territorio dello Stato”) - “Chiunque commette un 
reato nel territorio dello Stato è punito secondo la legge italiana. Il reato si considera 
commesso nel territorio dello Stato, quando l’azione o l’omissione, che lo costituisce, è 
ivi avvenuta in tutto o in parte, ovvero si è ivi verificato l’evento che è la conseguenza 
dell’azione od omissione”. 
17 Supra note 14. 
18 Supra note 11. 
19 Supra note 6. 
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(a) the conduct listed in Article 12 of Legislative Decree no. 
286/1998 is deemed criminal even without any actual harm to the 
migrants being done (reato di pericolo), provided that the harm would 
have occurred if the authorities had not intercepted the vessel in distress 
and rescued the migrants on board;  
(b) the norm refers to a generic conduct (reato a condotta libera) 
without specifying any particular type of criminal behaviour (e.g. 
preparatory acts of the crime or those which Article 12 refers to as altri 
atti diretti a procurarne l’ingresso); 
(c) the crime can be committed regardless of whether the illegal 
entry of the migrants into Italian territory actually occurs (reato a 
commissione anticipata); 
(d) the attempt to commit such offence (delitto tentato) cannot be 
contemplated because the norm provides that only preparatory acts of 
the crime can be prosecuted.  
As a result, the judge assimilated the organisation of the voyage 
(both by land and sea) along with the transportation of the 226 migrants 
to preparatory acts of the offence aimed at facilitating the illegal entry 
into the Italian territory, and although these acts were committed in 
extraterritorial areas, he confirmed that the conduct of the smugglers 
was indeed punishable under Italian law.20  
 
5. Case study: Operation “Deep Sea”. The ‘essential fragment’ of 
the crime of facilitating irregular immigration 
Pursuant to another modus operandi frequently adopted by the 
criminal organisations operating in Libya, on 22 April, 2015, the 
Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre in Rome received two distress 
calls via satellite phone from two different rubber boats that had 
departed from Tripoli heading for Italian coasts and were allegedly 
carrying migrants on board. Both rubber boats were intercepted in 
international waters (Fig. 9 and 10) and 220 migrants were rescued at a 
distance of about 20 nautical miles from Libyan shores (Fig. 11). 
                                                
20 Unofficial translation. For a comparative analysis of the text, please refer to 
Sentenza n. 27106 del 16 giugno 2011 e sentenza n. 38159 del 23 settembre 2008 della 
Corte di Cassazione, secondo cui: “… il delitto consistente nel compiere atti diretti a 
procurare l’ingresso illegale di una persona in altro Stato ha natura di reato di pericolo o 
a consumazione anticipata e si perfeziona per il solo fatto che siano compiuti atti diretti 
a favorire l’ingresso, a prescindere dall’effettività, durata e finalità dell’ingresso 
medesimo, in quest’ultima incluso il mero transito con destinazione finale il Paese di 
origine della persona stessa”. 
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Fig. 9 and 10 – The GdF OPV “PV. 03 Denaro” rescuing migrants from 
both rubber boats 
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In both cases, the operations aboard the two rubber boats were filmed 
by the police officers on the scene and these recordings, along with the 
ensuing investigation, proved to be fundamental in identifying the 
smugglers who were trying to hide among the immigrants. The migrants 
were then transferred on board the GdF OPV “PV. 03 Denaro” and 
escorted to the port of Catania (Fig. 12) while the smugglers were 
arrested.  
 
   
Fig. 11 – Positions of the rubber boats intercepted at 20 nautical miles 
from Libya 
 
Fig. 12 – The “P.V. 03 Denaro” escorting the migrants to the port of 
Catania 
 
In this instance, the case also raises the question as to whether the 
judge can extend Italian criminal jurisdiction over international waters, 
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prosecuting the smugglers apprehended so far away from the Italian 
coasts. In this regard, using an innovative approach, the judge 
established that: 
 
“Italian jurisdiction shall be recognised in international waters when 
the smugglers leave the migrants adrift onboard unseaworthy boats in 
order to trigger a SAR event. This modus operandi is pursued by the 
smugglers in order to oblige the rescuers to transport the migrants into 
the Italian territory. The rescuers facilitate the illegal entry into the State 
by escorting the migrants towards the coasts, however, they operate 
under the “state of necessity”.21  
 
Nevertheless, since the ‘state of necessity’ is caused by premeditated 
acts committed by the smugglers with the aim of endangering the lives 
of the migrants, the offence is indeed directly linked to the smugglers. In 
fact, although the preparatory acts to facilitate the illegal entry are 
committed abroad (both in Libya and in international waters), they can 
be prosecuted pursuant to the cases contemplated by Article 7 
(“Offences committed abroad”) of the Italian Penal Code.22  
On the one hand, according to Article 54 (“state of necessity”) of the 
Italian Penal Code, the rescuers who allowed the migrants to reach the 
Italian territory by facilitating their illegal entry into the State are 
deemed as indirect perpetrators23 operating under the international 
obligation of the “duty to render assistance”.24 On the other hand, the 
smugglers who deliberately caused and artfully instrumentalised the 
                                                
21 The “state of necessity” (“stato di necessità”) in the Italian legal framework is 
defined by Article 54 of the Italian Penal Code: “The dispositions described in the first 
part of this article shall apply even if the state of necessity is determined by a threat from 
a third party. In this case, those causing the person to commit the offense, shall be held 
responsible for the consequences on their behalf” (unofficial translation). For a 
comparative analysis of the text, please refer to Articolo 54 (“Stato di necessità”) 
comma 3 del Codice Penale: “La disposizione della prima parte di questo articolo si 
applica anche se lo stato di necessità è determinato dall’altrui minaccia; ma in tal caso, 
del fatto commesso della persona risponde chi l’ha costretta a commetterlo”. 
22 In particular, the part that reads as follows: “…an offence is considered to be 
committed within the territory of the State when the action or omission that constitutes 
the conduct is wholly or partly committed within its territory…” (unofficial translation). 
Supra note 16. 
23 In the Italian legal framework the indirect perpetrator is referred to as “autore 
mediato”. 
24 Article 98 of the UNCLOS and SAR Convention. 
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‘state of necessity’ in order to oblige the rescuers to commit the offence 
are considered to be the direct perpetrators. As a result, although the 
preparatory acts of the crime were committed abroad, the conduct of the 
smugglers is punishable under the Italian law.25  
Such an operational approach was also confirmed by the Court of 
Cassation’s judge who stated that in this case the ‘state of necessity’, 
which is strictly linked to the “duty to render assistance”, was 
knowingly caused in order to promote the illegal entry into the State 
under the international protection provided by the SAR intervention. In 
accordance with this view, judicial authorities began to consider the 
distress call performed on international waters as an ‘essential fragment’ 
of the facilitators’ criminal conduct that allows the judges to extend 
Italian jurisdiction to the high seas.26 This judicial interpretation was 
further supported by the recent guidelines published by the DNA which 
ruled that the law enforcement intervention on the high seas is deemed 
to be legitimate in those specific cases where the facilitators try to 
exploit the “duty to render assistance” as a means to perpetrate the 
offence of illegal entry of migrants into Italian territory. Furthermore, 
the Court of Cassation confirmed this point of law by clarifying that, 
regardless of where the offence has been committed, under these 
particular circumstances, the rescuing of migrants serves as an 
instrument to pursue the facilitators’ ultimate goal. Such an act, which is 
deliberately caused by the smugglers in order to trigger the coastal 
State’s SAR intervention, represents the last fragment of their intended 
criminal design. Therefore, the Court of Cassation, recognising criminal 
jurisdiction beyond territorial waters, concluded that the criminal 
conduct of the facilitators in international waters is indeed liable to 
prosecution under Italian jurisdiction.27 
 
6. Operational challenges: the contiguous zone  
The challenges that have emerged over the years during air-naval 
operations against irregular immigration by sea emphasise the need to 
understand the enforcement powers that can be legitimately exercised 
by the Italian State in the contiguous zone. Notably, Article 33 
(“Contiguous zone”) of the UNCLOS reads as follows: 
                                                
25 Unofficial translation. For a comparative analysis of the text, please refer to 
sentence n. 14510/14 of the Italian Court of Cassation. 
26 Sentence n. 3345/15 of the Italian Court of Cassation. 
27 Sentence n. 14510/14 of the Italian Court of Cassation. 
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1. In a zone contiguous to its territorial sea, described as the 
contiguous zone, the coastal State may exercise the control necessary to: 
(a) prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or 
sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea; 
(b) punish infringement of the above laws and regulations committed 
within its territory or territorial sea. 
2. The contiguous zone may not extend beyond 24 nautical miles 
from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is 
measured. 
Despite the fact that the legal provisions included in this article 
attribute to the coastal State the control necessary to ‘prevent’ the 
violation of its domestic laws, it should be noted that the measures 
contemplated by customary international law entail both preventive and 
repressive powers.  
Arguably, the thesis that such law enforcement measures should be 
limited merely to preventive powers appears rather contradictory and 
has been disproved by international practice. It would be illogical to 
affirm that a State Party, after having gathered and collected the 
evidence of offences committed in the contiguous zone during the 
boarding and searching of a ship, should release such vessel and wait for 
its entry into territorial waters before exercising repressive powers.28 
Therefore, it is fair to assume that the expression ‘prevent’ is used in its 
wider meaning, for the purpose of indicating all those activities that are 
necessary to exercise these powers comprehensively, including 
repressive measures when needed. These norms on the powers of 
intervention in international waters were borrowed from the provisions 
set forth in the UNCLOS and have been effectively implemented in all 
Frontex Operational Plans. These documents establish the rules of 
engagement with which Member States must comply within the 
framework of international Joint Operations in the Mediterranean Sea 
carried out under the coordination of the European Agency. These rules 
also apply to the Joint Operation TRITON 2015, for which the Air-
Naval Group (“Gruppo Aeronavale”) of Taranto acts as the Local 
Coordination Centre (LCC) for the air-naval assets of the participating 
Member States. 
On the other hand, as far as domestic laws are concerned, it is worth 
mentioning the relevant national legislation and sentences pertaining to 
                                                
28 See B. Conforti, Diritto internazionale, VIII Edition, Editoriale scientifica, 
Napoli, 2010. 
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the application of immigration laws, with particular focus on the 
contiguous zone:  
a. Article 12 “Measures against the smuggling of migrants by 
sea”, paragraphs 9 bis and 9 quater of Legislative Decree no. 
286/1998.29 Specifically, in terms of law enforcement powers that police 
forces can legitimately exercise in the territorial waters and the 
contiguous zone, paragraph 9 bis clarifies that: 
If an Italian police force ship has reasonable grounds to believe that a 
vessel sailing in the territorial waters or the contiguous zone is engaged 
in the smuggling of migrants by sea, it may stop, board and search the 
vessel. If elements confirming the involvement in the smuggling of 
migrants are found, it shall seize and escort the vessel to a port of the 
State.30 
In addition, paragraph 9 quater points out in which cases the above 
mentioned enforcement powers can be specifically exercised when the 
ship is outside territorial waters:  
The powers referred to in paragraph 9 bis can be exercised outside 
the territorial waters by the ships of the Italian Navy as well as by ships 
of Police Forces, according to the limits set out by domestic law, 
international law or multilateral/bilateral agreements, if the vessel is 
flying a national flag or another State’s flag, or the vessel is without 
nationality or is flying a flag of convenience.31  
b. Interministerial Decree of 14th July 2003 “Measures against 
irregular immigration”, Article 6 (“Activities in the territorial waters and 
the contiguous zone”). In particular, as far as internal and territorials 
waters are concerned, paragraph 2 reads as follows: 
                                                
29 These two paragraphs were introduced by the article 11 paragraph 1 (d) of the 
Law 189/2002. 
30 Unofficial translation. For a comparative analysis of the text, please refer to 
Articolo 12 comma 9 bis: “La nave italiana in servizio di polizia, che incontri nel mare 
territoriale o nella zona contigua, una nave, di cui si ha fondato motivo di ritenere che 
sia adibita o coinvolta nel trasporto illecito di migranti, può fermarla, sottoporla ad 
ispezione e, se vengono rinvenuti elementi che confermino il coinvolgimento della nave 
in un traffico di migranti, sequestrarla conducendo la stessa in un porto dello Stato”.  
31 Unofficial translation. For a comparative analysis of the text, please refer to 
Articolo 12 comma 9 quater: “I poteri di cui al comma 9-bis possono essere esercitati al 
di fuori delle acque territoriali, oltre che da parte delle navi della Marina militare, anche 
da parte delle navi in servizio di polizia, nei limiti consentiti dalla legge, dal diritto 
internazionale o da accordi bilaterali o multilaterali, se la nave batte la bandiera 
nazionale o anche quella di altro Stato, ovvero si tratti di una nave senza bandiera o con 
bandiera di convenienza”. 
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For the purpose of expediting the intervention of Police Forces in 
territorial waters, an area of coordination that extends to the limit of the 
zone internationally recognised as ‘contiguous zone’ is established. In 
these waters, if there are various assets belonging to different corps, the 
coordination of naval activities related to combating irregular 
immigration is entrusted to the Guardia di Finanza.32  
As mentioned in the previous paragraph, in 2002 Law no. 189/200233 
introduced specific measures to counter irregular immigration by sea in 
the contiguous zone. This norm can be considered as the only domestic 
law that makes a clear reference to the contiguous zone and affirms its 
existence. Nevertheless, jurists and scholars have long debated whether 
this law reflected the original intent of the Italian legislator and whether 
this provision was sufficient to establish a contiguous zone recognised 
by all the State Parties of the UNCLOS. However, it shall be noted that 
the UNCLOS does not clarify any legal instrument nor specify any 
particular procedure through which a State Party should implement the 
introduction of the contiguous zone. Thus, considering that this legal 
provision constitutes a clear manifestation of the will to establish this 
area, Police Forces operating at sea have invariably exercised the 
enforcement powers provided by this law where applicable.  
For this reason, if a State Party can stop, board and search a vessel 
allegedly involved in the smuggling of migrants in the contiguous zone 
(regardless of its nationality) and when evidence is found it can seize 
and escort such vessel to a port of the State, it might as well take 
appropriate measures against the smugglers of migrants long before they 
enter territorial waters. In fact, recent decisions have confirmed this 
point of law by acknowledging the operational approach of the GdF 
during air-naval operations at sea. Evidently, the locus commissi delicti 
(whether the offence occurs in territorial or extraterritorial areas) in 
which the crime of ‘facilitating the irregular immigration’ has been 
committed is no longer relevant in terms of the qualification of such 
criminal conduct. In fact, several jurists have clarified that this specific 
                                                
32 Unofficial translation. For a comparative analysis of the text, please refer to 
Articolo 6 comma 2: “Al fine di rendere più efficace l’intervento delle Forze di polizia 
nelle acque territoriali è stabilita una fascia di coordinamento che si estende fino al 
limite dell’area di mare internazionalmente definita come «zona contigua» nelle cui 
acque il coordinamento delle attività navali connesse al contrasto dell’immigrazione 
clandestina, in presenza di mezzi appartenenti a diverse amministrazioni, è affidato al 
Corpo della guardia di Finanza”.  
33 Supra note 29. 
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offence has already been committed before the migrants reach territorial 
waters.34 
Conversely, since the contiguous zone is not a maritime zone where 
coastal States can exercise their full sovereignty, in this area it is not 
possible to prosecute migrants pursuant to the offence of “illegal entry 
and sojourn in the territory of the State”, as defined by Article 10 bis of 
the Legislative Decree no. 286/1998.35 Rather, the contiguous zone 
represents a functional area established for the purpose of allowing 
Police Forces to prevent only those offences perpetrated against the 
coastal State.36 As a result, with the contiguous zone being an area over 
which the coastal State cannot exercise its full sovereignty as 
established for the territorial sea, this maritime space does not need to 
be delimited by boundaries. In fact, it can be extended up to the limits 
set by the UNCLOS (24 nautical miles) and can even overlap with any 
adjacent areas of neighbouring coastal States. Notably, jurists have 
always been cautious in this field, and in fact, there are very few cases 
where the intervention of criminal police in the contiguous zone has 
been confirmed by judicial authorities. However, these few operations 
have been carried out by air-naval assets of the GdF. 
c. Sentence no. 42/2012 issued on June 7, 2012, by the Justice of 
Peace of Alessano. 
This case deals with the interception of a small boat with seven 
migrants (including 2 minors) in the contiguous zone (about 14 nautical 
miles from Santa Maria di Leuca) on May 4, 2012. The migrants were 
brought before the judicial authorities in Lecce for the offence of Article 
10 bis of Legislative Decree no. 286/1998.37 In his ruling, the judge 
stated as follows: 
(1) despite the fact that the intervention of the GdF was triggered 
by a SAR event, police officers also acted in accordance with Article 12, 
paragraph 9 bis and quater of Legislative Decree no. 286/1998. These 
                                                
34 Supra note 20. 
35 Unofficial translation. For a comparative analysis of the text, please refer to 
Articolo 10-bis (“Ingresso e soggiorno illegale nel territorio dello Stato”): “Salvo che il 
fatto costituisca più grave reato, lo straniero che fa ingresso ovvero si trattiene nel 
territorio dello Stato, in violazione delle disposizioni del presente testo unico nonché di 
quelle di cui all’articolo 1 della legge 28 maggio 2007, n. 68, è punito con l’ammenda da 
5.000 a 10.000 euro. Al reato di cui al presente comma non si applica l’articolo 162 del 
codice penale”. 
36 These powers are those referred to in the article 33 of the UNCLOS. 
37 Supra note 35. 
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provisions establish that the Italian authorities shall prevent the illegal 
entry of migrants into the Italian territory, both in the territorial waters 
and contiguous zone, and that these powers must be exercised within the 
limits set out by international law;38 
(2) as far as the exercise of law enforcement powers in the 
contiguous zone is concerned, the intervention of the GdF can be 
considered as legitimate. Despite the fact that there is no explicit 
proclamation of the contiguous zone in the Italian legal framework, its 
existence is confirmed by Article 12 of Legislative Decree no. 
286/1998, limited to the exercise of the powers relating to the 
prevention of irregular immigration. These provisions are deemed 
sufficient to recognise Italian jurisdiction over this area and to 
acknowledge the exercise of enforcement powers to suppress a violation 
committed in the contiguous zone also in accordance with the Article 33 
of the UNCLOS; 
(3) the existence of a contiguous zone for the purpose of preventing 
the infringement of its immigration laws complies with the provisions 
set forth by international law, thus the criminal jurisdiction was 
legitimately exercised against the migrants who were heading towards 
Italian shores with the intent of entering the territory of the State 
irregularly; 
d. Sentence no. 32960/2010 of the Court of Cassation, on the 
seizure of a Turkish ship named CENGIZKAN. 
This case differs from those described above as the Court of 
Cassation did not raise the issue of whether a contiguous zone had or 
had not been established. This judgement deals with the case of a 
Turkish vessel and a boat acting in conjunction with a ship captured by 
a GdF patrol vessel in international waters. The boat had been launched 
from the vessel for the transportation of irregular migrants. After being 
intercepted in international waters, there followed a hot pursuit, 
commencing within the contiguous zone. In the first instance, the 
Tribunal of Locri, applying Articles 33 (“Contiguous zone”) and 111 
(“Hot pursuit”)39 of the UNCLOS, confirmed the arrest of the Turkish 
smugglers and the seizure of the ship. However, the Court of Cassation 
did not recognise Italian jurisdiction, stating that the contiguous zone 
could not be invoked because Turkey did not ratify the UNCLOS. Such 
a decision caused a heated debate among scholars and jurists and the 
                                                
38 Supra notes 31 and 32. 
39 Article 111 (“Right of hot pursuit”) of the UNCLOS. 
	  306 
Turkish smugglers were acquitted. However, in the context of law 
enforcement operations at sea, supporting such a controversial 
argument, would lead to the assumption that Italy could not exercise its 
full sovereignty over the Gulf of Taranto (Fig. 13), which is 
internationally regarded as an ‘historic bay’, because the flag State of a 
ship in transit has not ratified the Convention and does not recognise the 
coastal State’s jurisdiction in those areas. 
 
 
Fig. 13 – Italian baselines and the Gulf of Taranto 
 
7. Concluding Remarks. Effective measures to prevent the smuggling 
of migrants 
The above mentioned operations are just a few of the numerous and 
complex missions carried out by the Guardia di Finanza whilst 
countering irregular smuggling by sea. All these air-naval operations 
were performed using a bold and innovative approach and exploiting all 
the instruments provided by the international Law of the Sea. Following 
the success of some of these law enforcement operations, the most 
recent judgements of the Court of Cassation in this matter have shown 
that there is a progressive tendency to acknowledge the extension of 
Italian jurisdiction over international waters (creeping jurisdiction). On 
the one hand, this operational approach stems from the need to ensure 
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the safety of life and the protection of migrants’ rights at sea, while on 
the other it is also aimed at prosecuting smugglers as well as identifying 
transnational criminal organisations that promote irregular immigration.  
At the same time, the need to enforce these measures farther away 
from national coasts calls for a maritime legislation reform in order to 
confer stricter powers upon law enforcement authorities operating in 
international waters. In fact, the international law framework and the 
legal instruments currently available now appear rather obsolete in 
comparison with the globalisation of illicit trafficking by sea. Evidently, 
the legal provisions established by international conventions are 
insufficient to assist law enforcement personnel operating at sea, and for 
this reason, these rigid norms are often overcome by bold judicial 
interpretations of the Court of Cassation. Apparently, under some 
circumstances, police officers find it hard to secure the arrest of 
smugglers at sea without the endorsement of a clear and unequivocal set 
of norms establishing the application of criminal law on the high seas.  
It is essential for Italy that the existence of a contiguous zone be 
explicitly and legally established in order to authorise law enforcement 
personnel to apprehend smugglers within such an area. In addition, the 
harmonisation of domestic law with the international legal framework, 
with particular regard to irregular immigration, should also be 
encouraged at the European level. Special legislation for the closed and 
semi-closed seas granting coastal States greater powers to exercise their 
jurisdiction in international waters could certainly strengthen the role of 
police forces operating at sea, and support the work of judicial 
authorities. In conclusion, such proposals could potentially enhance the 
possibility of countering irregular immigration effectively, with the aim 
of combating the criminal networks that organise, fund and promote 
people smuggling whilst also safeguarding the lives of migrants at sea. 
 
  
MIGRATION BY SEA: A “SEARCH AND RESCUE”  
EMERGENCY AND A BIG CHALLENGE  
FOR THE ITALIAN COAST GUARD 
Paolo Cafaro* 
 
The huge migration flows that are currently taking place in the 
Mediterranean have assumed dimensions never before seen in all of 
human history, in any corner of the world. These migrations lead to 
highly dangerous situations for the vast number of people who are sent 
out to sea on board overcrowded boats that are totally unsafe and 
lacking in the most elementary means of life saving. Under such 
conditions these desperate people can have only one destination: the 
bottom of the sea. It is difficult to believe in a criminal intent so 
appalling that it can conceive of sending tens of thousands of human 
beings to certain death simply for money. Saving them is the biggest 
challenge the Italian Coast Guard is facing right now. But before 
examining in detail the involvement of the Coast Guard in migration 
flow management, let’s take a quick look at its organization and 
principal missions. 
Although the Italian Coast Guard is a branch of the Navy the 
majority of its tasks are performed for government organizations other 
than the Ministry of Defense as all Ministries are responsible for various 
sectors of maritime affairs and civil uses of the sea and each uses the 
Coast Guard to manage these different sectors. For example, the 
Ministry of Infrastructures and Transportation has the political 
responsibility of safety at sea and the organization of search and rescue 
operations. It is also responsible for the administrative functions 
inherent to maritime navigation, seafarers’ training and administration, 
public ownership of merchant, leisure and fishing vessels, and much 
more. All these tasks are performed by the Coast Guard. The Ministry of 
the Environment relies upon the Coast Guard to protect the sea 
environment. The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry uses the Coast 
Guard to supervise fisheries policies. The Coast Guard also works with 
the police forces of the Ministry of the Interior to combat illegal 
activities at sea and with the Civil Defense Department in the event of 
natural disasters such as floods, volcanic eruptions, tsunamis, etc. while 
the Ministry of Historical, Archeological and Cultural Heritage calls on 
the Coast Guard to protect submerged archeological and historical 
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artifacts. Coast Guard personnel are also linked with the Justice 
Department as they are considered as police officers and with the 
Ministry of Labor concerning the employment of seafarers. 
In brief, the principal duties of the Coast Guard are the following: 
- Search and rescue at sea 
- Maritime safety and port and ship security 
- Protection of fishery resources and pollution prevention 
- Administrative functions relating to maritime navigation, 
fisheries, ownership of vessels, seafarers’ training and employment.  
In order to carry out the above missions successfully the Coast Guard 
relies on a robust structure that extends from one end of the national 
coastline to the other, composed of 250 maritime offices. The 
organization consists of 15 maritime directorates, 55 maritime 
compartments, 51 maritime district offices and 128 local offices. All the 
officers in charge of these commands are harbor masters as well. 
According to 1979 Hamburg Convention and consequent national laws, 
a specific organization dedicated to Search and Rescue (SAR) of human 
life in distress at sea has been inserted into the above described structure 
of the Italian Coast Guard. The national maritime SAR organization is 
composed of the IMRCC (Italian Maritime Rescue Coordination 
Center), responsible for organizing SAR operations and establishing and 
maintaining contact with foreign SAR organizations. The IMRCC 
cooperates with the Italian Coast Guard Headquarters in Rome and is 
composed of 15 Maritime Rescue Sub Centers (MRSC), one for each 
Maritime Directorate, and 101 Coast Guard Units (CGU) distributed 
among the other territorial maritime offices. They are charged with 
handling all levels of SAR events. 
The Mediterranean Sea has over 46,000 km of coastline bordering 22 
States. With its 8,000 km of coastline Italy alone represents 16% of the 
entire Mediterranean coastline. In addition, Italy is centrally located and 
its SAR region covers about 500,000 square miles compared to the 
630,000 sq. km of the Maltese and North African SAR regions. 
Considering that the IMRCC is constantly on call to coordinate SAR 
operations connected to migration flows the Italian Coast Guard 
undertakes extraordinary efforts in the performance of its missions. 
For SAR purposes it can rely upon its own air assets, such as the 
long range maritime patrol airplanes “ATR42 – MANTA”, the medium 
range “P180 – ORCA” or its newest “AW139 – NEMO” helicopters 
used for rescue and medical evacuation operations, deployed between 
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the Coast Guard Air Station of Catania and the island of Lampedusa. It 
also has such naval assets as the recently acquired 95 m long ships of 
the “Diciotti” class, equipped with a flight decks and large spaces 
capable of hosting up to 1,000 people, or the 22.30 meters long “300” 
class SAR vessels, deployed along the Straits of Sicily, fully operational 
in rough seas. Mention must also be made of the extraordinary results of 
divers who are deployed on board SAR vessels as rescue swimmers. 
The Italian Coast Guard makes use of all available resources to fulfil 
its mission of saving human lives in danger, making use of all air and 
naval assets. A strong effort is also made by numerous merchant ships 
from many different countries, witness the below table of their many 
successful operations in 2014: 
 
 
 
More than 880 merchant ships were diverted by IMRCC to assist and 
save migrants in distress at sea. 254 of these ships saved over 42,000 
migrants during the past year. Italian Navy ships saved more than 
86,000 migrants in close coordination with IMRCC as part of the 
military and humanitarian operation “Mare Nostrum” in 2014. 
FRONTEX assets, especially those included in the TRITON operation, 
also performed hundreds of SAR missions coordinated by IMRCC as 
shown in the following figures referring both to the past and the current 
years: 
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Let’s examine and analyze the figures of the migration flows. 
MIGRANTS RESCUED BY: Units
ITALIAN NAVY 82 14.720
ITALIAN COAST GUARD 133 19.146
MERCHANT SHIPS 122 13.618
ITALIAN CUSTOM POLICE 47 5.010
FRONTEX (NOT ITALIAN UNITS) 44 7.881
N.G.O. 36 6.276
Other FOREIGN MILITARY UNITS 67 11.918
TOTAL 510* 78.569
1126
Persons
MIGRANTS RESCUED AT SEA – YEAR 2015 
FROM 01ST JANUARY TO 14TH JULY 2015
Migrants arrived on they own on the Italian shore
*Some boats have been rescued by units of the Italian Coast Guard together with other  Military/Force of Police.
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The largest migratory flow is from Libya, with a total of 141.484 
people rescued at sea in 2014. Traffickers use rubber and wooden boats, 
overloading them to the point of extreme danger. Rubber boats meet no 
safety requirements and consist of long tubular sections that can easily 
deflate, causing the boat to sink, something that happens all too 
frequently. The wooden boats have a more solid structure but are 
unstable given the excessive number of people embarked, many of 
whom are jammed into the lower areas of the boat, whose movements 
can make the boat capsize, especially when a rescue vessel is in sight, 
causing numerous deaths. The majority of these rubber or wooden boats 
depart from the wester Libyan ports of Tripoli, Zuwarah and Gasr 
Garabulli. 
Up to the first half of last year many of the wooden boats departed 
from eastern Libya, specifically from Benghasi, but this flow is now 
over, probably because of the disorders affecting that part of Libya.  
There is currently a significant flow from Egypt using fishing vessels 
with the same problems described above: 15,283 migrants involved in 
this flow were rescued last year, while an additional 11,699 migrants 
from Turkey and Greece arrived on sail boats and motor boats in 2014. 
These are quite difficult to detect as they only carry a limited number of 
people on board who do not ask for help and can easily be mistaken for 
leisure boats. Most of the time the migrants are intercepted after they 
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have already reached Apulia, on the south-eastern coast of Italy or the 
Ionian coast of Calabria. Smaller groups of migrants leave Tunisia 
directed toward the island of Pantelleria or leave Algeria heading toward 
western Sardinia. 
Although merchant ships or military ships sometimes are the first to 
detect boats carrying migrants and notify the IMRCC so that it can 
initiate SAR operations, most often it is the migrants themselves who 
contact the IMRCC by satellite phones provided to them by the 
traffickers, along with the appropriate phone  numbers to call. Other 
times the IMRCC is contacted by migrants’ relatives or friends or from 
NGOs when they receive information. When sat phone calls are 
received directly from migrants’ boats, it’s much easier to get their 
position through the company operating the sat service. Sometimes the 
migrants can read their position on their sat phone display but often their 
English is too poor to provide the coordinates. When it is not possible to 
detect the position of a call for distress it is very difficult to manage a 
SAR operation and it may take days to locate the boat, using planes, 
helicopters and ships. They are not always successful. 
Why is the Italian Coast Guard so directly involved in rescue 
operations so far from the national SAR region and so close to the 
Libyan coast? The answer is simple: because IMRCC is almost always 
the first rescue center to receive distress calls from boats  that are even 
15 or 20 miles out from the Libyan coast, IMRCC is obliged by the 
SAR convention and IAMSAR manual to intervene, communicating the 
information to the MRCC responsible for the region. However it is not 
possible to do this in respect of Libya for reasons that are easily 
understood. Thus the IMRCC must coordinate SAR operations, 
diverting any merchant vessels in the vicinity, employing Navy or 
FRONTEX resources and sending Coast Guard assets. This is not only a 
legal obligation but also an ethical  and humane one. But in order to 
provide help and assistance to boats so far from Italy (160-180 nautical 
miles), the IMRCC must be constantly aware of the maritime situation 
throughout a large part of the Mediterranean. To help them achieve this 
goal, the IMRCC has radio and satellite systems available to provide the 
position of all ships in a given area and constantly updated information 
such as their last port of call, port of destination, type of cargo on board, 
etc. All these systems allow them to monitor ship traffic and identify 
anyone in distress in a specific area. 
There was, however, one type of migration event that differed from 
  
315 
315 
those examined above and that did not involve the IMRCC.  Last year, 
on September 28th, an old merchant ship, 56 m long, with no crew on 
board but occupied by 364 migrants, called the IMRCC for help as it 
entered the Italian SAR region. The people on board were rescued and 
the ship was towed to the harbor of Crotone, in Calabria. Since then, 14 
other similar cases have occurred, 2 of which were managed by Greek 
and Turkish authorities. These vessels, in port waiting to be dismantled, 
were hired by the migrants and departed illegally from Turkish ports. 
As the vessels entered the Italian SAR region, the IMRCC received a 
sat phone call requesting rescue while the traffickers left the ship adrift 
or blocked the steering wheel and controls on a course toward the Italian 
coast at a speed of about 10 knots. These were highly dangerous 
situations and in order to avoid a disaster the Italian Coast Guard had to 
deploy special teams on board helicopters to board and get control of the 
ship. So far they have always succeeded except for one case when they 
only managed to unblock the wheel and change course as the ship was 
just a couple of miles off the southern coast of Apulia. The ship was 75 
m long and we can easily imagine what would have happened if it 
hadn’t been diverted in time! The involvement of Turkish authorities  
demanded by Italy and strict controls of the Turkish Coast Guard seem 
to have stopped this kind of traffic, proving that international 
cooperation can achieve important results in avoiding casualties. The 
figures below, relative to migration flows during the first half of the 
current year, demonstrate that they are not decreasing at all and their 
characteristics remain basically the same: 
 
 
What is probably changing is Europe’s awareness that  a stronger 
collaborative effort must be made to avoid so many deaths at sea. That 
is why the IMRCC can now rely upon more governmental vessels flying 
events persons events persons
LIBYA 361 66.145 471 73.210
GREECE 22 636 11 663
TURKEY 7 378 10 1.749
EGYPT 20 4.875 11 2.808
TUNISIA 23 333 6 119
ALGERIA 2 23 1 20
other flows 1 61 0 0
total 436 72.451 510 78.569
DEPARTED FROM
year 2014
4%
-64%
-13%
-42%
363%
year 2015
(until July, 14th) (until July, 14th)
11%
Increase %
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the flag of various EU countries to rescue migrants and more effective 
cooperation. Of course this is not the solution to migration problems, 
but it is an acceptable response to the request that the safety of migrants’ 
lives at sea must be felt as a strong commitment not only by the Italian 
Coast Guard and Navy and by ship-owners, but also by the entire 
international community. 
ANNEX 
The Stakeholders “Naples Charter” – From Mare Nostrum to 
Triton and the Way Forward to Deal with Migration in the 
Mediterranean Sea 
	  
	  	  
LA	  CARTA	  DI	  NAPOLI	  
“Proposte	  per	  Affrontare	  le	  Migrazioni	  nel	  Mare	  Mediterraneo”	  
 
MARSAFENET - il Network di esperti sugli aspetti giuridici della 
sicurezza in mare - e JMCE Migranti - il Centro di Eccellenza Jean Monnet 
sui diritti dei migranti nel Mediterraneo - entrambi aventi l’obiettivo di 
migliorare lo scambio di informazioni e di buone pratiche sulle migrazioni 
nel Mediterraneo tra tutte le parti interessate e di promuovere altresì 
l’elaborazione e l’adozione di idonee e concrete soluzioni, 
 
Considerando il dibattito svoltosi nel corso dello Stakeholder Workshop dal 
titolo From Mare Nostrum to Triton and the Way Forward to Deal with 
Migration in the Mediterranean Sea, che ha avuto luogo lo scorso 15 maggio 
2015 presso l’Università degli Studi di Napoli “L’Orientale”, in Italia, (d’ora 
in avanti “lo Stakeholder Workshop”), 
 
Esprimendo il proprio apprezzamento per l’intervento durante lo 
Stakeholder Workshop dei rappresentati dell’Organizzazione internazionale 
per le migrazioni (IOM); dell’Alto Commissariato ONU per i Rifugiati – 
Agenzia ONU per i Rifugiati (UNHCHR); dell’Agenzia europea per la 
gestione della cooperazione internazionale alle frontiere esterne degli Stati 
membri dell’Unione Europea (FRONTEX); del Defence College della NATO; 
dell’Associazione italiana di studi giuridici (ASGI); del Consiglio Italiano 
per i Rifugiati (CIR); della Cooperativa sociale  Dedalus; dell’Associazione 
Lotta all’Esclusione Sociale per lo Sviluppo del Mezzogiorno d’Italia 
(LESS), del Migrant Offshore Aid Station (MOAS); dell’Unione Forense per la 
Tutela dei Diritti Umani (UFTDU), ed esprimendo soddisfazione per gli 
sforzi compiuti da tali enti per affrontare il fenomeno delle migrazioni nel 
Mediterraneo, 
 
Esprimendo il proprio apprezzamento per l’intervento, nel corso dello 
Stakeholder Workshop, dei rappresentanti della Guardia Costiera italiana e 
della Marina Militare Italiana, e prendendo atto dei dati illustrati riguardo 
alle operazioni di ricerca e soccorso dei migranti in mare, 
 
Ringraziando il Presidente di Augusta Offshore Spa per l’intervento nel corso 
dello Stakeholder Workshop e sottolineando l’importante ruolo svolto dalle 
compagnie di navigazione, che spesso si trovano ad assistere in mare le 
persone in pericolo, 
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Ringraziando, per il loro contributo, gli esperti e gli studiosi della materia 
intervenuti durante lo Stakeholder Workshop,  
 
Avendo preso in considerazione il quadro giuridico internazionale 
(convenzioni, risoluzioni e principi guida) applicabile al fenomeno in 
esame, i recenti risultati emersi dalle conclusioni del Consiglio europeo del 
23 aprile 2015 e dalla risoluzione del Parlamento Europeo del 29 aprile 
2015, nonché le ultime proposte per l’Agenda Europea sulle Migrazioni 
presentate dalla Commissione europea il 15 maggio 2015, 
 
Esprimendo profonda preoccupazione per il crescente numero di migranti 
deceduti o scomparsi nel tentativo di attraversare il Mediterraneo mentre 
cercavano di raggiungere un luogo sicuro in Europa, 
 
Prendendo atto dei risultati derivanti dallo “Stakeholder Questionnaires – 
Migration at Sea: A comprehensive Approach” che ha raccolto e analizzato i 
dati e le informazioni forniti da diverse categorie di stakeholder 
relativamente al controllo delle frontiere e alla sorveglianza marittima, da 
un lato, e alla protezione delle vite dei migranti in mare, dall’altro lato, e 
tenendo conto in modo specifico dei seguenti risultati: 
 
a) Il quadro normativo internazionale in materia è inadeguato poiché è 
stato adottato con lo scopo di disciplinare situazioni di pericolo diverse dal 
fenomeno attuale di massicci flussi migratori nel Mediterraneo. È 
necessario dunque uno sforzo finalizzato al rispetto in buona fede non solo 
degli obblighi che discendono dalle norme di Diritto del mare, ma anche di 
quelli che derivano dalle norme poste a protezione dei rifugiati e da quelle 
poste a salvaguardia dei diritti dell’uomo, 
b) Il quadro normativo nazionale è nella maggior parte dei casi poco chiaro 
e ambiguo; inoltre diverse disposizioni interne rischiano di criminalizzare 
l’assistenza umanitaria fornita ai migranti in difficoltà, 
c) È necessario che siano riveduti i criteri utilizzati per valutare le nozioni di 
“luogo sicuro” e di “pericolo” in modo da renderle conformi con gli 
standard derivanti dal dalle norme sui rifugiati e sui diritti dell’uomo ed 
evitare, quindi, il fenomeno dei respingimenti in mare e altre serie 
violazioni di tali norme, 
d) Sebbene la società civile svolga un ruolo fondamentale e particolarmente 
apprezzabile, il suo intervento deve essere previsto per far fronte solo a 
situazioni temporanee ed emergenziali, e non come soluzione permanente 
al problema. Agli Stati è richiesto di investire le risorse necessarie per 
predisporre servizi di ricerca e soccorso efficaci e sufficienti, e ciò in linea 
con quanto sancito dagli obblighi internazionali in materia. 
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Tutto ciò premesso, proponiamo alle istituzioni attive sia a livello 
nazionale sia a livello internazionale di: 
 
1. Considerare la dimensione attuale del fenomeno migratorio nel Mare 
Mediterraneo come un fenomeno globale che, come tale, richiede un 
approccio comprensivo e sforzi condivisi tra gli Stati. 
 
2. Rivalutare le operazioni di controllo delle frontiere alla luce 
dell’imponente fenomeno di migrazioni irregolari nel Mediterraneo. In 
particolare: 
 
- L’Unione Europea dovrebbe predisporre nel Mediterraneo un’operazione 
di ricerca e salvataggio credibile ed efficace, sul modello di Mare Nostrum, 
- Frontex dovrebbe svolgere in modo effettivo il suo duplice ruolo di 
coordinamento del sostegno operativo alle frontiere agli Stati membri che si 
trovano sotto la pressione dei flussi migratori e di ausilio nella protezione 
della vita dei migranti in mare; 
 
3. Contrastare in modo più efficace il contrabbando e il traffico di migranti 
attraverso: 
 
- Un’efficace cooperazione regionale ed internazionale tra gli Stati e 
attraverso misure effettive per prevenire il traffico di migranti nei Paesi di 
origine ed in quelli di transito; 
- Una maggiore cooperazione tra gli Stati al fine di armonizzare le 
procedure giudiziarie contro i trafficanti; 
- Una maggiore cooperazione finalizzata a favorire la più ampia ed efficace 
applicazione possibile delle norme internazionali sul di traffico di migranti. 
 
4. Incoraggiare l’adozione di norme internazionali che fissino chiari criteri 
per determinare il concetto di “luogo sicuro” presso cui sbarcare i migranti, 
e ciò al fine di garantire l’effettiva tutela dei diritti umani, il rispetto del 
principio di non-refoulement, e una distribuzione più equa degli sforzi degli 
Stati membri di ospitare i sopravvissuti e soddisfarne diritti e bisogni; 
 
5. Migliorare ed allargare i canali di accesso legale all’Europa, attraverso 
una revisione del Sistema di Dublino, nel pieno rispetto del diritto d’asilo, 
così come sancito nell’articolo 18 della Carta dei diritti fondamentali 
dell’Unione Europea, al fine di garantire il diritto dei rifugiati alla libertà di 
circolazione in Europa e quello al ricongiungimento familiare, favorendo, 
nel contempo, la creazione di canali alternativi di accesso sicuro e regolare 
tramite visti umanitari, semplificazione degli spostamenti e dei 
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ricongiungimenti familiari, allargamento dei programmi di lavoro, di 
ricerca e di studio; 
 
6. Sostenere le compagnie di navigazione nei loro sforzi per salvare vite 
umane, attraverso chiare e sicure procedure di sbarco e il rapido 
coordinamento delle operazioni di soccorso, in modo da ridurre al minimo 
i danni economici e le perdite finanziarie cui esse possano andare incontro 
per ottemperare all’obbligo di salvare i migranti in mare. 
 
Napoli, 20 giugno 2015 
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THE	  CHARTER	  OF	  NAPLES	  
“The	  Way	  Forward	  to	  Deal	  with	  Migration	  in	  the	  Mediterranean	  
Sea”	  
 
MARSAFENET - a network of experts on the legal aspects of maritime 
safety and security - and the JMCE Migrants - the Jean Monnet Centre 
of Excellence on Migrants’ Rights in the Mediterranean -  which aim 
both to foster the exchange of information and practices among 
stakeholders and promote the adoption of feasible and suitable 
solutions, 
 
Taking into account the discussion held at the Stakeholders Workshop 
From Mare Nostrum to Triton and the Way Forward to Deal with Migration 
in the Mediterranean Sea, which took place at the University of Naples 
“L’Orientale”, Italy, on the 15th of May 2015 (hereinafter the Stakeholder 
Workshop), 
 
Acknowledging the intervention at the Stakeholder Workshop of the 
representatives of the IOM - the International Organisation for 
Migration -, UNHCR - the UN Refugee Agency -, Frontex - the 
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at 
the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union -, 
the NATO Defence College, ASGI - the Italian Association for Juridical 
Studies, CIR - the Italian Council for Refugees -, Dedalus Cooperativa 
Sociale, LESS - Lotta all’Esclusione Sociale per lo Sviluppo del Mezzogiorno 
d’Italia -, MOAS - the Migrant Offshore Aid Station -, the Unione 
Forense per la Tutela dei Diritti Umani, and encouraging their work to 
deal with the phenomenon of migrations in the Mediterranean, 
 
Acknowledging the contribution at the Stakeholder Workshop of the 
representatives of the Italian Coast Guard and the Italian Navy, and 
taking note of the data illustrated, concerning search and rescue 
operations of migrants at sea,  
 
Grateful for the intervention at the Stakeholder Workshop of the 
President of Augusta Offshore S.p.a. and stressing the importance of 
shipping companies, which have assisted people in distress at sea,  
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Grateful for the contribution of the scholars who intervened at the 
Stakeholders Workshop,  
 
Considering the applicable international legal framework, including 
conventions, resolutions and principles, and the recent outcomes of the 
European Council Conclusions of 23 April 2015, the Resolution of the 
European Parliament of 29 April 2015 and the latest proposals for the 
European Agenda on Migration presented by the European 
Commission on 15 May 2015, 
 
Expressing concern regarding the recent increasing number of migrants 
who have died or have gone missing in the attempt to cross the 
Mediterranean Sea in order to reach a safe place in Europe, 
 
Acknowledging the results obtained from the initiative “Stakeholder 
Questionnaires – Migration at Sea: A comprehensive Approach”, which 
assessed data and information provided by distinct categories of 
stakeholders on the two interrelated aspects of border control and 
maritime surveillance on the one hand and the saving and protection of 
migrants’ lives at sea on the other, and taking into specific account the 
following outcomes:  
 
a) The international maritime legal framework is inadequate as it 
was adopted to regulate situations of distress different from the 
current massive phenomenon of migration in the 
Mediterranean Sea. An effort is necessary for good faith 
compliance not only with Law of the Sea obligations, but also 
with those arising from complementary sources of refugee and 
human rights law, 
b) Most of the national legal framework is unclear, ambiguous and 
several internal provisions are likely to criminalize the 
humanitarian assistance provided by civil society to migrants in 
distress, 
c) It is necessary to review the criteria used to assess the place of 
safety and the notion of distress in line with refugee and human 
rights law standards, to avoid instances of non-refoulement and 
other serious harm, 
d) The role of civil society in the field of migration by sea is 
recognized and appreciated. Currently it is capable of 
responding to a temporary situation of emergency, but it cannot 
manage a permanent one. States need to invest the necessary 
resources to run effective and sufficient search and rescue 
	  	  	  
services, in line with the search and rescue obligations under 
international law. 
 
To national and international policy makers we propose to: 
 
Consider the current dimension of the phenomenon of migration in the 
Mediterranean Sea as a global phenomenon requiring a comprehensive 
approach and shared efforts among States.  
 
Reassess border control operations in view of the current massive 
phenomenon of irregular migration in the Mediterranean Sea. In 
particular: 
 
-­‐ The EU should promote a credible search and rescue operation 
in the Mediterranean, on the model of Mare Nostrum,  
-­‐ Frontex should effectively fulfill its dual role of coordinating 
operational border support to Member States under pressure 
and helping to save the lives of migrants at sea; 
 
Combat criminal smuggling and trafficking more efficiently through: 
 
-­‐ Regional and international cooperation among States and 
through effective measures to prevent smuggling in the 
migrants’ lands of origin and in transit States; 
-­‐ Additional cooperation in the field of harmonization of judicial 
actions against smugglers and traffickers 
-­‐ Additional cooperation to promote a wider and more effective 
application of the existing international provisions on 
Smuggling. 
 
Encourage the adoption of international provisions including clear 
criteria to determine the place of safety to disembark migrants, in order 
to guarantee effective protection of human rights, compliance with the 
principle of non-refoulement, and a more equitable sharing of efforts 
among EU States to host survivors and meet their needs and legal 
entitlements; 
 
Improve and expand legal channels of access to Europe, through a 
revision of the Dublin System, in full compliance with the right of 
asylum as recognized in Article 18 of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, in order to ensure the refugees’ right to freedom of movement 
within Europe and the right to family reunification, encouraging the 
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creation of alternative channels of safe and regular access, via 
humanitarian visas, resettlement, easier family reunion, expansion of 
work, research and study programs; 
 
Support shipping companies in their efforts to save lives, through clear 
docking schemes, disembarkation options, and rapid coordination of 
rescue operations, so as to minimize any economic damages and 
financial losses that they may incur in complying with their duty to 
rescue migrants at sea. 
 
Naples, 20 June 2015 
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